Wang Sanyi (Painted by Zhang Jing)
The late Qing intellectuals once used the Ottoman Empire as a mirror of civilization, such as Kang Youwei said at the beginning of the "Preface to the "Weakening of the Turks": "Across all countries, it is similar to China, compared with the same kind, and the most important one is like the Turks." "Turkic" here refers to the Ottoman Empire. But today, the complex and incoherent political system of the Ottoman Empire is still a blur for most people, and there are many gaps in the field of research.
Professor Wang Sanyi of the Department of History of Shanghai University has devoted himself to the research of modern economic history and Ottoman Empire in the Middle East for many years, and has published "The Challenge of Industrial Civilization and the Transformation of Modern Economy in the Middle East" (China Social Sciences Press, 2006), "Research on the British Mandate in the Middle East" (World Knowledge Press, 2008), "Studies on the Late Ottoman Empire (1792-1918)" (China Social Sciences Press, 2015), and "The Decline of the Empire: Six Treatises on the History of the Ottoman Empire" (Social Science Literature Press, 2018) and other monographs.
Professor Wang Sanyi's new book, The Rule of Empire: The Political System of the Ottoman Empire (Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2023), explores the political foundation and characteristics of the political changes of the Ottoman Empire, revealing the rise and fall of the political system in the historical process from the reign of Suleiman the Great to the collapse of the empire. On the occasion of the centenary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey, the Shanghai Review of Books interviewed Professor Wang Sanyi and asked him to talk about the Ottoman Empire inherited by modern Turkey from the perspective of history.
"The Rule of Empire: The Political System of the Ottoman Empire", by Wang Sanyi, published by Shanghai People's Publishing House in May 2023, 426 pages, 65.00 yuan
From the establishment of the Ottoman state in 1299 to the abolition of the imperial system in 1922, the Ottoman Empire lasted for more than 600 years.
Wang Sanyi: Our understanding of the Ottoman Empire is often to first know the "decline" and "death" of this empire, especially the Balkan crisis and the Turkish revolution, and then go one step further to link the events such as the capture of Constantinople and the Suleiman legislation, dating back to the early history of the empire. If you can read the complete general history of the Ottoman Empire, you will be amazed at the resilience of this empire and have the same questions as you.
The Ottoman Empire was able to remain relatively stable for a long period of time, lasting for hundreds of years, which clearly has its own particularities. At the very least, the Ottoman rulers ruled and managed the many nationalities and sects within the territory effectively. In fact, from the historical data, on the issue of how to govern the empire, the ruler did not have a complete "top-level design" at first. With the victory of foreign wars, the territorial scope has become larger and larger, the population has increased, the ethnic composition has become complex, the state structure has become loose, and the ruling party has to find a way to solve what problems it encounters. Experience and rules are slowly accumulated.
In the process of expanding the territory, how to manage the acquisition of new land, it is modeled on the system of the Byzantine Empire, and the fiefdom is implemented, and the recipient provides cavalry, that is, the "Tima" system. How to manage the question of minorities and infidels, the Ottoman rulers let the followers of different denominations live in different "millets". The administrative system of the Ottoman Empire was "Sultan centralization", the court was the center of power in the empire, and the government was a subsidiary of the imperial palace. After 1517, Sultan received the title of caliph and became the religious leader of the Muslim world, achieving "theocracy". The empire depended on armies, and the court janissary cavalry and standing army infantry came from the "Dewushemai" conscription system, which amounted to a military slavery.
