In World War II and the Pacific War, the United States and Japan showed the world what a showdown between aircraft carriers is. Perhaps the naval strength of the Japanese army is indeed very strong, but in front of the US Navy, it is not worth mentioning.
Especially in the late Pacific War, the Japanese Navy and the US Navy took on an almost one-sided strategic form.
A naval battle between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States Navy near the Mariana Islands in the Pacific theater of World War II. This naval battle was the largest aircraft carrier decisive battle in human history.
But why is such a war nicknamed "Mariana Turkey Hunting Competition" by the US military? Today, Xiao Gong will talk with you about it.
On June 19–20, 1944, Task Force 58 of the U.S. Fifth Fleet and Japan's First Mobile Fleet fought a naval battle off the Mariana Sea. In this naval battle, the United States and Japan committed almost 24 aircraft carriers, and countless others.
At first, the Japanese Navy's battle plan was cleverly designed, but it basically lost its meaning before the war.
From the second half of 1942 to the first half of 1943, with the victory of the Allied forces in the Guadalcanal Campaign, the US military basically completely seized the initiative in the Pacific theater.
Admiral Chester William Nimitz, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, wanted to launch a new offensive in the middle of the Pacific, and Admiral Douglas MacArthur launched island-hopping operations from Australia to Indonesia and the Philippines, and in the first half of 1944 both fronts were rapidly approaching Japan.
From here, it can basically be seen that the goal of the US military is very clear, that is, to attack the Japanese mainland.
And in this way, the US military needs a very important springboard. Therefore, in order to further launch air strikes on the Japanese mainland and completely crush Japan and the Japanese Navy, the US military also needs to capture the Mariana Islands as a base for B-29 bombers.
Of course, the menacing US military and the Japanese Navy are not fools, and they also see the intentions of the US military at a glance. In response to the plan of the US military, Japan also formulated a corresponding combat plan to resist the attack of the US army. After replacing the deceased Koga Mineichi as commander-in-chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Toyoda launched Operation Ah on May 20, 1944, hoping that a mobile force of nine aircraft carriers led by Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa could deliver a fatal blow to the U.S. Fifth Fleet when the U.S. attacked Marina.
At that time, the Japanese Navy had also realized the decisive role of aircraft carriers in the war, but when the Japanese Army realized, the US military had been ahead of the Japanese army for two years, so from the perspective of sea operations, the Japanese Navy was a very undominant side, and at that time, the Japanese Navy, after several previous defeats, the naval strength had declined greatly, not as good as before.
Therefore, the Japanese army also thought of countermeasures for such a situation. That is, the Japanese fleet hovered outside the combat radius of the US aircraft, and then took off carrier-based aircraft to attack the US fleet, and after completing the attack mission, flew to the Japanese air bases on Rota Island and Guam, refueled and hung bombs, and then turned back to launch the next wave of attacks, so as to achieve one flight and two bombings.
In this way, the Japanese army's battle plan is indeed very ingenious, but reality has slapped the Japanese navy hard.
On June 13, 1944, after the U.S. Fifth Fleet arrived in the operational area, Japan's First Mobile Fleet also set out. After Spruance had received the Japanese naval sortie , he concluded that neither fleet would make contact until the 17th.
Therefore, Spruance decided to clean up the Japanese land-based fighters in the north in order to avoid falling into a situation of being caught between two sides during the battle. To this end, on June 14 he decisively ordered the 1st and 4th Detachments of Task Force 58, the main force of the Fifth Fleet, to attack Iwo Jima and Chichijima in the Ogasawara Islands.
As expected, the U.S. Navy relied on powerful air power and skilful bombing techniques to bomb the Japanese-occupied islands, thus severely damaging the Japanese air force. This also led to the destruction of most of the Japanese land-based aircraft, and the ones that were not destroyed were also seriously damaged by the airfield, and they could not take off quickly for a while. And that ingenious battle plan of the Japanese Navy has completely lost its practical meaning.
The 58th Task Force of the U.S. Fifth Fleet inflicted heavy damage on the Japanese Navy's main mobile fleet, the First Mobile Fleet, in one fell swoop, seizing sea supremacy in the western Pacific and consolidating the positions established in Saipan, and the U.S. military paid a very small price of 76 killed, 123 aircraft, and four warships lightly damaged, inflicting huge damage on the enemy's three aircraft carriers, two oil tankers, and 600 aircraft.