Press: Xenophobic rhetoric is rife on social networks, right-wing parties have won a lot of votes from young people... The current situation has left us with the impression that Young Japanese are becoming "conservative and xenophobic". Is this really the case? The Japanese sociologist Kenji Hashimoto discussed this issue in his book The New Japanese Class Society, and through various investigations, he found that the problem is not so simple.
Kenji Hashimoto pointed out that partisanship is a more important factor in determining whether a Japanese person is xenophobic than his age group. More precisely, LDP supporters are more likely to take "xenophobic" and "arms-oriented" positions. Since the integration of Japan's conservative factions into the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955, the party has been in power for a long time except for a few periods of time and is the representative of conservative forces in Japanese politics. Typical of LDP supporters is tolerating widening disparities, basing themselves on the theory of self-responsibility and opposing income redistribution.
Beyond partisan positions, class differences also affect the degree of xenophobia. Kenji Hashimoto argues that the dualistic structure of classical capitalist society (capitalist class-working class) has long since become unsuitable for analyzing the current situation in Japan. First, with the development of capitalism, some of the business that was originally managed by the capitalist class was entrusted to some members of the working class, and a "new middle class" emerged, that is, the "salary men" observed by Vogel, an expert on Sino-Japanese studies at Harvard University, in post-war Japan, although they sold their labor to obtain wages, but their status was higher than that of the working class. At the same time, there was a division within the working class, with the emergence of a "lower class" of informal workers in addition to the hired clerks, salesmen, service workers, and other manual workers, plus the "old middle class" composed of self-employed people and household workers.
Looking further at class differences, we find that there is a certain "distortion" in the relationship between class positions and multiculturalism. The more supportive of income redistribution in the lower classes, the stronger xenophobic tendencies there are. Kenji Hashimoto argues that this "distortion" is particularly alarming because it reveals that the old left-right political framework has collapsed and the traditional left-wing working class no longer exists. In classical Japanese left-wing thought, the oppressed working class often loves peace while calling for equality and narrowing the gap, rejecting armaments, demanding responsibility for aggression abroad in the Asia-Pacific war, and establishing friendly relations with the peoples of the countries that have invaded. But judging from the results of the survey, the reality is that "their dissatisfaction with the gap and their demand for narrowing it are not combined with the demand for peace, but always with xenophobia." "This insight not only helps to deepen our understanding of the socio-political spectrum of today's Japan, but also helps us unravel some of the myths in the global populist landscape."
The Structure of Antagonistic Relationships on The Gap (Excerpt)
Written by | Kenji Hashimoto translated | Zhang Qixin
Young people do not necessarily tend to be conservative, and the lower classes have some connection with xenophobia
At the beginning of the 21st century, the term "conservatization of young people" began to prevail. It stems from a series of events in which the LDP, led by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, won a landslide victory in the 2005 House of Representatives elections (the so-called "postal elections"), in which many young people voted for the LDP. Later, in the 2014 Tokyo governor election, Toshio Tamu, who was known for his right-wing words and deeds, won a lot of votes from young people. Also, the results of a survey reportedly done at the exit at the end of each vote show that most of the young people voted for the ruling party.
In addition, the increasingly widespread right-wing and xenophobic remarks on the Internet's bulletin boards, blogs, etc. are rampant, and the bloggers and keyboard heroes who make these remarks are called "internet right-wingers". It is said that most of these people are young people, and they are low-income young people without regular jobs. In response to this rumor, Naoto Higuchi made the following statement.
When it comes to the right wing of the network, some kind of standard rhetoric must follow. That is, in these network right-wingers, there must be people who are struggling to survive on the edges or at the bottom of society, full of alienation and resentment that they have not met. Most of these people are men, venting their accumulated grievances online, spilling their grievances on South Korea, China, and "enemies" such as "foreigners in Japan." (Naoto Higuchi, "Japanese Xenophobia")
Higuchi interviewed xenophobic activists on this issue, and its findings showed that most of the xenophobic activists were college graduates, most of whom were white-collar workers in formal employment. This fact negates this statement. Furuya Jingheng, who also considers himself a "network right wing" and has many fans on the Internet, has also done independent surveys on the Internet, basically people who communicate with him on the Internet (such as friends on Twitter or Facebook), and the results also show that most of the "network right" elements are white-collar workers and self-employed people in their thirties and forties, with more than 60% of college graduates and higher incomes ("The Counterattack of the Internet Right Wing"). It follows from this that the claim that the xenophobic activists or the "cyber right" active online are young people at the bottom is purely contrary to the facts.
