laitimes

"I may never declare war, but I can make war"

"I may never declare war, but I can make war"
"I may never declare war, but I can make war"

Yesterday, Putin announced that he recognized the "independence" of the two regions in Eastern Ukraine and the hot search, adding to the variables of the situation in Eastern Europe, which continues to be tense. Ukraine was once part of the Soviet Union, a behemoth that had been feared by britain and the United States before World War II, but had also formed allies against the Axis powers.

When Hitler tore up the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in 1941 and invaded the Soviet Union, Britain decided to aid the Soviet Union, and at the other end of the Pacific, Roosevelt "couldn't wait" to "lure Japan into the war"...

In terms of this sub-standard politician's character, President Roosevelt and Churchill of the United States are just a natural pair.

After the destruction of Nazi tyranny, all nations should enjoy a safe peace, and all peoples should live free from fear and poverty.

He made the whole country of the United States volunteer to fight, because no American at the time would have thought of how the Surprise Attack of the Japanese would fit in with the president's plan.

The development of the Soviet question and war towards the Pacific

This article is excerpted from Military History of the Western World

[English] by J.F.C. Fuller; translated by Niu Xianzhong

"I may never declare war, but I can make war"

01

At 9 p.m. on the day of Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, Mr. Churchill made the following speech to the British people from the radio:

I would now like to announce the decision of the British Government, and we have only one simple and unchanging objective. We decided to destroy Hitler and the Nazi regime. We will never compromise, we will never negotiate with Hitler or any of his party members. Any human or nation that is an enemy of the Nazis can get our help. Any human or national partner with Hitler is our enemy. This is our policy, and this is our manifesto. So in the future, we will do everything in our power to help the Soviet Union and the Soviet people.

From the above-mentioned declarations, as well as other similar statements, it is clear that Mr. Churchill did not know anything about his heavy responsibilities as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of the United Kingdom. First, he should know that his primary responsibility is to win a favourable peace for his country. But to replace Hitler with Stalin would be morally and politically unproductive.

Secondly, since he had marked the extinction of Hitler and Hitlerism as his goal, he should have an understanding of the difference between the Nazi regime and the German people in general. If he could have such an understanding, he should know that the various anti-Hitler forces in Germany were his excellent allies. According to his manifesto, great assistance was due, but he was dominated by emotion and committed the same great mistake that Hitler had committed in the Soviet Union. This mistake made the war unnecessarily prolonged for a long time, and in the end, although the final victory was won, peace was lost, and the war became a ridiculous joke.

"I may never declare war, but I can make war"

Thirdly, there was an Anglo-Polish Treaty between Britain and Poland, and although Poland was divided, the binding force of this treaty continued to exist. As far as the partition of Poland is concerned, Stalin's faults and Hitler's crimes can be said to be indistinguishable. So Mr. Churchill really should not have been so impulsive as to lead the whole of England into Stalin's arms. At the very least, stalin should wait until he asks for help before negotiating terms with him. Like the Treaty of Libentlop-Molotov signed on August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union should be required to immediately declare its abrogation, and all Polish prisoners of war and Polish people exiled by the Soviet Union should also be forced to be released by the Soviet authorities.

In terms of this sub-standard politician's character, President Roosevelt and Churchill of the United States are just a natural pair. In order to win votes, he did not hesitate to cultivate the Communist Party and his fellow travelers in a planned way, because they were very important in New York State. As one American writer put it: "When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, the bureaucracy of the American 'New Deal' became a communist shelter." "It's unbelievable that this infiltration effort by the Communist Party of america would be so successful that many branches of the U.S. government have been taken over by Kremlin spies." The job of these spies was to influence the thinking of the President of the United States and help him form his wartime policy toward the Soviet Union.

When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, Roosevelt's offer of American aid did not offer the Soviet Union a price, especially not to ask the Kremlin to offer a guarantee for the annexation of foreign lands. Like Churchill, he simply threw himself blindly into the arms of the Soviet Union and immediately began to send large quantities of leased goods to the Soviet Union.

But the question for the president of the United States remains: How can he put the United States into war? The answer is that since Hitler refused his provocation and refused to declare war on the United States, he had no choice but to provoke Japan to attack the United States.

