<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="5" > Four Field General Series 15: Cheng Zihua (middle</h1>).
Author: Mast
In the three historical stages of our army, Cheng Zihua's seniority was very high, and his military achievements were also very prominent.
Let's first look at Cheng Zihua's qualifications:
On September 17, 1935, the Red 25th Army, which arrived in northern Shaanxi during the Long March, merged with the Shaanxi-Gansu-Hong 26th and Red 27th Armies to form the Red 15th Army, with Cheng Zihua as the political commissar of the corps and Xu Haidong as the commander of the regiment. After the end of the Long March, the Red Army was restored in early November, with the Red 1st and about 15th Armies under its jurisdiction. At that time, the commander and political commissar of the Red 1Staffe Army were Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen respectively. Cheng Zihua's highest position during the Red Army period was the political commissar of the corps. In terms of rank, Cheng Zihua and Lin, Nie, and Xu Haidong are of the same rank.
Cheng Zihua
During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Cheng Zihua first served as the political commissar of the Jizhong Military Region; later as the deputy political commissar of the Jin-Cha-Ji Military Region, and acting commander and political commissar in the later period of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. At that time, Jin-Cha-Ji was a first-class military region, and Cheng Zihua was acting as Nie Rongzhen's deputy.
At the beginning of the Liberation War, Cheng Zihua served as the commander and political commissar of the Jichareliao Military Region, and on April 20, 1947, he was assigned to the Northeast Democratic United Army and has since been under Lin Biao's command. Due to the expansion of the scale of Dongye's troops, in order to facilitate front-line command, from August to September 1947, Dongye established two forward command posts (later renamed the 1st and 2nd forward command posts) in Nanman and Jicha Reliao, with Xiao Jinguang and Cheng Zihua as commanders. In August 1948, the 1st and 2nd party command posts were changed to the 1st and 2nd corps respectively, and the commanders and personnel remained unchanged. On March 11, 1949, Siye formed four corps, of which the 12th Corps and 13 Corps were renamed from the 1st and 2nd Corps, with Xiao and Cheng still as commanders; the 14th Corps and 15 Corps were newly formed corps, and the commanders were Liu Yalou and Deng Hua.
Judging from the above-mentioned appointments in different periods, no matter from which angle, Cheng Zihua should be a senior general of the hard state.
Look at his exploits:
During the Red Army period, Cheng Zihua's most important battle achievement was to command the Red 25th Army to successfully complete the Long March. During the Long March, the Red 25th Army passed through the barriers and beheaded the generals, and there were many big battles and vicious battles, such as the Battle of Dushu Town, the Battle of Yujiahe, the Ambush of Shita Temple, the Ambush Battle of Yuanjiagoukou, and the Battle of Sipo Village. Although these battles or campaigns were fought under the collective command of the Red 25th Army, as a military commander, Cheng Zihuadang was the main commander and the main responsible person. After the Red 25th Army arrived in northern Shaanxi, during the two battles of Laoshan and Yulin Bridge, Cheng Zihua was the political commissar of the Red 15th Army, the campaign policy was determined by him, and the front-line command was Xu Haidong and Liu Zhidan.
During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Cheng Zihua's status in the Jizhong and Jin-Cha-Ji Military Regions was relatively high, and the main task was to create base areas, and there were not many battles under direct command.
During the Liberation War, the Jichareliao Military Region, of which Cheng Zihua was commander and political commissar, stepped out of the three main columns of Dongye, namely the 8th Column, the 9th Column, and the 11th Column (after the unified reorganization, it was the 45th, 46th, and 48th Armies). During the Liaoshen Campaign, the layout of the campaign between Lin Biao and the Dongye headquarters was to divide the entire battlefield into four organic components that were interconnected: First, jinzhou was also the core and key of the campaign, and was directly commanded by the headquarters led by Lin Biao; second, the siege of Changchun was besieged and commanded by Xiao Jinguang; third, the diversionary action was taken in the western Liaoning Corridor, and the 6 column commanders unified command of the 5th column and the 10th column, preparing to destroy the enemy who broke through Changchun, and monitoring and containing the westward advance corps in Shenyang; and fourth, blocking the enemy's eastward advance corps at Tashan. Cheng Zihua unified the command of the 4th column and 11th column of Dongye and the independent 4th and 6th divisions of the Jichareliao Military Region.
That is to say, Cheng Zihua was the top commander of the battlefield on the Tashan side. The importance of the direction of Tashan is second only to the Jinzhou offensive. It can be seen from this that Cheng Zihua's position and weight in the Dongye Army at that time. After 6 days of fierce fighting, it successfully blocked the enemy's eastward advancing corps, effectively guaranteeing the victory of Jinzhou's offensive and the entire campaign. The Battle of Tashan Blockade was a classic example and was the result of the bloody struggle of commanders and fighters at all levels. However, as the top commander of the battlefield, Cheng Zihua made indispensable contributions to whether it was to go deep into the front line to arrange defensive positions and implement the allocation of troops before the war, or to command the operation after the start of the war and adjust the deployment according to the changes in the battlefield situation.