So, are the average young people who are not active becoming more conservative? Let's prove it with data.
Chart 6-1 shows the change in support for the LDP over a 30-year period from 1985 to 2015 by age group. Support for the LDP fell sharply in 1995 for all ages, as the formation of the new party led to a temporary and dramatic change in the structure of support for the party, which we ignore from the perspective of observing long-term changes. In addition to this, we can see the following trends.
First, support for the LDP declined considerably across all age groups from 1985 to 2005. Among them, the larger decline is the population over 40 years old, and the decline under the age of 40 is smaller, mainly because the support rate of the population under 40 years old is already very low, and the proportion has decreased by 30% or 40%, and the difference is not large. However, by 2015, the support rate of people over 50 years old continued to decline, and the support rate of 40-49 years old hovered horizontally, compared with the support rate of people under 40 years old, and the support rate of people under 40 years old increased, thus narrowing the gap in support rates shown by different age groups. That is, the support rate of young people under the age of 40 for the LDP has not increased significantly, but its support rate has not continued to decline, on the other hand, the support rate of young people over 50 years old has declined, in contrast, the pro-"Liberal People' color" of young people has become stronger. So, for that matter, it is not uncommon to say that young people tend to be conservative.
So, can we assume that today's young people resonate with the xenophobic, or statist, claims of the "internet right"? In the 2016 Tokyo Metropolitan Area survey, a set of issues that are not covered by the usual public opinion survey was specifically designed on this issue. The proposition of showing a "right-wing mentality" was directly raised, and the respondents were asked whether they agreed or not. The content of the question and some of the survey statistics are as follows:
"There are more and more foreigners in areas where they don't want to live"
Very much agreed1.1%
Some agreed 36.1%
Disagreed with 40.2%
Didn't agree with 7.1% at all
Didn't know 6.5%
"It would be better to be able to amend the Constitution of Japan and have an army"
Approved 2.6%
Not good to say 28.8%
Disapproval of 49.4%
Don't know 9.1%
"It is also helpless for US military bases to be concentrated in Okinawa."
Approved 15.0%
Not good to say 33.5%
Disapproval of 41.2%
Don't know 0.3%
For the question "I do not want more and more foreigners in the area where I do not want to live", I basically agree with and oppose it. The question "National Constitution, Owning an Army", as in most public opinion surveys, greatly outnumbered those who opposed it. Women, in particular, objected to 56.5 percent. However, if "nothing" is regarded as an acceptanceist, then one has to admit that "for" + "accept" and "against" are opposing views. The question that followed, "It is also helpless for U.S. military bases to concentrate in Okinawa," was one of the most feared questions in this investigation. As a result, the opposition greatly outweighed the approval. However, as in the previous question, if "indifferent" is regarded as an acceptanceist, then "agree" + "accept" slightly goes beyond "oppose".
So, what are the results of looking at these answers according to different age groups? As shown in Figure 6-2, the results are simple and straightforward. Young people, compared with other age groups, do not explicitly support the idea of "armaments importance". It is true that for the question of "importance to armaments", the rate of young people in their 20s answering "approval" and "indifference" is slightly higher, while the rate of "not agreeing at all" is lower, but it cannot be said that there is a big difference with people of other ages. Second, as far as "xenophobia" is concerned, people in the higher age group are more supportive, and among the lower age groups in their 20s, the "xenophobic" tendency is the weakest.
So is it correct to argue that low-educated, low-income young people are becoming conservative? After using the same statistics and re-analyzing young people under the age of 30 according to different classes such as different education and different incomes, we did not get the result that the young people at the bottom had a strong tendency to "xenophobia" and "attach importance to armaments".
