On December 4, 1949, Chairman Mao Zedong personally wrote a letter for Nie Rongzhen and Li Tao, in which he stressed the importance of promoting cadres of the Red Fourth Front. The letter caused widespread speculation and reflection. Before exploring the deeper meaning of this letter, let's first review the historical background to understand why Chairman Mao Zedong wrote specifically to these two military leaders.
In the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China, China's military system and organizational structure were still in the process of evolution. Unlike the later Eighth General Headquarters and the Third General Headquarters, the newly established High Command did not yet have a complete institutional setup, especially in terms of cadre work. At this time, Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai concurrently served as vice chairmen and presided over the daily affairs of the Central Military Commission. The implementation and coordination of specific work is undertaken by the General Staff Department headed by Nie Rongzhen, acting chief of the General Staff, and the Operations Department of the Central Military Commission under the responsibility of Li Tao.
This mode of operation meant that the General Staff and the Central Military Commission's Operations Department played a key role in the system at that time, both as the working bodies of the CMC and with cadre management and coordination functions. Therefore, Chairman Mao Zedong chose to write to Nie Rongzhen and Li Tao, in fact, according to the routine operation of the time, to ensure that his instructions could be carried out in a timely manner.
But the real highlight of the letter was Chairman Mao Zedong's special attention to the cadres of the Red Fourth Front. Why does he put so much emphasis on promoting these cadres? This needs to be understood from several perspectives.
First of all, Chairman Mao Zedong always adhered to the principle of employing people from all over the world, and he was well aware that many outstanding military cadres had gathered in the Red Fourth Front. These cadres went through the Long March, the War of Resistance Against Japan, and the War of Liberation, and accumulated rich experience and combat effectiveness. Therefore, promoting and using them not only meets the needs of the revolutionary cause, but also affirms their past efforts.
Second, the historical context also needs to be considered. In the history of the Red Fourth Front, there have been some sensitive incidents, such as the "dragging the gun to escape" incident, which led to the implication and influence of some cadres. Chairman Mao Zedong was aware of the particularity and complexity of these events, and eventually rehabilitated those involved. Therefore, his attention to these cadres can be seen as a summary of historical experience and the application of lessons learned to ensure that similar problems do not arise again.
Most importantly, the cadres of the Fourth Red Front Army achieved outstanding combat merits in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the War of Liberation, and many of them became outstanding military generals. Their great combat achievements and fame cannot be ignored. Chairman Mao Zedong's letter was actually an affirmation and encouragement of these outstanding generals from the Red Fourth Front Army and an expectation that they would continue to play a leading role in the new Chinese army.
To sum up, Chairman Mao Zedong's letter was not only a special concern for the cadres of the Red Fourth Front, but also reflected the mode of operation of the military institutions at that time. More importantly, it expressed Chairman Mao's lofty trust and expectations for those cadres who had worked hard and demonstrated outstanding abilities in the revolutionary struggle. This letter became an important reference for New China's policy on the appointment of military cadres, and it was also one of Chairman Mao Zedong's unique contributions to the management of military cadres.