A reason is called a "normative justification" for an action because it favors someone's action.
But what does it mean to say that a reason is "favorable" for a certain behavior?
One way to understand this statement is to understand it in terms of legitimacy: a reason that makes someone act in a certain way is justified or correct.
For this reason, normative justification is also referred to as "legitimate" justification.
The term "normative justification" derives from the idea that there are norms, principles, or norms that dictate behavior: these norms, principles, or guidelines dictate the right and wrong to do certain things.
To take a relatively trivial, culturally determined example, the etiquette norms in some countries dictate that the correct thing to do when meeting for the first time is to shake hands, while in others the correct thing to do is to kiss each other on the cheek.
Therefore, in the UK, a handshake is the norm of etiquette, which is why you should shake hands when you meet for the first time in the UK.
There are many other norms, principles, and values, implicit or explicit, that are often more important, and that make it right to do or not to do something.
The existence of these norms or values depends on a variety of factors: logical and natural relationships, conventions, rules and regulations, etc.
These norms or values may be moral, prudent, legal, hedonistic (related to pleasure), or other types.
Thus, there are normative reasons that correspond to various values and norms: moral, prudent, legal, hedonistic, etc.
The diversity of norms, or values, on which normative justifications are based requires a certain amendment to the statement that "justifications conducive to actions make those actions right".
If a reason is in my favor to do something, then I have a reason to do it: I am doing it right.
But there may also be reasons against me doing it: reasons not to do it.
A joke is funny, and that's probably why I'm telling it; But the joke will embarrass others, which may be the reason why I don't tell the joke.
In this case, I have one reason for telling the joke and another reason for not telling the joke.
Whether I am right to tell this joke and whether I have a reason to tell this joke "in a comprehensive way" depends on whether one of the reasons is stronger than the other.
If so, one reason overwhelms or "beats" another.
I am only right to tell the joke, or reasonable in all cases, if the argument for telling the joke is not defeated.
But what is a normative justification?
What gives justification the power of prescriptiveness to make it right for someone to do something?
And what determines whether such a reason exists and to whom does it apply?
In recent years, these and related issues have received extensive attention from the philosophical community.
There is consensus that normative justification is factual, although this consensus is not universal.
The question is compounded by disagreement about what is a fact: Is a fact a concrete or abstract entity?
Are facts equivalent to the corresponding true propositions, or are facts the "creators of truth" of propositions?
Are there other facts besides empirical facts, such as logical, mathematical, moral, or aesthetic facts?
John McGee, for example, argues that there are no moral facts.
McGee objected to the existence of moral facts, in part on the grounds that moral facts were metaphysically "outlandish."
He argues that if any moral facts exist, then they must be objective and must inspire those who are aware of them, and he claims that anything with such a property is completely implausible.
If McGee's view that there is no such thing as a moral fact is correct, then either the moral justification is not the normative justification.
Either at least some normative justification, that is, moral justification, is not a fact.
Among those who believe that normative justification is a fact, there are those who believe that facts are true propositions, and therefore justifications are also true propositions.
Others reject the idea that normative grounds can be true propositions; The rationale for this is, for example, that propositions are abstract and representational (they represent the way the world exists), while reasons must be concrete and non-representational (they are the way the world exists).
These are complex and affect the whole body, but we cannot address them here, and perhaps we do not need to, because the view that normative grounds are facts usually implies a low conceptual requirement of facts.
Thus, when it is said that facts are reasons, the word "facts" is used to refer to the basis on which a true statement or a reasonable statement is true or reasonable.
By "fact", I simply mean a fact that can be specified using the operator "fact".
There is less consensus on the normative basis of practical justification, i.e., the ability of justification to justify conduct.
There is an argument that the normative nature of practical justification depends on the goodness of doing what is justified, whether intrinsic or instrumental.
This view is related to Aristotle, who in the Nicomachean Ethics links what is right (what a person has reason to do) with what is good (whether intrinsic or instrumental).
This view was very popular among medieval philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas, and in the 20th century it was central to Elizabeth Anscombe's discussion of intentional behavior.
Many contemporary philosophers, on the basis of this idea, have discussed the normativity of reason, so reason is the normative reason for doing something, because it chooses the character or value of the good in relation to the action.
Reason is facts, and acting on these facts is good in some ways and to some extent.
There are also discourses that base the normative nature of reason on the concept of reason.
A different view, which coincides with Hume's view of the relationship between reason and passion, holds that the normativity of reason is based on its relation to our desires.
Therefore, what a person has reason to do ultimately depends on his desires and motivations.
Roughly speaking, when a person has a reason to act, he is required to have some kind of motive, and that motive can be achieved by acting in a way that is supported by the presumed reason.
This motivation can be desire, plan, long-term project, or values, among others. It can be something that the actor actually has, or something that the actor would have if he or she had reasoned correctly from his current motives.
Whatever we interpret its normativeness, normative justifications should be able to motivate actors to take action, which they may often fail to do.
Therefore, any interpretation of normative justification must provide a reasonable explanation of the relationship between the normative nature of the justification and its ability to motivate the actor to act.
The explanation must illustrate how the idea of "I have a reason to do something" can motivate me to take action and act for that reason.
In this regard, desire-based rationalism seems to be more advantageous.
If the reasons that apply to me depend on my antecedent motives (desires, plans), then I have a reason to do what I think will contribute to satisfaction, or to promote those motives.
But desire-based explanations are not so good at accommodating another central claim about normative justification.
Because there are reasons (such as moral reasons) that seem equally plausible, and those reasons apply to people with any motives.
It can be said that we all have reasons to do what morality requires, whether we are driven by those reasons or not.
It is generally accepted that the claim that something is a normative justification for an action is a "relational" claim: it establishes a relationship between the facts, the subject of the action, and the type of action.
This relationship is the relationship "as a reason". For example, the fact that a person has eaten a deadly poison may be a reason for a paramedic to give him an antidote.
Some people believe that the relationship involves more than just one person, one reason and one action: time, circumstance, etc.
This relational view of reason gives a minimal meaning, in the sense that claims about normative reasons are "agent-related": they link agents to reasons.
But even in the most basic sense, the agent relevance of justification raises questions about the conditions that determine when a justification for action applies to a particular agent.
One of the questions mentioned in the previous paragraph is whether the reasons that apply to you depend on your desires and motivations.
Another question is whether these reasons depend on your knowledge and beliefs.
Going back to Othello's example: on the one hand, Othello clearly had no reason to kill Desdemona, he thought he had a reason, and her infidelity was not a reason at all.
Othello, on the other hand, does seem to have a reason, as he believes that Desdemona is unfaithful and that his reputation has been damaged and needs to be restored through Desdemona's death.
At least from his point of view, these beliefs seem to justify what he does.