Watch the NBA | The shadow assassin beside Wang

In the 2023 Men's Basketball World Cup, Lithuania took the lead in naming Reeves' plan, and Germany and Canada followed suit. Reeves is not bad defensively, can make a lot of tackles with keen judgment, and the effort to chase and defend without the ball is impressive, but in the face of highly talented players and too big a gap, Reeves can do nothing. The U.S. team's defensive integrity was hard to say good, and it didn't provide Reeves with enough help.

If it is in the case of the Lakers, with thick eyebrows to assist the defense, with Reeves' efforts and high defense quotient, a similar situation will be more comfortable to deal with. The Lakers' three guards, one short and thin, two weak, dare to use together, and can also reap the desired effect on many occasions, of course, not without reason.

But the Lakers' three guards obviously can't play the world. In the second round of the playoffs, G6, the Lakers cleared with three guards. The same lineup used in the Western Conference G1, which became the beginning of the series digging. The different configurations of the Warriors and Nuggets and the ability to punish small body misalignment determine the defensive safety of the Lakers' three guards, Murray can wantonly beat Schroder, the highest defensive rating among the three guards, Thompson and Wiggins face Reeves and Russell, but failed to give a similar effect - if it can be airborne, at that moment, the ideal game-breaker in my mind is, Devin Booker.

Booker has done well playing the Lakers in recent years, but that's not the point. The focus is on Booker's way of solving problems – simply dribbling or not dribbling in a tight space, ignoring defenders to throw the ball in. This description sounds a bit abstract, and most stars who are known for their projections seem to have this kind of hard solving ability. But if we do a breakdown, we can still put Booker in a unique position:

Durant's breakthrough from outside the three-point line is slowed down by the contraction of the two wings, and the risk of misses on the ball increases. Leonard has solid ball protection skills, but there are still many problems with holding the ball outside the three-point line;

After Durant's big injury, you worry about the impact of the defender's next set on his low post. And Leonard's inability to catch the ball low is already a systemic problem for the Clippers, and his radius of running no-ball starting catches does not seem to exceed 2 meters.

Basically, forward singles will always have the question of "how to get people and the ball in the dessert section at the same time". In contrast, backcourt singles who are faster, more agile in running and changing direction, and have a lower chassis have fewer problems in this regard. This was reflected in the Suns' series with the Nuggets that it was harder for Durant to get rid of Gordon's entanglement with or without the ball, and Booker could accelerate from the three-point line and stop to distance himself from Gordon. Durant's ability to get into the Nuggets' hinterland from outside the three-point line is harder to get into the Nuggets' heartland, requiring more low-post preparation, while Booker can go into attack at any time from the moment he receives a backcourt rebound.

Booker's problem is that his shooting efficiency fluctuates greater, how explosive the burst is, and how embarrassing the crotch pulling scene is. This is not an isolated phenomenon, and while backcourt players have the advantage of offensive initiation flexibility, they are also generally more inconsistent than frontcourt players. It's not easy to maintain a playoff in '23 and have only one performance with a true shooting percentage below 57%. But with subtle changes in positioning, the likelihood of maintaining this type of performance is increasing — which bottle of poison is more poisonous between Durant and Booker, it's hard to say at their current age. To be sure, there are bound to be quite a few teams that focus on Durant. For Booker, this is undoubtedly a looser.

Where exactly is the loosening?

Of course, no coach is stupid enough to empty Booker when he pinches Durant, and the character who is ignored must be some puzzle player crouched in the bottom corner. But against the Nuggets' series, the Suns showed that they have an affordable combo skill using the Durant Booker combination:

The two stand on either side of the arc, one holding the ball to initiate a pinch strike, and the other to pick up the pot and launch again. This pot man, whether it's Durant or Booker, has a defender in front of him — but only one. This equates to a one-on-one environment for the pot catcher, and it will be difficult for the Nuggets to tightly block the breakthrough route into the three-point line when dealing with the Suns' second choice.

Just getting the opportunity to get "one dozen one" instead of "one dozen N" is already a big loosening for superstars. You can imagine how hard Durant and Booker would have had to play if they hadn't liberated each other with that Suns' puzzle response.

Another thing is that Durant's possession of defensive resources will allow Booker to gain weaker defensive matching. This is not visible against the Nuggets, because the Nuggets' defensive strengths Gordon and Pope have their own strengths, so Gordon's defense against Booker may not be good. Of course, Pope can't prevent Booker, and the most suitable type to prevent Booker is the slightly larger No. 3 position. Generally speaking, unless a team's No. 4 can also lead the defensive stronger, such No. 3 is also a candidate to lead Durant. For example, if the Suns meet the Lakers and default to James' opening without strong points, a Vanderbilt (or eight villages) is not enough points, and the candidate to defend Booker is probably Reeves.

