laitimes

Behind the Russian army's recent introduction of a variety of technologies and tactics is the need to improve offensive efficiency

author:Blame Shu Huang Lao Zeng

In the recent Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Russian army has gradually gained a strategic advantage, which stems from Russia's partial mobilization and the peak of Ukraine's resources under the current level of NATO assistance. In the case of resource superiority, the problem that the Russian army is facing now is that it is difficult to achieve a high exchange ratio in offensive operations, so it has delayed its own offensive speed. In the event that Russia is unable to assemble a large cluster of heavy troops for a wide frontal assault like the Soviet Union, the speed of Russia's offensive will be significantly delayed by the Ukrainian army's defense system.

Under this model, the exchange ratio of the Russian army can only rely on artillery superiority to suppress the positions of the Ukrainian army, but in the specific offensive process, it will still be effectively reconnoitred by Ukrainian drones, and strike with the help of anti-tank missiles, FPV and a small number of artillery. The Russian army has suffered tactical setbacks with large losses in recent times, and in addition to command errors, the inability of the Ukrainian army to effectively suppress the threat is also the key.

Therefore, the Russian army is also actively trying to find a way at present, and there are indeed some things that are used in local law.

The first is that they installed three 800/900MHz/2.4/5.8GHz patch antennas on a T-72B3, and also added the corresponding batteries, which made the tank almost two stories high. These antennas cover most of the frequencies of civilian drones used by the Ukrainian army and can interfere with drones in the range of 700-1000 meters. In real combat, this T-72 did manage to jam 4 FPV UAVs, but did not prevent the fifth from crashing into the fire control system, its tracks became entangled in barbed wire, and finally crashed into another broken down infantry fighting vehicle. This T-72 was abandoned by the Russian army and captured by the Azov Brigade of the Ukrainian army.

Behind the Russian army's recent introduction of a variety of technologies and tactics is the need to improve offensive efficiency

It can be seen that this kind of electronic warfare T-72 can not really solve the threat of FPV, and at the same time, the integration capability of the Russian army's electronic warfare system is still very poor, so this huge pile of electronic warfare tanks has appeared. Of course, this may be an important idea for future tanks, but it should be said that the approach of the Russian army is indeed very crude.

Behind the Russian army's recent introduction of a variety of technologies and tactics is the need to improve offensive efficiency

In the case of dealing with the threat of drones, there are more extreme approaches. The Russians also tried to equip the tank with a huge turtleshell-like outer layer of armor, which undoubtedly sacrificed the tank's mobility and firing range, but at least it seemed to ensure that the FPV could only drill through the best protected front. However, if the opponent hits an anti-tank missile, then this protection mode may have a concentrated effect on the explosive energy, which may instead increase the destructive power of the opponent's strike weapon. Moreover, this mode of protection seriously undermines the perception of the tank and is a very extreme approach.

Behind the Russian army's recent introduction of a variety of technologies and tactics is the need to improve offensive efficiency

The tank has already been shown in an armored assault operation in Krasnohorivka, and it has not yet been destroyed. However, this way is by no means the ideal solution.

In addition, the 1st Battalion of the 123rd Brigade of the Russian Army used motorcycles as assault weapons to carry the assault team to the front of the Ukrainian army's position in the direction of Seversk, and magically forced the Ukrainian army to abandon its position, and the tactics were successful. The motorcycle itself is light and maneuverable, and it is indeed possible to approach the positions of the Ukrainian army by surprise. The advantage of the motorcycle is also that it may be too light because of its own weight, and it will not explode when pressed against the anti-tank mine, which may be a more fatal problem for the Ukrainian defense forces who are reluctant to show their heads.

Of course, the problem of insufficient protection of motorcycles is also obvious, which also means that this tactic can only be used when the Ukrainian army's defense is relatively weak, the will to resist is not strong, there are not many artillery, and the surface positions are effectively suppressed. As long as the Ukrainian army has no suppressed machine gun positions, the motorcycle commandos are more than lucky.

It can be seen that the Russian army is indeed actively trying to find a way, and the local method can be used on the battlefield. However, it should be said that behind all these somewhat uncoordinated local methods, it is the price of the Russian army's and even Russia's lack of understanding and preparation for modern warfare. If you are a party that does not participate, in the face of these new threats, it is a truly meaningful and systematic move to make full and systematic preparations.

Behind the Russian army's recent introduction of a variety of technologies and tactics is the need to improve offensive efficiency

Read on