The Paper's special contributor Hu Yukun
Recently, the United Kingdom unilaterally promoted a series of actions to amend the "Northern Ireland Protocol", which once again angered the EU. On 27 June, the House of Commons of the British Parliament voted 295 to 221 in favor of the bill submitted two weeks ago by Foreign Secretary Traus on unilateral amendments to the Northern Ireland Protocol.
In the words of the BBC, the Uk government's plan to overturn parts of the 2020 Brexit deal has crossed the first hurdle in Parliament. At present, the bill has entered the phase of progressive review, and its subsequent progress, passing or not, has cast a shadow of uncertainty on the future direction of the RELATIONSHIP between the UK and the EU.
The "insignificant" revision fueled by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the "constitutional crisis"
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson claimed his changes were "relatively insignificant", and the British cabinet secretary also insisted that the move did not violate international law. However, from the perspective of the main content of the bill, the UK's amendment to the original protocol is not insignificant: eliminating "unnecessary" paperwork and costs for corporate transactions in the UK; Businesses may, at their option, sell their products in the Northern Ireland market in accordance with UK or EU rules; Ensuring that Northern Ireland enjoys the same tax breaks and spending policies as the rest of the UK; Disputes are resolved through independent arbitration instead of the European Court of Justice.
British Prime Minister Johnson Xinhua News Agency (Courtesy of the British Prime Minister's Office)
In this regard, not only the EU strongly opposes it, saying that the unilateral act of the United Kingdom is undermining bilateral mutual trust and preparing to file legal proceedings, but even there are voices of dissatisfaction within the British political arena. Needless to say, the opposition Labour Party, former British Prime Minister Theresa May, who is also a Conservative MP, also believes that the amendment to the protocol is "contrary to international law", after all, she herself has experienced arduous Brexit negotiations with the EU, and although she has failed in her tenure, she knows that reaching this fragile Brexit agreement is not easy to come by.
For the Johnson government, they may not be willing to cause trouble for themselves: Johnson took over May, which is already shouldering the mission of reaching a Brexit agreement, and the "Northern Ireland Protocol" is also the hard-won result of many rounds of negotiations between the current British government and the EU. However, in the face of the actual economic and trade situation after the agreement entered into force, the domestic opposition, especially the changes in the situation in Northern Ireland, the Johnson government will unilaterally "repent" as the key to the problem.
Originally, the Northern Ireland Protocol was reached to avoid a "hard border" between the British Northern Ireland region on the island of Ireland and the European Union's Republic of Ireland. It allowed Northern Ireland to remain within the European Single Market and the EU customs union and continue to implement EU rules, while de facto "hard border" controls between the UK and the EU were transferred between the Isle of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, i.e. within the UK.
This means that some goods from Great Britain to Northern Ireland are no longer unimpeded, but are subject to customs and border security checks similar to cross-border borders. The inconvenience of logistics between the two places quickly translated into an impact on the daily economic life of the people of Northern Ireland. Since last year, due to cumbersome customs declaration procedures, many daily consumer goods from Great Britain have not been able to appear on the shelves of local supermarkets in Northern Ireland in time, which has brought many inconveniences to the daily life of local residents.
In July last year, six British retailers, namely Tesco, Asda, Semboli, Co-operative Group, Iceland and Marks & Spencer, sent a joint letter to the British government and the European Commission, warning that if the protocol continues to be implemented, border controls between the two places will increase retailers' operating costs, resulting in higher prices of consumer goods in Northern Ireland. More than 75% of the supply of goods in northern Ireland's daily commodities market comes from these six major retailers.
The EU and the UK have taken interim measures to ease a possible crisis, such as a three-month extension of the grace period for customs inspections of frozen meat from Great Britain last June. But ad hoc measures cannot solve the problem at its root. As the Conflict between Russia and Ukraine expands and continues this year, the UK Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose 9.1% year-on-year in May, a new high.
In Northern Ireland, the external crisis and the Northern Ireland Protocol have combined to boost inflation and hit local consumer confidence hard: a danske bank survey in Denmark showed that more than 40% of northern Irish people in the first quarter of this year believe that their economic situation will deteriorate in the coming year due to the soaring cost of living.
More of a headache for the Johnson administration than the economic impact is the local political dilemma triggered by the Northern Ireland Protocol, which is the direct cause of unilateral action by the British government.