02

Since 1931, friction between Japan and the United States has intensified. In that year, Japan was mainly looking for a region for consumption for its growing population, as well as for the supply of raw materials for its industry. The Japanese annexed northeast China, established a "Manchukuo," and established a puppet government to protect their economic interests. This high-handed act made President Hoover's Secretary of State, Stimson, greatly dissatisfied, and he announced the US policy of non-recognition. In addition, he accused Japan of violating the Briand-Kellog Pact of 1928, but in fact, in 1929, the Soviet Union attacked China, becoming the first country to break it. He also emphasized the economic interests of the United States in China, and also won the support of some business people. "If the United States does not have access to new markets, its capitalist system is about to collapse, and China, with its 400 million people, will be the most promising patron in the future, which is necessary for the continuation of the American economic system," they argue. Secretary of State Stimson also urged President Hoover to impose sanctions and embargo measures on Japan, but Hoover refused to listen to him.

"I may never declare war, but I can make war"

Roosevelt's attitude was completely different from that of his predecessors, and as he himself put it, he had a deep sympathy for China, because his wife's ancestors had done business with China. Not only did he support Stimson's non-recognition, but since he came to power, he has been strengthening the U.S. fleet to the limits set by the Washington Accords of 1921, which the Japanese fleet had already reached. At the end of 1934, two years after the treaty was signed, Japan announced its withdrawal from the Washington Accords and would no longer accept the restrictions of the treaty.

When the Sino-Japanese War resumed in June 1937, President Roosevelt began planning to force Japan to submit by cutting off Japan's trade by means of a joint Anglo-American blockade. In January 1938, he sent a secret mission to London to discuss the issue. In March 1939, British Foreign Minister Lord Halifax suggested to Roosevelt that in order to maximize psychological pressure on Japan, the American fleet should be concentrated in the Pacific. A year later, in April 1940, Roosevelt ordered the relocation of the Pacific Fleet, which had been based off the coast of California, to Hawaii, despite the advice of the naval authorities.

At this time, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, with the strong support of Stimson and some business people, also advocated a boycott of Japanese goods and a ban on U.S. oil imports into Japan. The campaign was so successful that in mid-June 1941, all oil-carrying ships were banned from the East Coast to the West Coast, and Morgenthau and Stimson advocated freezing Japan's deposits in the United States to crack down on Japanese trade.

On 23 July, when Japan oppressed the French Vichy government to agree to its temporary occupation of Vietnam, as it was a direct threat to Burma and Malaysia, but also to the Philippines, Roosevelt ordered his Chief of Naval Command, Admiral Stark. H. D. Stark) expressed his views on the issue of the embargo on Japan. The latter, in turn, proposed a memorandum stating: "The outcome of the embargo may presuppose Japan's attacks on Malaysia and the Dutch East Indies." And there is no doubt that it will only strengthen the determination of the Japanese authorities to continue their existing course of action. Moreover, if Japan had taken military measures against the Anglo-Dutch colonies, the result would have been to include military action against the Philippines, which would have led to an immediate Pacific war. Knowing that the embargo would be enough to draw Japan into war, on July 25, President Roosevelt announced the freezing of all Japanese funds in the United States, and the British and Dutch immediately announced the freeze; on the 31st, he banned the import of aircraft fuel and equipment into Japan. This is tantamount to saying that the United States has officially declared an economic war with Japan.

"I may never declare war, but I can make war"

This situation is tantamount to indicating that the scourge of war in the Pacific is imminent, and that the next step is to be taken by Churchill, that is, to try to get the United States to hurry into war without further delay. He arranged a meeting with the President of the United States in Placentia Bay in Newfoundland, where the so-called "Atlantic Conference" took place from August 8 to 13. According to Roosevelt's son, Elliot, Churchill knew that without American participation, Britain could no longer support the war. His difficulty was in the United States, where only Congress could declare war on the outside world, so churchill raised the issue with Roosevelt shortly after the conference began. Roosevelt's answer was this: "I may never declare war, but I can make war." If I were to ask the U.S. Congress to declare war, they might have to debate for up to three months before they could decide. "He has already created war against Germany, and now he is going to make war against Japan. So he made a promise to Churchill: "Even if the United States itself is not attacked, it will try to enter the war in the Far East." At the same time, he said that when he returned to Washington, he would soon present a provocative ultimatum to the Japanese ambassador to the United States, General Nomura. The ultimatum, which was delivered to Ambassador Nomura on 17 August, contains a passage that reads: "The United States Government now deems it necessary to proclaim the Government of Japan, and if the Government of Japan continues to pursue its policy or plan of military domination or military threats against its neighbors in the future, the United States Government will be compelled to take immediate and necessary steps to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and the American people and to ensure the security of the United States." ”

