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Li De was only an adviser, so why did he have absolute command over the Red Army? Wu Xiuquan bears witness to history

author:Bing said

Four Field General Series: Woo So-kuen 1

Author: Mast

Compared with the many "star generals" in Shino, many people may not be familiar with Wu Xiuquan. He was one of the first generals to march into the northeast, and when the Northeast People's Autonomous Army was established, Wu Xiuquan was the second chief of staff. He left the army at the beginning of the founding of the country and did not participate in the 1955 award, but he was actually one of the first generals in our army to award a rank. He was a Confucian general, who had served in the center for a long time, personally participated in many major events inside and outside the army, and belonged to the "general with a story". Let's talk about this general who has a more special experience.

(1) Attended military school, participated in the Red Square military parade, and was wounded in battle for the first time

In October 1925, Wu Xiuquan went to Moscow to study at Sun Yat-sen University. In September 1927, when he was preparing to return to China after his studies, due to the road blockage, he arranged for some cadets to stay and study military affairs. Wu Xiuquan transferred to the Moscow Infantry School and stayed on as a translator for a year after graduation. During this period, Wu Xiuquan also participated in the Red Square military parade on the 10th anniversary of the October Revolution with his student company.

Li De was only an adviser, so why did he have absolute command over the Red Army? Wu Xiuquan bears witness to history

The military training of the Moscow Infantry School is extremely rigorous. Wu Xiuquan belongs to the academic hegemonic type of talent, primary school to middle school, culture class and physical education class are excellent. After studying in the Soviet Union, the Russian language improved rapidly. In the two years of military school, not only did he achieve good results in theoretical courses, but also his military training achievements were also very prominent, and he laid a solid foundation in military skills.

In October 1929, the Middle East Road Incident broke out, and Wu Xiuquan and 10 other people were transferred to the Soviet Far East Military District. After the end of the war, Wu Xiuquan was assigned to work at the State Defense Bureau of the Far East of the Soviet Union (i.e., the KGB). By 1931, Wu Xiuquan had been in the Soviet Union for nearly five years, during which time he had always wanted to return to China to work. However, because he was a member of the Soviet organization, Wu Xiuquan always found the Chinese delegation of the Comintern and the Organization Department of the CPSU before he was allowed to return to China, and entered the Jiangxi Soviet Region around the end of July of that year and was assigned to the Operations Section of the Fujian-Guangdong-Gansu Military Region as a staff officer.

In Wu Xiuquan's military career, although he has been engaged in staff and military diplomacy for a long time, he has also been on the battlefield and has been seriously injured. It was during the third anti-encirclement and suppression period, and in order to cooperate with the main Red Army, the Fujian-Guangdong-Gansu Military Region organized an offensive operation at Lufeng near Shanghang, under the command of Xiao Jinguang, chief of staff of the military region. At this time, Less than a month after Wu Xiuquan arrived in the Soviet zone, he temporarily went down to the machine gun company directly under the military region as an instructor, and he also participated in the battle with the machine gun company.

The machine gun company had 4 heavy machine guns. After the battle began, Wu Xiuquan instructed the soldiers on how to operate the machine guns in actual combat, and when the battle was fierce, he personally operated the gun and shot, and it was particularly painful to see the charging enemy being knocked down by rows and rows. The battle begins at dawn and is fought together until dusk. Just as the battle was about to end, a bullet struck Wu Xiuquan's left cheek, knocking him to the ground and immediately being carried to the rear for treatment.

Li De was only an adviser, so why did he have absolute command over the Red Army? Wu Xiuquan bears witness to history

This was the only time in Wu Xiuquan's life that he went to war and was wounded. Fortunately, when the bullet hit him, it may have been at the end of the flight and did not form a penetration. That bullet, it wasn't until more than a year later, that it was taken out of the mouth.

(ii) How did Li De command the Red Army? Look at the map in the detached house

After recovering from his injuries, Wu Xiuquan was transferred to the Red Army School as a teacher. During this period, he briefly served as the commander of the Tinglian Military Sub-district for about 3 months, and then returned to the Red Army School. In October 1933, Wu Xiuquan received an order to report to Ruijin immediately.

After arriving at the headquarters, General Liu Bocheng personally talked to Wu Xiuquan, saying that the military adviser sent by the Soviet Union had arrived in Ruijin, and the organization decided to transfer him to Li De as an interpreter. General Director Liu believes that Wu Xiuquan is good at Russian, has studied military affairs in the Soviet Union, and has more than 2 years of actual combat and teaching experience, and is "fully capable of this work."