The successes or cleverness of the design of the political system can be summarized in four aspects: First, the multi-layered system of the Ottoman Empire was the need for conquest, expansion and imperial management, which came from practice and was practical. Second, the "Sultan-Caliphate" system determined the characteristics of the imperial polity, and the coexistence of administrative and religious systems ensured the vertical management of the local areas by the imperial court; A stable military system determines the victory of wars; The land system and tax system determine the relative stability of the economy; Under the special bureaucratic system, the chief executive, Grand Vizier, assists Sultan in handling complicated government affairs, but cannot compete with Sultan Chamber; An effective system of ethnic and religious administration reduced the cost of maintaining the unity of the empire. Third, the systems in different fields have their own emphasis, management is divergent, and there is a certain degree of flexibility, which ensures the operation of the empire and enables the continuation of the empire. Fourth, the Ottoman rulers were able to adjust and reform the system according to the needs of the situation. For example, in the eighteenth century, when the shortcomings of the system were exposed, rulers embarked on reforms to restore the destroyed institutions and rules.
What is the secret that the founders of the Ottoman Empire were Turkic peoples, who conquered and controlled the majority of Arabs, Greeks, Armenians and other peoples and maintained their dominance?
Wang Sanyi: It is indeed obvious that ethnic groups with a minority population rule over several ethnic groups with a majority of the population. The ruling class of the Ottoman Empire came from the Turkic tribes headed by the Ottomans. In the process of the development of the steppe states into empires, such as the conquest of Greece, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, large numbers of Greeks and Arabs were brought under imperial rule.
It is easy to explain if the problem is divided into two levels, one is how to conquer and control, and the other is how to maintain long-term rule over other peoples. From the perspective of world history, conquest and short-term control are not the most difficult, and there are so many rapidly rising, fleeting large and small empires and even hegemonic powers in Eurasia. However, few steppe countries lasted more than four hundred years after they developed into empires.
Let's start with conquest and short-term control. The conquest by the Ottoman Turks went smoothly, from the Ottoman emirate to the empire, about a century and a half (1299-1453). Control of all of Asia Minor, and then the Balkans, formed the first two provinces. The Ottoman Turks grasped the "time of day" and won the "geographical advantage". The conquered territories were the territories of the Byzantine Empire, the Seljuk Turks and the former Romani Sultanate. The Byzantine Empire survived and did not have the strength to protect its territory, giving the Ottoman Turks the opportunity to invade. The region of Western Asia experienced the conquest of the Mongol army, and the various previous regimes fell apart, and no force was able to resist the Ottoman Turkish army. The conquest of Arabia was in 1516-1517, relatively late. If he had gone south in his early years and wanted to control cities such as Aleppo and Damascus and conquer Syria, he would not have been able to do so. Short-term control of conquered regions and the appointment of powerful local figures to govern the region had long been provided by Alexander the Great in the fourth century BC.
The real difficulty is the long rule. The Ottoman Empire administered the majority of the population in three unique ways: first, it was to adapt measures to local conditions and treat them differently, second, to loosen religious policies, and third, to strictly prevent the emergence of powerful local interest groups.
In the Ottoman Empire, minorities tended to be minority sects, such as Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, but some minorities believed in Muslims and did not belong to minority sects, such as Kurds; Arabs, on the other hand, are both a majority and a majority of Muslims, sharing the same faith as Turkey. The Ottoman rulers were managed differently from the beginning, using administrative means according to local conditions. For example, the original tribes, villages and towns of Anatolia were directly administered by Sanjak Bey, and soon incorporated into the provinces; In the Balkans, Rumelia was included in the provinces, but the principalities such as Moldavia remained and were subject to imperial jurisdiction in the form of "vassals"; After the conquest of Egypt, it was listed as a separate province and specially formulated the "Egyptian Code". The Maghreb region was entrusted to the pirate Barbarossa Hayreddin as governor of Algiers. As for the liberalization of religious policy, it was a unique place in the administration of the Ottoman Empire and had formed a system. Of course, there is also the means of intolerance, that is, to strictly prevent the emergence of interest groups against the imperial court. Whether it is the interest group of Muslims, the interest group of the majority nation, or the interest group of Christianity or other denominations, they are all resolutely contained, and the Ottoman Sultan has really done it.
The Ottoman Empire was vast, spanning three continents in Europe, Asia and Africa at its peak, and what role did the "Tima" system, which you just mentioned, play in the local governance of the empire?