In the British local elections in May this year, the Conservative Party suffered a crushing defeat, and Northern Ireland also experienced a "big change" unprecedented in a century, advocating Sinn Fein's Party to break away from the United Kingdom and establish a unified republic with Ireland to become the largest party in the Northern Ireland Parliament. Under Northern Ireland's current political system of power-sharing and consultation, Sinn Féin Vice-Chairman Michel O'Neill is eligible to be nominated as Chief Minister of Northern Ireland, thus becoming the first "republican/independent" regional leader in history.
However, the Democratic Unionist Party, the second largest party in Parliament and the leading force in the region's "royalist/unionist" (advocating for Northern Ireland to remain in Britain), holds a very strong "stay in Britain" position and is firmly opposed to any policy that could weaken Northern Ireland's ties with the rest of the United Kingdom, especially the Northern Ireland Protocol, which sets a "hard border" between the two places.
So the Democratic Unionist Party used the requirements of the power-sharing rules in the Northern Ireland region to "blackmail" the British government into amending the protocol. At present, the party is using the rules to boycott the convening of a new parliament in Northern Ireland and refuse to participate in a coalition government, making it impossible to form a new government and causing a rare "constitutional crisis" in the region.
Originally, in order to alleviate economic problems, the Johnson government intended to amend the "Northern Ireland Protocol" to simplify the customs clearance procedures for the movement of people and goods between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, and the current political impasse in Northern Ireland has prompted it to make up its mind and take the first step.
Would amending the Northern Ireland Protocol appease resentment or exacerbate the centrifugal forces of the "United Kingdom"?
Among the "United Kingdom", Northern Ireland is undoubtedly the most sensitive area and a potential powder keg. If asked what impact the 2016 Brexit referendum had on the UK, amplifying the structural contradictions in Northern Ireland is undoubtedly the most direct one.
The problem of Northern Ireland has a long history, and the key lies in the status and belonging of Northern Ireland. The British ruled Ireland for centuries, and protestant British rulers oppressed and exploited the Catholic Irish, triggering a sustained revolt by the latter. In 1949 the United Kingdom recognized the complete independence of the 26 southern counties of Ireland, becoming today's Republic of Ireland. The 6 northern counties, where the Protestant population is concentrated, are still under British rule and become the Northern Ireland region of The United Kingdom.
Due to historical tensions between Catholics and Protestants, republicans/independenceists and royalists/unionists, Northern Ireland has been in turmoil for a long time since the late 1960s, and violent terrorist attacks have even spread to other parts of the United Kingdom, Ireland and continental Europe. The 1972 "Bloody Sunday" tragedy pushed hostility to the extreme. The 30-year-long bloody conflict resulted in 3,532 deaths and more than 47,500 injuries.
It was not until 1998, under the auspices of George Mitchell, then Special Envoy of the President of the United States in Northern Ireland, that the British Government, the Irish Government and the parties in Northern Ireland signed the Belfast Agreement after peaceful negotiations.
The Belfast Agreement, which clarifies the current autonomous status of the Northern Ireland region within the scope of British sovereignty (but at the same time the people of Northern Ireland have the right to decide to stay in the future), and the institutional arrangement of the two parties to jointly govern, especially the institutional framework for the handling of Anglo-Irish relations and relations between North and South Ireland, are important milestones in the peace process and normalization in Northern Ireland.
In the 20 years since the agreement came into force, both Britain and Ireland are members of the European Union, and the two countries have established a joint travel zone before joining the EU, ensuring that the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland is open and that people, goods and services can move freely. As a result, the contradictions between the two factions of "leaving the UK" and "staying in Britain" have been alleviated to a certain extent, providing a guarantee for the peace process in Northern Ireland.
However, this still cannot eradicate the contradictions and antagonisms between the two major forces of the Northern Irish republicans and the royalists, after all, the two hold diametrically opposed positions on the status and belonging of Northern Ireland. The proportion of the population that supports "maintaining the status quo" and "leaving Britain and entering love" remains at more than 50% and less than 40%, respectively, and neither of these two factions can occupy absolute dominance and overwhelm the other.
