In the long dark night, the moonlight barely penetrated the thin clouds and reflected on the distant frontier land. The atmosphere on the borders of the Soviet Union and China, two huge countries, was extremely tense. Since relations between the two countries deteriorated, military operations in the region have become more frequent, and troop deployments along the border between the two countries have reached an unprecedented scale. Every soldier, Soviet or Chinese, felt the presence of the other—even if the other was just a hazy shadow in the dark.
This tension has been going on for years, but little is known about the specifics of the region. External news is always general and full of political considerations, and the truth seems to be obscured by a fog. It wasn't until years later, when a retiring U.S. intelligence officer mentioned this history in his memoirs, that the world began to learn about this hidden history.
The historical background and enlightenment of the counterattack on Zhenbao Island
The 1969 Zhenbao Island counterattack was not only an important part of the Sino-Soviet border conflict, but also a microcosm of the geopolitical tensions during the Cold War. At the outbreak of the campaign, the Soviet troops, taking advantage of their technological and equipment superiority, put significant pressure on the Chinese border guards in the early stages. However, the Chinese army, with its familiarity with the terrain and the ability to adapt to unexpected situations, eventually achieved local superiority on the battlefield.
Zhenbao Island is located in the middle of the Ussuri River, with complex and varied topography and vertical and horizontal rivers. The Chinese army showed a high degree of adaptability and flexibility in this complex terrain, effectively using natural landforms and temporary fortifications to hinder the advance of the Soviet army. However, the Soviet army's modern equipment – including tanks, artillery and automated fire control systems – showed a clear technological advantage in direct confrontation.
Faced with the gap in equipment, the Chinese commanders had to adjust their tactics and use asymmetric tactics such as guerrilla warfare and tunnel warfare to weaken the superiority of the Soviet army. In addition, the Chinese army made extensive use of mines and explosive traps, designed to slow down the offensive of Soviet armored vehicles in order to find a tactical balance in unfavorable conditions.
Although the results of the Zhenbao Island counterattack did not completely change the strategic situation on the Sino-Soviet border, it made the Chinese military and political leadership realize that it was necessary to fundamentally improve the autonomy of the defense and military industry. Mao Zedong's "three-line construction" strategy came into being against this background. The strategy not only focuses on the optimization of the layout of the economy and industry, but also a layout that comprehensively improves the country's strategic security and development capabilities.
The "three-line construction" covers the relocation of some key industrial and scientific research institutions from coastal and border areas to the western interior. These areas are relatively far from the front lines of a possible war and are able to maintain a high level of stability and security in a military conflict. For example, some important aerospace industries and military electronic equipment manufacturing industries have been relocated to inland provinces such as Sichuan and Shaanxi. Through this internal relocation, it not only enhances China's sustainable capacity in the production of strategic materials, but also promotes the economic development of inland areas and reduces the development pressure of coastal areas.
Adjustment of the strategy of the construction of the third line and the fortifications
The Northeast region is of particular interest due to its geographical proximity to the USSR. In this area, the Chinese military and local governments have jointly built dense mountain fortifications, including deep-dug trenches, fixed artillery positions, and well-camouflaged command posts. Most of these defenses are located on key communication arteries and strategic heights, and use complex terrain, such as mountains and forests, to provide natural cover and obstacles for defensive operations.
In addition, the strategy of "clearing the wilderness" was implemented in order to weaken the logistical support capabilities of the Soviet army. This strategy involves the evacuation of the population of the border areas and the destruction of facilities that may provide shelter or supplies for enemy forces, such as food storage and dwellings. This ensured that it was difficult for Soviet forces to find any form of support as they penetrated deep into Chinese territory, greatly increasing their logistical burden and affecting their combat efficiency and staying power.
In North China, the same tactics were employed, but the defensive measures differed depending on the terrain and geographical conditions. The North China Plain is relatively open and lacks the natural barriers of the northeast, so fortifications in this area are more focused on the construction of traffic control points and strong ground fortifications, such as dugouts and fixed batteries. Underground tunnel systems have also been extensively excavated in the area to connect major military and political installations to ensure a smooth chain of command and rapid response capability.
In these areas, popular support and participation were also one of the key factors in the successful construction of fortifications. The local government mobilized the local population to participate in the construction of the fortifications, and at the same time conducted military training in case of emergency. This has not only strengthened the defense capability of the border areas, but also enhanced the people's sense of security and national defense awareness.
Soviet military deployment in the Far East
At the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union attached great importance to its military deployment in the Far East in response to possible conflicts, especially border tensions with China. According to historical records, the Soviet Union deployed three armies and one infantry corps in the Far East, in addition to several armored units and other support units. This huge military force, with a staggering 1.3 million personnel, demonstrated the Soviet Union's extreme concern and military commitment to the security of the region.
China, in response to Soviet military pressure, also built a multi-layered defense line in key border areas such as northeast, northwest and north. These lines of defense include fixed fortifications, bunkers, artillery positions, and a large number of minefields and obstacles. The Chinese military has accordingly increased its input of personnel and equipment to ensure that it maintains adequate defense and response capabilities in the face of the Soviet military threat.
