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The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

author:South China Sea talks

As we all know, the division of labor and cooperation between Chen Yi and Su Yu during the Liberation War was an important factor in the successive victories of our East China Field Army.

But many people overlook that in the early days of the Liberation War, Chen Yi and Su Yu commanded battles in Shandong and central China, respectively.

Because they both looked at the problem from their own perspectives, many problems arose in the coordinated operations of the two military regions. In October 1946, three commanders of the Central China Military Region sent a secret telegram to Yan'an behind Chen Yi's back, requesting the central authorities to resolve the issue of command of the joint operations of the two military regions.

Chairman Mao finally decided to establish the new East China Military Region, which completely reversed the unfavorable situation of nearly half a year.

The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

Chen Yi and Su Yu

After the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, in order to avoid the enemy's front, our army's center of gravity shifted northward, but the reconstruction of the Central China Military Region had an awkward relationship with the Shandong Military Region

After the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in 1945, Chiang Kai-shek, while wantonly "looting" the occupied areas, also paid attention to how to eliminate the liberated areas created by the people's army.

However, compared with the northern liberated areas opened up by the Eighth Route Army, such as Jinsui, Jin-Cha-Ji, and Shandong, although the central China Liberated Areas created by the New Fourth Army were prosperous, they were adjacent to the enemy capital Nanjing, and they would inevitably bear the brunt of the battle between the two sides.

As soon as its western neighbor, the Central Plains Liberated Area was besieged by heavy enemy forces, and it could not play a role in supporting each other.

Moreover, the Central China Liberated Area and the Central Plains Liberated Area did not have mountains and rivers as a natural barrier, and the Kuomintang army used American weapons to build a fast column with strong mobility. In the face of such an unfavorable strategic situation, Chairman Mao put forward in September of that year the policy of developing space to the northeast.

The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

Mao Zedong

Therefore, our army sent 120,000 officers and men and local cadres from North China and Shandong to the north to compete with the Kuomintang army for the northeast region liberated by the Soviet army.

At the same time, Chairman Mao also ordered Luo Ronghuan, commander of the Shandong Military Region, to lead the party committee and the leading body of the military region to the north as a whole to establish the leading organ of the Northeast Military Region.

Chen Yi, commander of the New Fourth Army and secretary of the Central China Bureau, led the New Fourth Army and the leading institutions of the Central China Military Region to Shandong to establish a new East China Bureau and Shandong Military Region Headquarters.[1] Chairman Mao was already worried that central China would be abandoned in the early stages of the war, so he wanted to downgrade it to a guerrilla zone.

However, Su Yu, then commander of the Jiangsu-Zhejiang Military Region of the New Fourth Army, resolutely opposed the voluntary abandonment of central China. At that time, our army established four military regions in central China, namely Jiangsu Central, Northern Jiangsu, Huainan and Huaibei, with a population of up to 30 million and rich in grain.

The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

Su Yu

Su Yu believed that retreating north in great strides would only strengthen the enemy's strength and give the central power to force Chen to persist in the struggle in central China. After careful consideration, Chairman Mao agreed with Su Yu's view.

In October 1945, Deng Zihuan became the secretary of the newly established Central China Branch, and after the reconstruction of the Central China Military Region, Zhang Dingcheng was appointed as the commander.

At the same time, four columns of the main forces of the Central China Military Region were reorganized into the Central China Field Army, and Su Yu became the deputy commander of the Military Region and concurrently served as the commander of the field army [2].

However, at that time, no one expected that the Central China Sub-Bureau would accept the leadership of the East China Bureau, so that the Central China Military Region would be subject to the control of the Shandong Military Region, which would in turn restrict the operations of the two military regions. Because the development of the Shandong Eighth Route Army was better than that of the New Fourth Army during the Anti-Japanese War, if the two military regions jointly operated, the Shandong Military Region could only be the mainstay.

The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

Su Yu

In the early days of its establishment, the Shandong Field Army had under its jurisdiction the 7th and 8th Divisions of the former Eighth Route Army Shandong Military Region, and the 1st and 2nd Columns of the New Fourth Army, with a total strength of 74,000 troops. Although the Central China Field Army had 6, 7, 8 and 9 columns, it was mainly upgraded from local troops, and its total strength was only 47,000.

However, the Central China Military Region is actually facing a stronger enemy, and Shandong, as an important base connecting our many strategic regions, will never be able to attack the entire army to cooperate with the Central China Field Army to ward off the enemy.

At the same time, the means of communication of our army are limited, and it is impossible for two military districts and two field army headquarters to communicate face-to-face and in real time.

In this way, both Chen Yi and Su Yu could only make plans based on the situation of the enemy in front of them, and Chairman Mao, who was far away in Yan'an, could not quickly judge whose plan was more reasonable. This laid many hidden dangers for our army's southern front operations after the outbreak of the Liberation War.

