The peace talks were really a delaying tactic, and the Burmese army counterattacked in an all-out way
In the northern Burma battlefield, the Burmese army is launching an all-out counterattack. Now it seems that the peace talks may be a real delaying tactic. The evacuation of the Tatmadaw army and administration in Lao Cai before December 30 was just to stall for time. It is enough to evacuate for a maximum of three days, and the so-called retreat before December 30 is only to create time for the Burmese army to counterattack.
Recently, the Myanmar air force and artillery have been very active, and the Tatmadaw has continued to carry out air and artillery operations in the northern part of Chan State, especially the rear of the Kokang Allied Army, which is besieging Lao Cai.
Myanmar Air Force MiGs, Y-8 transport planes and Mi-35 helicopter gunships launched heavy air strikes against Nam San, Nam Kham, Gui Yin, Mandong and Mu Jie towns in northern Chan State, and the Burmese army also fired 500-pound aerial bombs.
In just one place, the Burmese army launched 28 air raids in one day, dispatching 10 air strikes, 6 Y-12 transport planes, and 12 Mi-35 helicopter gunships. The Burmese artillery launched artillery bombardment operations along the entire front.
The Burmese army used Y-8 and Y-12 transport planes to drop large aerial bombs on the target area, followed by intensive rocket strikes by MiG fighters, and finally the large-caliber machine guns of Mi-35 helicopter gunships strafing the air.
The Burmese army even dispatched special operations units to carry out airborne operations. In Nankou Town, the Burmese army helicopters parachuted more than 100 Burmese troops into the special operation in three separate operations to launch a surprise attack.
Hundreds of troops from the Kokang Alliance Army and the De'ang National Army launched a fire siege on the airborne Burmese army. The only choice for the helicopter landing was to be open and flat, and the Kokang Allied Army and the De'ang National Army hid at the commanding heights of the surrounding soil slopes and fired intensively at the Burmese army with rifle light machine guns such as Type 81 automatic rifles.
Rifles fired in bursts are difficult to control because the muzzle is easy to deviate and the accuracy of shooting is relatively low, so in order to maintain the speed and accuracy of shooting, clinker veterans will use the burst method of shooting.
If it is a shootout between police and bandits, such as encountering gun-wielding resistance from gangsters at a temporary inspection on the road, or even a face-to-face firefight within 30 meters, a magazine can divide life and death, it must be better to strafe.
However, when fighting, it is not that the faster the launch, the better, but the higher the accuracy, the stronger the ability to control the enemy. Many new rifles now choose to reduce the rate of fire to increase the accuracy of their shots. Well-trained armies generally adopt the tactics of combining short-point shooting with precision killing and long-point shooting suppression.
Although the Burmese army was well-trained in special operations, its planes were immediately crushed by intensive point-fire and mortar bombardment. On the battlefield, the De'ang National Army and other units captured at least 19 assault rifles, several grenade launchers, 4 boxes of ammunition, as well as various communication equipment, medicines, grenades, etc.
This Burmese airborne force is estimated to have been trained by Russia and India, and as a result, it was sent out by Min Aung Hlaing in the first battle. Airborne operations have many advantages, but there are also a lot of significant disadvantages.
The Airborne Forces, lacking sufficient firepower and armored vehicles, simply could not fight the opposing side's fortifications and mortars in battle, so they quickly lost.
In real combat, the paratroopers did not have sufficient mobility, ammunition reserves were insufficient, artillery cover and direct support fire were lacking. And the ground forces, which were originally scheduled to converge with the Airborne Forces, have also repeatedly dropped their chains in actual combat, which will force the Airborne Forces to become a very embarrassing existence.
They had to attack those who had fortified positions, and the results were predictable. This was already very evident in the battle for Antonov Airport in February 2022 with Russian paratroopers.
When the narrow road meets, the brave wins, and the old street has to fight in the streets
On the outskirts of Lao Cai, the Burmese army launched a counterattack, and in Lao Cai City, the Burmese army and the telemail militia began to deploy in the streets and alleys and rooftops to fight street battles. Now, the Kokang Alliance has an advantage in morale, but not enough troops.
In real urban street fighting, no matter how carefully you organize it, the casualties will be very high, both on both sides of the world. Usually 30% casualties in the field is a very tragic battle, and in large-scale urban street battles, a 30% casualty rate is often just a starting price.
Grozny, Fallujah, Aleppo, Mariupol...... These street battles have proven that attacking teams can only breach a city at a great cost if they have at least a five-fold advantage and air supremacy.
The main force of the Kokang Allied Army, local troops, militia forces, and even administrative cadres are only more than 10,000 people. It is also necessary to disperse the deployment on the front from Rolling Lane, Sister Mu, and all the way to Laojie. The number of troops that can really attack Lao Cai is not large, and it is very likely that the number is not as large as the number of Lao Cai defenders.
The Bai family and the Wei family, who were still trapped in the beasts, continuously gave bonuses to the militia guards, claiming to have killed a company commander of the Kokang Alliance Army and rewarded 50,000 yuan in cash (equivalent to RMB), and also dispatched the Burmese army to supervise the battle.
The key to street fighting is to be calm, because there are still a large number of civilians in the city, so street fighting is often mixed with humanitarian issues.
The narrow road means that there is no way out, only to fight to the end. To put it bluntly, the brave man wants to be reckless with you to the end, and whoever instigates you first will lose, because when you are running, the reckless one catches up and outputs it on your back.
The Kokang Allies had an advantage, but it was not an easy task to defeat three or four thousand armed outlaws without harming civilians with minimal casualties.
Fighting the old street is like catching mice in a porcelain shop, and you can't easily use heavy weapons. Otherwise, there will be one = dozens of cannons in unison, and ten old streets will be beaten down long ago.
To conquer Lao Cai, it is necessary to use the technical and tactical advantages of night battles and use light weapons to solve the battle as much as possible, which requires that there be no lights at night in Lao Cai. In addition, the lack of electricity can also make the combat readiness and life of the Burmese army and the defenders of the telemail militia extremely inconvenient, and weaken their combat effectiveness.
In the past two days, the Kokang Allied Army should have attacked the headquarters of the Burmese army in Mixiangou. Even if the commanding heights of Nantianmen are not taken, once the headquarters of the Burmese army in Mixiangou is captured, the Burmese army and the telemail militia in Lao Cai City are likely to collapse.