Recently, Prigozhin, the boss of Wagner mercenaries, gave an interview to the Russian media, in which he not only sprayed the Russian Ministry of Defense as usual and announced that he would not sign any volunteer contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense, but also seemingly unintentionally said that Wagner mercenaries would return to the front line on August 5. How Prigozin usually sprays the Russian Ministry of Defense is a trifle, and the real big news is precisely this time he revealed, which means that Prigozhin and the Russian Ministry of Defense may have reached an agreement, and now the return of Wagner mercenaries to the front line is a foregone conclusion, as for the contract issue it does not seem to matter. (Think about what Primozin said in the battle of Bakhmut, now look at him as a smoke bomb)
However, Prigozhin's official announcement of the return of Wagner is quite an intriguing point in time, because now Ukraine is launching a huge counteroffensive, from Donetsk to Zaporozhye almost into a pot of porridge, and the Ukrainian army in the direction of Kherson has also changed. Although the Russian army's defense line has not been shaken by the Ukrainian army as a whole, the pressure is still relatively obvious, why did the Wagner mercenaries wait until August to return to the front? Could it be that Prigozhin had ulterior motives and planned to reap the benefits of the fisherman?
In fact, Prigozhin's official announcement of the time is considered to have ulterior motives from a certain angle, but on the other hand, his words are also hidden murder. It's just that this is not because he wants to sit on the benefits of the fisherman, but because of the needs of the overall war situation of the Russian army, and it pinches the fate of the Ukrainian army.
Please think about a question, any offensive in the history of war must have its offensive cycle, and the Ukrainian army is naturally no exception, so how long is the offensive cycle of the Ukrainian army? The answer is three months. Taking the counterattack launched by the Ukrainian army in July last year as an example, starting with the mobilization of troops in Kherson in July, the Ukrainian offensive continued piecemeal until early October. The time when the Ukrainian army achieved a key victory in Kharkiv was in early September, but it should be noted that the Ukrainian offensive was also on the verge of ending at that time, which also caused the Ukrainian army to fail to form a annihilation effect in Kharkov, but only successfully drove the Russian army out of Kharkov.
If we take the counteroffensive of the Ukrainian army last year as an example, it is not difficult to find a very key problem, the most powerful time point of the Ukrainian offensive was in July, and then in August, the offensive power declined, before the main offensive in Kharkov was launched, the main pressure direction of the Ukrainian army was in Kherson, and it was not until September that it suddenly turned to attack Kharkov. It is worth noting that perhaps the reason for the excessive pressure in the Kherson direction, a large number of materials and mobile forces of the Ukrainian army were actually consumed in the Kherson direction.
It must be admitted that the performance of the Ukrainian army from July to October last year was very wonderful, although the Kherson counteroffensive that began in July was a pretense, but the Ukrainian army still focused on suppressing the logistics line of the Russian army in the direction of Kherson, while using its own strength advantage to encroach on the positions of the Russian army, forcing the Russian army to determine that the main direction of attack of the Ukrainian army was in Kherson. After the Russian army completely ignored the threat in the Kharkov direction, the main forces of the Ukrainian army, which had been hiding, swarmed out, crushing the vulnerable forces of the Russian army in the Kharkov direction with absolute superiority. And the defeat of the Kharkov direction also led to a lot of things, such as the fact that the Russian army had to give up the lands of Red Liman and Kherson on the right bank of the Dnieper, etc.
But please note that the offensive of the Ukrainian army actually ends here, and the two-front war between Kherson and Kharkov is also very heavy on the logistics of the Ukrainian army, and the Ukrainian army needs time to recover its consumed equipment and materials and replenish the troops participating in the battle. This logistical force majeure forced the Ukrainian army to end its counteroffensive in early October, and although the Ukrainian government did not want the offensive to end, the reality was that the Ukrainian army was too exhausted to continue the offensive. Of course, we all know the following things, the Ukrainian government forced the Ukrainian army to operate in the direction of Bakhmut, but because of lack of preparation, this finally turned into a complete meat grinder, and the valuable mobile forces of the Ukrainian army were also strangled by Wagner mercenaries in Bakhmut.