The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

Su Yu

Chairman Mao ordered the southern front to attack and force the enemy to negotiate, Su Yu fought seven battles and seven victories, but Chen Yi defeated Si County

On June 26, 1946, the enemy's 300,000-strong army launched a fierce attack on the Liberated Areas of China's Central Plains, marking the full-scale outbreak of the Liberation War.

Although our Central Plains Military Region has long made preparations for a breakthrough, the main force of the breakthrough still suffered heavy losses on the way to battle.

Faced with such an unfavorable balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves, Chairman Mao formulated a plan to take advantage of the enemy's all-out attack on the Liberated Areas of the Central Plains and take the initiative on the southern front. At that time, many people believed that the scale of the civil war was manageable, and Chairman Mao also believed that although the enemy was numerous, he was numerous.

However, due to logistical and transport capacity constraints, it is not possible to drive to the front line all at once. Therefore, it is hoped that superior forces will be formed locally to attack and defend, and try to avoid introducing war into the Liberated Areas.

He asked our Taihang troops and Shandong troops to take the initiative to attack to the south and strive to fight several annihilation battles in a short period of time. Perhaps it could be forced to force the enemy to stop the offensive and continue negotiations between the two parties instead.

The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

army

The top brass of the Shandong Field Army quickly analyzed the enemy situation and made a plan, but Chen Yi realized that it would be difficult to attack the Longhai Road on his own. Moreover, many elite and strong generals followed Luo Ronghuan to the northeast, so that the mountains and fields could not find qualified generals who could command the battle of the large corps.

Fortunately, Chairman Mao also thought of this layer and decided that Huaye would also participate in the southern offensive. When Chen Yi heard the news, he was overjoyed and immediately sent a report to Zhang Dingcheng, commander of the Central China Military Region, hoping that they would move the main force to the west, and the two field armies would form a local superior force under the unified command of the mountain and field headquarters to annihilate the enemy.

However, Su Yu believed that once the main forces were transferred to the Jinpu line, the Soviet Union-Central Liberated Area was likely to quickly become an enemy.

The lesson of his failure to lead the Red 7th Army north to Zhejiang made Su Yu very resistant to fighting without rear.

The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

Su Yu

He proposed another plan, in which Huaye used the advantage of internal operations in the central Soviet Union to annihilate the enemy coming from the direction of Nanjing in order to deal with the mountains. However, Zhang Dingcheng and others considered organizational relations and once decided that Hua Ye would act according to Chen Yi's plan.

Unexpectedly, while they were discussing the battle plan with Chen Yi, Su Yu also sent his own proposition to Yan'an. On July 4, Chairman Mao sent a telegram back to Su Yu, approving his plan to fight a major war in the Soviet Union. At the same time, he sent a telegram to Chen Yi, asking him to suspend the southern offensive plan.

Why can Su Yu, who ranks low in the leadership of the Central China Military Region, have more confidence than Zhang Dingcheng and others to insist on his own claims? It turned out that on August 20, 1945, when the Central Military Commission ordered each strategic region to form a field army, it explicitly required the military regions to provide support for the field army's operations, and the Central Military Commission directly inquired about the military operations of the field army.

In this way, Su Yu was able to bypass Chen Yi and directly report to Chairman Mao, but it also showed the awkwardness of the relationship between the two military regions at that time.

The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

Su Yu

While our troops in Shandong and Central China were repeatedly discussing battle plans, Tang Enbo, commander of the enemy's First Pacification District, commanded 15 brigades of five reorganized divisions, totaling 120,000 superior troops, and slammed into the Soviet Union.

Fortunately, Su Yu had been prepared for a long time, and after 45 days from July 13, he fought seven victories in Rugao, Hai'an, Fort Lee, Huangqiao, and Shaobo, annihilating 53,000 enemies. The "seven battles and seven victories" between the Soviet Union and China fully proved Su Yu's outstanding military talent, and also proved that our army is capable of defeating the Kuomintang army with American-style equipment as long as the tactics are appropriate.

Although it was learned that the Central China Field Army had its own plans, the leaders of the Shandong Military Region believed that they could complete the external attack operations on their own.

In July, the 2nd Column of the Mountains and Fields cooperated with Liu Deng to attack Chaoyang Ji in northern Huaibei, and indeed won the victory of annihilating more than 5,000 enemies.

The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

Chen Yi

But then Chen Yi and the chief of staff of Shan Ye noticed that the headquarters of the 172nd Division of the enemy Seventh Army and two regiments were stationed in Si County. Not only was the location isolated, but the 7th Army's Gui clan should not be supported by Chiang Kai-shek's lineage.

At this time, the relationship between the Shandong Military Region and the Central China Military Region played a role, and Su Yu ordered the Central China Field Army to send the 9th Column to cooperate with Chen Yi's operation.[3]

Unexpectedly, when the 8th Division of the Shandong Field Army launched a siege battle on August 7, heavy rain suddenly fell from the sky and caused the water level of the enemy's moat to rise sharply.

