Author: Marshal Zhukov
The recent situation in Ukraine has become the focus of attention of all parties, and careful netizens will find that the Russian military's performance in the Russo-Ukrainian War is not the same as that of the Russo-Georgian War. In the Russo-Georgian War, the Russian army staged the most splendid "informationized blitzkrieg", and in only 5 days, the Russian 58th Group Army annihilated more than 2,000 Georgian troops and firmly gained the initiative on the battlefield. More than a week has passed since the Russo-Ukrainian War, and the Russian army has won a series of victories on the battlefield, but it has still not completely defeated Ukraine.
Now many netizens have raised questions, is it the strength of the Russian army? Some netizens will even put forward their own views: the combat effectiveness of the Russian army is not as good as the Soviet army in 1944. So, is the Russian army really not able to fight? Why was it that the Russian army was able to take Georgia in 5 days, but it could not completely defeat Ukraine in more than a week?
First, the military strength of Georgia and Ukraine is compared, and the military strength of Ukraine is far greater than that of Georgia. Russia faced an enemy army stronger than Georgia.
Georgia had a brigade of U.S.-trained "American troops" before the war, but it was too small to play any decisive role on the battlefield. Before the war, the Georgian army had only more than 21,000 active troops and more than 17,000 reserves. Its air force is a single-digit Su-25 strike aircraft, with no fighter jets.
Ukraine did not have "American-style troops" and its equipment was made in the Soviet Union. However, the size of the Ukrainian army is much larger than that of Georgia, and the Ukrainian army currently has 200,000 active duty troops, equipped with 2,500 tanks, 100 aircraft, and more than 2,000 infantry fighting vehicles. The Ukrainian army also has more than 1 million reserves and 2 million militias in training, and the war potential and staying power are far stronger than in Georgia.
Although the training of Ukrainian soldiers is formalistic, according to the current situation of battlefield feedback, the extremist militia organizations in Ukraine have indeed brought certain losses to the Russian army. For example, the Ukrainian militia cooperated with special forces to ambush the Russian paratrooper convoy in the vicinity of Kiev, blew up at least 5 paratrooper fighting vehicles, and killed many Russian paratroopers.
Before the war, the Ukrainian army invited the US army to train Ukrainian soldiers to operate anti-tank missiles, and at present, Western anti-tank missiles and Stinger surface-to-air missiles are entering the territory of Ukraine. If the Ukrainian army and militia are equipped with anti-tank missiles on a large scale and trained, although they will not change the situation of the war, they can still bring greater losses to the Russian army.
Second, the Russian army did not make full use of the air force on the battlefield and was "tied up in its own hands and feet", which is the problem of the Russian army in this operation.
In the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, the Russian army fully used air force aviation to cooperate with the ground forces to attack. According to the data at that time, the 4th Army of the Air Force of the North Caucasus Military District of the Russian Army invested 112 Su-24, 98 Su-25 and 105 MiG-29 and more than 50 Su-27 fighters, as well as Russian Air Force Tu22M bombers. After the fighting began, the Russian Air Force dealt a devastating blow to airfields, air force and air defense military bases in Georgia, including aircraft maintenance plants in Tbilisi, as well as other military targets to varying degrees. Under the high-intensity bombardment of Russian aircraft, the Russian army quickly seized air supremacy, causing a devastating blow to the living forces of the Ukrainian army.
In the 2022 Russian-Ukrainian war, perhaps Putin wants to achieve major results, or other reasons, the Russian air strikes are not as strong as during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.
After the battle began on February 24, the Russian army dispatched aviation and missile units to attack the military objectives of the Russian army at a fixed point and achieved certain results. However, judging from the results of the comprehensive promotion of the troops in the three offensive directions of the Russian army, the Russian army encountered stubborn resistance from the Ukrainian army in the process of attack, and the troops suffered certain losses. This shows that the living forces of the Ukrainian army have not been devastated in the early air raids of the Russian army. Although we do not have public information to determine how many aircraft the Russian army invested in this operation, the effect of the Russian air raids in Ukraine is obviously not as good as that of the Russo-Georgian War.
[Russo-Ukrainian War, Russian army figure 22M did not participate in the war]
Third, the Russian military's information-based combat capabilities are not as good as those of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.
In this Russo-Ukrainian war, the Russian military used a large number of precision-guided bombs and cruise missiles, but the level of informationization of russian operations seems to be inferior to the level of the Russo-Georgian war.
