2023 marks the 100th anniversary of the founding of the modern Republic of Turkey. Looking back over the past 100 years, Turkey's domestic political pattern, economic structure, and military role have undergone tremendous changes. The Paper will launch a series of articles on "From Ottoman to Turkey", starting from history and reviewing the key nodes in the process of Turkey's "formation".
On May 29, 2023, local time, Istanbul, Turkey, people strolled around the Blue Mosque.
Turkey is customarily known as a bridge connecting Europe and Asia and connecting East and West. In such a key strategic position, Turkey's political trend often faces attacks from both left and right, and even forms fierce conflicts. During the War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal faced contradictions between Soviet Russia and European influence. In the end, the imperative of nationalism overwhelmed socialist ideals while pursuing a modern civilization modeled on the West. To this day, the left-right struggle remains an important dimension of Turkish politics.
At the end of World War II, Turkey faced a brief torch between East and West. Under the demands of the USSR about straits and territories, Turkey quickly turned to the West. The newly emerging United States has become a major dependent. In 1948, Turkey was included in the Marshall Aid Program, along with Greece. In 1952, Turkey officially joined NATO. Turkey's prime minister, Adnan Mendeles, claimed that Turkey wanted to become a "little America." This fully demonstrates its camp's position during the Cold War.
However, U.S. aid and Western alliances have not adequately addressed Turkey's development problems. On the contrary, the excessive dependence of the Democratic government on the United States soon led to an imbalance in its economic structure, and the economic crisis of Turkey in 1954 and 1958 was the same. Fearing losing power, Mendeles and the Democratic Party, who came to power through elections, have also become increasingly authoritarian, using various means to suppress the opposition. Turkey's decade-long experiment in democracy came to an end, beginning a "turbulent era."
The 1960 coup d'état and the rise of the Turkish left
On May 27, 1960, Turkey saw the first military coup d'état in the second half of the 20th century, which began a turbulent era. Fortunately, the 1961 Constitution reshaped the identity of the Republic and gave the people full freedoms and rights.
Between 1961 and 1965, there were four coalition governments. The first three were led by Ismet Inonu and the Republican People's Party, and the shortest took only about half a year. It was not until the rise to power of Suleiman Demirel and the Justice Party that politics entered a period of relative stability. In contrast, economic policies are more stable. In 1960, the post-coup government established the National Planning Commission. In 1963, a new five-year plan was introduced, and import substitution became the dominant economic policy. During the three five-year plans of 1963-1967, 1968-1972 and 1973-1976, GDP growth remained at 6.7%, 6.6% and 7% respectively. The industrial growth rate is as high as 10%. Under this policy, the wages of Turkish workers doubled, which also stimulated the development of trade unions.
Suleiman Demirel
During this period, the Republican People's Party's left-leaning turn and the rise of Brent Edjevit had a profound impact on Turkish politics. It was the 1961 Constitution, dominated by the Republican People's Party, that became the premise and guarantee for the left and the socialist/communist movement. The power of the Republican People's Party in the 60s also provided space for the legitimate activities of socialist parties. In October 1966, at the XVIII Congress of the Republican People's Party, Evevit was elected secretary general, and "center-left" became the party's official policy. In 1972, Edgewett was elected party chairman. In his book Center-Left, he explains that the center-left line is an opposition to Kemalism. At the same time, they are distinguished from the left by their belief in democracy.
From 1961 to 1967, Yön magazine became an important front for leftist intellectuals in Turkey, represented by Doğan Avcıoğlu and Niyazi Berkes. They wanted to legitimize their discourse through Kemalism; But at the same time, Kemalism, especially Kemal's populism, was equated with socialism. The Directions position themselves as socialist, but they emphasize "Turkish socialism." Socialism was conceived as a way of life and a path of development whose purpose was to achieve social justice. Moreover, this socialism is also nationalist, mainly based on its anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist characteristics.
Under the influence of American unionist Irving Brown, the Turkish Confederation of Trade Unions was formed in 1952. In 1967, the Revolutionary Trade Union Confederation broke away from the Turkish Trade Union Confederation and became an independent organization. It criticizes the latter for not being real trade unions, but for wanting to establish political, independent, socialist trade unions. Under the influence of the labor movement, social democratic trade unions, nationalist trade unions and Islamic trade unions followed. Despite their different tactics and sometimes conflict, trade unions have also become an important factor in Turkey's democratization.
In February 1961, the Turkish Workers' Party was founded. Unlike previous socialist parties, it was mainly composed of workers' representatives rather than intellectuals. Mehmet Ali Aybar, a prominent lawyer, served as the leader. According to statistics, 27 percent of party members are industrial workers, 9 percent are agricultural workers, 17 percent are peasants, and 47 percent are intellectuals, civil servants, students and craftsmen. In 1964, the Workers' Party held its first congress and adopted the non-capitalist path of development as the party's policy. In the 1965 parliamentary elections, the Workers' Party won 270,000 votes (about 3%) and 15 seats in Parliament. After the election, Ayibal declared that the Workers' Party was a socialist party that aimed to replace the capitalist system with socialism. The influence of the Workers' Party lies not in its electoral votes, but in its ideologically labeled party character.