After 2016, as Brexit changed from an emotional catharsis to an inevitable fact, the contradictions between the positions and religious beliefs of the two factions were further intensified, and Northern Ireland's social and party politics accelerated towards polarization:
Nearly 56% of northern Ireland's population opposed Brexit at the time of the 2016 referendum. In the post-Brexit era, if there is no additional institutional arrangement, there will inevitably be a "hard border" between Northern Ireland and Ireland, which is not only unacceptable to the hardline republicans, but also emotionally unacceptable to most ordinary people in Northern Ireland.
Both the UK and the EU are well aware of the trouble this issue can cause, so the two sides have reached the Northern Ireland Protocol through twists and turns. However, the protocol does not seem to alleviate the contradiction: in other parts of the UK, opponents argue that it violates the UK's complete sovereignty and unified market, undermining the bottom line; In Northern Ireland, the Royalists were not happy to see the Protocol maintaining or even strengthening ties between North and South Ireland, but were more concerned that the barriers between Northern Ireland and Great Britain would weaken the links between the two places.
As for the republicans represented by Sinn Fein, they will not be more pro-British than before Brexit because of this protocol, but if the protocol is unilaterally amended, resulting in any obstacles to the passage between North and South Ireland, it will strengthen their motivation and desire to "leave the UK and enter love". It can be said that the introduction of the "Northern Ireland Protocol" has hardly played a role in calming resentment and alleviating domestic contradictions.
Because of this, the Johnson administration has no incentive to sustain this fragile compromise, and instead has, instead, instead threatened to use Article 16 of the Northern Ireland Protocol (which authorizes one party to act unilaterally) for nearly two years to bargain with the EU in disputes over bilateral movements of goods and the distribution of vaccines. Now, the Johnson government has taken this risky step under pressure from many sides, which will not only further offend the republicans in Northern Ireland, but also face the EU's countermeasures, intensify the British-European friction, and be condemned for "violating international law" and damage the international image.
In addition to the foreseeable social rift in Northern Ireland and the twists and turns in the bilateral relationship between London and Brussels, the Johnson administration needs to carefully consider whether the existing system in the "United Kingdom" will be fundamentally impacted.
Just as the dispute over amending the Northern Ireland Protocol was at stake, Scottish Chief Minister Nicola Sturgeon in the north officially announced on June 28 that scottish local governments plan to hold a second independence referendum on 19 October 2023. Sturgeon's voice at this time is obviously accurate to the changes in the political map of various regions in the United Kingdom after the local elections, as well as the new wind direction driven by the latest developments of the Northern Ireland Protocol.
Compared with the first independence referendum in Scotland in 2014, if next year's second referendum is held as scheduled, the result is very likely to be very different: before the 2014 referendum, the EU stated that it would not accept an independent Scotland as a member state, and at that time, the United Kingdom did not propose to hold a Brexit referendum, and a considerable number of Scots supported staying in the UK in order to stay in the EU; The 2016 Brexit referendum has made most of the Scottish people who support Remain in the EU more or less have a feeling of being deceived by the UK, and since the UK is now drifting away from the EU, "Brexit" in the hearts of these people may mean greater hope of "joining the EU".
This can also be reflected in the results of various polls: since 2014, the support of the Scottish public remaining in the UK has hardly reached the level of 55.3% at the time of the first referendum, or even 50%, and there have been many "death crosses" with the support rate of independence (see chart below).
Since the 2014 independence referendum, the support rate of Scottish stay in the UK (red) and independence (green) has changed, source: Wikipedia
Of course, unlike former Prime Minister David Cameron, Johnson has so far made no concessions on this "issue of principle" and has repeatedly stated that he will not agree to Scotland's second referendum. However, it is indeed necessary for the British government to start from diplomacy, negotiate with the EU, properly handle the "Northern Ireland Protocol" and even the Bilateral Relations between the United Kingdom and the Eu, promote the settlement of domestic issues, and alleviate the domestic contradictions intensified by Brexit that year, especially the centrifugal force of Northern Ireland and Scotland.
Only in this way will the "Globalized United Kingdom" envisioned by Johnson not become a "divided kingdom" of England and Wales alone.
(Hu Yukun, Member of the China Translation Association and International Political Columnist)
Editor-in-Charge: Zhu Zhengyong Photo Editor: Jiang Lidong
Proofreader: Zhang Liangliang