When the Liaoshen Campaign was not yet finally over, Fu Zuoyi sent three armies, cavalry, tanks and other units to sneak into Shijiazhuang and threaten the central garrison. On November 1, 1948, Cheng Zihua, on the orders of the headquarters and the Eastern Commandery, led the Dongye Advance Corps, that is, the 4th Column, the 11th Column, 3 Independent Divisions, and 1 Cavalry Division, which had just been withdrawn from the Tashan Front, and immediately marched towards Guannei, directly threatening Beiping and forcing Fu Zuoyi to withdraw the army attacking Shijiazhuang.
Under the deployment of the chairman, the entry of the Higashino Advance Corps into the customs was actually a prelude to the Battle of Pingjin. On December 9, Cheng Zihua commanded the 4th Column and the 11th Column, and with a swift and powerful movement, cut off the Pingzhang Line in one fell swoop, quickly annihilated the enemy's 16th and 104th Armies, and entered the Nankou and Changping fronts, effectively ensuring that the North China Field Corps surrounded and annihilated the enemies of Xinbao and Zhangjiakou, and was commended by the general order of the headquarters.
Under the command of Cheng Zihua, the Dongye Advance Corps ignored the extreme fatigue after the great war, did not wait for personnel and materials to be replenished, and immediately dispatched after receiving the order, not only brilliantly fulfilling the task of threatening Beiping and relieving the siege of Shijiazhuang, but also cutting off the Pingzhang line in time, creating conditions for the strategic development of the Pingjin Campaign. On the one hand, this shows that this unit is not afraid of fatigue, is not afraid of hardship, and resolutely carries out its combat style; on the other hand, it also proves That Cheng Zihua's ability to govern and command the army.
Transferred to Shanxi Secretary:
After the Battle of Pingjin, Cheng Zihua served as the commander of the 13th Corps of Siye and commanded the 38th, 47th, and 49th Armies to fight south. The opponents of the Four Wilds fighting south, except for the Gui clan, which still has some combat effectiveness, the other enemy troops are all fleeing from the wind. The four wild armies were like a bamboo all the way, there was no battle, it was basically a pursuit battle, and it could not reflect any command level. In the Battle of Hengbao, the task of the 13th Corps was to detour the western road, take the Yuanling and Zhijiang rivers, and directly insert itself into Guangxi Baise and Nanning, and cut off the enemy's retreat to Yunnan and Guizhou. But there was no big battle.
After the Battle of Hengbao, most of the main force of the Gui clan was annihilated, and the large-scale battle in the area of The Four Wilds was basically over. At the end of 1949, the organization arranged for Cheng Zihua to serve as the secretary of Shanxi, the chairman of the province, the commander and political commissar of the provincial military district, and he was a veritable "number one" in Shanxi.
The reason why Cheng Zihua was transferred to Shanxi was that first, cadres were urgently needed in the newly liberated areas, and the war of liberation was nearing its end, so organizationally a large number of cadres were drawn from the army to take up posts in local areas; second, there seemed to be an unwritten stipulation at that time, and as far as possible, local people were selected to take charge of the new liberated areas, such as Chairman Li in charge of Hubei, Huang Kecheng in charge of Hunan, Ye Jianying in charge of Guangdong, Chen Zhengren in charge of Jiangxi, and so on; Cheng Zihua was a native of Shanxi, so he was sent to Shanxi; third, the main responsible persons of the provinces that were arranged to be in charge at that time were basically cadres at the corps level. Cheng Zihua was the only Shanxi native among the corps-level cadres.
In this way, Cheng Zihua left the army at the beginning of the founding of the country and missed the 1955 grand award. With Cheng Zihua's seniority and military achievements, if he did not leave the army, he was obviously awarded the rank of general in 1955. Since he was not awarded a title, there was relatively little publicity about his military achievements, and it is not surprising that some young friends did not know much about his qualifications and military achievements. In addition, it has to be said that the Red 25th Army can only produce a general, if Cheng Zihua did not leave the military circle, it was really difficult to choose between him and Xu Haidong when awarding the title. Therefore, the rank of great general can also be regarded as a courtesy that Cheng Zihua inadvertently gave.
There are still many generals like Cheng Zihua who did not participate in the awarding of titles, such as the commander of the Red 4 Regiment who served as the pioneer of the Long March Road, and the famous General Geng Biao of the Yang Luogeng Corps, who did not award titles because he served as an ambassador abroad, and later became the only defense minister in China without a military rank.
General Cheng Zihua fought for half his life and made outstanding achievements, but he did not award a title, which is indeed a bit of a pity. But we should not forget the exploits of those who did not have titleless generals.
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