For Japan, is strengthening the Japan-US alliance no longer serving its purpose of making itself safer, but rather creating greater risks for itself?
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is on an official visit to the United States. According to the Japan-US Joint Statement of April 10, 2024, Japan will make a greater contribution to U.S. intervention in the region, while the U.S. will assist Japan in developing high technologies such as artificial intelligence and cutting-edge semiconductors. However, the more Japan strengthens its alliance with the United States, the more it is detrimental to its own security.
A careful reading of the joint statement shows that the new cooperation between Japan and the United States is mainly in the field of security, including traditional security and economic security.
In the field of traditional security, the most noteworthy thing is that with the improvement of the command and control system, Japan's military power with a specific orientation will likely be used by the United States to intervene in regional affairs. The Self-Defense Forces will establish an integrated command to integrate the previously relatively independent command systems of their respective guards, and the US military stationed in Japan will also strengthen its operational command function – which means that the US military stationed in Japan will likely have operational command authority. U.S. President Joe Biden called it "the most important improvement since the alliance was founded."
According to the joint statement, the two sides will work to achieve seamless integration of military operations through improved command and control systems, including joint planning, joint operations, and the establishment of the Japan-US Joint Intelligence Analysis Organization (BIAC) to conduct joint reconnaissance and research and judgment. Although Prime Minister Kishida emphasized the "independence" of the command systems of the two sides, many personnel related to the Self-Defense Forces believe that the US military has stronger reconnaissance and research capabilities and will play a leading role in joint command. This means that Japan's developing large-scale offensive force and its ability to carry out a long-term and high-intensity war will be used by the United States to intervene in regional affairs, including the Taiwan Strait. Japan's emphasis on developing these capabilities is based on a conclusion that is "very close to reality." The congressional defense has confirmed that the high-intensity scenario of the deduction is the joint intervention of the Self-Defense Forces and the US military in the Taiwan Strait.
Japan-U.S. cooperation in the military industry focuses on helping the United States strengthen its deterrence capabilities. The two sides have established a new "Japan-U.S. Industrial Cooperation, Procurement, and Maintenance Regular Consultation Mechanism" (DICAS) to jointly develop and produce missiles and maintain forward-deployed U.S. military equipment. The background to this cooperation is that the United States wants to intervene in the region's affairs with small, decentralized forces within the first island chain and rely on low-cost weapons such as missiles, so it is reluctant to increase its deployment in Japan on a large scale, and it also faces a shortage of weapons production capacity. Japan has rich experience in the maintenance of US fighters and warships, and has relatively advanced technology and relatively large production capacity in the field of guided weapons. With Japan's assistance, the United States will be able to increase the availability of deployed equipment and weapons stockpiles in the region without significantly increasing its input, and substantially enhance its military presence and intervention capability in the region.
Japan and the United States will also jointly build a satellite constellation to detect hypersonic weapons and jointly develop related interceptor weapons. This is also conducive to the intervention of the US military, which regards hypersonic weapons as a "significant threat", in regional affairs. In addition, Japan and the "Australian-British-American Alliance" will also cooperate in high-tech fields other than nuclear submarines.
In the area of economic security, the most noteworthy is the possibility of Japan-US cooperation around high-value-added manufacturing and the possibility of jointly establishing trade barriers against China. Japan and the U.S. will continue to promote public-private cooperation in areas such as artificial intelligence and new semiconductors. The two sides will also establish a high-level dialogue mechanism for green transition, focusing on offshore floating wind power, small nuclear reactors, and new solar energy. This is undoubtedly a "first move" given the possibility of regime change in the United States and Trump's disdain for renewables. Japan and the United States will also drive more countries to engage in the so-called "industrial chain strengthening" of traditional process semiconductors, that is, the establishment of trade barriers against China. According to media reports, Japan had hoped to push the United States to change its "America First" policy in the broader high-value-added manufacturing sector, and instead push Western countries to jointly establish a "free market for Chinese exclusion." However, the two sides did not reach a clear consensus on this this time.
In the future, there will be both certainty and uncertainty about the above-mentioned cooperation between Japan and the United States. The so-called certainty stems from the fact that Japan and the United States share the same strategic goals toward China. The national security strategies of Japan and the United States are aligned with each other's positioning toward China. Takeo Akiba, director of Japan's National Security Agency, recently wrote an article for a US newspaper saying that Japan will play a stronger deterrent role in order to force relevant countries to "dialogue." It is to be expected that even if there is a regime change in the United States, the new government will not refuse to allow Japan to voluntarily provide military resources for US intervention in regional affairs. The uncertainty is that even if Japan and the United States already have a "U.S.-Japan Partnership of Competitiveness and Resilience" (CoRe) and a new high-level dialogue mechanism for the green transition, the new administration that emphasizes "America First" will be able to abandon it. There is also a risk that Japan's return for cooperating with the United States in containing China – that is, the United States supporting Japan's revival of high-end manufacturing in areas such as semiconductors – is also unsustainable.
This certainty may seem like making Japan a major ally of the United States, but there is a fundamental contradiction behind it. According to the Japanese government's statement, the purpose of strengthening both the military and the alliance between Japan and the United States is to reduce the risks it faces. However, the more Japan provides military resources for US intervention, the higher the probability of provocation by the "Taiwan independence" separatist forces, and the greater the possibility of conflict between the mainland in striking at the "Taiwan independence" separatist forces, and the risks and costs that Japan faces actually increase as it plays an increasingly important role in the Japan-US alliance. Especially with the United States dominating the command operation, Japan faced the risk of difficulty in controlling the escalation of the war. In the exercise carried out by the Japanese government, the targets of the attack were all over Japan. As far as Japan is concerned, is strengthening the Japan-US alliance no longer able to achieve its original goal of making itself more secure, but has instead brought greater risks to itself? This is a fundamental question that Japan should reconsider.
Source: "China Institute of Contemporary International Relations" WeChat public account
Author: Xu Yongzhi Shi Guannan
Editor: Hu Liang
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