Wang Sanyi: The new lands obtained by the conquest were divided as "tima" (transliteration of timar), which was promoted by the early Ottoman rulers. The temporary policy evolved into a relatively complete land system, which solved the problem of land distribution and provided Sultan with the necessary sources of troops for war. This system served first and foremost national military operations, because the cavalry who followed Sultan in the war, including their equipment and salaries, came from Tima holders; The second was to play an important role in the local administration of the Ottoman Empire.
The Ottoman Empire had large and small quarries. Caiyi, called "Timma", refers to fiefdoms with an annual revenue of less than 20,000 akcha. Akcha is a monetary unit. The imperial court stipulated that Tima could not be bought, sold or transferred. The basis for the government's mastery of feudal cavalry was the "register". The rules for the distribution of Timma, the registration of Tima amounts, the recipients of Tima grants, etc., are recorded.
The role of the "Timma" system in the local administration of the Ottoman Empire was firstly to facilitate the control of the local government by the imperial court, and secondly, to enable the Tima holder to assist the local officials in managing local affairs. The loyalty and obligation of the Tima holders were indispensable in the vertical chain connecting the court and the grassroots units. Sultan orders were conveyed through the Governor to Sanjak Beyi and the heads of subordinate units, directly to the Tima holders, and the national policy was implemented. Tima holders also help with tax collection, law and order and the protection of the population. Especially in the management at the village level, the Tima holders play a role in specific matters, such as preventing bandits and bandits from threatening the village. In the local administration system, with the assistance of the Tima holders, Sanjak Beyi kept abreast of the situation in the village community, which contributed to the maintenance of tranquillity and stability in the newly conquered areas. Later, the local administration of the Ottoman Empire was lax and chaotic, which was related to the gradual abolition of the "Tima system".
In addition to the "Tima system", please tell us about another characteristic system of the Ottoman Empire - the "millet" used to manage non-Muslim communities. Is it also the key to the Ottoman Empire's management of the country's diverse ethnicity and religion that the core elements of the "Millet" system are cultural tolerance, religious leadership accountability, and internal autonomy?
Wang Sanyi: During the Ottoman conquest, non-Muslim religious groups or communities were called "milletts", which means "groups or peoples with special beliefs in the Ottoman Empire".
This system, institutionalized by a policy of conditional tolerance, is essentially internal autonomy, and is tantamount to loyalty to Sultan commitments plus the payment of a certain amount of taxes in exchange for the judicial independence of the community. This approach was not created by the Ottoman rulers, but adopted the traditional way Muslims treated the "Dimi" (holders of the scriptures) during classical Islam. Fundamentally, the Ottoman rulers considered Christianity and Jews easy to manage.
Because the Millet was an autonomous organization based on religious relations, except for obeying Sultan and paying taxes to the imperial government, the rest of the affairs were handled by their own religious leaders within Millet. Sultan was content to control these peoples and infidels, without forcing them to convert or subject them to the control of officials at all levels. Therefore, some scholars summarize the core content of the "millette" system as cultural tolerance, religious leadership responsibility, and internal autonomy.
Even by the lowest measure, the Ottoman rulers treated minorities and infidels, at least much more tolerant than the rulers of Christian Europe of the same period. Moreover, the effect of this cultural tolerance is obvious. First, after the implementation of the "Millet" system, it not only solved the management problems of minority sects in the empire, but also attracted many immigrants from Europe. Second, the lives of minorities such as Greeks, Armenians, and Jews in the early Ottoman Empire were relatively stable. Third, the Ottoman rulers also had little trust in them. Fourth, there have been fewer revolts in the name of religion in various places.
Objectively speaking, non-Muslims were given a definite relationship in the early Ottoman Empire, they were given certain rights, but politically, non-Muslims had a lower status than Muslims. Even in some areas where Muslims are in the minority, non-Muslims remain dominated by Islamic religious groups. Of course, it is rare that this "acceptable" relationship is recognized and maintained for a long time.
