The Paper's special contributor Tang Jun
【Editor's Note】
The Russian-Ukrainian military conflict has been going on for more than 140 days, but it is still "foggy of war", the news is true or false, even if some battles at the beginning of the conflict, it is difficult for the outside world to get a glimpse of the whole picture, but by piecing together some relatively authoritative information that appears later, it is also possible to have a deeper understanding of some battles - such as the battle for Gostomery Airport, which was closely watched on the first day of the conflict, and this key battle directly affected the direction of this conflict.
Although the advance troops of the Russian airborne troops completed the task of seizing control of the airport, they caused serious damage to The Gostomery Airport in the stalemate battle and lost their role as a forward base for follow-up reinforcements.
Although the battle objectives were not achieved, this scramble still showed the good combat effectiveness of the Russian airborne troops, and the advance troops of more than 200 people went deep behind the enemy and faced a disparity of nearly 1 to 10 (more than 2,000 troops of the Fourth Rapid Reaction Brigade of the Ukrainian Army, if you add the airport guard force and the special forces of the Ukrainian Army reinforced in the follow-up, the proportion is even more disparity), which supported for more than ten hours, and the combat quality and mental outlook are remarkable. Moreover, from the perspective of the entire war situation, the first phase of military operations in the direction of Kiev still played a role in containing the deployment of the Ukrainian army, and this kind of blitzkrieg operation also caught the other side off guard and gave the other side a certain degree of psychological shock.
The Battle for Gostomel Airfield will be a battle recorded in the history of airborne operations and has great research value, so it is still valuable to discuss and study this scramble, especially for large countries with larger army aviation, airborne troops and amphibious combat forces. Because, in the war that may break out in the future, the above-mentioned branches of the armed forces may also face going deep behind the enemy's lines, using various methods such as airborne landing and parachute landing to seize control of key targets, and the enemy's equipment is more perfect, and the air defense capabilities cannot be underestimated.
On 24 February, the Russian advance troops at Gostomelli airfield were attacked by Ukrainian Air Force fighters.
Why did it fail?
The author believes that for the Russian army, the reason why the Battle for Gostomel Airport did not achieve the combat objective is mainly because the difficulty of this mission is greater than the previous task of Russian airborne troops to seize control of the airport, whether it is the capture of Prague Airport in 1968 or the occupation of Kandahar Airport in Afghanistan in 1979, the former relies on deception, the latter has already deployed troops at the airport, and the seizure of Gostomel Airport is a "hard robbery" behind the enemy' lines, if the other side is well prepared, it is likely to fall into a heavy siege.
According to multiple sources, Ukraine already knew through the director of the CIA William J. Burns in January 2022 that the airport was a target of the Russian army and was prepared, such as the arrival of the 31st Airborne Brigade as the main advance force after arriving at the airport and found that there were heavy trucks used to obstruct the take-off of the aircraft, the deployment of man-portable anti-aircraft missiles near the Kiev Reservoir, and the "coincidental" 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade of the Ukrainian National Guard also exercised near the airport. The author believes that the United States has a large number of intelligence facilities and intelligence personnel in Europe, coupled with various types of reconnaissance satellites operating in space (image reconnaissance satellites, electronic reconnaissance satellites, early warning satellites, etc.), the United States has long detected signs that Russia may launch military operations around February 24, and passed this information to the Kiev side. But Kiev may not be entirely convinced that the Russian airborne troops will launch such a bold raid, just in case, and have made some targeted deployments, but have not deployed pocket formations, otherwise the advance force may be even more tormented.
The second reason is that intelligence work is not perfect, especially the real-time intelligence on the evolution of the battlefield situation is insufficient, and the other side's will to resist is underestimated, believing that the firepower strike + airborne raid and multi-way army operations in the early stage of the conflict can allow Kiev to compromise in a relatively short period of time. Of course, the above is only an individual judgment based on the available information, and the controversy over whether the Russian army was light on the enemy and whether it was fully prepared at the beginning of the conflict still exists, and the real situation can only be confirmed by waiting for more detailed information.
Prepare for a group of Russian helicopters at Gostomeri airport.