From this, we can draw a very key conclusion, that is, the Ukrainian counteroffensive cycle is three months, of which the first month of the offensive will be very ferocious, the intensity of the offensive will begin to decrease exponentially in the second month, and the last month of the offensive is the weakest time of their offensive. If we look at the Ukrainian army's counteroffensive cycle last year, then the Ukrainian army is currently in the first month of its counteroffensive cycle. If you consider that the Ukrainian army has invested a large number of NATO equipment on the battlefield, this is indeed the strongest stage of the Ukrainian offensive cycle.
If we consider the current front situation of Russia and Ukraine, the Ukrainian army can put into the counteroffensive at this stage about 40 brigades, and there are about 15 brigades currently pressing the front line, which is also the Ukrainian army's current mobile force with a high degree of mechanization and a relatively complete number of heavy equipment. The Ukrainian army is currently hoping that these troops can break through the Russian army's defense system, so that those lightly armed brigades that do not have the ability to break through can randomly move troops to break into the hinterland of the Russian front. Unfortunately, because the current defense of the Russian army is very solid, the Ukrainian army has only broken through the minefield and anti-tank obstacle area, which is still far from the goal of shaking the Russian defense system, and the relative losses of the Ukrainian army are already very high.
In other words, when Wagner returned to the front on August 5, the Ukrainian army must have paid a high price to break through the Russian front, even if the Ukrainian army could touch the core defense belt of the Russian army at that time, the Ukrainian army's attack capability had fallen to the bottom. If the Russian army does not plan to use reserves, but plans to keep them for winter, then Wagner mercenaries will be used to counter the offensive of the Ukrainian army in the last month. But it is unlikely that Wagner will be expected to launch a flexible defense, and they are more likely to be thrown into a certain position to launch an offensive, forcing the Ukrainian army to invest its forces in the last month to the position that the Russian army hopes they will take, thereby disrupting the deployment of the Ukrainian army in one fell swoop, so as not to repeat the Ukrainian army's old tricks to repeat the Battle of Kharkiv.
It can be assumed that Wagner mercenaries will pick a position that the Ukrainian army cannot easily give up, carefully prepare another "meat grinder" for the Ukrainian army, and let the Ukrainian army fight the war in the way Russia wants. This is in line with the strategy and tactics of the Russian army at this stage - to try to wear down the main forces of the Ukrainian army, especially the mobile forces among them, and expand the losses of the Ukrainian army. Although we still do not know where the Wagner mercenaries will reproduce the "Bakhmut", the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Wagner mercenaries should be ready, just wait for the Ukrainian army's offensive cycle to reach the limit, the Wagner mercenaries will inevitably attack.
This is not good news for the Ukrainian army, because their life has been pinched by Russia. Judging from the current war situation, their losses in June were already somewhat too high, and a large number of NATO equipment was destroyed and abandoned, which marked that the Ukrainian counteroffensive suffered irreversible resistance. If the Ukrainian army continues this reckless attack, then the counteroffensive will most likely turn into another "Bakhmut" in the end, not to mention that the main force of the Ukrainian army's attack is those veterans who survived the battle of Bakhmut, if these veterans are also dead, then the Ukrainian army will really collapse.
The best way for the Ukrainian army now is to reduce the scale of the counteroffensive, which should be aimed at winning a favorable defensive position as much as possible, so as to gain a respite and recovery, rather than pursuing a so-called full-front victory. However, how Ukraine will fight us as spectators is not a matter of opinion, and I only hope that the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian military can make a wise judgment to avoid this result. Otherwise, the Ukrainian army will not only have to bear the consequences of the failure of the counteroffensive, but also more likely to completely lose the strategic initiative. But whether the Ukrainian side will discover the hidden danger, then only time will tell.