At the same time, muddy roads prevented artillery from reaching the front line, and explosive packs were generally wet and unable to fire. As a result, two days later, both the 8th Division of Shanye and the 9th Column of Huaye suffered heavy casualties, and seeing that they could neither capture Jiancheng nor help, Chen Yi had to order his troops to retreat.

The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

army

Chen Yi ignored the advice of the general of central China to move his troops to Muyang, and the enemy took Huaibei lightly, causing our army to be forced to withdraw from central China

The Shandong Field Army attacked the city with superior forces and lost to the enemy two regiments, and the commanders and fighters at the grassroots level in the mountains and fields all complained, as if they had been compared by Huaye.

However, in the early days of the Liberation War, it was a basic fact that the enemy was strong and weak, and the 172nd Division of the enemy, as the elite of the Gui family, had a level of weaponry and training that our army could not match, and this could not be simply attributed to a mistake in command. The defeat in the Battle of Sixian did not change the leadership system of our army, and the Shandong Military Region still had the right to ask the Central China Military Region to cooperate with its own battle plan.

However, Xue Yue, director of the Xuzhou Appeasement Office, saw the weakness of our army's inability to effectively cooperate, and he personally formulated an operational plan of "attacking the south with the sound of the north."

The enemy's suspension of operations on the southern front attracted our Huaye to the south to regain the lost territory, and the main force of the northern front also set off the posture of attacking Muyang and fighting a decisive battle with our Shandong Field Army.

The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

Chen Yi

Chen Yi saw that the enemy was trying to eat the Shandong Liberated Area step by step, so he ordered the main force of the field army to be placed near Muyang for layers of defense.

But Su Yu, who was directing the battle in Hai'an, found that the enemy had deliberately lengthened the front and fell into confusion, and suddenly found the lifeline of our army on the map: the Lianghuai Military Region.

He immediately sent an urgent telegram to the headquarters of the Central China Military Region, analyzing: The enemy clearly wants to attack Muyang, but in fact he may actually want to invade the Lianghuai region. As soon as the two Huai were lost, the connection between Central China and Shandong was severed.

Of course, with the current situation, it would not hurt if Shan Ye could defeat the enemy in Muyang's direction. But if the two armies form a state of anxiety, the two Huai, which have empty troops, will be in danger.

The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

Chen Yi

Central China Governors Zhang Dingcheng, Deng Zihui, and Zeng Shan were shocked when they read Su Yu's telegram and immediately sent a report to the leaders of the mountains and the central authorities. They asked the Central Military Commission to make a decision immediately, and that the main force of Huaye should be transferred to the north immediately, or that Shanye should send a main force to Lianghuai immediately for defensive deployment.

But Chen Yi received this urgent call and analyzed Mu Yang's enemy situation in person. He found that the enemy's main force Seventh Army and the reorganized 74th Division were in the direction of Muyang, and the enemy did not have more troops to play any more conspiracies at the moment. So he called back to Huazhong and said that he would go to Lianghuai if he defeated Muyang's enemy.

But the day after the battle between the enemy and us near Muyang, Chen Yi suddenly found that the enemy's 7th Army had uncharacteristically fought with all its strength, while the number of the reorganized 74th Division had disappeared. Chen Yi suddenly realized this, and hurriedly made deployment adjustments.

However, before our main forces in the north and south did not react, the enemy's reorganized 74th Division had already taken advantage of its mobile superiority to conquer Huaiyin and Huai'an.

When Su Yu heard the bad news, he beat his chest with anger, and he could only give up as soon as the two Huai were lost in the Central China Liberated Area.

The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

Su Yu

The three commanders of the military region jointly demanded that Su Yu take unified command, and the merger of the two field armies finally opened up the situation

By this time, the top officials of the two military regions and the field army realized that only by letting Huaye go north to Shandong could he avoid being surrounded and annihilated by the enemy.

On September 23, Chairman Mao sent a telegram to the two field armies at the same time, and for the first time proposed the idea of the two field armies fighting together, with Chen Yi and Su Yu serving as the chief and deputy commanders respectively.

However, just as Su Yu and them were discussing the route of retreating north to Shandong, the enemy actually made an advance move. Xue Yue ordered the enemies of the two Huai to attack Lianshui north, in a vain attempt to cut off Huaye's passage north to Shandong. Another enemy attacked Zaozhuang from Lunan, creating the illusion of attacking the capital of our Shandong base area.

It was obvious that the enemy's attack on Lianshui was the real killing move, but under the objective situation that the two field armies were still hundreds of miles apart and communication was not smooth, Chen Yi still ordered Shanye to defend Zaozhuang with all his strength, and asked Hua Ye to defend Lianshui himself.

