Fang Xingdong: Washington's formation of the "US-EU Science and Technology Alliance" is full of obstacles

Source: Global Times

The role of the EU in the Biden administration's escalating technology war against China is undoubtedly worth observing. At a time when complaints from the EU side about the unfair trade policies of the United States continue to rise, the Biden administration and a delegation from the European Commission recently met near Washington to try to tighten ties with the EU on trade and new technologies. If the United States regards containing China as a "war of national fortunes", then from the perspective of the global process of digital technology development, Washington's eagerness to pull the EU to take sides in the game with China will not only far exceed the current content, but also surpass the so-called "ideology and values" of the United States, covering digital technology, digital infrastructure, digital trade rules and even the overall global digital rule framework.

On the 5th of this month, the US-EU Trade and Technology Committee (TTC) held its third meeting at the University of Maryland. The TTC is a permanent transatlantic exchange platform between the United States and Europe to coordinate international trade and emerging technology issues, with the strategic goal of seeking to set the rules for the global economy and strengthen technological competition with China. The first meeting, held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on September 29 last year, was followed by a 16-page Joint Statement that identified the first five key areas of cooperation: "investment review", "export control", "artificial intelligence", "semiconductor supply chain" and "global trade challenges". Although the statement did not mention China, it was aimed at China everywhere. Germany's Business Insider reported calling it a "new tech alliance against China."

In general, the Biden administration wants to restore the solid cooperative relationship between the United States and Europe on China in the field of science and technology during the Cold War. The linkage between the two sides is mainly reflected in three levels: first, in terms of market access, crowding out Chinese enterprises from entering the digital infrastructure field; Second, supply chain security has become the hottest "common language" of both sides; The third is about global digital rules, which are not only the top priority in the future, the United States and Europe need each other, but also constitute the biggest game point between the two sides. The United States and Europe have strategic practical considerations at these three levels, but we also need to recognize that there are irreconcilable strategic contradictions between the United States and Europe.

Obviously, striving to build a "US-EU science and technology alliance" is one of the key factors in the Biden administration's escalation of the "Sino-US science and technology war", and "common democratic values and the world's largest economic relationship" is Washington's most important signboard. However, it is difficult to hide internal differences in the face of interests. Taking the first US-EU meeting as an example, the biggest obstacle is the strategic conflict of interest between the two sides in digital governance. In recent years, Europe has gradually recognized the concept of "cyber sovereignty" advocated by China and others, emphasized "digital sovereignty", and strengthened Europe's dominance in global digital rules. Through systematic institutional construction such as antitrust, digital taxation and data protection, Europe hopes to further resist the "digital technology invasion" of the United States. Now, the new electric vehicle subsidies introduced by the Inflation Reduction Act in the United States have become a new source of discontent in the EU.

The EU and China are in a similar strategic position vis-à-vis the US. That is, whether it is the core technology of the digital age, network security or the global network super platform, they are all under the monopoly shadow of the global hegemony of the United States, and they need to strive for security and prosperous autonomy. Although the US offensive digital global strategy is currently mainly aimed at China, the lack of dominance of the EU has not improved as a result. The Chip and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act introduced by the United States have also seriously eroded the EU's industrial development and supply chain security.

Although the United States and Europe involve a series of topics such as semiconductors, data flow, artificial intelligence, medical technology and new energy, the focus of the big power game mainly revolves around two levels: one is the dominance of a new generation of digital infrastructure, and the other is the dominance of international rules in the digital era. The United States wants to have both and dominate the world. The EU, for its part, wants to play a key role in the latter. Therefore, the different strategic situations and strategic goals of the two sides determine the most critical internal conflict of the US-EU alliance. A factor that cannot be ignored is that the core idea of the US-EU alliance is to target China's so-called "non-market economy" behavior, when in fact what the United States does is precisely to interfere in the market through politics. Moreover, the United States has implemented government subsidies and political intervention with a degree rarely seen in the history of human science and technology, pushing political interventionism and market protectionism to the extreme, which even the European Union and major European countries cannot tolerate.

In addition to the same strategic situation, China and the EU also have irreplaceable complementary needs. China-EU trade volume has been increasing year by year, and it is precisely because of the rise of China that Europe's strategic position in US-EU relations has also increased. Therefore, Europe needs China. As former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said, "Being an enemy of America is dangerous, but being an ally of America is deadly." "Europe certainly knows that.

In the face of the United States' efforts to pull the EU into a technological alliance, on the one hand, we must let go of any illusions, and on the other hand, we must also be strategically steady and step by step. First of all, in the context of the times and the global situation, we have the confidence and strength to follow our own strategic pace. Based on itself and with ourselves as the mainstay, China should firmly uphold the values of open innovation, fair competition and benefiting mankind, increase innovation, accelerate the pace of development, and form stronger scientific capabilities and technological strength.

Secondly, strengthening the national strategic scientific and technological strength and daring to conquer core technologies has become an alternative to the "American system", which is not only the key to China's strategic autonomy in the digital era, but also the only choice for the strategic autonomy of Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Third, China needs to re-understand Europe and rediscover Europe. The development of China-EU relations is not based on the game with the United States, but on the mutual need of each to achieve development. Europe's ability to innovate institutions also stems from its inherent endowments. Whether it is platform antitrust, the introduction of the General Data Protection Regulation and the Digital Market Law, or governance in the field of AI, Europe is a representative of global institutional innovation. We should humbly learn from Europe's institutional innovation and help modernize China's governance.

In the past two years, the United States has completed the arrangement of troops, including strategy, institutions and personnel, around the global digital infrastructure and the dominance of global digital rules, which will become the biggest "battlefield" of the global power game in the next decade. We must strengthen our strategic determination to develop science and technology, maintain strategic patience and strategic endurance, which will be the key to changing the strategic situation. (The author is Executive Director of the Center for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication of Zhejiang University and Dean of the Wuzhen Institute of Digital Civilization)