In July 1925, according to the organization's arrangement, Zhu De came to the "Eastern Workers' Communist University" in Moscow, the Soviet Union, to study military affairs. There, Zhu De not only studied the military theories of the Soviet Union, but more importantly, he combined his actual combat experience in suppressing bandits in the mountainous areas of China with the theories he had learned, forming a unique outlook on war. In a class, when the instructor asked Zhu De how he would fight after returning to China, Zhu De gave a shocking answer: "If you win, you will fight, if you can't win, you will run, and if necessary, drag the team up the mountain." These 18 simple and unpretentious words, but they contain profound military wisdom, and the instructor was impressed by Zhu De's views at that time, and his face changed. So, what is the military wisdom of Zhu De's 18-character proverb, and how did it guide Zhu De to perform many miraculous feats in the Chinese Revolutionary War?

The path to the formation of Zhu De's military wisdom

Zhu De was born in a poor family in Yilong, Sichuan, and his parents hoped that he could become a scholar. However, Zhu De's fate was not related to the fragrance of books. In 1909, Zhu De went south to Yunnan and was admitted to the Yunnan Lecture and Martial Arts Hall, starting his military career.

At that time, Yunnan Jiangwutang was the most prestigious military academy in southwest China, and the teaching level was first-class. Zhu De met his classmate Zhu Peide there, and the two became the best students of the year. The famous general Cai Yi once coached in person, and he was very important to Zhu De, and Zhu De could enter and leave the Cai family's mansion at will.

During his studies, Zhu De was diligent and studious, especially interested in military theory. In 1911, Zhu De's special class graduated ahead of schedule, and he was retained by Cai Ye under his command and entered the military from then on. Although he had only studied for two years, Zhu De had already laid a solid foundation in military theory.

Went to the University of Göttingen in Germany for further study

In 1922, after joining the Communist Party of China, Zhu De went to Europe to study philosophy and European military works at the University of Göttingen in Germany, broadening his horizons and integrating Chinese and Western military thought.

During his time in Göttingen, Zhu De not only devoted himself to his studies, but also actively participated in revolutionary activities, for which he was imprisoned twice. In July 1925, Zhu De went to the "Eastern Workers' Communist University" in Moscow, the Soviet Union, to further his military studies according to the organization's arrangement.

Moscow "Eastern Workers' University" tempering

During his time in Moscow, Zhu De studied the advanced military theories of the Soviet Union, and at the same time, he also combined his practical combat experience in suppressing bandits in China's mountainous areas for many years with the theories he had learned, and gradually formed a unique strategic thinking of "luring the enemy into depth."

In a class, when the instructor asked Zhu De how to fight after returning to China, Zhu De gave the 18-character motto: "If you win, you will fight, if you can't win, you will run, and if necessary, drag the team up the mountain." This seemingly unpretentious answer actually contained profound military wisdom, which made the instructor's face change at that time.

Zhu De's answer reflects his sober understanding of China's national conditions and the contrast between the forces of our enemies and ours. In China at that time, the armed forces of the Communist Party were weak and incapable of confronting the Kuomintang army head-on. Therefore, only by being flexible and maneuvering, luring the enemy into depth, and waging guerrilla warfare can we conserve our strength to the maximum and wait for a favorable opportunity for a counteroffensive.

This guerrilla strategy of "first avoiding their sharp spirit and then striking at their fatigue" is precisely the valuable experience that Zhu De developed when he suppressed bandits in Yunnan. It differed from the conventional combat theory emphasized by the Soviets, but it was very close to the reality of the Chinese revolution. It was this unique military wisdom that enabled Zhu De to perform many miraculous feats in the Chinese Revolutionary War and become an important pioneer and leader of the Communist People's Army.

The uniqueness of Zhu De's military wisdom

The most striking feature of Zhu De's military wisdom is that he is good at adapting measures to the enemy's conditions and is flexible and mobile. This stems from his actual combat experience in the early years when he was suppressing bandits in Yunnan.

In 1914, Zhu De went to southern Xinjiang with the army to suppress bandits. At that time, the bandits were skilled in guerrillas, broke up into pieces, and fought in a dispersed manner, which brought great trouble to the regular army. Zhu De judged the situation and put forward the strategy of "mobile cluster operations," that is, the troops were also dispersed into multiple small detachments to attack the bandits from different directions, and they would fight if they could fight and withdraw if they could not be defeated.