The same conclusion applies to statistical results for all age groups. In the class classification, if a part-time housewife is added. The most obvious is the difference between men and women, who show stronger xenophobic tendencies. This was mainly the result of a lower rate of "very agreeable" and "somewhat agreeable" and higher rates of "not knowing" responses from a group of respondents with secondary school qualifications, with no substantial difference overall. In the class category, there is no difference between the new middle class, the regular workers and the lower classes, except that the capitalist class is becoming more and more xenophobic. The weakest xenophobic tendencies are part-time housewives.
But, if analysed in more detail, it is undeniable that there is some connection between the people of the lower classes and xenophobia.
LDP supporters are more xenophobic, with Komeito supporters having the weakest xenophobic tendencies
Those who support "xenophobia" and "attach importance to armaments" are very inclined to deny the fact that the gap is widening and oppose income redistribution. But before we go any further, let's confirm the relationship between "xenophobia" and "emphasis on armaments" and political party support.
Figure 6-8 shows the tendency to support "xenophobia" and "emphasis on armaments" by the supporting political parties. Regarding "xenophobia", 2 answers are "very agreeable" to get 6 points, 2 answers are "not at all approved" to get 0 points, in addition to "valuing armaments" is the same, 2 answers are "approved" get 4 points, 2 answers are "disapproval" get 0 points, so the answer will be converted into the number of components, and then according to the size of the score, divided into four stages, so that the respondents can be balanced classification, and then statistics.
The results are clear at a glance, and the relationship between the two and the supporting parties is very clear. LDP supporters have a strong tendency to support xenophobia. The proponent "emphasis on armaments" is stronger than that of other political party supporters and non-partisans. In addition to LDP supporters, komeito supporters are particularly weak in their support for xenophobia, and in addition, the tendency of DPP supporters to support "attach importance to armaments" is particularly weak. Still, there is little difference between DPP supporters, Komeito supporters, Communist Party supporters, and non-partisans, and LDP supporters are more heterogeneous. It feels as if the LDP's supporters are fanatical supporters of "xenophobia" and "armament-attached" cult groups.
So, what is the relationship between "xenophobia" and "emphasis on armaments" and their understanding of the gap? Based on these results, LDP supporters show a typical image of those who tolerate widening gaps, stand on the theory of self-responsibility, and oppose income redistribution, and it is conceivable that they will also support "xenophobia" and "attach importance to armaments". Judging from the data, there is indeed this tendency. However, it is not so simple. For the relationship between "xenophobia" and "importance of armaments" and their perception of the gap will vary depending on the class to which they belong. Figures 6-9 explain this relationship through statistics. The so-called statistic is the correlation coefficient that shows the direction and strength of the relationship between two variables.
First, let's look at the overall statistics regardless of class. The correlation coefficient between support for income redistribution and xenophobia is -0.067 and the correlation coefficient for valuing armaments is -0.166, both of which are negative, which is statistically meaningful. It shows that, on the whole, it is not as pro-xenophobic as those who support income redistribution, and it also shows that there is no support for the emphasis on armaments in general. As expected.
However, the values of the correlation coefficients and the signs of positive and negative also vary from class to class. Xenophobia, in particular, is clearer. The correlation coefficients between income redistribution and xenophobia are in the capitalist class and the new middle class, which are two extremely negative values, such as -0.200 and -0.176, respectively, and their absolute values greatly exceed the correlation coefficients seen in general (-0.067). It means that in the capitalist class and the new middle class, the tendency to support xenophobia is not as strong as the tendency to support income redistribution. For both classes, support for income redistribution and support for xenophobia are two things that are incompatible.
However, in the regular workers, part-time housewives, and the old middle class, the correlation coefficient was smaller and no correlation between the two could be seen. The correlation coefficient between the lower classes in favor of income redistribution and support for xenophobia reached a considerable positive value of 0.248. It means that the more supportive of income redistribution among the lower classes, the stronger xenophobic tendencies there are.
What is the relationship between supporting income redistribution and supporting an emphasis on armaments? In the case of the new middle class, part-time housewives, and the old middle class, the correlation coefficient is extremely negative. It means that people in these classes do not support the re-emphasis on armaments as much as those who support income redistribution. The correlation coefficients of the other classes, the capitalist class, the regular workers, and the lower classes are smaller in absolute value, and the correlation between the two is not visible. That is, pacifists do not necessarily support income redistribution.