Because the content of these negotiations could not be published publicly, on the surface, an Atlantic Charter had to be issued as a cover. This document was neither considered to be a formal "state document" in its original sense, nor was it formally signed and affixed with the national seal. It was published only as a shorthand draft. This is a highly idealized document that stipulates that no territorial change shall be made unless it is in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned. All people should have the right to choose their own form of government. All nations, victorious or defeated, should have equal rights to world trade and to the acquisition of raw materials. After the destruction of Nazi tyranny, all nations should enjoy a safe peace, and all peoples should live free from fear and poverty.

"I may never declare war, but I can make war"

It may not be possible to comply fully with everything provided for in this Charter. Fortunately, at that time, the role was only to deceive the world. Nevertheless, until it was torn apart at the Teheran Conference, it was a first-class propaganda material and one of the greatest hoaxes of world war II.

For Japan, there are only two possibilities for the outcome of the embargo: if Japan does not withdraw from China, it must try to break the blockade. So shortly after the End of the Atlantic Conference, the Japanese began negotiations with the Americans in Washington in an attempt to open the impasse. In addition, in September, in preparation for war, the Tokyo authorities also began to notify the Japanese consul general in Honolulu with a coded telegram to investigate detailed intelligence about Pearl Harbor, Oahu, and the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The Japanese had no idea that the Americans had debunked their code (known as "Magic"), so they knew exactly what they were communicating.

03

Because negotiations in Washington had been fruitless for a long time, on November 22, the Tokyo authorities sent a secret telegram to Ambassador Nomura, insisting that unless all negotiations were completed by November 29 and a treaty was signed, they would have to "resign themselves to developments." This statement is to imply that the Japanese will carry out some form of surprise attack, but because the U.S. fleet and army in the Pacific are not yet ready for an attack, from November 22 to 25, the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, made a proposal for a temporary response, advocating an extension of 90 days, during which the United States and Japan continued to maintain economic relations, but the latter tacitly refrained from further conquest. This proposal was never submitted to Ambassador Nomura, because on November 25, the Americans recommended it to Chiang Kai-shek's adviser Owen Lattimore (a pro-Soviet element) to telegraph the U.S. president's assistant for oriental affairs, Lauehlin Currie, who was also a communist spy, saying: "Easing economic pressure and thawing will greatly enhance Japan's military position in China and will deprive China of its faith in the United States." At the same time, on November 25, after stating that he feared that the Japanese would attack the following Monday (December 1), the President of the United States added with great significance: "The question is how we should lead them [the Japanese] into firing the first shot without putting ourselves in too much danger." ”

"I may never declare war, but I can make war"

Hull's suggestion did not achieve this goal, so it was replaced by a "ten-point proposal". According to W. Lange L. Langer) and S. Gleason E. Gleason's semi-official history of the Unannounced War, based on H. White's book, is based on the book "The Undeclared War." D. White, again a Communist spy), wrote a memorandum submitted to Finance Minister Morgenthau. On the surface, it is proposing the United States to solve the problem between the two countries, but in fact it is an ultimatum. In order to sign a new trade agreement and unfreeze funds, Japan should agree to sign a non-aggression pact with the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the Netherlands, and other countries; withdraw their troops from China and Vietnam, abolish all pseudo-organizations, sign treaties with the United States according to most-favored-nation treatment, and stabilize the yen in dollars.