At that time, Li De was assigned 2 interpreters, and Wu Xiuquan was responsible for translations for operations and conferences. When Li De gave military lessons to Red Army cadres, Wang Zhitao (major general in 1955) served as an interpreter.

At that time, a residence was also specially built for Li De, about 1 km from the station of the organ. Because the house was surrounded by rice fields, it was called "independent house" at that time. When Li De arrived in Ruijin, Chiang Kai-shek's fifth encirclement and suppression of the Soviet zone had already begun. Therefore, as soon as Li De arrived, he began to command the fifth anti-encirclement and suppression operation.

Li De's command procedure was as follows: The headquarters received a telegram from the front and immediately sent it to the "independent house." Wu Xiuquan first translated the telegram into Russian, pinpointed the location on the map and drew it into a sketch map, and then sent the translation and the sketch to Li De; after Li De signed the opinion, he translated Li De's opinion into a Chinese and sent it to Vice Chairman Zhou, where the general matters were dealt with directly, and major matters were submitted to the meeting for discussion, and then an order was given to the troops. In fact, it is basically based on Li De's opinion.

Li De was only an adviser, so why did he have absolute command over the Red Army? Wu Xiuquan bears witness to history

Li De served as the chief of staff of the cavalry division in the Soviet Army, and was a high-caliber student of the Frunze Military Academy, although his identity was full of doubts, he did not have the power to command the Red Army, and it was history that pushed him to a special position and gave him special powers. Objectively speaking, Li De is not a layman in military command, he has theory, he also has combat practice, and of course, he also has the desire to help China. But with Li De in command of the Red Army, at least the following problems existed:

First, they do not understand China's national conditions, do not conduct in-depth investigations and studies, and only command operations on the basis of maps in "independent houses"; second, they have high self-esteem, blind self-confidence, stubborn personality, and cannot listen to different opinions; third, they copy books, seriously deviate from reality, and occasionally go to the front line to accuse this and reprimand that.

Li De was only an adviser, so why did he have absolute command over the Red Army? Wu Xiuquan bears witness to history

(3) Li De did not have a good feeling for Wu Xiuquan, but thought that his translation was "completely correct"

First of all, in terms of military strategy, Li Deyi changed his previous operational policy of focusing on mobile warfare in the anti-encirclement and suppression campaign, and proposed to "resist the enemy outside the gates of the country," to "fortress to fortress," and to confront the superior enemy army with position warfare and regular warfare. As a result, the Red Army was completely passive strategically.

In terms of tactical command, let's take a simple example: the maps at that time were already very inaccurate. With such a map, Li De calculated the distance according to the scale, and then decided the time when the troops arrived and launched the battle, regardless of whether it was a mountain road or a flat land, regardless of the river, climate and other conditions. As a result, it is difficult for the troops to arrive on time and enter the battle, it is difficult to coordinate effectively, and it is difficult to avoid losing the battle.

You may ask: Why should a foreigner who was just an adviser command the Red Army? The root cause is ourselves.

At that time, our person in charge, Bogu and others, did not understand the military, blindly superstitiously believed in The identity and experience of Li De, and sent several telegrams to Moscow, proposing to let Li De serve as a military adviser. Moscow finally replied that Li De was "at the mercy of the Chinese side as an adviser without the power to direct."

Li De was only an adviser, so why did he have absolute command over the Red Army? Wu Xiuquan bears witness to history

After entering the Soviet zone, Bogu and others did not trust the cadres of the Soviet zone and fully trusted and relied on Li De militarily. In addition, Li De is very conceited, called an adviser, and actually enjoys absolute command.

Objectively speaking: We invited this foreign adviser, and we handed over the command to him. Therefore, it is also inappropriate to blame Li De for the failure of the fifth anti-encirclement and suppression campaign.

Li De was short-tempered and scolded people at every turn, which was completely different from the tradition of being consistent with the officers and men of our army. Wu Xiuquan believes that translating li de as "the most embarrassing task." Other people working in "detached houses" have also repeatedly stirred up emotions and asked for work transfers.

Li De was impressed by Wu Xiuquan, a translator who had been with him for several years, but mainly negative impressions. In his 1973 Chronicle of China, he argued that "he translated it completely correctly", and at the same time, it was clear from the lines that he had no good feelings for Wu Xiuquan, and that he was obviously a little schadenfreude about wu Xiuquan being criticized in a special era. As for another translator, Wang Zhitao, I can't even remember his name.

【Deeply cultivate the history of war, carry forward positive energy, welcome to submit, private messages will be restored】

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