#Find the True Knowledge Faction ##National Defense Science ##历史冷故事 #
From May 1, 1942, the Japanese army gathered heavy troops and carried out an unprecedented sweep of the base areas in Central Hebei. In this sweep, the enemy mobilized more troops, swept the area of the sweep, lasted for a long time, and was more brutal than ever.
After a month of armed struggle, by the end of May, all the divisions of our army had suffered heavy losses, among which the 23rd Regiment headquarters and the third battalion of the main force of our eighth sub-district had fought a bitter and extremely hard battle with the Japanese 163rd Wing in the village of Zhanggang in the east and west. In the next few days, according to the results of the previous research by many gentlemen, Xiaobian reluctantly summarized and restored the specific combat process of that year, and asked you to correct it.
I. The pre-war situation of the Battle of Zhanggang Village in the East and West
When the enemy's May Day sweep was carried out for nearly a month, all the divisions in our jizhong region suffered heavy losses one after another. On May 23 alone, the Japanese army simultaneously held several of our main forces outside Lijiajiao, Renjiao, Wangjiapu, and Cui's villages, causing heavy casualties in our army.
On May 27, the 163rd Wing of the Japanese 110th Division, led by Wing Commander Katsuru Uesaka, surrounded the village of Hokufumi in Dingxian County and implemented the cruel "Three Lights Policy". Not only did they loot a large amount of property and burn down a large number of houses, but they also brutally released a fierce poisonous gas at the Dingnan County Brigade and ordinary people who had drilled into the tunnels, brutally killed more than 1,000 of our soldiers and civilians, and created the appalling "May 27 Northern Massacre" (in 1956, china sentenced war criminal Kamisaka to 18 years in prison).
On the same day, the 45th Regional Team of the 7th Division encountered a combined attack of more than 1,000 enemies at Yangjiazhuang in Shujin County, and when the troops moved to Duhezhuang, they were once again surrounded by the enemy on all sides. Except for Hu Junsheng, the political commissar who led some people to break through the siege to the northwest, most of the troops were scattered, and the captain of Liu Jin District was seriously wounded and captured. When the enemy carried him on a stretcher, he took the initiative to roll down from the stretcher several times, tearing and enlarging the wound, and finally died due to excessive bleeding, preferring to die rather than be taken prisoner, and was a martyr of the Chen Shuxiang style.
In short, by the end of May 1942, our army, which was still fighting in the central area of the old base area, had encountered great difficulties, and they were fighting with the enemy for a month without food and ammunition and without sleep without any logistical support.
2. The base area where bunkers are lined up
In order to completely "clear" the Eighth Route Army in the base area, the enemy at that time was tightly fortified, they hoarded troops at various strategic points, and then between the villages of the garrison, there were cavalry, cars, bicycle teams and other troops flowing during the day to block, and at night they lit torch patrols. In this way, they repeatedly swept in the form of a dragnet in the enclosure, which was called the iron wall enclosure at that time.
In order to achieve the goal of long-term occupation, the enemy also built many additional strongholds in our old base area, and at that time 26 strongholds were built in Raoyang County alone, 22 strongholds in Wuqiang County, and 16 strongholds in Xianxian County. In the Ninth Subdistrict, the enemy built six strongholds in the area south of Suning, Lixian and Boye, including Shihe and Gudi, and built 17 pillboxes, including Cheng Wei and Zhanggang. It can be said that you look up to see the turret and go out to block the ditch.
In addition, the Japanese army also forcibly established a pseudo-township regime and a pseudo-armor protection system, and developed pseudo-intelligence officers in each village. As soon as the Eighth Route Army arrived in the village, the traitors immediately reported to the stronghold. At the same time, the enemy also continued to seize the people to build roads and blockade ditches, and built roads from Ligang to West Zhanggang, South Ligang to Nanzhuang, Juying (Anping North), and Dongyang Village to Boye. By the end of the sweep, the Japanese army had built a total of 86 strongholds and 87 county artillery towers. 59 roads were built, totaling about 970 kilometers, and more than 10 blockade ditches were built, totaling about 460 kilometers.