The overall strategy of defense often fails to cover both cores of the opponent at the same time. Unless the two cores are incompatible, if one of them is strictly grasped, the other will inevitably be relatively loosened, and the key point to break the game often lies in this loosened core. They are usually the more personal ones in the duo or dual-core game, and what they need to do is slap the opponent's contempt, torture the coach's soul, and make their stupid choices pay.

So, this grouping, I call it "thugs".

Most of the players in the group are No. 2/3 wing swingers or point guards who are good at one-on-one. They can attack with the ball almost anywhere on the pitch and if your centre of gravity is not with them, terrible things can happen.

Booker became the top card in this group. It can eat small on the back, fight small in the noodle basket, and have a comprehensive threat of throwing sudden transmission. Booker has almost the most reliable long two-point shot in the league's backcourt, and only needs a small amount of room to control the movement to solve small defenders away from the basket guard, which has great strategic value when encountering teams that do not have enough offensive defense resources and rely on interior defense to solve defensive holes.

Booker's T1.5 undoubtedly has the effect of the proximate cause, which is very risky, because several bigwigs in other groups in the same class as Booker are not easy to mess with. There was an empty gear behind Booker, after which I gave the T2.5 to Jamal Murray and Owen.

If you compare the overall performance under the large sample in recent years, Murray and Irving and Booker are indeed separated by grades, after all, Murray is recovering from injury, and Irving does not have much time to play seriously. In addition, although a small sample of a series does not tell the whole story, with the large sample already dominating, the direct comparison between Booker and the two men becomes more convincing:

In this year's Suns vs. Nuggets series, Booker and Murray played the role of "hitters" for their respective teams. Although the Nuggets were the final winners, Murray also proved in this passionate matchup that this is not a 1-on-2 game of Jokic. But in terms of the overall performance of this series, Booker is more bright than Murray. The comparison of the data of the two is as follows:

Booker, 30.8 points + 4.7 rebounds + 7.8 assists + 2.8 turnovers + 1 steal + 0.7 blocks, true shooting percentage of 67.5%;

Murray, 24.8 points + 4.8 rebounds + 6.5 assists + 2.2 turnovers + 1.5 steals + 0.2 blocks, true shooting rate of 55.2%;

In last year's Nets vs. Celtics series, Irving also played the role of a "hitman" next to Durant. Except for G1 that almost went against the tide, Irving has little sense of presence at other times. There are some differences between the two environments, the Celtics are stronger defensive than the Nuggets, but the Nets' finishing determination on the inside, the quality of shooters, and the offensive ability of non-space points on the outside are also stronger than the Suns. Irving doesn't have many excuses to talk about, and his numbers are significantly inferior:

21.3 points + 5.3 rebounds + 5.3 assists + 2.3 turnovers + 1.8 steals + 1.3 blocks, true shooting rate of 58.8%.

Compared to Murray, who has a shorter career resume, Irving has more highlight points. But the '16 finals were already seven years ago. After leaving the Cavaliers, Irving's best chance to prove himself "ace the first whip" was the playoffs against the Bucks in '21, however, you know.

All kinds of brain-opening ideas make Owen have no durability to speak of, and his greatest hope is still to be a good thug by his eldest brother's side. In the 22-23 season, Irving averaged 9.5 points per game in the fourth quarter (64.6% true shooting), ranking No. 1 in the league, and succinctly showed what Irving's role is next to Doncic, who "wants to eat a fat man", and this is indeed his strength.

Jamal Murray is a struggle. If Booker is close to the effect of upgrading to T1.5, and Irving stays at T2.5 to have the blessing of Yuwei, then Murray appears in this position as if betting on a hypothesis about Murray. Murray has indeed received reviews from Mr. Big Spectators and playoff players, and on three playoff trips in his career, he has performed much better than the regular season that season. You can simply compare the differences in panel data:

53 playoff games is not a small sample, and I'm not sure that's enough proof that Murray has transformational attributes. Looking only at the regular season, Murray was lackluster, and in the middle of the 22-23 season, I thought his form was the biggest hidden danger to the Nuggets' climb to the top, and even put him and Russell in a topic in one comparison. Obviously, I was punched in the face by playoff Murray, who completed the required lessons for hitters in the playoffs:

Murray responded to the various forms of single defense that his opponent imposed on him. These include blocking with Jokic, hand-to-hand, opponents holding the ball without disturbing three-point shots, and thick eyebrows changing defenses. Holding the ball to the near mid-range, he can eat hard. The Lakers defended Gordon with thick eyebrows and Hachimura defended Jokic, and this strategy had some effect, and Murray helped the team hold the scene with a hard solution before the Nuggets found a systemic solution.

