Text/Daifuku
Public number: Wei Wu wielded a whip
Misrepresentation:
Dear readers, when I first wrote the article "The Idea of Going up the Mountain within the Communist Party was first proposed", I thought that although Zhu De had put forward the idea of going up the mountain before Mao Zedong, he did not put it into practice. This point of view was corrected by an enthusiastic reader who lives in Hunan and has a deep understanding of the geography and history of the area, and his correction has helped me a lot, and I would like to thank him personally and apologize to the reader for writing this history by mistake. After careful study by the author, the author believes that Zhu De's launch of the Shonan Rebellion, located in the Luoxiao Mountains and the Nanling Mountains, is indeed the practice of the idea of going up the mountain. Reading thousands of books, but also to travel thousands of miles, the author is young, shallow knowledge, the geography and terrain of China's central and western regions, history and humanities, and did not personally experience, writing articles is therefore limited, is a major deficiency of the author, will find opportunities to make up.
In the future article, it is inevitable that there will be errors, and please also ask all readers to correct and correct!
In the last book, we said that after Mao Runzhi withdrew from Chaling, he was preparing to return to Yuan Wencai to rest his army, and on the way, when the county seat of Suichuan in Jiangxi Province was empty, he resolutely took Suichuan and established the Suichuan County Workers' and Peasants' And Soldiers' Government.
After several days of intensive organization, Suichuan quickly set up guerrilla groups and Red Guards, distributed land to the common people, and the sphere of influence in the revolutionary base areas was also expanding.
However, the good times were not long, and such a peaceful life was soon broken by Zhu Peide, the boss of the Jiangxi government army.
When Zhu Peide heard that a county in Jiangxi Province under his jurisdiction had been reddened, he couldn't help but get anxious, knowing that if the spread of communist ideas was so fierce that if it was not curbed, the whole of Jiangxi Province would be at risk of being reddened.
But this small rebel force is not worth taking it upon themselves.
So he immediately ordered his general Yang Ruxuan to lead a division of troops to Suichuan to attack.
Yang Ruxuan believed that this small group of rebels was not worthy of his own personal action.
So he immediately ordered his subordinate Wang Guozheng to lead a battalion of troops to Suichuan to attack.
Wang Guozheng did not think that he could beat Mao Runzhi, because his battalion only had six hundred people, Mao Runzhi had developed for such a long time, at least there were thousands of people, he wanted to ask for another battalion, but Yang Ruxuan refused.
In January 1928, Wang Guozheng took out a battalion from the provincial party committee troops, and together with the local public security bureau police, drove into the new city, that is, Ninggang, and stationed it.
Ninggang is near the gate of Jinggang Mountain, the kingdom government calculated, know that he can't fight, then it is better to occupy a city near Jinggang Mountain, when a thorn in the eye, can not beat me disgusting you.
Mao Runzhi's side is also a headache; as soon as the revolutionary work is in full swing, the enemy will come, and he will not attack, but will be stationed in Ninggang, which is equivalent to cutting off local transportation, and everywhere he goes, he will have to take a detour, and it will be difficult to carry out the revolutionary work.
Mao Runzhi decided to first inquire into the enemy's falsehood, he sent a few scouts, day and night to observe, and finally concluded: there is a battalion of troops in the city, and there are no reinforcements nearby.
Six hundred people, Mao Zedong fell into meditation, if these six hundred people in the wilderness, with them to fight guerrillas, it would not be difficult, but at present they are guarding the city, to fight a siege war, he is not too sure.
However, if we do not fight, the enemy will only increase, and the revolutionary base areas will be unable to continue, and after a few days of careful consideration, Mao Run made up his final determination to fight!
With no enemy reinforcements nearby, he planned to mobilize all his forces into the battle.
He ordered his men to disperse and assemble their troops, mobilized the first regiment of his own revolutionary army, and the Red Guards and guerrillas organized since the establishment of Suichuan, and even Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo, who were guarding Jinggangshan, were also transferred.
Counting the men and horses, there were three thousand men, the strength of a regiment.
Five times the enemy's strength gave Mao Runzhi a little confidence.
From the author's point of view, Mao Runzhi's style of doing things has two characteristics:
First, making up your mind to do things will often take longer than others, never make decisions easily, and will decide to do them after several times of deliberation. But once you have made up your mind to do something, no matter how high the risk or how much it costs, you will do it very thoroughly. For example, the Liberation War, the Korean War.
The second is to pursue stability more than anyone, but dare to take risks more than anyone else. For example, in a war, Mao Runzhi generally does not fight a battle of uncertainty, never takes the enemy lightly, encounters the enemy, first finds out the number of the enemy, and then mobilizes five to ten times the number of troops to surround him; if so many people cannot be transferred, at least three times, and three times cannot be transferred, then it is better not to fight. However, militarily, he was able to get out of many dangerous moves, such as the four crossings of Chishui during the Long March, the capture of Luding Bridge, the Battle of Jinzhou during the Liberation War, and the thousand-mile leap into dabie Mountain. The two extremes of stability and risk come together.
This is the first battle personally commanded by Mao Runzhi after embarking on a military revolutionary career, before the Autumn Harvest Uprising, although he was the leader, but sitting in the rear, the specific tactical command was mainly responsible for Lu Deming, and then chen Hao was responsible for entering and occupying the Chaling, and entering and occupying Suichuan did not cost a single shot and a cannon, and this time it was really a battle.
Mao Runzhi believed that the siege of the city had a certain degree of difficulty, if he could eliminate part of the government army outside the city and then attack the city, then the difficulty would be much smaller.