Right-wing political forces are also rising at the same time. As early as 1962, right-wing organizations such as the Anti-Communist League were formed and used Islam as an important tool. "House of idealism" gradually developed into the main social representatives of right-wing forces. In 1961, the Justice Party was founded under the protection of the military. In 1964, Suleiman Demirel was elected as the new party chairman and became the dominant figure in Turkish politics in the late 60s. At the same time, Alpasslan Tolkesz, a key figure in the 1960 coup, led the National Action Party, which became the representative of Turkish ultra-nationalism. In 1968, Najimeddin Elbakan founded the National Order Party, which became the representative of Islamism.
Under the influence of the 1968 global student movement, the Turkish left also exerted a wide influence among students, with radicalization and polarization tendencies. The rise of organizations such as the "Revolutionary Youth" is the main representative. After the 1969 elections, the government sought to further weaken the left, especially by attacking the influence of revolutionary trade unions. This gave rise to the Great March of June 1970, which covered the entire Marmara region centered on Istanbul. University campuses have become important fronts in the conflict between left-right youth. Turkish society is in chaos, and another military coup is possible.
The 1971 coup d'état and Turkey's left-right struggle
On March 12, 1971, Turkey witnessed the second military coup d'état of the second half of the 20th century. "Restoring law and order" is considered the main task after the coup, but this is mainly limited to the blow to leftist forces. In April, Turkey declared martial law. In May, the Consul General of Israel in Istanbul was kidnapped and killed. This further intensified the government's crackdown on leftist forces. In July, the Workers' Party of Turkey was banned. Although the National Order Party was banned, its leader, Elbakan, did not appear in court and was still able to operate publicly until 1972.
Under a series of constitutional amendments, the right to liberty granted by the 1961 Constitution was almost completely eliminated. Trade unions, universities, publishing, media, etc. are subject to huge restrictions. The Universities Act 1973 established a supervisory committee headed by the Prime Minister to monitor and control student movements. Paradoxically, turmoil once again characterized this period, even more intense than in the 60s. From 1971 to 1980, there were ten cabinets, the shortest of which was only a few months. The rise to power of Edjevit and Demirel reflects the stagnation of Turkey's political left-right struggle.
In the 1973 elections, the CHP won in most areas, especially in large cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, with 49.6%, 49.5% and 45.9% of the vote, respectively. The Republican People's Party legalized squatters in large cities and continued to receive support from the Turkish Confederation of Trade Unions and the Revolutionary Confederation of Trade Unions. The ruling of the CHP also once again provided an opportunity for the revival of leftist parties. In 1974, the Turkish Socialist Workers' Party was founded. In 1975, the Turkish Workers' Party was reorganized. In 1975, the Republican People's Party joined the Socialist International. However, in the context of the Cold War, the CHP tried to distance itself from socialist parties. In 1978, Doğu Perinçek founded the Turkish Peasants' and Workers' Party.
However, after his heroism in 1974, Evevit did not translate this influence into the support of the ballot box. Instead, the right-wing Demirel and Tolkesh formed a government of the "nationalist front" that lasted until 1977. A figurative statement reads: "Demirel in parliament, Torkesh in the streets." "The National Action Party's youth extremist group Grey Wolf has become a major perpetrator of terrorism, launching a series of violent actions against leftist forces." Leftist organizations such as Revolutionary Left and Revolutionary Road also violently fought back. Youth on the left and right have serious armed clashes on college campuses, and the dominant side often forbids the opposing party from entering the campus. Demirel is ostensibly indifferent to the conflict, but in fact secretly supports the right-wing forces.
Evit himself was stoned on the campaign trail, and he hit back with a larger rally in Istanbul. Political violence reached its peak at the 1977 Labor Day rally. The Revolutionary Trade Union Confederation organized a large rally in Istanbul to oppose the so-called "rising wave of fascism". Towards the end of the event, there was open fire on the population, causing extreme chaos. Evit's rise to power also failed to quell violence in Turkey. In the first 15 days of 1978 alone, there were 30 political murders that resulted in more than 200 casualties. In February 1979, Abdi Ipekçi, editor-in-chief of the newspaper National, was killed. The attacks were also directed at minorities in Allawi, with large-scale violence in Sivas, Bingale, Kahramanmaraş and other places. Between 1975 and 1980, more than 5,000 people died as a result of political violence and more than three times as many were injured. In the summer of 1980, there were more than 20 political murders a day.
The violent clashes after 1975 are considered to be significantly different from the leftist protests of the early 70s. Violence is its most prominent feature. The ideological conflict between the left and the right became a key factor. University campuses became major battlegrounds for the conflict. It was in this atmosphere that the founder of the PKK, Öcalan, arose. Under the influence of Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution, Islamists held a large rally in Konya, claiming to restore Sharia. At the same time, the negative effects of the import substitution policy have become increasingly significant over the years, and Turkey is once again facing a serious economic crisis. In this state of chaos, the coup d'état once again became a powerful weapon to restore order.