Jokic's presence doesn't usually put Murray in a pinched environment. But the playoffs did have a team that caught Murray, the Heat, and they wanted to cover Murray's shot route with a pinch, while shrinking their wings to block Jokic's catch, so that Jokic could not comfortably get the ball in the dessert area. As a result, Murray responded with a series average of 10 assists per game.

These performances are haunting. It's too hard. Murray is enough to finish T2.5.

The next stage has 6 players.

Bronson is the shortest in this group. If you want to be a good hitter, it is usually necessary to have a certain height advantage in your position, because in addition to blocking and looking for misalignment, the thug must have the ability to omit all links and solve the problem directly. Although Bronson is short, he has a fairly reliable one-on-one grasp, and although he is more of a blocker driver from the regular season, Bronson's offensive logic is based on mid-range one-on-one technique rather than cover and do. In the past two years of playoffs, Bronson has averaged 4.1 and 5 singles per game, scoring more than 1.07 and 1.04 per round.

Jaylen Brown is perhaps the roughest one in this group, but also the one with the best dynamic talent. The combination of good body and mid-range recline technique basically means punishing the weak counterpoint without a solution - although we don't feel it. Even if you don't talk about Brown's desperate seven-steal after Tatum's injury, Brown is indeed not a second-in-command with a thug temperament, except for the 22-year first-round hot man who destroyed Curry Jr. and more playoffs, Brown did not turn himself into a bigger, more active role.

It's not exactly Brown's problem, in addition to Tatum, the Celtics have three guards who can handle the ball. But Brown's dominance technique is really not good enough to be called out frequently from outside the three-point line. Next season, Boshen will occupy a long interior position, and the departure of Smart has left the Green Army backcourt with one less manpower, which may give Jaylen more time in the No. 2 position, which means he will have a greater alignment advantage and more autonomous decision-making opportunities.

This is an opportunity as well as a challenge.

Middleton, the standard second-in-command "thug". 21 years of championship journey, Middleton is half-god. At one point, he couldn't punish Irving, who was two sizes younger than himself, but then he beat Bruce Brown, who seemed more defensive. The feeling is "hot man", and the feeling is "spicy eyes". Midou is very unstable, but for the Bucks, who both carry explosives and carry explosives, it is essential to have such a hard solution that can defuse bombs.

DeRozan, proving that he could not win enough series as a first solution. He seems to have been lacking the opportunity to get a relatively relaxed one-on-one environment as a second option in a team where the first main attacker can contain the opponent's main defensive energy. I feel like he can do it right now. But I'm not 100% sure.

Bill, he's not actually the standard "thug" style. As a big master, he is like a charging production finisher. Playing the second boss, under the suppression of Bill's domineering aura through the middle two, he will seal some of his powers. But now he has to be a "hitman", a third choice next to Durant and Booker, who will face Russell and Jamal Murray. In such a scene, he needs to explain to the fans why he can take 40 million.

Ingram, he has greatly changed the negative impression of "how can you not lift at a critical moment" and "unable to press the counterpoint". His shot has improved significantly, and he has the control to initiate roll calls, which is rare among strikers alone. But the play-off against the Thunder is a reminder of the fact that after all, Ingram is a forward who has a harder time pressing from outside the three-point line to the dessert zone than SGA. As a forward, Ingram's ability to be low in the three-point line and not on the ball is limited, coupled with the lack of sufficiently stable shooting efficiency support for a high proportion of mid-range play, making him stuck in an "ok and not enough" position.

Ingram and Jaylen Brown are the two most hidden defensive qualities in this group, and if they have the heart, there are opportunities to improve their evaluation from the other end.

CJ McCollum. The old "thug" is out, and if he is just getting into the Pelicans' form, he is stable in T3. But in the '22-23 season, CJ had some games that were too abstract, and as a No. 1 hitter, he lacked defensive compatibility than the No. 2/3 players and was more sensitive to the decline in his offensive performance.

Here is the overall binning of the "Hitter" grouping, and the other groups that have been completed: