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Why did the Russian-Ukrainian conflict "fight the small with the big" failed to reproduce the crushing phenomenon of the Gulf War?

author:Bing said

Author: Forget about the jianghu

It has been more than half a month since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, and the performance of the Russian army has been questioned.

The Russian military's propaganda is that its slow progress is mainly based on humanity and "benevolence": not using heavy artillery to injure innocents, not targeting civilians, and not destroying industrial facilities, which is also a profound lesson learned by the Russian army in the two Chechen wars. However, the judgment of all wars must end with "victory or defeat", especially modern wars, and the longer it drags on, the more passive it becomes.

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has sparked a heated debate: Why has the Russian military not reproduced the scene of the US military crushing Iraq?

Why did the Russian-Ukrainian conflict "fight the small with the big" failed to reproduce the crushing phenomenon of the Gulf War?
The iron flow of the Russian army did not meet expectations

First, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the way of playing is not as good as the Gulf War?

Compared with the Gulf War more than 30 years ago, there are many similarities with the Russian attack on Ukraine.

For example, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the Gulf War are largely large countries fighting small countries, and the land area, military strength, and economic volume of the two sides are not at all an equal magnitude; for example, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the Gulf War are all large countries fighting small countries; for example, the Russian military has a Belarusian "borrowing road", and the US military has a Saudi base.

However, the russian-Ukrainian conflict and the gulf war are completely different in course, and the high-profile Russian army has not achieved its operational objectives for a long time.

In the Gulf War, the US aircraft carriers and warships in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Can take off fighters at any time and carry out fire strikes, so 38 days of the 43-day operation were "clearance operations" of the navy and air force, and finally 5 days were left for ground troops to intervene, and at this time Saddam's 300,000 elite "Republican Guard" basically had no ability to resist.

In the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the Russian army was also fully qualified to use the Caspian Fleet for sea and air strikes, and then the ground troops "cleaned up the mess". Since the Russian army had already taken Crimea and the ports of Sevastopol in 2014, there was no problem in sending aircraft carrier formations to carry out offshore strikes.

However, the high-profile Russian army is still the same as the previous two Chechen wars, the Georgian war, the Crimean dispute and the invasion of Syria, the "new bottle of old wine" has no novelty at all, the navy is almost not involved, and the famous "air and space army" is not outstanding, resulting in repeated attacks on tanks deep behind the enemy, and the loss is not much progress.

Why did the Russian-Ukrainian conflict "fight the small with the big" failed to reproduce the crushing phenomenon of the Gulf War?

Aircraft carrier group of the Gulf War

Second, why did the Russian military's "blitzkrieg" not be fought?

Modern warfare is different from traditional warfare and puts forward higher requirements for the armies participating in the war.

In addition to high-tech weapons and equipment, high-quality troops, and highly efficient logistical support, it also emphasizes the coordination of the army, navy, and air force, as well as special forces and electronic information warfare. In addition, the previous indiscriminate bombardment has gradually been replaced by so-called "limited intensity" wars.

Limited intensity war is actually the "three noes" method pursued by the Russian army, but if you want to be a "benevolent division" without affecting the combat effectiveness, you must make more efforts in technical tactics and high-tech elements, otherwise you will fall into a "tug-of-war" like the Russian army's "blitzkrieg", and even have the danger of being dragged into the quagmire of "protracted war" and cannot extricate yourself.

At the beginning of the war, the Russian army also sacrificed special forces to raid Kiev, but the "blitzkrieg" did not start.

Why is it that in the geographical conditions are very similar, they are all strong to fight the weak, the army, navy, air force can completely form a synergy, but the Russian army with sufficient preparation time, with superior troops to raid the Ukrainian army, but did not form a strategic sudden, concealed and deceitful like the US army fat beat the Iraqi army, and did not form an absolute crushing trend in tactics?

The reasons for this are: First, Ukraine has been guarding against the Russian army since it lost the Crimea industry 8 years ago, and has lost the precondition for surprise attacks; second, Ukraine's poor road has restricted the advance of Russian tank troops; third, Ukraine's separatist forces are concentrated in the east, and the Russian army lacks "internal response" in the central and western regions; fourth, due to the limitations of financial resources, the advantages of the navy and air force have not been brought into play.

The Russian army raided Ukraine this time, and the scene of entering Syria in 2015 did not reappear.

Why did the Russian-Ukrainian conflict "fight the small with the big" failed to reproduce the crushing phenomenon of the Gulf War?

Su-34 Platypus fighter bomber

Third, the depth of interspersed, or step by step?

Whether it is traditional warfare or modern warfare, "blitzkrieg" is always complementary to the large depth of interspersing.

