Faka Mountain, located at No. 26 boundary monument on the Sino-Vietnamese border in Shangshi Town, Pingxiang City, Guangxi, is a boundary mountain between the two countries, with a total area of about 1 hectare. Divided into 5 highlands from north to south, the main peak No. 3 highland is 511.3 meters above sea level, which is a riding line point across the two countries. Highlands 1 and 2 north of the main peak belong to China, and highlands 4 and 5 south of the main peak belong to Vietnam.
After the end of the 1979 self-defense and defense of the frontier against Vietnam, the Vietnamese army, unwilling to lose, crossed the border line in January 1980, occupied two high ground on the Chinese side of the Farca Mountains, took advantage of the favorable terrain to shoot and fire, and frequently created armed provocations, seriously threatening the production and life and life and property safety of Chinese border residents.
On April 19, 1981, according to the instructions of the Central Military Commission, the Guangzhou Military Region decided to uproot the Yue army stronghold at Faka Mountain and take control of it. In accordance with the instructions of the Guangzhou Military Region Headquarters, the Guangxi Military Region decided that the 9th Regiment of the 3rd Border Defense Division would carry out combat tasks. At 6:50 a.m. on May 5, the 4th Company of the 2nd Battalion of the 9th Regiment, which was the main attacker, captured Mount Faka with the support of artillery fire, and then turned to the defensive position.
As of June 30, the 9th Regiment had repelled four counterattacks by the Vietnamese army from company to regimental size, killing 705 Vietnamese troops, wounding 513, destroying 135 artillery pieces, injuring 2 tanks, and destroying 14 cars.
Strengthen pre-war reconnaissance. Before each major counterattack, the Vietnamese army used a variety of reconnaissance methods to find out the deployment of troops, the allocation of firepower, and the construction of fortifications in the front and depth of our defense. The reconnaissance methods adopted are mainly observation, cross-border reconnaissance and aerial reconnaissance.
After 5 May, the Vietnamese army quickly opened more than a dozen infantry and artillery observation posts at some commanding heights on the front and flanks of Mount Faka, and carried out uninterrupted observation of the Area of Mount Fakaa, which combined the front and side and complemented each other day and night. At the same time, the reconnaissance detachments of its divisions and regiments were deployed near the border line, carried out arrival observation, and repeatedly dispatched special agents to carry out infiltration and reconnaissance. In addition, an Aerial Reconnaissance Aircraft of the MiG-2IP type was also conducted in the frontier areas of our army.
Beware of covert attempts. The Vietnamese army organized a counterattack, emphasizing the secret completion of preparations. Sometimes, in order to confuse our army, they also organize pretense. Before the 337th Division organized the first counterattack on May 10, the 52nd Regiment, which was the main offensive, under the guise of the exercise, carried out operational arrangements to carry out offensive operations against our army, secretly and in batches and in multiple ways to the attack starting area, and opened a forward finger in front of Faka Mountain, and covertly completed the combat preparations. At the same time, in order to cover up the counterattack organized by the 337th Division, the 327th Division on its flank deliberately created a tense atmosphere to strengthen its preparations for war in an attempt to divert the attention of our army.
Pay attention to artillery preparation. In order to support infantry operations, before the Vietnamese army launched a counterattack, it attached great importance to organizing artillery fire to attack our army's defensive positions, kill and injure our army's living forces, suppress all kinds of firearms of our army, and destroy our army's fortifications. Judging from the situation of the Vietnamese army's repeated counterattacks, its artillery fire is relatively fierce and the shelling time is longer.
From 5 May to 30 June, the enemy fired more than 20,000 rounds of various shells at the Faka Mountain area. Among them, when the counterattack was launched on May 10, at 23:50 on the 9th, the artillery bombardment of our army lasted for 18 hours, firing more than 1,900 shells. On May 16, in order to cooperate with the regimental-sized counterattack, the Vietnamese army carried out fierce artillery preparations against me, pouring more than 4,100 shells of various shells into our Position at Mount Faka. The focus of the Vietnamese army's artillery preparations is the key points of our army's defensive front, and at the same time suppress and disrupt our army's deep targets. According to rough statistics, the key points of our army's forward points accounted for about 74 percent of the total number of shells fired by the enemy.
Judging from the situation of smashing the Vietnamese army's offensive several times, the Vietnamese army has paid more and more attention to the status and role of artillery in offensive operations, and artillery preparation and artillery support and cover in battle have become an indispensable content of its offensive operations, which to a certain extent reflects the improvement of the level of coordinated operations of Vietnamese infantry and artillery; but at the same time, it can be seen that the Vietnamese army is still relatively poor in the unified command and observation of artillery, the shooting is not accurate and concentrated, and the coordination between infantry attack actions and artillery is not compact enough.
Emphasis is placed on night action. The timing of the attack is usually in the dark of night or when visibility is poor. Judging by the four larger counterattacks, two before dawn, one at 3 a.m. and one at dusk. At the same time, great importance was attached to the quiet operation at night, and judging from the corpses of some enemies killed by our army, they were all lightly armed, and there was no other equipment except for weapons and ammunition, and many of them were barefoot. Actual combat shows that the Vietnamese army does have a certain night activity capability, especially the small detachment operation, and the night activity ability is stronger. However, when organizing larger offensive operations at night, the Vietnamese command was poorly coordinated and could not firmly grasp the troops.
Focus on tactical changes and coordination. The Vietnamese offensive tactics are more flexible and diverse. There are both regular offensive warfare and cunning guerrilla warfare; there are both concentrated offensive operations and scattered raids and sabotage. Attaching great importance to the combination of the main offensive and containment, while attacking the main target with the main force, attacking its flanks with a certain number of troops, forming a multi-way and multi-directional attack, in an attempt to force our army to disperse its strength and attention, so as to help it achieve the main offensive objective.
For example, in the counterattack on June 7, the Vietnamese army took our army's position called Ka Shan as the main direction of attack, deployed about one battalion of troops, and at the same time used some troops to carry out a diversionary attack on our positions of Fa ka shan and Pu Liu De, in a vain attempt to mislead our army to put the main defensive direction on fa ka shan in order to achieve its goal of breaking through the ka shan from the flank. Because the main offensive force and the containment unit of the Vietnamese army often did not coordinate well, there was often an imbalance of attack, the dispersion of troops, and the weak attack ability, and several counterattacks were quickly defeated.
Emphasis is placed on the combination of sneak attacks and strong attacks. Most of the sneak attack troops are group or squad or platoon size. Most of the methods are to use the night to sneak to the front of our army's positions, to attack and harass our army with actions such as shooting, bomb dropping, and demining, and to conduct reconnaissance to create conditions for its strong attack.
It also attaches importance to the coordination of attacks behind enemy lines with frontal operations. In addition to organizing a frontal attack with its main strength, the Vietnamese army also organized special teams to infiltrate our territory on many occasions to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage activities. Its main targets are mostly command structures, artillery positions and communication hubs. In order to cooperate with the frontal attack on May 19, the Vietnamese army sent 9 special agents on the night of May 18 to infiltrate our army 8 kilometers deep in an attempt to attack our artillery positions. The Vietnamese use of special forces to cooperate with frontal attacks is a prominent feature of operations in the Phaka Mountain area.
The author is a master of history, a university lecturer, focusing on the history of the Sino-Vietnamese war.
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