This strategy was twice as effective with half the effort, and finally the bandits in southern Xinjiang were defeated. Zhu De summed up the mystery of "winning more with less" and said proudly: "Since the Xinhai Revolution, I have fought for ten years, and I have always been able to win more with less. ＂

During the Patriotic War in 1916, although Zhu De was only a regiment commander, he repeatedly commanded three or four regiments, and even fought on one front, and performed well. He recalled: "I still learned to fight big battles at that time. It can be seen that his military command ability has begun to show its edge.

After the Nanchang Uprising in 1927, Zhu De led 3,000 people to resist the siege of more than 10,000 people by Qian Dajun in Sanheba, and held out for three days and three nights. In 1928, he defeated the attack of Xu Kexiang, commander of the Second Independent Division of the National Army, in southern Hunan and captured thousands of people. These battles further tempered Zhu De's military wisdom of being flexible and maneuvering and luring the enemy into depth.

During the Jinggangshan period, Zhu De worked closely with Mao Zedong, combined his own experience with Marxist military theory, and summed up the famous "16-character guerrilla policy": "When the enemy advances, I retreat, when the enemy is stationed, I disturb, when the enemy is tired, I fight, and when the enemy retreats, I pursue." This is the highest embodiment of Zhu De's military wisdom, and it is also the magic weapon for China's victory in the revolutionary war.

Attach importance to relying on the masses and fighting the people's war

In addition to being flexible and mobile, another of Zhu De's great military wisdom is that he attaches importance to relying on the masses to fight the people's war. This also stems from his early combat experience.

In 1914, when he suppressed bandits, Zhu De noticed the importance of mass power. After dispersing his troops into small detachments, he was not only able to move flexibly, but more importantly, he was able to go deep among the masses, propagate revolutionary ideas, and mobilize the masses to join the armed forces. It was precisely by relying on the strong support and participation of the local masses that Zhu De was able to defeat the guerrilla bandits.

After the Nanchang Uprising, Zhu De paid more attention to the role of mobilizing the masses. In 1927, at Sanheba, he called on local peasants to join the armed forces, and received strong support from the masses. In 1928 in southern Hunan, Zhu De organized a large number of militias and local armed forces to fight with the regular army, so that he could win more with less and defeat the offensive of the national army.

When he came to the Jinggangshan base area, Zhu De further carried forward the idea of relying on the masses to fight the people's war. He personally made arrangements and established political power organs in various counties that combined the party, government, and army, extensively mobilized the masses, and organized militia forces. This powerful mass armed force has become an important support for Zhu De in fighting guerrilla warfare.

It is precisely by relying on the strength of the masses that Zhu De was able to perform miraculous feats in the face of the huge disparity between the strength of the enemy and us. He later recalled: "The key to our ability to defeat a formidable enemy was that we relied on the broad masses of the people. This sentence fully embodies Zhu De's military wisdom of attaching importance to the role of the masses.

Pay attention to strategic guidance and coordinate the overall situation

Zhu De was not only a brilliant tactician, but also a visionary strategist. He was good at making overall plans from the perspective of the overall situation and made major contributions to the victory of China's revolutionary cause.

In 1946, the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party broke out. Zhu De served as chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission. In the face of the ever-expanding battlefield, Zhu De put forward the strategic principle of "concentrating superior forces and winning decisive battles." He personally deployed the famous three major battles of Liaoshen, Pingjin, and Huaihai, concentrated the main army, looked for the enemy's weak points, and launched an attack by surprise, inflicting heavy losses on the Kuomintang army.

In 1948, Zhu De personally commanded the Pingjin Campaign. He judged the situation and decided to attack Taiyuan first and cut off the enemy's base area from the front line. Subsequently, he commanded the troops to launch a general attack on the Jinpu line, trapping the enemy's heavy forces in the Jinpu area. After more than a month of hard fighting, the PLA finally conquered Tianjin and Beiping, laying the foundation for victory in the Huaihai Campaign.

In January 1949, the Battle of Huaihai began. Zhu De personally presided over the operational meeting and determined the operational policy of "attacking Xu Beng first, and then Huaiyin." He instructed the troops to concentrate superior forces, quickly crush the enemy's main forces, and not give the enemy a chance to breathe. After more than a month of fierce fighting, the PLA won a decisive victory on all fronts.

During the Huaihai Campaign, Zhu De also personally commanded the famous Battle of the Fen River. He ordered the main force of the East China Field Army to advance to the south of Jin, cutting off the enemy's retreat. At the same time, he instructed Chen Yu's troops to launch an attack in northern Jin, so that the enemy fell into a situation of passive beating. In the end, the Kuomintang army was completely annihilated in the area of the Fen River.

