Observe | The Russian-Ukrainian conflict may turn Indian diplomacy around

Contributed by Zhuang Genghua and Ma Xiaolin

Since Russia launched a "special military operation" against Ukraine on February 24, the vast majority of Western countries and their partners have strongly opposed the use of all deterrent measures except direct participation in the war to sanction Russia. This situation has made India, which has traditionally been friendly with Russia and in recent years, has warm relations with the United States face a dilemma. But overall, India seems to have pulled away from the Western bloc and shown a more pro-Russian posture. Because of India's unique identity and social values, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is unlikely to set off an anti-Russian wave in all walks of life in India; on the contrary, it may be a rare opportunity for India to change its diplomatic strategy, and may even have a profound impact on its future diplomatic direction.

India's pro-Russian pro-Russian pro-Russian development has become a unique political landscape

Compared with the United States and its traditional allies and partners, India's statement about Russia's "special military operations" is quite intriguing. On the first day after the military operation began, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke with Russian President Putin and Ukrainian President Zelenskiy respectively, calling on both sides to cease fire as soon as possible and expressing concern about the lives and property of Indian citizens stranded in Ukraine. However, Modi did not directly oppose Russia's military action, but stressed that the crisis can only be resolved through "sincere dialogue" between Russia and NATO. In a phone call with European Parliament President Metzola and French President Emmanuel Macron, Modi only mentioned that "sovereignty and territorial integrity should be respected" and still did not follow the European and American camps to condemn Russia. The Washington Post commented that India "refused to support a U.N. resolution and moved closer to its Cold War partners."

As a security and ideological alliance partnership mechanism promoted by the United States during trump's presidency, the U.S.-India-Japan-Australia Four-Nation Security Dialogue Mechanism (QUAD) held an online summit on March 3 to focus on the Ukraine crisis, but Modi's speech was clearly "chicken and duck" with the leaders of the United States, Japan and Australia. Modi said the four-nation security dialogue mechanism should focus on the core goal of promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, and the four countries should increase cooperation in humanitarian assistance, supply chains and clean energy. Even if the Ukraine issue cannot be avoided after all, Modi only repeats the established statement that "the crisis should be resolved back to dialogue and diplomacy", and does not respond to the topic of sanctions against Russia that the United States, Australia and Japan are concerned about. In addition, Modi also instructed the Indian Foreign Ministry to focus its work on the evacuation of Indian citizens who have been stranded in Ukraine.

On the other hand of India's Russia-related stance and lack of intention to participate in sanctions, its energy and economic circles have made great strides on the road of strengthening cooperation with Russia. "Hindustan Times" reported on March 14 that India is about to build an additional payment system to support trade with Russia, and at the time when many payment platforms are suspending business with Russia, this measure is expected to greatly reduce the impact of India-Russia trade, and may even mean that the long-term downturn in India-Russia trade has finally ushered in an opportunity to accelerate development. Reuters reported that after the United States and Europe announced the suspension of a large number of Russian-related energy orders, India's largest oil refiner, India Petroleum, reached a deal with Russia for 3 million barrels of crude oil. At a critical moment when almost the entire Western world is about to create a "cold winter" for the Russian economy, India's move is not only different, but even a tribute to Russia.

India's official "pro-Russian" choice has also received strong support from the people. Since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Indian netizens, scholars and even diplomats, giving full play to their expertise in familiarity with the English and Western discourse systems, have vigorously supported Russia on social media, condemned the United States and NATO, and even appeared many posts advocating the establishment of an "India-Russia-China alliance"; the hot search tag of "I support Putin" has been listed on the Twitter hot trend list in 12 countries and regions under the posting boom of Indian netizens. Although Indian netizens may be one of the most easily instigated groups of netizens in the world, and their reasons for supporting Russia are also strange, this is still a rare Internet spectacle.

The relationship between India and Russia has lasted for a long time

India's "uniqueness" in the Ukraine crisis is not a whim, but the result of long-term accumulation. Good relations between India and Russia have a long history, even before the October Revolution. At that time, there was frequent interaction between the high-level intellectuals of the two countries, such as Tolstoy's "non-resistanceism" on Gandhi, which inspired Gandhi greatly, and the socialist trend after the establishment of Soviet Russia, which also had a profound impact on the Indian national liberation movement. Soon after India's independence, the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with it and provided economic, military and technical assistance on a large scale. Subsequently, due to the continuous deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and the Soviet Union's pursuit of global hegemony, Soviet and Indian cooperation was further strengthened, and the Soviet Union sided with India in the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962 and provided India with a number of technologies that had previously refused to be transferred to China.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, India-Russia relations continued to improve. During Putin's visit to India in October 2000, the two sides issued the Joint Statement on The Russian-Indian Strategic Partnership; since the 2010s, with the support of international organizations such as the G20, the BRICS Organization, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (India was an observer state until 2017), India-Russia relations have maintained steady development under the circumstances of the international situation. Objectively speaking, India's status has improved in recent years, and the credit for Russia's co-ordination and support cannot be underestimated.