The lower classes are not necessarily more supportive of xenophobia than other classes. But the lower class has a characteristic that no other class has: that is, the tendency of this class to support income redistributive policies aimed at narrowing the gap is combined with xenophobia. To further illustrate this issue, let's take a look at the following statistics.
Above, we have divided the proponents for income redistribution and the xenophobic tendencies into four phases, and now we have further simplified them into two phases, combining these two statistical methods into Charts 6-10. According to this chart, "perceptions of income redistribution and xenophobia" are divided into four types. The relationship between these four types and the class to which they belong is shown in Figure 6-11.
Among the capitalist class, the new middle class, and the regular workers, the largest number of people adopt the position of "tolerance gap xenophobia" with a negative attitude towards income redistribution but a strong xenophobic tendency, accounting for 40.6%, 37.8% and 36.9%, respectively. This is followed by a "tolerant gap multiculturalist" stance that is negative about income redistribution but does not support xenophobia, accounting for 25.7%, 26.2% and 26.3%, respectively.
Among the lower classes, however, the highest number of people with a strong support for income redistribution and strong xenophobic tendencies to "correct gap xenophobia" reached a high of 36.2%. Among part-time housewives, there is a slightly more "tolerance gap multiculturalism" and a middle position on correcting the gap, but the xenophobic tendency is weaker. The old middle class was close to the tendency of part-time housewives, and the four types were essentially opposed.
In the post-war peace movement and left-wing movement, the demand for equality was often combined with the demand for peace. Those who participate in or empathize with these movements are also seeking peace while seeking equality. On the contrary, the rightists deny the demand for equality, believing that it is seeking "evil equality" and "ignoring efficiency" while seeking armament expansion. The same demand for equality, the former in the Asia-Pacific war in the war accountability, combined it with the sense of atonement against the people of the countries where Japan had invaded. The right, while denying the demand for equality, blatantly denies the facts of aggression or rationalizes the war, and has been fiercely opposed to the claims of China and South Korea, as well as the left, which seek responsibility for the war. Thus, from a political standpoint, the position of correcting the gap - pacifist - multiculturalist position and tolerating the gap - valuing armaments - xenophobia can be said to have been considered the position of the logical left and the right.
Looking at the results of the analysis, this structure seems to have collapsed. Indeed, as shown in Figure 6-9, this structure appears to be already fragile in general, but it still exists, and the demand for equality and the demand for peace are combined in the new middle class, the part-time housewives, the old middle class. In addition, the demand for equality and multiculturalism are closely linked to the capitalist class and the new middle class. But the only thing that binds the two is the new middle class, while the lower class in particular closely combines the demand for equality with xenophobia.
It has been confirmed earlier that the lower classes in general are not exclusive. It is just that the demand for correcting the gap is closely integrated with xenophobia only in the lower classes. On the one hand, the poor demanded that the gap be corrected through income redistribution, and on the other hand, they were wary of the influx of foreigners, and they strongly rejected the claim that Chinese and South Koreans should be held accountable for the war. There seems to be a lot of people in the lower classes who hold this position. The germination of fascism is growing within the troubled lower classes, and this is by no means alarmist.
In the October 2017 House of Representatives election, attention was focused on the "Party of Hope" led by Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike, and from the above statistics, there are significant highlights in the policy of the Party of Hope. The Party of Hope has asked candidates who wish to become recognized candidates to sign a policy agreement that includes acceptance of a security rule that can exercise the right to collective self-defense and opposition to granting foreigners to participate in power. The election then publicly committed to discussing the revision of Article IX of the Constitution. It is entirely xenophobic and attaches importance to armaments.
However, along with the commitment, the party's policy platform also includes policies to narrow the gap and redistribute income by promoting formal employment and introducing basic income. That is, it combines xenophobia, an emphasis on armaments and income redistribution. Perhaps not many in power have noticed this, and the result has not received widespread support, but as a new party's future attitude, it can be said that she has set a precedent.
The old political framework has collapsed and the traditional left-wing working class no longer exists
The previous article put forward the understanding of xenophobia, the expansion of armaments, the understanding of the gap, and the political parties supported, and analyzed their relationship with the class to which they belonged. These realizations, broadly speaking, can also be called political consciousness.