The most classic "blitzkrieg" in ancient times includes the Battle of the Huns north of the desert by Wei Qing and Huo Fuyi in the Han Dynasty, the "Tank Raid War" of Guderian in Germany during World War II, and the recent war of our army against India and Vietnam, all of which are examples of "blitzkrieg" and "large depth interspersed".

However, judging from the operational characteristics of the US military for more than 40 years, the army has gradually transformed from the former "pioneer" of the road to the "rear guard" of cleaning the battlefield, and the air raids of aircraft have gradually replaced the fire support of warships. With the development of unmanned aerial vehicle technology, the so-called "precision air strike" operations of the US military have become a conventional method of warfare for intervening in local conflicts in recent years.

Whether it is "blitzkrieg" or "large depth" interspersed, it is necessary to meet several points: First, electronic information warfare, so that the opponent's defense system should become half "blind"; second, unmanned aerial vehicles and other air strikes, basically destroying the enemy's important military facilities and communication facilities; third, the raid of special forces to take down the enemy's center and occupy the key points of transportation; fourth, the deep penetration of the troops must have a super strong street combat capability.

Judging from the trend, it is becoming more and more difficult to fight "blitzkrieg" and penetrate deeply behind enemy lines.

First, the away fighters are not familiar with the land, such as the plan of fighting back against Vietnam Xu Shiyou is "steady and steady", but the high-level consideration of the Soviet Union's Million Chen Soldiers must be quickly decided, only to be revised to a large depth interspersed. Second, the development of urbanization, the requirements for the ability to attack the strongholds and street battles of the interspersed troops are also high, and the equipment behind the airborne enemy cannot be compared with the defensive side, resulting in the Russian army falling into a bitter battle.

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict can best illustrate one point: once the economy is not strong, even if there is a "nuclear stick", it will not be waved.

Why did the Russian-Ukrainian conflict "fight the small with the big" failed to reproduce the crushing phenomenon of the Gulf War?

Behind Putin's toughness is the helplessness of economic weakness

Bombers or aircraft carriers, which is more important?

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict also has a very important warning: aircraft carriers are still more important than strategic bombers.

There was once a view that in the face of modern missiles, aircraft carriers are a huge living target. However, looking at the US military's wars for more than 40 years, the role of aircraft carrier battle groups cannot be replaced: the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Afghan War, the Iraq War, the Libyan War, the Syrian War, and the US Military without aircraft carrier support is almost a second-rate force.

In the US military's combat system, aircraft carrier formations are an indispensable and key link in carrying forward the past and the future.

On the contrary, one of the keys to the poor performance of the Russian army in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the failure to achieve an overwhelming advantage is that the aircraft carrier battle group is no longer dominant because of the lack of money, otherwise the Caspian Sea and the port of Sevastopol can take the initiative. Even the "Air and Space Force", on which the Russian army is famous, did not show its due strength, and lost several Su-34 fighters.

Judging from the current local war, the role of aircraft carriers is still far greater than that of strategic bombers that are "famous".

In fact, at the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, in addition to auctioning off the unfinished aircraft carrier "Varyag", had also been peddling their strategic bomber Tu 160, also known as the "White Swan". After comprehensive consideration, our army still chose the "Varyag" to develop an aircraft carrier. Strategic bombers are conducive to offense, but the target is also large, and the aircraft carrier can attack and defend, which is more in line with our army's strategy.

Why did the Russian-Ukrainian conflict "fight the small with the big" failed to reproduce the crushing phenomenon of the Gulf War?

Figure 160 strategic bomber

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has once again exposed the global strategy and ambitions of the US military from the side:

In Europe, U.S. and Russian forces compete over land. Through the "NATO" 8 eastward expansion, 30 countries have formed a fan-shaped encirclement of the Russian army, but in Turkey, Ukraine and Finland, which are easy to make the Russian army "nervous", the US military is still hesitating.

In Asia, the US military intends to form a disturbance and clampdown on our military through forces in the East China Sea and around the South China Sea. However, this also verifies from another aspect the incomparable correctness of our army's vigorous development of aircraft carriers and large aircraft over the past 20 years, and the more the enemy opposes, the more our army must persist!

Why did the Russian-Ukrainian conflict "fight the small with the big" failed to reproduce the crushing phenomenon of the Gulf War?

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has also sounded a wake-up call for the "allies" of the "US military": Beware of following the "leading big brother", either the sandpiper clams compete with each other to win the fish, or the mantis catches the cicada and the yellow finches in the back, or the city gate fires and the pond fish, or it is better to insist on peaceful coexistence!

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