Wang Guozheng would train troops outside the east gate of the city every day, and Mao Sui led the rebel army to sneak in the grass outside the east gate, taking advantage of the fact that the kingdom government was not prepared to train troops, launched a sneak attack, and caught The kingdom political off guard, but because the weapons and equipment of the rebel army were too rudimentary, only a part of the government army was eliminated, and the rest hid back in the city, closed the city gate, set up machine guns, and entered a defensive posture.
Mao Runzhi's side lacked siege weapons, but he had already taken this situation into account, so he ordered people to carry the prepared dry wood and kerosene, and brought two machine guns as cover, organized a platoon of troops to burn the city gate, and lit fires everywhere under the city wall. Government troops on the city walls would be choked by smoke if they tried to probe and shoot.
The government army was not stupid, and immediately dispatched manpower to carry water to extinguish the fire, but in this way, the defensive manpower was not enough, some people were choked by the smoke and could not shoot, some people went to find water, and the rebels took this opportunity to climb the city tower and use the numerical advantage to fight with the government army in close combat.
As a result, it is conceivable that in the face of an enemy several times larger than themselves, the government army that has lost the defensive advantage of the city wall has only the fate of being surrounded and beaten.
Seeing that the general trend was gone, the kingdom drew his pistol and committed suicide, and the remaining government troops also pulled their legs and ran to the north gate, only to encounter the Red Guards who had been ambushed there for a long time, and the north gate could not run out, and then ran to the south gate, and was caught by the guerrillas.
During the battle, the rebels annihilated the main force of a battalion of government troops and all the police forces of the local public security bureau, and captured more than 300 people.
As we mentioned above, after the capture of Suichuan, Mao Runzhi led the rebel army to deal with the common people for the first time and won the trust of the people.
After this Battle of Xincheng, Mao Runzhi also came into contact with the prisoners for the first time, and how to deal with the prisoners must also begin to study.
He saw that there were many cases of beating and cursing prisoners in his troops, and from the height of a politician, he believed that the policy of treating prisoners should be relaxed, so as to benefit the development of his own ranks, and this was also the difference between the new type of people's army he had built and the old army.
So he vigorously defied the crowd and announced three policies for the treatment of prisoners:
First, do not beat and curse prisoners, and do not search the pockets of prisoners.
Second, the injured person is treated.
Third, those who are willing to stay in the team will be paid the travel fees.
This was the beginning of the Communist Party's preferential treatment of captives, which would exert great power in the future.
At this time, shortly after the April 12 counter-revolutionary coup, when countless Communists fell under the butcher's knife of the government army and were full of blood debts, Mao Runzhi was able to put aside hatred, vigorously defy public opinion, treat prisoners leniently, and have the mind and height of a great man.
The victorious end of the Battle of Xincheng consolidated the political power of the Jinggangshan revolutionary base area, tempered the ability of the rebel army to attack and fight, and enhanced the morale of the military and people in the base area.
Unfortunately, such a good momentum was soon broken by a distant visitor dressed as a businessman, whose name was Zhou Lu.
The Battle of Xincheng was not large in scale, and the weapons and equipment were limited to darts, long guns, dry firewood, kerosene, and several machine guns, except for professional soldiers, most of which were local peasant armed forces in Gannan Province. Therefore, looking at the entire campaign, it is more similar to the peasants' struggle for territory in the village mouth, and the "China National Geographic" magazine that I recently read, which introduced that villagers in Hubei province broke out several large-scale armed battles in the 1990s in order to compete for the Danjiangkou Reservoir, which was similar to the scale of the Battle of Xincheng. But in the spirit of seeing the small things, there are still some points worth digging into.
In the campaign, the offensive and defensive sides were Mao Runzhi and the kingdom government, and the advantage of the attacking side Mao Runzhi was that there were many people and the inferiority was that the weapons were backward. The advantage of the defending kingdom is that the weapons are advanced and there are city defenses, and the disadvantage is that the number is small. That is to say, both sides have their own advantages and disadvantages.
However, the outcome of this battle was that Mao Runzhi skillfully used machine guns, dry firewood, kerosene and other tools to avoid his own disadvantages and suppress the advantages of the other side; when he climbed the city tower, he smoothly played his own advantages and dealt a sharp blow to the disadvantages of the other side.
Sun Tzu's Art of War says that if you know yourself, you will never lose a battle. What does this "knowing" mean? The author believes that the meaning of "knowing" lies in analysis, and what is the analysis? The author believes that it lies in analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of the enemy and us.
However, the author believes that Sun Tzu did not say everything and omitted the most important link, which is a pity.
If you have clearly analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of the enemy and us, will you be able to win? I don't think so.
You know what your strengths are, so please ask, in the process of competing with each other, can you play your advantages?
For example, Mao Runzhi did have five times the enemy's strength, but he did not want to attack the city tower, and no matter how many others there were, he could only be a target below, and he could not exert this advantage. At that time, there were many powerful people on the Iron Horsemen of Mengyuan, but they surrounded Xiangyang for five years.
If your strengths cannot be played out, can your advantages still be called advantages?
Do you know what the disadvantage of the other party is, so please ask, will the other party obediently expose the disadvantage to you?
If you can't beat the other party's disadvantage, can his disadvantage still be called a disadvantage?
Therefore, the author believes that analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of the enemy and us is only the first step, and what we really need to make efforts to make is to think about how to use the existing conditions to give play to our own advantages to hit the disadvantages of the other side.
You are an assassin, your weapon is a dagger, the other side is a gunman, his weapon is a long gun, you meet him, you should think, how to pull him into the alley to fight, isn't it? As long as your purpose is achieved, even if he is the world's first gunner, you dare to show your sword.
Written on the last day of 2021