In bilateral exchanges, India's demands on Russia are mainly reflected in both political and military aspects. India, which considers itself the leader of a third world country, is desperate to change the current international system, especially in its efforts to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, while Russian President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov and other politicians have expressed ambiguity about the "India normal" option on different occasions. When India is at a disadvantage in the field of international public opinion over issues such as the Kashmir dispute and domestic religious conflicts, Russian officials often use silence to give disguised support to India. Militarily, in order to build a regional military power, India is highly dependent on imports from Russia in terms of equipment upgrades. As of 2017, about 68% of the armament of the Indian Armed Forces comes from Russia, making it the second largest customer of the Russian defense industry. Although both sides agree that the economies of the two countries have certain complementarities, due to production levels and transportation costs, the trade between the two countries has developed slowly, and the trade volume between India and Russia accounts for a very small proportion of India's total foreign trade, even less than 2% in 2020, and is further declining due to a series of reasons such as the impact of the epidemic.

India has been trying to sway the international arena. As the United States gradually upgraded the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" to the "Indo-Pacific strategy" and suppressed Russia and other countries, India showed a clear tendency to move closer to the United States, which has tested India-Russia relations to a considerable extent. In order to cater to the eastward shift of the US strategic center of gravity, India has repeatedly made overtures to the United States, high-level visits have been frequent, senior US officials have been generally welcomed even by Indians, and there have even been strange stories of Indian folk worshipping their "idols" during the Trump period. In 2015, India and the United States signed the U.S.-India Defense Cooperation Framework Agreement, and in 2017, India joined the U.S.-India-Japan-Australia Four-Nation Security Dialogue (QUAD) mechanism initiated by Trump, opening up a new stage for further cooperation between the two countries. In addition, India has tried to expand its influence in Central Asia, establishing a "India + Central Asia C5+1" foreign ministerial dialogue mechanism in 2019, while Russia has always been extremely sensitive to regional foreign forces involved in Central Asia. India's warm connection with the United States and its involvement in Central Asia have had a negative impact on India-Russia relations. However, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has brought a new window of history for the two sides to seek common ground while reserving minor differences and to escalate the long-term "Non-League and Alliance" relations.

India's diplomacy will reach a fork in the road

The changes in the international situation after the Russian-Ukrainian conflict fully reflect the division of interests and paths between India and the United States and its traditional allies, and are also caused by India's long-term understanding of its own history and international relations. On topics related to territorial disputes left over from history, India often considers itself a victim of colonialism, "national self-determination" and even neoliberalism, and has long been at a disadvantage in international public opinion on issues such as the India-Pakistan conflict and the ownership of Kashmir. Blindly following the West in imposing sanctions on Russia may pose an obstacle to India's future voice on the disputed territory. Ideologically, although India often emphasizes the importance of values such as freedom and democracy, this is more of a practical consideration, and the implementation of economic, trade and financial sanctions only because of differences in values or hostilities is too costly for India as a large developing country. This is also one of the reasons why India's low participation in the four-nation security dialogue and the greater emphasis on regional cooperation rather than geopolitical design of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" – it is not in India's national interest to expand conflicts with major powers and neighbors.

In the history of diplomacy, India has presented itself as the "leader" of the third world and developing countries, and has actively initiated and participated in the "Non-Aligned Movement" and the "Group of 77". In recent years, in order to seek economic and political support from more sources, India has taken a series of initiatives close to the United States in order to achieve its goal of becoming a regional power. However, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has revealed that the FORTRESS of the United States at the economic and energy levels is not impregnable, and its alliance system has entered a stage of sacrificing the interests of its allies in order to maintain its own fragile global hegemony, and the envisaged U.S.-ally interest community is becoming increasingly loose. Moreover, if it follows the United States too much, India will always be in a subordinate position in terms of political and economic status, and it will be difficult to achieve industrial upgrading and achieve rapid economic and social development. This is not difficult for Modi and india's political elite to recognize. Appropriately reversing the pro-US policy and increasing cooperation with Russia and other countries in a pragmatic posture are options that conform to India's political identity and national interests, at least in stages. (About author:Zhuang Genghua, Assistant Researcher, Institute of Mediterranean Rim Studies, Zhejiang Chinese University; Xiaolin Ma, Dean and Professor, Institute of Mediterranean Rim Studies, Zhejiang Chinese University of Foreign Studies)

Source: China Youth Daily client