As to why Russia cannot win quickly, Russia's Komsomolskaya Pravda last month interviewed Former Russian Airborne Commander GeorgyShpak, who was involved in the wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Georgi pointed out that Russia's General Staff once judged that Russia may only need 1 to 2 weeks to complete the expected strategic goals in this war. However, later results have also proved that the Russian General Staff has misjudged the other side's will to resist. Almost all senior and senior officers of the Ukrainian army studied with the Russian commanders. The Ukrainians knew how and in what mode the Russians would attack. Georgi tactfully pointed out that up to the General Staff and down to the commanders on the front, they once thought that the local people and defenders would calmly accept the Advance of the Russian Army, and even take the initiative to welcome the arrival of the Russian Army. At this point, it can be said that it is a fatal mistake in intelligence work - misjudging public opinion and public opinion.
In addition, it is also worth discussing whether insufficient pre-war mobilization and the lack of psychological and military readiness of soldiers will affect the successful completion of the mission of the advance troops. According to interviews with captured paratroopers, most of the soldiers did not know that they were going to raid The Gostomelli airfield, and from a secrecy point of view, only a few officers knew that it would improve the secrecy and suddenness of the operation. According to the interview, the captured paratroopers said that when we were supposed to deploy to the exercise ground on the 24th of February, the commander gathered us, boarded the truck, and then we got on the helicopter, and then when the helicopter took off, an officer came over and said that the plan had changed, we did not fly the training ground, but went to raid the (Ukrainian) airfield in Kiev. After completing the task of seizing control of the airport, wait until the third day to get heavy equipment, according to the interview, everyone does not know what to do next.
The performance of the Russian Air force in the early stage of the conflict was also questioned by the outside world, and the author believes that the failure of the battle for Gostomelli airport has a lot to do with the lack of support from the air and space force. After the advance forces were heavily encircled, the air and space force aircraft did not provide them with sufficient fire and intelligence support, and the advance troops could only rely on helicopter gunships left at the airport to provide fire support. The advance troops not only had to face the attack and shelling of the ground troops, but also were attacked by aircraft and helicopters in the later stage, taking care of one or the other, causing relatively large losses. If on the day of the battle for the airfield, the air and space force dispatches a large number of aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles for fire and intelligence support, the success rate of the mission will be greatly improved.
Although the Russian army was equipped with the Orion Tsatert-UAN, because the aircraft was only tested last year, it was scarce in number, and it only began to appear in the late stages of the conflict, and was not used to support the battle for Gostomelli airport.
Revelations and lessons
After exploring the reasons why the Russian airborne advance troops lost the battle for Gostomelli airfield, we can explore some of the lessons and lessons we have brought.
Sun Tzu Day: Know each other and know yourself, never lose a battle; Know yourself without knowing the other, one win and one loss; If you do not know the other, you will lose every battle. The importance of intelligence for the success of military operations is self-evident, from some Russian military documents captured by the Ukrainian army, it can be seen that before the outbreak of the conflict, the Russian army did a lot of detailed intelligence work on the deployment of the Ukrainian army, weapons and equipment, etc., but the battlefield situation often changes very quickly, especially modern warfare, which is changing rapidly, and puts forward higher requirements for the mastery of real-time intelligence.
This Russian-Ukrainian conflict has exposed the shortcomings of the Russian military's space-based reconnaissance capabilities and aviation reconnaissance capabilities. Before the outbreak of the conflict, the Image Reconnaissance Satellite operated by the Russian Air force in orbit had only one "role" -3 optical reconnaissance satellite with a maximum resolution of 0.3 meters, while the small optical reconnaissance satellite (resolution 0.9 meters) developed under the "Small High-Resolution Spacecraft" project, according to US media reports, there were problems after the two launches into orbit, and another image reconnaissance satellite - "Condor" was launched in 2013, with problems in 2015, and there was no new launch record since then. This shows that the Russian military is likely to rely on only one "role" - 3 and 1-2 dual-use "resources" to provide space-based image intelligence in the conflict, which is a huge gap with NATO countries. NATO not only has many reconnaissance satellite countries such as the United States and France, but also can obtain the support of commercial remote sensing companies, and the Ukrainian army can often ambush the Russian army and kill many senior Russian generals without air supremacy, because there is a steady stream of intelligence support from Western countries.