During the outbreak of the Russo-Georgian War, the "hacking forces" of the Russian army launched an all-out attack on Georgia's computers and command system, the computer system of the Georgian authorities was completely paralyzed, and the presidential photo was replaced by a photo of Hitler. With the smooth progress of the Russian "hacking force" network attack, the informationized command system of the Georgian army has been paralyzed under the blows of the Russian army, which directly affects the command of the top level of the Georgian army on the front-line combat troops, and the various combat units of the Georgian army can only fight for themselves.
In the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Russian army did not send "hacking forces" to attack the Ukrainian military command system, resulting in the paralysis of the Ukrainian military command system. After the outbreak of war, although President Zelenskiy was ready to run to Israel, Zelenskiy, with the support of NATO, still had illusions about victory, wearing camouflage uniforms at home to command the Ukrainian army to fight, and spread rumors of the results of the war - the Ukrainian army killed 6,000 Russian troops, annihilated a large number of Russian troops, and so on. Zelenskiy's instigation played a very good role, and the Ukrainian troops under the leadership of Zelenskiy were uniformly deployed to resist the Russian attack step by step, causing certain losses to the Russian army. At present, the Russian army is estimated to be around 600 casualties, and the overall casualties are about 2,000.
[Russian UAV did not participate in large-scale war, destroying the Command System of the Ukrainian Army]
Before the war, the Russian army must destroy the ukrainian army's combat command system, paralyze the command ability of the Ukrainian army, and completely interrupt the command between Zelenskiy and the front-line troops. Only in this way can the Russian army break through the Ukrainian troops individually. In the Russo-Georgian War, the Russian army successfully used hackers to destroy the command system of the Georgian army, completely paralyzing the german command system. However, in the Russo-Ukrainian War, although the Russian military used precision-guided bombs to blow up part of the command system of the Ukrainian army, bringing certain difficulties to the Ukrainian army in combat, the Russian army did not completely destroy the enemy's command system as in the last Russo-Georgian war, resulting in the Ukrainian army still maintaining a strong fighting spirit on the battlefield and causing losses to the Russian army.
Therefore, the positive and negative lessons of the Russo-Ukrainian War and the Russo-Georgian War have taught military scientists of various countries a vivid lesson -- in informationized warfare, seizing the right to control information is the core, and destroying the enemy's command system is an important step in seizing the right to control information. Once a war breaks out, our own troops should adopt two methods: physical destruction and soft destruction of computer information, completely destroy the enemy's official and military command system without being able to "resurrect," cut off the contact between the enemy's headquarters and the enemy's front-line combat units, and disseminate all kinds of information within the territory of the enemy country to encourage the officers and men of the enemy to lay down their weapons and revolt.
The Russian army did not destroy the Ukrainian command system in the first time also brought convenience to NATO support, NATO in the wartime to the Ukrainian army to convey a lot of russian intelligence, Ukrainian army command will be Russian military intelligence to the front-line troops, command the front-line troops with relatively accurate intelligence to attack the Russian army. If the Russian army can destroy the Ukrainian command system and beat the Ukrainian army into a "deaf and blind man", NATO intelligence support will not be able to be implemented.
Fourth, the Russian army is somewhat tied in combat, and the Russian army has gained moral support from many developing countries in only fighting military objectives, but it has caused certain difficulties to the Russian army on the front line. The Ukrainian army coerced the masses into fighting with "human shields", so that the Russian army that "cannot hurt the masses" as a military discipline was somewhat helpless. In order to reduce the casualties of the common people, the Russian army abandoned heavy fire strikes, missiles and air force bombing on many targets, and adopted the means of infantry attack, resulting in casualties of infantry in field troops.
At present, the Russian army has completely annihilated the 53rd Brigade of the Ukrainian Army and severely damaged the Azov battalion. With the formation of the Russian army's encirclement posture, the Russian army will launch a full-scale attack on the Ukrainian army in a relatively short period of time, and it is only a matter of time before the Ukrainian army is defeated. However, the lessons learned from the Russian-Ukrainian War are very helpful to the armies of various countries. Informationized warfare -- air force high-intensity air raids + missile saturation attack + information control right to seize and destroy the enemy's command system This "three axes" are indispensable, and the military powers of various countries are improving the combat level and information warfare capabilities of the air force and missile units in combination with their own conditions, while the Russian army has obviously lagged behind other military powers in information warfare, and the Russian military needs to improve its own information warfare level and establish the ideology and tactics of informationized operations.
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