The combined strength of the two countries in the Far East exceeded 4 million, setting a record for the highest density of troops in the world at that time. This figure not only reflects the strategic importance of the region, but also shows the great importance that both sides attach to military control in the region.
At the heart of the Soviet military deployment were its infantry corps and armored units, which were armed with the most advanced tanks, self-propelled guns, and MLRS of the time, and were far superior in firepower and mobility to conventional units. The tactical layout of the Soviet army revolved mainly around rapid assaults and deep strikes, with the intention of quickly neutralizing the opposing side in any potential conflict. Group armies, on the other hand, assume more responsibility for strategic reserves and dispatch and command to ensure the sustained combat capability of front-line troops.
The strategic response of our army and the strength of the Soviet army were bluffed
China's border guards take full advantage of the country's complex and varied terrain, especially in the mountainous northeast and desert mountains in the northwest. The terrain of these areas provides a natural advantage for conducting guerrilla warfare and protracted warfare. For example, the mountainous terrain provided numerous concealed positions for the construction of artillery positions and supply warehouses, as well as ideal conditions for ambushing Soviet troops. The complex terrain of deserts and mountains made it difficult for the Soviet Union's heavily armed forces to exploit their technological superiority, with limited movement and vulnerable supply lines.
At the same time, the Chinese armed forces implemented the principle of "people's war" and mobilized the vast numbers of residents in rural areas and border areas to participate in defense construction. This includes not only direct military operations, such as participation in combat, reconnaissance and logistical support, but also help build defenses, dig tunnels and set mines. This extensive mobilization of the people has effectively increased the depth of defense and strengthened the connection between the army and the population, laying a solid foundation for a protracted war.
Despite the fact that the military power of the Soviet Union seemed to be strong in numbers and equipment, the combat effectiveness of many so-called "shelf divisions" was not as good as it appeared on the surface. Although these units are numerous, their actual combat effectiveness is not high due to their lack of effective training and combat experience. In addition, the deployment of Soviet troops in the Far East relied too much on heavy equipment, which became a tactical limitation in difficult terrain. The Chinese army, through flexible tactics and terrain utilization, was able to inflict large losses on the Soviet army at a lower cost, thus offsetting the lack of equipment.
For example, in the dense forests of the northeastern region, where Chinese forces used dense woodland and rugged mountains for ambushes and raids, Soviet tanks and armored vehicles were slow to move and vulnerable to mines, anti-tank weapons, and improvised explosive devices. In addition, the Chinese army set up numerous traps and obstacles, such as wooden stakes and barbed wire, which further reduced the mobility of the Soviet troops.
Strategically, the Chinese army adopted a flexible and mobile defensive strategy, and did not engage in large-scale front-to-head battles with the Soviet Union. Through continuous skirmishes, the combat strength and morale of the Soviet army were constantly depleted, making it difficult for them to form an effective combat build-up within China. This tactic effectively exploited the weakness of the Soviet army, namely its unsuitability on non-traditional battlefields, as well as the underestimation of the Chinese terrain and the tactics of the people's war.
Reflections and Enlightenment after the End of the Cold War
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the global strategic landscape has undergone drastic changes. During this period, the United States and its Western allies began to gradually unravel some of the secrets of the past few decades. Publicly available archives and intelligence reveal the true military power of the Soviet Union during the Cold War and its deployment in the Far East, and this information is of great value for assessing international relations and military strategy at the time.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, archives of its former satellites and republics also began to be opened to the international community, providing more details about the Soviet Union's military deployments. This information shows that while the Soviet Union had a large military force on paper, its actual combat readiness and the maintenance of its troops were not as strong as they advertised. Many units lack basic equipment maintenance, and some of the so-called combat units are in fact "paper tigers," whose combat effectiveness is far below the theoretical standard.
An analysis of these historical data shows how China effectively fended off threats during the Cold War against an adversary like the Soviet Union, with terrain superiority, strategic deployment, and popular mobilization. China has not only built a complex defense network in the border areas, but has also formed a lasting resistance force through broad popular participation. This mode of defense does not rely on high-tech or expensive military equipment, but on the broad participation of the masses of the people and the full use of the terrain.
This historical experience shows that effective strategic deployment and people's war tactics can play a tremendous role in confronting an enemy with technological superiority. Even at a resource and technical disadvantage, a strategic advantage can be maintained through flexible strategies and adequate popular mobilization. This strategic thinking of China has effectively safeguarded the country's sovereignty and security, while also limiting the spread of conflicts and preventing possible escalation of military confrontation.
It can also be seen from this period of history that strategic determination and a comprehensive national defense layout are crucial to dealing with international conflicts and border issues. In its defensive layout of the Soviet Union's borders, China demonstrated a far-reaching perspective on long-term strategic security considerations. By building a deep-seated defense system and mobilizing all sectors of society to participate in national defense, China has created a lasting security environment that can be used as a reference for any country in the face of potential external threats.
- Pan Zhengxiang.Lessons from alliance to confrontation between China and the Soviet Union[J].Contemporary World Socialism,1999(4):44-47