Sisso European Review| Macron elected, Europe won a "moratorium"?

The Paper's special contributor Hu Chunchun

【Editor's Note】

This article is the 19th article of the column "Sisso European Review" launched by the "European Studies" research team of the Shanghai Institute of Global Governance and Regional Country Studies of Shanghai University of Foreign Chinese (SISU) in cooperation with the International Department of The Paper. Macron has finally won his second term, what does that mean for Europe?

On May 18, 2021, the German newspaper "Commerzel" chose the headline "France overthrows Europe" when looking forward to the French presidential election to be held next year, predicting that the French presidential election will be "the election that determines the fate of Europe", because "French Trump" Marina Le Pen is likely to be elected president of France and "destroy Europe from within".

An election that will determine the fate of Europe

A year later, on April 21, 2022, three days before the second round of voting in the French presidential election, the heads of government of Germany, Spain and Portugal took a surprising move: they jointly issued a letter in the French newspaper Le Monde calling on the French people to vote for the current French president, Macron, because they wanted the French to choose a France that defends "our common values", a France that has the courage to support justice and rebel against Russia. The fact that foreign leaders have joined forces to intervene directly in the election of another country's leader is a rare political phenomenon even in the European Union, which has removed its internal borders. At the same time, the reasons used by the three authors in their appeals were not for the sake of French internal politics, but for the sake of "all of Europe", especially in the face of war or peace, justice or injustice.

Therefore, it is not difficult to understand why after the results of the French election on the evening of April 25, from Brussels to the major European capitals and mainstream media, they all breathed a sigh of relief. The 2022 French presidential election has long been given political and value meaning beyond France, and the boundaries of meaning are gradually expanding: whether it is how to deal with the threat of populist and eurosceptic forces, or how to solve the current Russian-Ukrainian crisis, and even the future of Europe and all mankind seems to depend on Macron's re-election.

France was undoubtedly one of the dominant forces of European integration, and de Gaulle's France was also unique on the world political stage, but this expectation of France and its leaders never appeared even during the Cold War. However, we cannot fully understand the importance of France in a positive sense at this time, because in recent years, France has given people a sense of surplus and insufficient strength in terms of economic strength and appeal to advocate so-called "European sovereignty".

The truth may be the opposite: France's sudden designation is unusual, perhaps even more so because europeans generally believe that France and Europe are facing a moment of directional crisis and decision. That is to say, we should understand the importance of france's presidential election in the sense of a negative warning.

The French challenge macron faces

In this way, Macron's task in the next five years is even more difficult.

France was macron's first problem. Macron moved into the Elysee Palace in 2017 with promises of "radical" change in France, breaking social barriers and protecting vulnerable groups. His successful re-election this time is not due to his impressive achievements in his first term, but rather to the fact that he created a "cholera or plague" dilemma for French voters not to choose the best, but to eliminate the bad.

Over the past few years, the traditional political landscape of checks and balances between the left and the right in France has fallen apart at an alarming rate. Although the decline of the Socialist Party and the Republican Party is first and foremost attributed to its own causes and the regularity of social change, Macron's "Republic Advances!" ”（La République en Marche! Political movements dilute the boundaries between the traditional center-right and center-left camps and are an important factor in accelerating changes in the political ecology. Under the onslaught of Macron's "progressive" movement, neither left nor right, only the far-right and far-left political positions remain distinctive. That is to say, Le Pen led the right-wing populist "National Alliance" and the ultra-left "indomitable France" led by Mérançon in the first round of this French presidential election with Macron's "Republic Advance!" "Basically form a three-point trend, the support rate of all parties is between 20% and 30%, which is also due to Macron to a considerable extent."

Therefore, when Macron vowed to shout "to be the president of all Frenchmen" after winning the election, the first thing that was exposed was the fact that he had to face that France's party politics was in danger of hollowing out and that society was divided like never before. Macron himself received less than 28% of the support in the first round of the presidential election, and in the second round of the election, under the unanimous call of mainstream public opinion in Europe and France to "stop Le Pen", his lead over Le Pen was also greatly reduced from the 2017 election, and if the total number of voters was used as a benchmark, only 38.5% of voters chose Macron, which is the lowest vote rate for any French president since 1969. Despite her defeat, Le Pen has reason to think she still has a "victory" because she boosted her approval rating by 8 percent in the second round compared to the last election, and more than 41 percent of French voters now accept a president with a far-right background. If this trend continues, who can guarantee that Le Pen will not become the first female president of the French Republic when she runs for the fourth time in 2027?

Therefore, Macron's first priority in his second term is to bridge the gulfs that have deepened in the society of the country in his first term. In this election, these gaps or tears are reflected in France's urban-rural areas, between voters of different ages, and between different social classes. A significant percentage of French people lost interest in political participation due to disappointment, with 28 percent of voters not voting in the second round of the 2022 presidential election and a record 57 percent abstention in the 2017 legislative election. Macron's political career so far, however, makes it hard to imagine him abandoning his elite stature and competing with Le Pen for endorsement of low-income and "yellow vest" protesters, or overhauling the legislative electoral system that favors pro-establishment parties.

What worries international and domestic observers even more is whether France's economic power and Macron's economic and fiscal policies can provide support even if Macron works hard to reform. After all, a good economic and financial foundation is a prerequisite for solving social and political problems. It is precisely at this point that France is not reassuring: France's debt ratio of 115% of GDP, although not among the highest in the EU, 47.8% of France's debt is in the hands of foreign creditors, which is a potentially unsettling factor. Macron's plans for the future are also considered by economists to be "a complete departure from the EU's Fiscal Stability Pact."