Zhu De not only personally commanded the major battles, but also always paid attention to the changes in the national war situation. In the spring of 1949, he discovered in time that the enemy's forces in the Central Plains were empty, so he ordered the Central China Field Army to cross the Yellow River to the west and cooperate with Chen Yu's troops to launch a strategic offensive. After more than a month of fighting, the PLA conquered Wuhan, Nanyang and other important towns, and completely wiped out the enemy's forces in the Central Plains.

It was precisely because of Zhu De's wise command that the Chinese People's Liberation Army was able to win successive battles in Liaoshen, Pingjin, and Huaihai during the strategic offensive period, completely destroying the main force of the Kuomintang army. This laid the decisive foundation for victory in the final battle.

In addition to personally commanding operations, Zhu De also attached great importance to strategic decision-making. At the beginning of 1949, he presided over the famous Xibaipo Conference, which determined the strategic policy of "cleaning up the poison left over from the war and consolidating the newly liberated areas". The meeting also decided to continue to mobilize the masses of the people in the cities throughout the country to cooperate with the army in fighting and accelerate the liberation of the whole of China.

It was precisely because of Zhu De's wise leadership that the Chinese People's Liberation Army was able to win successive battles in Liaoshen, Pingjin, and Huaihai during the strategic offensive period, completely destroying the main force of the Kuomintang army and clearing the way for the final strategic decisive battle. Zhu De's strategic vision and command ability were an important guarantee for the final victory of the Chinese revolution.

Zhu De's outstanding contribution to military wisdom

Zhu De's military wisdom made outstanding contributions to the victory of the Chinese revolution, which was mainly reflected in two aspects.

The revolutionary forces were preserved and developed

After the Nanchang Uprising in 1927, Zhu De led the rebel troops all the way to the south, and when Sanheba and Qian Dajun's troops were besieged, he relied on flexible and mobile tactics to hold out with a force of 3,000 people for three days and three nights. This bought precious time for the revolutionary forces to avoid being annihilated on the spot.

In 1928, Zhu De defeated the attack of Xu Kexiang, commander of the Second Independent Division of the National Army, in southern Hunan and captured thousands of people. This not only preserved the revolutionary ranks, but also provided favorable conditions for future development and growth.

During the Jinggangshan period, Zhu De worked closely with Mao Zedong and summed up the famous "16-character guerrilla policy". This principle embodies the strategic thinking of luring the enemy deep and being flexible and mobile, so that the revolutionary forces can preserve their strength to the maximum in the face of the great disparity between the forces of the enemy and ourselves.

In 1934, the main force of the Central Red Army was heavily surrounded by the Kuomintang troops, and the situation was critical. Under Mao Zedong's decision, Zhu De personally commanded the Red Army to open the way to the Zunyi Conference and save the Party and the Red Army.

In October 1935, Zhu De led the main force of the Central Red Army to start the difficult Long March. During this 10,000-mile trek, Zhu De used tactics such as luring the enemy deep and breaking through the encirclement, and repeatedly defused the encirclement of the Kuomintang army, and finally let the main force of the Red Army highlight the encirclement.

It is precisely because of Zhu De's wise command that the revolutionary forces have been able to turn danger into relief again and again and finally develop and grow in the face of the huge disparity between the forces of the enemy and ourselves.

The road of the Chinese revolution was explored

Zhu De combined Marxist military theory with China's reality and creatively put forward a series of unique military strategies and tactics, making a major contribution to exploring the road of China's revolution.

As early as 1914, when suppressing bandits, Zhu De proposed the strategy of "mobile cluster warfare", that is, dispersing troops to fight guerrilla warfare. This is different from the conventional combat theory emphasized by the Soviets, but it is very close to the actual situation of the Chinese revolution.

In the Jinggangshan period, Zhu De and Mao Zedong summed up the "16-character guerrilla policy" and established a military line based on guerrilla warfare. This line deviated from the classic view of the Soviets, but it became the magic weapon for the victory of the Chinese revolution.

During the Long March, Zhu De repeatedly used tactics such as luring the enemy deep and breaking through the encirclement to resolve the encirclement of the Kuomintang army. These tactics were created in accordance with China's national conditions and fully embodied the uniqueness of the Chinese revolution.

In 1949, Zhu De personally commanded the three major battles of Liaoshen, Pingjin, and Huaihai, concentrating superior forces to fight a war of annihilation, completely destroying the main force of the Kuomintang army. This strategic thinking was somewhat different from the Soviets' conventional combat theory, but it was perfectly suited to the final stage of the Chinese revolution.

It is precisely because of Zhu De's creative thinking and the integration of Marxist military theory with China's reality that we were able to explore a revolutionary road suited to China's national conditions and ultimately win a revolutionary victory. Zhu De laid a theoretical foundation for the modernization of the new Chinese army.