At the same time as building roads and pillars, the Japanese army also wantonly arrested the families of anti-Japanese personnel and the wounded of the Eighth Route Army, killing innocent people. Wherever this Japanese army went, it was burning, killing, plundering, and committing no evil, and its crimes were numerous and numerous, and its brutal crimes were too numerous to describe. In Raoyang County alone, more than 300 innocent people were killed by the Japanese Kou, more than 360 people were killed, more than 4,300 people were injured, more than 400 people were arrested and sent to the northeast as laborers, more than 1,000 houses were burned, and the armed forces and cadres in the county and district suffered very heavy losses.
By this time, it can be said that the cause of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression in central Hebei has entered the most dangerous and difficult period in an all-round way.
3. The deployment of the Japanese army
Specific to the battlefield of Dongxi Zhanggang Village in the north of Raoyang County, these two villages are located about 12 kilometers north of the county seat of Raoyang County. At that time, the Japanese garrison in the vicinity was mainly part of the 163rd Wing of the 110th Division regiment that created the "Hokukan Massacre".
The so-called 110th Division of the Japanese Army is one of the so-called "Hundred Character Heads" divisions formed by the remaining personnel of the original standing division. It was formed on June 16, 1938, by the remaining personnel of the 10th Division regiment in The Japanese Himeji, and was formed as a "four-unit division" with two brigades and four infantry companies. In July 1938, after landing at Tanggu, it directly administered the North China Front and garrisoned the Shijiazhuang and Baoding areas; in May 1942, the 140th Infantry Regiment was drawn from the 110th Division and merged with the Hunchun Garrison regiment to form the 71st Division Regiment, and then the 110th Division regiment was changed to a three-company system, which at that time had jurisdiction over the 139th, 110th and 163rd Infantry Regiments and the 110th Field Artillery Regiment, which became the "Three-Company Division".
The division commanders of the 110th Division were Takaaki Kuwamu (June 18, 1938 – December 1, 1939), Mori Iinuma (1939.12.1 – 1942.8.1), Yoshitaro Hayashi (1942.8.1 – 18 July 1944) and Kimura (18 July 1944 – 8 August 1945).
108th Infantry Brigade. Brigade Commander Yoshiho Ishii
139th Infantry Regiment. Co-captains: Fumio Nagata, Ryuo Shimoeda, Tsubasa Hayashi
140th Infantry Regiment. Co-Captain: Kobayashi Nagahachiro
133rd Infantry Brigade. Brigade Commander Mitake Tsuda
110th Infantry Regiment. Squadron Leader: Shinichi Yanagawa, Gennosuke Kurosu, Takeo Nakamura
163rd Infantry Regiment. Co-captains: Shinmijiro, Katsuru Uesaka, Ando Yushiro Kono
110th Cavalry Brigade. Captain Tian Daoji
110th Field Artillery Regiment. Wing Leader Haruharu Taniguchi
110th Engineer Wing. Wing Commander Shinsaburo Fukuchi and Senichi Maynon
110th Wing of the Heavy Army. Co-captains Mitsunosuke Echichi and Shinzo Ozaki
110th Division Regimental Health Corps
110th Division Regiment Signal Team: Nomura Toyo
1st Field Hospital of the 110th Division: Saburo Shimizu
2nd Field Hospital of the 110th Division: Yoshihito Shima
110th Division Regiment Sick Horse Factory: Shimizu Baokuan
At that time, during the May Day sweep, the opponents that our 23rd Regiment faced in the local area were the 11th squadron and the 9th squadron of the 163rd Wing of Kaesaka-sheng, as well as hundreds of puppet troops of the Raoyang County Pseudo-Garrison. At that time, specifically near the battlefield of Zhanggang Village in the east and west, the fortification of the Japanese army was that there was a turret in the west of Zhongbu Village and Bozhuang Village. Further away, Hujiaying Village and Wufang Village also have artillery towers.
According to the Japanese army's troop allocation map, the main force of the Japanese 11 squadron at that time was mainly stationed 1000 meters north of beidaitou village, 15 kilometers southeast of Lixian County. In addition, two teams, an infantry squad and a machine gun squad, in coordination with the pseudo-county garrison, supervised the construction of the new artillery tower in zhongtou village.