Taking Macron's planned financial subsidies after his victory as an example, fuel subsidies for drivers, food stamps for 8 million poor people, etc. may buy temporary social stability under the double impact of the epidemic and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, as well as bring some votes for Macron's legislative elections in June, but the effect may be counterproductive for high inflation. But if Macron can't even achieve social integration in France, how can he promote European integration?

The European challenge facing France

Europe is the second test of Macron's ambition and ability. Macron's most affirmative point is that he has always adhered to the European position, and has not taken the populist free ride in the era of populism, and shifted the responsibility for all problems to the EU. However, Macron's successful re-election does not mean that Europe will make progress, but because Macron prevented Le Pen from being elected, Europe was able to temporarily avoid the risks of Le Pen's claimed withdrawal from NATO, exit from the European Union, and cooperation with Russia.

The challenge before Europe is more than a Le Pen! After Merkel stepped down as Chancellor of Germany late last year, the EU's de facto leadership has been hanging in the air. The domestic and diplomatic performance of Germany's three-party coalition government over the past few months proves that the Scholz government is unable to assume the role of European leader, and that the expectations of European and international observers naturally fall on France, the other pole of the EU's "Franco-German axis" or "German-French axis". Europe is not out of the impact of the pandemic at present, the recovery of the economy is facing many uncertainties, and the dispute between the EU and member states such as Hungary and Poland on the rule of law national standards is still unresolved. At the same time, the rise of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is the overriding challenge, and war or peace is not only related to Europe's security architecture and overall development environment for the next few decades, but also raises the issues of energy supply, inflation, refugee resettlement, supply chain security and other issues of urgency.

France has been unslack in the sharp escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on February 24, and has been active in the front line of the EU and NATO in terms of diplomatic mediation, sanctions against Russia and assistance to Ukraine. Macron personally went to Moscow before the conflict, and after the conflict broke out, he spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin several times to promote peace; France's resistance to Russia because it was much less dependent on Russian gas and oil than Germany; and its support for Ukraine, including heavy weapons, did not cause domestic controversy. In fact, the outbreak of the Conflict between Russia and Ukraine has indirectly assisted Macron in the election, and the presidential candidates Zemur and Le Pen in the far-right populist camp have been embarrassed by their support for Russia's conservative stance in the past and their close cooperation with Russia. But to Macron's embarrassment, his personal mediation efforts have so far failed to have the desired effect, and he clearly does not have the European and international prestige of Merkel, who single-handedly brokered an overnight mediation in Minsk in February 2015.

It was also in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that Europeans deeply realized that they did not have the "European sovereignty" that Macron always called for in the field of security and defense. Last week, former German Foreign Minister Gabriel, in response to a reporter's question about what kind of weapons Germany should provide for Ukraine, made the following suggestions: Germany should look at the United States, what the United States can do, Germany can do as much as possible; what the United States does not do, Germany absolutely should not do. As a former member of the government who is no longer in office, Gabriel's inadvertent and public position reveals the "psychological image" of Europeans, that is, there is no, no ability, and no willingness to develop Europe's independent security and defense capabilities, and even independent strategic thinking. The peace and prosperity of Europe after World War II has always been based on the umbrella provided by the United States.

Within the eu, France is the only country that can propose and promote the building of An independent European defense capability. But France's quest for great power status, especially during the periods of Charles de Gaulle and Mitterrand, and the institutional characteristics of excessive concentration of political decisions on the president, including Macron's own assertion that "NATO is brain dead", have also left a shadow of "prejudice and misunderstanding" in important European countries such as Germany, and even triggered "distrust" (German Institute of Foreign Affairs). Therefore, Macron's grand Blueprint for Europe must start with the establishment of a European consensus in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict crisis. Germany's Merkel is a political master of seeking "minimal consensus" and maintaining the status quo, but Macron is clearly facing a more serious situation than in Merkel's time, and Europe urgently needs strategic thinking and decisive action to deal with the escalation or long-term continuation of conflicts. While Europe's attitude toward aid to Ukraine is now highly aligned, different countries, different political and social forces have different views on how to end the conflict and how to structure future relations with Russia. Le Pen's attitude is very different from Macron's.

Europe wins "probation"

Under the dual pressures of France's domestic politics and international situation, there is not much time left for the Europeanist Macron. Macron had expected to use the eu presidency in the first half of 2022 to push for further changes in the POST-PANDEMIC under the slogan of "prosperity, strength, belonging", including finding an economic growth model that balances innovation and employment, easing eu restrictions on member state borrowing to increase investment in areas such as climate protection, digitalization and defense, and defending the EU's external borders. However, Europe is currently in emergency mode, and expectations for the French presidency of the EUROPEAN Union have shifted to a crisis response.

On April 29, German philosopher Habermas submitted a letter to the Süddeutsche Zeitung, saying that Macron's re-election had won a "deferred execution period" for Europe to build its own security and defense capabilities. That is to say, there are opportunities in the crisis, but it is a difficult process in which Europe must reach a consensus, face up to its responsibilities, and truly become one of the poles of a multipolar world. Europe can no longer rely on "peace under the United States," much less ignore the high uncertainty of American domestic politics. Otherwise, the future of Europe will be at best an enlarged version of France, obsessed with the "beacon of world civilization" fantasy without knowing it.

(Hu Chunchun, Head of the "European Civilization Studies" Special Graduate Class, Shanghai Institute of Global Governance and Regional State Studies, Shanghai University of Chinese)

Editor-in-Charge: Zhu Zhengyong Photo Editor: Jiang Lidong

Proofreader: Yan Zhang