Now that Russia has been hitting Ukraine for more than ten days, it can be a summing up moment from all angles. Compared with the speed of the first day's war reports measured in minutes and hours, now because the front line is stuck in a stalemate, the Russian army has begun to replenish and increase troops on a large scale. So it's time to sum up the gains and losses. This article analyzes why this was a military adventure wrapped in the skin of total war, both in terms of pre-war strategy and the results of a failed campaign raid. Finally, I will make a qualitative summary of the gains and losses of countries.
Pre-war review
In terms of pre-war strategic layout, Russia was very successful. His core success lay in the fact that the pre-war Ukrainian army was essentially in a very disadvantageous position. For example, on the key pre-war Kharkiv side, the Ukrainian army had only one mechanized infantry brigade and roughly equivalent to an infantry brigade before the war, and Kharkov could determine in front of him that the group-level units that had appeared and thought before the war might support the direction of Kharkov were the Russian 20th and 6th Armies and the Neartan Episode. On the first day of the war it was certain that there were near-Tan episodes and the troops of the 20th Army participating in the battle. The ten main brigades of the Ukrainian army were all on the first line in Donbass. In the southern direction of Crimea, Russia deployed the 58th Army before the war, and the Ukrainian army in front of it was even smaller, so that it could engage in armed demonstrations at the beginning of the war. A similar situation occurred in the direction of Kiev before the war. This allowed as long as the militia and Russian troops in the direction of eastern Ukraine could attract the main force of the Ukrainian army, the air and space forces should do a good job of covering the battlefield and restricting the movement of the Ukrainian army into an organized structure. Russia could theoretically quickly insert itself into the rear of the main target to complete the encirclement.
Michael Kofman's campaign raid on the first day of the war was very similar to his own, except that he had an additional idea of assaulting Lviv.
More importantly, since Kiev had already deployed all its major mobile forces on the eastern Ukrainian line, once the border was breached and the main movement was restricted, the Ukrainian rear was empty, and the Russian army could control the main highways relatively in a manner similar to the speed of the march (such as whether the Crimea-Zaporizhia and Kharkiv-Dnipro highways were open or not was the key to whether the Russian army could quickly close the siege) and extend the axis to both sides.
And the U.S. has been warnings for a year that Russia is about to attack, which is essentially a wolf story. In particular, Russia's increase in troops from 100,000 to 200,000 in the months before the war was considered by Zelenskiy to be the best time to unify Ukraine in one fell swoop, which has to do with Zelenskiy's belief that Russia does not dare to act with the verbal support of NATO. In the first half hours of the war, the time when the Americans predicted Russia's all-out offensive was inaccurate, which objectively further blurred the judgment of the outside world on the determination of the Russian offensive. It can be said that the multiple early warnings of the United States and NATO objectively helped Russia complete the strategic deception before the battle. The political foundations were laid for an all-out offensive. In this regard, Putin has shown boldness as a traditional realist politician.
Pre-war deployment map, but after the start of the war, the mobilization is large, for reference only
Battle review
At the beginning of the campaign, Russia showed the strength to strike quickly throughout Ukraine, and announced the completion of the suppression of the Ukrainian navy and air force more than an hour after the start of the battle. On the first day of the war, Russia's surprise attacks in the direction of Kiev, Crimea and Kharkov all made it seem that Russia after military reform had a strong combat capability. The furthest assault range of the vanguard forces in the first day of the Kiev direction reached 130 kilometers, and the southern front captured Melitopol in a day and a half. And even in the direction of Kharkov, which now seems the most unsuccessful, the Russian army still reached Kharkiv on the first day.
Only at this time, Russia had a huge problem. In addition to the inefficiency of the Air Force and the rare use of precision-guided weapons. The problem of insufficient troops in some directions, especially in the direction of Kharkiv, and the fear of attacking the city was exposed. In the face of Kharkiv, Ukraine's second largest city, which was then defensively empty, the Russian army came to a halt for unknown reasons.
As can be seen from the image above, the ring road in Kharkiv is not completely connected, but the road from Kharkiv to Dnipro is directly connected to the external ring road
Taken together, the main reason seems to be the lack of troops. The mechanized troops who were first put into battle were not prepared to attack the city and were reluctant to throw valuable mechanized infantry into the street battles against houses in Kharkiv and the surrounding highways. Even the Russian army could not completely stabilize the front on the first day, and the multi-way reconnaissance troops sent out suffered losses of varying degrees. The time when Russia had a basic stable front under The city of Kharkiv was on the third day of the war, that is, on the 26th, after the second group of troops joined the battle. Based on a synthesis of information, we can be sure that at least one mechanized infantry brigade entered Kharkiv around the 26th to strengthen the defenders' defenses. This meant that Kharkiv's interspersed operations to think of Dnieper as a starting point were a complete failure. Most of the troops in the NearTan episode in front of Kharkov went into a state of disappearance after the first round of attack was frustrated, until around the 27th, when abandoned T-80U from the Neartan Fourth Division appeared in Poltava near Kharkov, and then the Taman Division appeared near Samui. The 41st Army, which had been suspected of supporting the direction of Kharkov, was confirmed to be in the direction of Belarus after four days of stealth.
The journey from Kharkiv to Dnipro is about 200 km, with no major cities in between
The failure of the above operation directly led to the inability of the 58th Army on the southern front to reach Zaporizhia and to establish an encirclement of all the main forces of the Ukrainian army. Theoretically, if the first day of the war can take advantage of the chaos of the war, clear a passage on the surrounding roads for travel, and stop reinforcements. The Russians could reach the city of Dnipropetrovsk within two days and use long-range firepower to ensure that the possible passage of the Ukrainian army to the west to Dniepr was blocked, so as to achieve a siege of the Ukrainian government forces. And that was almost the beginning of the first round of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. The good news for the Russian army at this time is that the Ukrainian army did not want to withdraw to Kiev, and Russia used nuclear blackmail to calm the restless hearts of the entire United States and Europe; the bad news is that Kharkov has not yet been fought, and in order to win the war, it must be fierce.
The Gulf War Death Highway is remembered fondly
In general, we can guess in this way that Russia's initial operational ideas were. With highly mobile mechanized composite battalion troops, the enemy's key positions were interspersed, and the heavy army group was quickly encircled by targets such as cities. At the same time, the firepower in the direction of Eastern Ukraine is advancing, forcing the enemy to move, and the firepower is carried out to strike at the enemy in the movement. If Russia thinks so, then the pause in the offensive caused by the lack of offensive troops in Kharkov will be an unforgivable mistake. And this kind of behavior can generally be summarized as military adventure. However, because the Ukrainian army has given up the battle maneuverability to avoid being blown out of the death road by Russian military aircraft, the problem is not so fatal. Of course, this also completely buried all possibilities for a short-term end to the war except for a negotiated settlement. In fact, if we look back at the entire battlefield of Ukraine from this perspective, in fact, the three main directions of attack and the direction of Samui have all come up with this kind of military adventurism plan. We can say that this is a compromise of military reality, but it must also be admitted that Russia's plan this time is extremely light on the enemy's advance.