At that time, a noteworthy situation was that the artillery tower in Zhongdai Village had not yet been completed, and the Japanese puppet army was constantly sweeping around and grabbing people, and forcibly using the houses of ordinary people as building materials to complete the Zhongli Artillery Tower as soon as possible.
Fourth, the strength of the Japanese puppet army to participate in the war
Regarding the strength of the Japanese puppet army at that time, there is a clear record in the "North China Public Security War", that is, there are 55 Japanese squadron leaders below the level, and 28 Chinese guards, a total of 55 + 28 = 83 people. The number of troops involved in the battle was in single digits, and these 55 Japanese troops happened to be a squad of 54 Japanese troops, plus 55 squadron leaders. If this were to be seen by some war history professors living in Japan, it would be ironclad evidence. Unfortunately, the Japanese here are playing another trick.
First of all, the 54-man Japanese squad was true.
The Japanese squad had three 13-man infantry detachments (i.e., infantry squads from other countries). The ordinary detachment of 13 people, the reinforcement of the squad can add a rifleman, at this time the whole squad strength reached 14 people), in addition to the squad leader and squad leader, divided into a 4-man machine gun group and a 7-man rifle group, the machine gunner in addition to the routine crooked handle (Taisho eleven-year type) and crutch (Type 96) light machine gun, generally will be equipped with a type 94 8mm pistol.
In addition, the Japanese squad also has a grenadier detachment (grenadier class), which is generally a detachment leader + 3 4-person Type 89 heavy grenadier teams, a total of 13 people, and some detachments will add 2 people to carry a Taisho decaulter cartridge, at which time the detachment reaches 15 people.
Three infantry detachments + one grenadier detachment formed a Japanese infantry squad, which is what we usually call an infantry platoon. Of course, if it was a platoon, there must be a platoon headquarters, but the Japanese platoon headquarters only had a platoon leader and a liaison officer. So it is very clear that 13 * 3 + 13 = 52 + 2 squad headquarters = 54 people, plus a squadron leader 55, how perfect do you see?
To say that the Japanese army's ability to make up nonsense is really good, the primary school mathematics 54 + 1 calculation is very clear. The question is, you are a squadron leader, just come out with a squad to meet a main battalion of the Eighth Route Army? Is it too confident or is "Bushido" mentally causing fainting?
What makes people even more ridiculous is that although the Japanese army did a good job in primary school mathematics, the "craftsman spirit" was not enough, and the work was not rigorous enough, and they still showed their feet on the battlefield map of the history of the wing: On this "Battle Map Near Xizhanggang in Raoyang County", the cumulative numbers of the Japanese army are:
The Japanese puppet armies to the west of the battlefield were:
11C/163I Squadron Main Force
Command class
MGPt(I)
1Pt (including 8 county police)
County Special Forces (six horses on horseback)
3Pt
2Pt
1 point/1 Pt
According to the "List of Chinese and Japanese Army Symbols", C represents the squadron, I represents the squadron, Pt represents the squad, and mgPt is the heavy machine gun squad. That is to say, the real combat strength of this battle was the main force of the Japanese 11 Squadron, including the command squad, and the first, second, and third squads participated in the battle.
In addition, the number of the first squad also appeared in the village of Xizhanggang in the west and the stronghold of Zhongbutou in the east, that is, in addition to the three squads of the 11th Squadron, the first squad of the 9th Squadron participated in the battle. The Japanese squadron level did not have heavy machine guns, and the heavy machine gun squads that appeared at this time were undoubtedly strengthened by the machine gun squadrons of the brigade. In addition, there are puppet army county special forces and county police teams to cooperate.
5. The real combat strength of the Japanese puppet army
Now we know that the real Japanese combat strength is all of the 9th Squadron, plus the 11th Squadron and a heavy machine gun detachment.
A standard infantry squadron of the Japanese army consisted of a squadron headquarters and three infantry squads under its command. In addition to three infantry squads of 54 men each, there was also a squadron headquarters of 19 men: squadron leader, sergeant, hygienist, service man, trumpeter (trumpeter), etc. This is 54 *3 + 19 = 181 people. It has 139 rifles, 9 light machine guns and 9 grenadiers. It should be noted that this is only a normal squadron, and the wartime reinforced squadron will increase by 15-24 people, with a total number of about 196-205 people, with 148 rifles, 9 light machine guns, and 12 grenadiers.