My opinion is that the Ottoman Empire could not do without minorities. Minorities played an irreplaceable role in the commercial sphere of the empire; They acted as intermediaries or managers for European merchants and, together with European merchants, controlled foreign trade in the Middle East; Armenians, Jews, and Greeks dominated the city's main economic sectors, such as customs, taxation, banking, and more.
Why did "Millet" gradually alienate in the later period of a policy of cultural and religious tolerance, and even lead to dissatisfaction and resistance among non-Muslim minorities?
Wang Sanyi: In modern terms, the "shelf life" of the system is short and long. When the Ottoman Empire was strong, the imperial court was able to control the remote provinces, which could ensure the safety and flow of most trade routes within the empire. Moreover, the courageous and far-sighted Sultan among the rulers, such as Suleiman I, valued commerce and was able to protect the interests of ethnic minorities. Later, the central power of the empire weakened, the trend of local division was obvious, the government could not protect the territory and the people, and the interests of ethnic minorities engaged in economic activities were damaged.
The Greeks took the initiative to secede from the Ottoman Empire. The Greeks began to question the "Millet" system and demand autonomy and independence, influenced by the nationalist trend of continental Europe. Originally, the Greeks were relatively economically prosperous and had a higher political status than other minorities in the empire, but they gradually did not accept the internal autonomy granted by the Ottoman government, but wanted to break away from the imperial rule and form an independent Greek nation-state. The desire of the Greeks for independence was intolerable in the eyes of the Ottoman rulers.
The beginning of changes in the lives of Armenians was also influenced by external factors. For example, the influence of nationalism and liberalism from Europe and the United States on Armenians. The political leanings of the Armenians were supported by Russia. However, the Ottoman rulers did not intend to allow the Armenians to exercise self-government.
Bernard Lewis, a prominent expert on Middle Eastern history, believes that "non-Muslim relations with Muslims are undermined by new ideas and ambitions." This judgment also makes sense. For, according to the liberal principles of Europe, the Ottoman government should be required to grant full equal rights to all the peoples to which it belongs; According to the principle of nationalism, the ruled peoples have the right to establish their own independent state.
When I read the historical records of the Ottoman Empire, I found that the rulers of the early period of the empire had a strong mentality, self-confidence was embraced by minorities and infidels, and ordinary Muslims were less suspicious of infidels. From the late seventeenth century onwards, the attitude of weakened Muslims towards non-Muslims changed, replacing peaceful coexistence with suspicion and hatred. To be fair, until the period of rapid change in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman government was very cautious in its handling of ethnic relations, and did not blindly adopt a high-pressure policy of drawing lines along ethnic or religious lines.
In addition to The Rule of Empire: The Political System of the Ottoman Empire, you have published the monograph "The Fall of the Empire" and "Studies of the Late Ottoman Empire (1792-1918)", can you give a general description of the decline of the empire? What are the main reasons?
Wang Sanyi: After the glory of the era of Suleiman the Great, the Ottoman Empire showed signs of decline. After a failed siege of Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Empire went on the defensive. The decline of this empire, built by force, was inevitable if it lost its way to wealth through plunder. The Treaty of Karowitz, which was forced to sign in 1699, is generally regarded as the dividing point between the empire's rise and fall. Since then, almost all wars have resulted in the loss of land to varying degrees, passive maintenance of sovereignty, and continuous shrinking of territory. In the war with Russia in 1788-1792, the Ottoman army almost lost its combat effectiveness. In the face of defeat, the ruling class finally reached a consensus: it must reform, it must learn from the West, or the country will perish. The period 1792-1914 was more than a century of Westernization of the Ottoman Empire, which eventually collapsed into World War I.
One of the simple measures of the decline of the Ottoman Empire: the military-skilled Ottoman Turks could no longer fight; Another sign is the general weakening of the empire, which is manifested in political corruption, economic depression, and serious ethnic separatist tendencies.