There is no doubt that the Japanese regard this proposal as an ultimatum. The Government of Japan decided to accept this challenge and responded with the battle they had been preparing for a long time. Japan's intention was not to go through a formal declaration of war, namely to attack first The Anglo-American bases in the Far East and the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Because they had to try to keep the U.S. fleet in port, Nomura and Raisu were instructed to continue negotiations with the U.S. government so as not to alarm the Americans and prepare them. According to Major General Rear-Adm. In his book The Last Secret of Pearl Harbor by R. A. Theobald, President Roosevelt had sufficient information in advance about all the preparations of the Japanese side, because he knew that the best way to get the United States into war was to subject the United States to a surprise attack on its territory, so he decided to use all means to lure the Japanese into the bait, rather than letting them know that the United States was waiting for this attack. So, apart from issuing an empty war warning notice on November 27 ( which did not specifically mention Hawaii ), he did not tell the commander of the Pacific Fleet at the time, Adm. Kimmel, all the details. H. E. Kimmel) and Commander of the Hawaii Garrison, Gen. W.C.Short).

From December 2 to 3, the Tokyo government issued a series of orders to its overseas consulates to destroy codebooks and secret documents, which of course was a sign of imminent war, but none of this important information was passed on to Kimmel and Schult. Finally, on December 6, the Japanese Embassy in Washington received a fourteen-point document sent in a beat, which was a response to the ten-point proposal made by the United States on November 26. At the same time, there is also an instruction that when the full text is collected, it will be copied properly, and then it will be kept in strict secrecy, and the time for transmission to the United States Government will be announced separately.

By 5:30 p.m. that day, the first 13 paragraphs of the lengthy telegram had been translated and sent to President Roosevelt. When he finished reading the document, he said, "This meaning is war." But Major General Theobald said: "At this last critical juncture, another full day has passed, and he still has not given a word to the commander in Hawaii." On December 7, the full text was released. It was a slightly disguised declaration of war, followed by a second order to be delivered to the United States Government at 1 p.m. that day.

"I may never declare war, but I can make war"

On December 7, Admiral Stark, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, arrived at his office at 9:25 a.m.; although he was pointed out to Washington at 1 p.m. that it was 7:30 a.m. Hawaiian time, he still did not consider the need to immediately warn General Kimmel, although his staff urged him to take the action. Two hours later, The Army Chief of Staff, General Marshall, also arrived at the War Department. He also saw this fourteen o'clock ultimatum, judging by the time it was ready to be delivered to the United States, indicating that the Japanese would launch an attack on American troops in the Pacific at about 1 p.m., so he drew up a briefing to send to the commanders of the American Army in the Far East, the Caribbean Defense, Hawaii, and the Fourth Army. "Japan is scheduled to send an ultimatum-like document to the U.S. government at 1 p.m. Eastern Time today," the content said. Greece is on strict alert and notifies the relevant organs of the Navy. "But such an urgent notice did not use a telephone across the Pacific, and if so, it could be delivered to General Schott within thirty or forty minutes." In fact, it was handed over to commercial radio companies, and by the time it reached Schulte's headquarters, it was already six hours after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. In this attack, a total of 18 U.S. warships were sunk and wounded, including 8 combat ships. A total of 4,575 Americans were killed or wounded, and 177 aircraft were destroyed. The United States officially entered the war, and the result of Pearl Harbor turned the United States into an ally of the Soviet Union.

This is the amazing story of President Roosevelt's luring Japan into war. Rear Admiral Theobald had the following comprehensive comment: "Leaving a weak Pacific Fleet in Hawaii and denying the commander of the fleet all relevant information (otherwise it would have made the attack impossible), President Roosevelt single-handedly dragged the United States into the war on December 7, 1941." He made the whole country of the United States volunteer to fight, because no American at the time would have thought of how the Surprise Attack of the Japanese would fit in with the president's plan. From the Navy's point of view, this was certainly a fiasco. But from a diplomatic point of view, Pearl Harbor was a prelude to the total defeat of the Axis powers. ”

Excerpt/Typography: Nine Tubes

Illustrations and cover images Source: Darkest Hour

Tiger! tiger! tiger! Pearl Harbor

"I may never declare war, but I can make war"
"I may never declare war, but I can make war"
"I may never declare war, but I can make war"

👇 Military History of the Western World