There are deep relationships between the class, the perception of the gap, the political consciousness, etc., which are often complex and cannot be easily grasped. But one of the reasons for this impression is that it is precisely ourselves who are convinced that there should be a very simple relationship between class, gap awareness, and political consciousness.
Regarding the relationship between class and disparities, and then politics, there used to be a strong assumption among the traditional left forces in Japan. This hypothesis, which can also be called the "socialist revolution hypothesis", is as follows.
The two great classes that make up capitalist society are the capitalist class and the working class. The capitalist class exploits the working class. A huge gap has formed between the two, and it will continue to widen. Wealth is increasingly concentrated in the hands of the capitalist class, and the working class is getting poorer and poorer. In the end the working class will seek to abolish the rule of the capitalist class and the capitalist economy that has plunged itself into poverty. Thus the working class takes power by direct action or through parliamentary means, abolishes or substantially modifies capitalism in order to narrow the gap. This is the basic agreement of the left-wing movement.
Then, based on its own experience of the war of aggression and its tragic defeat, the Left Movement in Japan added other elements. This is what has already been mentioned in the previous section, pacifism and the denial of armaments, as well as the pursuit of war responsibility in the Asia-Pacific war and Japan's sense of atonement for the peoples of the countries it has invaded. The integrated pattern of class, disparities, and politics formed by these elements is deeply rooted in the hearts of left-wing movements in Japan and those who are sympathetic to them. Proceeding from this standpoint, the oppressed class of capitalist society, the working class, while seeking to correct the gap in order to extricate itself from poverty, should love peace, deny armaments, assume the responsibility of invading overseas in the Asia-Pacific war, and establish friendly relations with the people of the countries that have invaded.
This typical idea can be seen in the following passage of the declaration of the General Assembly held on May 1, 1946 to restore May 1, 1946 (17th Labor Day).
Joining hands with the working class of the whole world, on the basis of close solidarity, we will open fire on authoritarianism, feudalism and fascism, which have once again sown the seeds of war in the world.
Only in this way can we, the masses of workers, be freed from hunger and poverty and can the world be filled with peace and glory. (Excerpt from Episode 22 of the Japanese Labor Yearbook)
Overly optimistic outlook, but not as a hypothesis. It's just that reality is so far away.
The class structure is becoming more and more complex. The originally conceived single-class employees = the working class has long ago begun to split into the new middle class and the working class, and now even the working class is further dividing itself into the regular workers and the lower classes. The gap between the three is already wide, as articulated in chapter III, and there are still differences between them. So this book classifies these three as three classes.
The gap between these three classes has widened in modern Japan, and the fact that the number of poor classes has increased is well known. The understanding of the facts is basically agreed. But acknowledging the facts does not mean that the three classes are positive about correcting the gap.
First, many people have embraced the theory of self-responsibility that rationalizes disparities and poverty. In addition, even if the general theory of excessive disparities is agreed, there may not be many people who support specific income redistribution policies such as "even if the government takes measures to increase taxes on the rich, it should also enrich the welfare of the poor" and "regardless of the reason for the difficulties in life, the state should also take care of those who have difficulties in life." Supporters are mostly the lowest-paid lower classes, and the new middle class and regular workers are more indifferent to the poor and even considered hostile to the lower classes.
So does the lower class embody the image of the classical working class that the left movement has always portrayed? Brutal exploitation and impoverishment, forced into alienated labour, and strong dissatisfaction with the status quo are the conditions used to describe the classical working class. But, otherwise, the answer can only be no.
They do not have the accumulation of social capital, and they lack the opportunity to cooperate with each other. Many people have physical and mental problems. And, above all, their dissatisfaction with the gap and their demand for its closure are not combined with the demand for peace, but always with xenophobia.
Judging from this status quo, it is puzzling to achieve a political line of narrowing the gap and eradicating poverty. People in the favorable classes are easily satisfied with the status quo of widening gaps, while the demands of the unfavorable lower classes to narrow the gaps are mistakenly hit in the wrong direction.
Excerpts from Chapter VI of The New Japanese Class Society are excerpted from chapter VI of The New Japanese Class Society, with abridged content, the title edited by the editor, and published with the authorization of the publishing house.