The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

Chen Yi

Su Yu and Zhang Dingcheng were very anxious when they saw the telegram, but they also realized that the Shandong Military Region and the Central China Military Region were doing their own thing, and that it was the fundamental reason why they were repeatedly defeated by the enemy. So on October 4, Zhang Dingcheng, Deng Zihui, and Zeng Shan jointly sent a secret telegram to the central authorities. In order not to affect the unity of comrades, they specially reminded Chairman Mao to "hope not to tell Chen."

In the cipher telegram, Zhang Dingcheng and others painfully recalled the losses caused by the inability of the two field armies to effectively coordinate operations. It is also believed that the Shandong Field Army has superior forces but poor results, just because of the lack of excellent battlefield commanders. Therefore, they suggested to the Central Military Commission that the mountain and central China field armies should be completely merged, and let Su Yu assist Chen Yi in commanding the whole army.

After careful consideration, Chairman Mao believed that Su Yu was far superior to Chen Yi in terms of military talent alone. However, Su Yu's biggest problem was that his qualifications were too shallow to effectively contain the arrogant generals of the Shandong Field Army.

Therefore, if the two field armies had to merge, Chen Yi could only be the main officer, and at the same time let him support Su Yu in charge of the battle.

The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

Chen Yi

However, at this time, Chen Yi had not yet realized this layer, and he called the Central Military Commission, still hoping that Chairman Mao would support him to return to Lunan to fight first, and then consider the demands of central China. Chairman Mao's reply call proceeded from the overall situation and finally persuaded Chen Yi to take over Huaye's battle in Huaibei first.

In a telegram to the two major field armies on October 15, Chairman Mao formally readjusted the system of the East China Theater. He pointed out that Chen Yi's Shandong leading organization must be merged with the central China leading organization, with Chen Yi taking overall responsibility. However, it was clearly required that Su Yu should command the troops to fight.

Under Chairman Mao's strategizing, Huaye finally went north to Shandong to join forces with Shanye. Chen Yi generously admitted his shortcomings in commanding operations and proposed to jointly launch the Subei Campaign.

After the front-line battle began, Chen Yi took the initiative to walk out of the war room to play chess, and Su Yu could concentrate on directing the battle without distraction.

The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

Mao Zedong

Of course, some mountain generals did not obey Su Yu at first, and even "promoted" their plans on the phone. At this time, Chen Yi grabbed the phone, and when he heard that it was "Mr. Chen", he did not dare to have an opinion.

The Subei Campaign annihilated the enemy's reorganized 69th Brigade in one fell swoop, and also proved for the first time the feasibility of joint operations between the two field armies. On January 23, 1947, the two major field armies and the two military regions were formally merged, and Deng Zihui, Zhang Dingcheng and Zeng Shan also entered the East China Bureau.

However, the new East China Military Region was still reappointed by the former leader of the Shandong Military Region, and Deng Zihuan and others no longer dealt with the military and mainly turned to logistics and conscription propaganda work. Su Yu grew up to be the deputy commander of the East China Field Army, and then commanded the new East China Field Army to fight successively in the Battle of Lunan , the Battle of Laiwu and the Battle of Menglianggu.

Chen Yi and Su Yu, a good partner of the Jiangnan Command of the New Fourth Army, soon became a golden partner comparable to Liu Deng in the PLA.

The three chiefs sent a secret telegram at the end of the article, stating "Don't tell Chen Yi", the chairman: The military system must be reformed

Chen Yi and Su Yu

So much so that when Chairman Mao decided to rebuild the Central Plains Bureau in 1948 and let Chen Yi go from East China to the Central Plains to preside over the overall situation, Su Yu reluctantly said to Chairman Mao: "I should obey the arrangements of the Central Committee, but Huaye cannot do without Commander Chen."

Finally, after deliberation, Chen Yi ostensibly remained the commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, while Su Yu was the acting commander and acting political commissar of the East China Field Army, and was actually responsible for all actions in Huaye. And when the Huaihai Campaign ended, the Second and Third Field Armies jointly fought the Battle of Crossing the River.

Chen Yi returned to being the commander of the Third Field Army, and Su Yu took the initiative to return to his position as deputy commander. Chen Yi never pressed Su Yu with his qualifications, and Su Yu never fought for positions with battle merits. With such a united senior general, our army will naturally be able to annihilate 8 million enemy troops and liberate all of China.

Resources

[1] Edited by the Chinese Communist Party History Society · Historical Dictionary of the Communist Party of China · CPC History Publishing House, Party Building Reading Publishing House · 2019

[2] Su Yu: The first of the ten generals made extraordinary achievements during the war years--Party History Channel-People's Daily.2021-06-09

[3] China Military Encyclopedia Editorial Office, China Encyclopedia, Military, China Encyclopedia Press, 2007