In fact, these two levels are also interrelated. For the Turks, by stopping their foreign expansion, they lost their advantage, and the empire's economic and political system faced new tests. Specific circumstances, for example: new land was previously opened up through conquest, there was a rational land system, and agricultural production was expanded; Gain a steady stream of wealth through conquest and at the same time acquire a large amount of labor; When the "enterprise" of the empire became larger and larger, religious activities and cultural arts expanded with it, and more jobs could be provided; The wider the territory of the empire, the less problematic it is to replenish manpower for military service and labor. The path of foreign conquest from 1699 to later was broken, and the political and economic foundations of the entire country were shaken.
It should also be noted that there was no victory for more than a century after 1699, which seriously dampened the martial spirit of the Ottoman Turks and extinguished the fighting spirit of some people. The subsequent defeat and weakening contrasted sharply with the glory and glory of the empire's rise.
The decline of the Ottoman Empire is judged by a longitudinal comparison of the history of the empire and a horizontal comparison with European countries. What I just said is a longitudinal comparison. In horizontal comparison, when European countries were on the rise, the rulers of the Ottoman Empire rested on their laurels, and the entire empire missed the opportunity for development. By the late eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was no longer on the same level as European countries.
From the reforms of Mahmud II, to the reforms of Tanzimat, to the two constitutional monarchies of the late empire, the rulers of the Ottoman Empire made many efforts to save the imperial crisis.
Wang Sanyi: There have been many research results in the academic community on the Westernization reform of the Ottoman Empire and the efforts to save the perilous life. When I was doing my doctoral dissertation more than 20 years ago, I had a special chapter on economic reform. The monograph on the political system of the Ottoman Empire also has a special chapter on the reforms of the late Empire, focusing mainly on administrative, judicial, and religious aspects.
To sum up, the Westernization reform of the Ottoman Empire has three characteristics: First, the reform itself has moved from shallow to deep, from the introduction of technology to the reform of the system. Second, the reform has the characteristics of stages, and the results in specific areas are different. Third, although the peak of reform was followed by Hamid's autocracy, the degree of openness of society was gradually expanded.
Specifically, Mahmud II's contribution was to disarm the old army, strip the local nobility that threatened the central government, maintain the authority of Sultan and establish an administration according to the European model, achieve the first census and land survey in the history of the empire, and abolish the Tima system, paving the way for later reforms. The inclusion of "security of life, honor, property" and "equality before the law" into the imperial decrees during the "Tanzimat" period was a clear progress. Moreover, the reform is in full swing. Although Hamid II practiced autocratic rule, he did not abandon reform and westernization, and achieved the most obvious results in the economic, educational, military and other fields.
The reform of the Ottoman Empire for more than 100 years is a model for the salvation of modern countries in the East, Asia, Africa and Latin America, because the reforms of other countries are not as early as the reforms of the Ottoman Empire, nor the reforms of the Ottoman Empire last long. The reforms may have exacerbated some contradictions, but they have eliminated some of the factors that hindered the functioning of the state apparatus.
Of course, after more than a hundred years of reform, it has not reached the original goal of becoming a rich country and a strong country, and there are several aspects of problems worth pondering: for example, the areas that are easy to reform have changed, and the areas that are difficult to reform have not changed; Another example is that political reform is hovering in the dilemma of "centralization" and "limitation of power", and cannot achieve substantive breakthroughs; Moreover, imperial reforms were characterized by short-term success, and reformers took the Western experience as a panacea, hoping for short-term results, but the results were still not achieved.
The image of Sultan Hamid II in history is bloody and brutal: repressive rule, spies and censorship, the Armenian massacre... But you also say that many of Hamid II's reforms have also had a positive effect on the transition from the traditional Ottoman Empire to modern Turkey. What do you think of this character?