The heavy machine gun squad of the Japanese army was even more powerful. The normal heavy machine gun squad consists of two heavy machine gun detachments, each with 11 men, each equipped with a Type 92 "Pheasant Neck" heavy machine gun (or type I heavy machine gun). There were also two anti-tank detachments, each with 11 men, each armed with a Type 97 20 mm semi-automatic anti-tank rifle. In addition, there is an ammunition detachment of 11 men. Total 11 * 5 = 55 + squad headquarters 2 = 57 people.
It is worth noting that the amount of ammunition carried by the Japanese heavy machine guns is very large. Each squad has 4 ammunition supply men, each of whom is responsible for carrying an ammunition box, each weighing 44 pounds and containing 540 rounds of ammunition, so that four people carry a total of 540 * 4 = 2160 rounds of ammunition, and two ammunition horses each carry 750 * 4 * 2 = 6000 rounds of ammunition! In this way, the normal bullet carrying capacity of a Japanese heavy machine gun can reach 2160 + 750 * 8 = 8160 rounds.
And that's not all, they are usually assigned to an ammunition detachment (1 non-commissioned officer, 10 soldiers, 8 horses), 8 horses can carry 24,000 rounds of ammunition, an average of 6,000 rounds per heavy machine gun. It is estimated that the Japanese army can have up to 9660-14160 rounds of ammunition per heavy machine gun. According to the local villagers' recollections, in order to carry more ammunition, the Japanese machine gun squad also arrested several villagers to carry heavy machine guns and ammunition for them.
That is to say, a Japanese squadron with a reinforced heavy machine gun squad at that time should be 181 + 57 = 238 people. Wartime can be strengthened to 196 + 57 = 253 people.
The Japanese army that appeared in the battlefield of Zhanggang Village in the east and west was a reinforced squadron of the Japanese army that strengthened an infantry detachment and a machine gun squad, and the total number of troops involved in the battle was estimated to be at least 250 people. At the same time, there are dozens of county special forces cooperating with the operation, and at least a hundred people of the pseudo-county guard team.
Therefore, the truth of the matter is very clear, and the so-called 55 Japanese troops and 28 puppet armies of the Japanese army participated in the war, which were only the troops they first came into contact with our army. The continuous arrival of Japanese reinforcements after that was not counted.
In this way, we can roughly understand how the Japanese army covered up the number of troops participating in the battle, and then covered up the casualty figures.
The main information of this article was collected and sorted by Mr. Wei Jiangtao of Beibei, and referred to the research results of Ran Erlin, Mu Lixin, Qi Gengchen, Liu Nian and other gentlemen, and the small editor Chen Tianjing wrote the record.
Interview List:
Wei Datuo, an old party member of Beidi Village
Wei Yongde, an eyewitness at the time
Kong Zenglin, 92 years old, a native of Xitan Village
Liu Ju, 92 years old, from Xizhanggang Village, Hengshui District
Yang Huizhi, 90 years old, a native of Suning Xitan Village
Song Guodong, 92 years old, a native of Xitan Village, served as a soldier in the county brigade and was one of the surviving veterans of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea in the Cangzhou area
Daughter-in-law of Qi Dianqing, a late veteran party member of Xitan Village
Resources:
A Brief History of the Twenty-third Regiment of the Eighth Military Subdistrict of the Jizhong Military Region, Wang Shouren
"Examination of the "Eighth Route Army Tomb" in the east of Lixian Beixi Village" Qi Gengchen Qianli Causeway
"Tomb of the Eighth Route Army" in the east of Beidai Village, Lixian County on the Qingming Festival" Ran Erlin and Mu Lixin
Memorabilia of the People's Anti-Japanese Struggle in Central Hebei
Memorabilia of the People's Anti-Japanese Struggle in the Eighth Sub-district of Jizhong District
《Chronicle of Raoyang County》
"North China Sweep"
"Anti-Japanese Ditch - The New Great Wall" Tian Ya
Liberation Daily, February 6, 1942, No. 265
North China Security War
Report of 11th Squadron, 163rd Infantry Wing
The 163rd Infantry Regiment