With the development of technology, helicopters face greater and greater risks of going it alone, and with the blessing of unmanned aerial vehicles, they can not only improve their strike capabilities, but also enhance their battlefield survivability.
In terms of aerial reconnaissance, judging from the video released by the Russian side, the advance troops of the airborne troops only carry civilian unmanned aerial vehicles similar to the "DJI" four-rotor, and can only reconnoiter within a range of seven or eight kilometers, and even small unmanned aerial vehicles similar to the "SeaHawk" -10 are not carried, and the armed helicopter gunship is also limited in order to avoid the blow of the portable air defense missile, and the scope of activity is also limited RQ-4, MQ-9 long-endurance drones, which can have more grasp of the situation around Gostomelli airport and adjust the battle plan.
Because the advance troops of the airborne troops who seized control of the airborne airfield did not carry heavy weapons, although some armed helicopters were left to provide fire support, but the amount of ammunition was also limited, and the continuous combat capability was insufficient, therefore, in the case of a huge disparity in strength, it was very necessary for the support of the air and space army or the army's long-range firepower, but we saw from the existing information that the advance troops on the day mainly relied on their own light weapons and some armed helicopters to fight with the Ukrainian army, and the air and space army and the army long-range fire support was insufficient (or basically did not get fire support), It may be that the real-time situation around the airport is not well grasped, or there may be no corresponding plan, and the Air and Space Force did not carry out air raids on the Ukrainian troops surrounding the airfield, destroying the Ukrainian long-range artillery that seriously threatened the airport.
The author believes that in the case of a customized air superiority, whether it is a conventional configuration similar to the MQ-9 "cha-and-strike" unmanned combat aircraft, or an unmanned combat aircraft with stealth design, it is the best partner for the troops behind enemy lines, and the long flight time means that the troops can provide 24 hours of aviation intelligence, and the precision-guided munitions carried on the drones can also be used to attack enemy targets, such as artillery, tanks and armored vehicles, which are more threatening targets, and multiple joint operations should be sent, even if they are shot down and redundant. And there is no need to worry about the loss of the pilot. In order to reduce the pressure on the advance troops, the Air Force manned fixed-wing drones or the Army's long-range rocket launchers should also be prepared for fire support and cooperate with the completion of the task of seizing control.
Helicopter gunships equipped with longer-range air-to-ground missiles have become a major trend.
The task of the special operations force to carry out key targets such as seizing and controlling Gostomelli airfield is generally "deep into the tiger's den", from the perspective of this conflict, the helicopter carrying out this task should be equipped with a main /self-defense system similar to the "Vitebsk" as much as possible, the alarm device + jamming bomb and the jamming foil strip can no longer meet the requirements, and a large number of portable air defense missiles on the other side will pose a great threat to the formation, and only with the active jamming system can the loss be minimized. With the development of low-altitude air defense missile technology, helicopters should also be equipped to launch long-range anti-tank missiles, the anti-tank used by the Russian gunship in this conflict mainly uses laser beam guidance, the helicopter can not do complex maneuvers in the guidance process, must continue to illuminate the target, multi-target attack capability is also insufficient, resulting in the Russian Ka-52 gunship was shot down by the Ukrainian anti-tank missile.
In addition, the range of russian anti-tank missiles is also insufficient, not more than 10 kilometers, and many helicopter gunships have begun to be equipped with missiles with a range of more than 15 kilometers or even 20 or 30 kilometers, and can cooperate with the previous unmanned aerial vehicles to greatly improve the survivability of helicopter gunships. Armed helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles have matured combat technology, and the land aviation of some countries has been equipped with jamming unmanned aerial vehicles, communication relay unmanned aerial vehicles, reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles and small and medium-sized "detection and combat integration" unmanned aerial vehicles. If the Russian advance troops raiding Gostomelli airport have these drones, the success rate of their missions will be further improved.
Editor-in-Charge: Xie Ruiqiang Photo Editor: Jiang Lidong
Proofreader: Luan Meng