Wang Sanyi: Hamid II is known as "Bloody Sudan", and in Western descriptions of Turkish history, there is a face-painted image of brutality. Hamid is autocratic, Hamid is tyranny, this is a relatively common judgment.
In fact, during the thirty-three years of Hamid II's reign (1876-1909), he did many things, both big and small. Saying that he was autocratic did not wronged him. For example, he terminated constitutionalism, dissolved parliament, and exiled Midhart Pasha, a representative of reformists; He centralized power, using dismissal, exile, assassination, imprisonment, etc. to attack or even eliminate the opposition; In order to control the people and suppress the resistance in various places, he established a secret agent system; He banned the press and blocked access to outside information.
Hamid II was accused of "massacring Armenians", which should be accurately described as "unshirkable responsibility for the Armenian massacre". Between 1894 and 1895, there were atrocities in the eastern part of the empire that killed Armenians. Initially due to resentment and vendettas between Armenians and Kurds, the Ottoman officials and army did not take steps to stop the massacre, and some soldiers participated instead. Armenian nationalists in the capital, Istanbul, also expressed solidarity and took action to seize the Bank of Turkey, which was suppressed by government forces. The European powers sent a note to Sultan demanding an end to the atrocities. In the eyes of later Turkish revolutionaries, Hamid II, who suppressed the revolutionary movement, was a tyrant and a dictator, so in the narrative of the Turkish Revolution, the image and negative evaluation of Hamid II were determined.
However, it should be noted that in terms of internal affairs, Hamid II did not stop Westernization reforms, and made great efforts in developing the economy, improving transportation, and establishing education, and achieved results. For example, through cooperation with Germany, the Reich's foreign trade grew rapidly; Due to economic development, various branch lines of the Baghdad Railway began to be built, the connection between the east and west of the empire was strengthened, and the two river basins were also developed; the purchase of weapons and equipment from Germany, the purchase of ships, increased military strength; Many cities within the empire built schools, orphanages, clinics, and hospitals. In terms of foreign relations, Hamid II did not blindly compromise with the big European countries. When Hamid II first came to power, the European powers intervened in the Balkan crisis, and the Ottoman government was very passive. But by the late nineteenth century, Hamid II was able to calmly face and analyze the changes in the situation in Europe, and took the initiative to choose countries that would be diplomatically helpful to the empire in order to seek the survival of the empire.
As a result of Hamid II's administration, the Ottoman Empire maintained sovereignty and basic social stability between 1878 and 1909, and crucially, some of the reforms that remained on paper during the Tan Zimat period were gradually implemented under Hamid II, and Ottoman society was more open than ever before. These changes were the basis and premise of the transformation of the traditional Ottoman Empire to modern Turkey.
In Istanbul's bookstores, there are quite a few books called "Our Beloved Hamid Sudan" and "The Great Sultan Hamid". In the minds of some cultural people in Turkey, Hamid II of the late empire was a remarkable monarch.
How do you evaluate the performance of the Young Turks Party, which the founding father of Turkey Kemal joined in his early years, which was the de facto ruling group in the "second constitutional period" of the Ottoman Empire (1908-1918)?
Wang Sanyi: After the success of the constitutional revolution in 1908, the "Young Turks" party changed from a secret organization to an open political party, and came to power in 1909. They did not trust Sultan and felt that there was no need to depose Sultan and that they were constitutional monarchy. They are also incapable of controlling government power. In Ottoman society, age and experience were prerequisites for gaining political authority, and the majority of Young Turks were young captains, majors, or lower-ranking officials with little experience and experience.
From 1909-1913, the Young Turks introduced a program of social reforms. At the political level, the bureaucracy was rectified and reorganized, redundant civilian officials were fired, royal property was confiscated, palace expenses were strictly budgeted, and the income of high-ranking officials was reduced. On the economic front, it pursues liberal policies, raises loans from abroad, removes tariff barriers, develops trade, supports agriculture, improves infrastructure and attracts investment. At the legislative and educational levels, new civil laws have been enacted, new laws on military service, education and marriage have been promulgated, and women have been given the same right to education. In addition, the reform programme involves safeguarding national security and implementing policies of ethnic equality.