The 1980 coup d'état and Turkey's right-wing turn
On September 12, 1980, Turkey witnessed its third military coup d'état in the second half of the 20th century. As chief of the army's general staff, Kenan Efren established the National Security Council as the main ruling body, which lasted until the 1983 elections. In television and radio addresses that night, Efren stressed that this was "the most serious crisis in our country" and that it had seriously threatened "the survival of the country and its people." The State Council announced the abolition of the constitution, the dissolution of parliament, the closure of political parties, and the arrest of their leaders, and social organizations such as trade unions were also banned. As central politicians of the 60s and 70s, both Evette and Demirel were in prison.
Kenan Efren
The newly revised constitution of 1982 showed a very distinctly conservative character, which set the tone for the subsequent development of politics. It placed the military above civilian officials, with the National Security Council as the main representative. It restricts the freedoms and rights of citizens to prevent the politicization of the population. A special institution is the Higher Education Commission, which stripped former universities of their autonomy. In addition, the constitution seeks to use religious ideology to socialize youth in order to overcome the influence of previous leftist ideas. The leader of the National Action Party claimed: "Our bodies are in prison, but our ideology is in power. ”
The 1983 elections made Turgut Özar and his Fatherland Party the new rulers. In 1987, Özal and the Fatherland Party won the election again. In 1989, Özal succeeded Efren as president until his sudden death in 1993. Under Özar, Turkey adopted a dual policy: economic liberalism and social conservatism.
Following Thatcher and Reagan, Özar advocated neoliberal economic policies. He proposed a threefold policy plan: raising the balance of payments and reducing inflation in the short term; a market-based, export-oriented economy in the long term; Realize the transformation from the original inward-looking economy and industrialization to the outward-looking economy. The most successful aspects of this policy are in exports. In 1979, exports amounted to only $2.3 billion, or 2.6% of GDP; By 1990, it had grown to 13 billion, or 8.6 percent of GDP. Among them, manufacturing exports increased from 36% to 80% of the total. Economic development became the main basis of the legitimacy of the Özar government.
On the socio-cultural front, the junta and Özar adopted the ideology of Turkish-Islamic integration to limit the development of leftist ideas. The concept was first proposed by İbrahim Kafesoğlu, president of the House of Idealism. In 1982, it became Turkey's official cultural policy in the National Culture Report of the State Planning Commission. Under the new constitution, religious education became compulsory in public schools. Özar himself had close ties with the Naxibandi order. During the Fatherland Party's rule, about 2,000 new mosques were added to Turkey every year. Imam-Khatup schools and Koranic classes also increased dramatically during this period.
Ötzal's neoliberal economic policies promoted the development of the Anatolia Tigers, represented by small and medium-sized enterprises. This, in turn, boosts the power of political Islamist movements. The infusion of Saudi investment has also strengthened the link between Islam and capital. In 1983, the Welfare Party emerged as the latest representative of the "national idea" movement. In the 1994 local elections, it won 19 percent of the vote, winning in 28 municipalities, including the largest city Istanbul and the capital Ankara. In 1995, it became the largest party with 21.6% of the vote, and in 1996 formed a coalition government with Elbakan as prime minister. This later led to another military coup in Turkish history.
epilogue
The three military coups of the second half of the 20th century marked the dividing line between Turkey's political and social development. William Haier, a prominent expert on Turkish studies, pointed out that "the most striking feature of the three military interventions in Turkish postwar politics is that each military was returned to the civilian government after a relatively short period of twists and turns." This makes Turkey's coup seem very exceptional, different both from the situation in Latin America and from its Middle Eastern neighbors. The coup d'état affected Turkey's economic development and democratization process, but maintained the country's basic institutions. This reflects the unique characteristics of the Turkish political system, including the party mechanism, civil-military relations, Western influence, etc.
On July 15, 021, local time, Ankara, Turkey, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan laid flowers at a monument to commemorate the victims who died innocently in the 7.15 military coup.
The rise of the Turkish left partly reflects the influence of European social democratic ideas on Turkey after World War II. In particular, the CHP's center-left turn has a very strong symbolic significance. The trade unionist trend in the United States also has a guiding effect on the trade union movement in Turkey. The rise of the global student movement in 1968 gave considerable impetus to the forces of the left. In addition, Soviet and Chinese socialist ideas also entered Turkey, stirring up a wave among young students. In the 60s and 70s of the 20th century, Turkey's relatively fragile government provided room for the development of leftist forces.
The 1980 coup d'état changed the overall dynamics of Turkish politics, with economic liberalism and social conservatism becoming the main labels. There is a stark contrast between democracy on the surface and might in reality. This reflects Turkey's unique political culture. The rise of the Turkish-Islamic ideology partly resolved the power struggle between the left and right factions of the 60s and 70s. However, the rise of political Islam also shook the secularist foundations of Father Kemal. The brief victory of the Welfare Party in the 90s was just a signal. More than 20 years of successive years in power by Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party in the early 21st century became a footnote to this transformation.