The reform measures of the Young Turks have been progressive, and some have yielded good results. However, from a purely political perspective, the powers and responsibilities of government functions are unclear and their role is limited; The role of military personnel in political life is too great; The relationship between the Young Turks and Parliament is not coordinated; Inter- and intra-party struggles continue. A new magnate formed in the purged government institutions. The new magnates controlled the parliament and cabinet, and a small number of powerful figures made arbitrary decisions, making the people disappointed with constitutionalism.
If we take into account the international situation and deep-seated contradictions in the country, we can "understand" the difficulties of the rulers of the Young Turks. There was the Italian-Turkish War in 1911 and the two Balkan Wars in 1912-1913. Of course, the biggest mistake was that the Young Turks, who held the leadership, were superstitious about Germany's advanced weapons and good military organization, and concluded an alliance with Germany, which brought the empire to danger, and the Ottoman Empire of 1914-1918 was the eastern theater of the world war, losing the environment for internal reform, and the empire was finally dismembered.
When the Ottoman Empire was weakening, the Qing Dynasty in East Asia was also in danger, they were all regarded as "sick men" by Western colonial empires, and how to change the law and become stronger in modern times has become a historical problem faced by both of them. Kang Youwei and other late Qing intellectuals repeatedly used the Ottoman Empire as a mirror for their own country in political discourse to prove the debate between reform and revolution. In your research, you also pay close attention to the comparative study of the Ottoman Empire and the late Qing Dynasty of China.
Wang Sanyi: Yes, comparing the Ottoman Empire with the late Qing Dynasty in China began in that era. Not only Kang Youwei, but later Sun Yat-sen's speech repeatedly mentioned the Turkish constitutional revolution of 1908.
In my own research, in order to be able to delve into the political system of the Ottoman Empire, I also carefully read the books of the Mughal Dynasty in India, the Kaiga Dynasty in Persia, and the Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan, in an attempt to make a comprehensive investigation and comparison of the Eastern Empire. Because there was too much content involved, it was difficult to grasp, so it was abandoned, and in the book there was only a comparison between the Ottoman Empire and the late Qing Dynasty of China. The bureaucracy of the Ming and Qing dynasties had a succession relationship, and I put the Ming dynasty into it. Since it is a comparison, what is seen is similarity and difference. Because they are all vast, multi-ethnic, and centralized, from prosperity to decline, many key links are similar, and there are many comparable factors and levels. Through comparison, it is possible to deepen the study of imperial political systems in world history. Compare and not compare, the depth of understanding is not the same. Because such a horizontal comparison is actually a kind of analytical work, it is equivalent to dismantling the political machine of the Ottoman Empire, comparing it, inside and out, and the effect is different.
You asked about the "takeaways" of comparative studies, and for me, the work of comparative studies is mixed. The good news is the takeaway from these comparative studies that I just mentioned. Those who are worried feel the difficulty of research. If you simply see the similarities and differences between the two research subjects, it is easy and anyone can do it. The question is, to what extent should the understanding be achieved after comparison? Want to draw some theoretical or regular conclusions? Or dig into first-hand historical materials in different languages, and never let go of the details, so as to maximize the advantages of data? In the domestic academic circles, "comparative research between China and foreign countries" has produced many results. What is the point of me opening up another position for comparative study of the Ottoman Empire and the late Qing Dynasty in China? The study of world history, in fact, can only study the history of a certain country at a certain stage, which is equivalent to the study of "foreign history", and any achievements of foreign history are not as good as the achievements of Chinese history that have attracted the attention of the Chinese people. Moreover, no matter how hard you try, it is impossible to study better than foreign experts. My study of the Ottoman Empire, including the use of "comparative studies", is an effort under limited conditions, and further thinking is needed in terms of research methods.