Text 丨 Fang Wen
Produced by 丨 Niu Dao CaiJing (niudaocaijing)
Many Chinese Internet companies will have a north-south confrontation, such as Meituan Hungry, JD Ali, both of which started in the north and south, and each occupyed an advantageous market.
The same city freight field of lala and fast dog taxi also have such characteristics, a Hong Kong start, the base camp in Shenzhen, the south is the advantage of the battlefield; a start in 58 under the banner, the base camp in Beijing, the northern market has more advantages.
Not only in terms of geographical location, but also in the business, Kuaigou and Lala also showed differences, and the two sides had the dominant form of enterprise and ordinary user.
It can be said that the goods Lala and the fast dog taxi, a "South Murong", a "North Qiao Feng".
However, as the double male of the same city freight, the market share of fast dog taxi began to shrink after 2018, and now it has fallen out of the first echelon. The entry of giants such as Didi has exacerbated the changes in the pattern.
Looking at the history of the fall of fast dog taxis, we can see that there is the inevitable development of the industry and the accident of business operation.
01 The watershed of falling behind - change the name storm
On February 6, Fast Dog Taxi passed the hearing of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and will soon become the first share of Internet freight on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
Previously, Lalala was rumored to be about to open an IPO several times, and it was also denied several times, and there was founder Zhou Shengfu's "no listing within ten years" in the front, and the attitude of Kuaigou and Lalala to land on the capital market was also diametrically opposed.
In fact, according to the market share calculation, fast dog taxi has been seriously left behind.
As mentioned in the fast dog prospectus, according to the 2020 transaction volume data, fast dog taxi is the second largest online logistics platform in the Chinese mainland, with a market share of 5.5%, but far less than the market share of 54.7% of the first place.
Comprehensive multi-dimensional information in the prospectus, the first place mentioned here should be Lala.
This can't help but make people sigh, according to the share calculation in the prospectus, the current volume of fast dog taxi is only one-tenth of the size of the cargo Lala.
What is even more unfavorable for fast dog taxis is that the gap is still accelerating.
Another data disclosed in the prospectus shows that as of the first nine months of 2021, the total transaction volume of Fast Dog Taxi was 1.4 billion yuan, with a market share of 3.4%, compared with the total transaction volume of the first-ranked Lalala reached 20.5 billion yuan, accounting for 49.6% of the market share. The volume of fast dog taxis is lower than 1/10 of that of Lala.
During the north-south confrontation with Lalala, the market strength of fast dog taxi was comparable to that of Lalala. According to the data in 2019, there are 3 million driver-side users and 28 million registered users; the number of driver users of Fast Dog Taxi is 3 million, and the number of registered users is 19.8 million.
The market recognizes that the advantage of Lalala is in the C-end market, and the predecessor of fast dog taxi, 58 express, has an advantage in the B-end market, which is also the field where lalala has been trying to catch up with fast dog taxi at that time.
Moreover, the decentralization of the C-end market has also made the industry generally believe that 58 Express actually controls the most stable income of the same city freight.
The intersection of fates is in the process of the two sides extending to each other's fields.
The renaming of Fast Dog Taxi is a dramatic turning point for the competitive landscape between the two sides. If the B side has more stable orders, then the C side is more dominant in the brand. 58 Express changed its name to Fast Dog Taxi in order to make the brand more C-ended. However, the name change storm was unexpected by the fast dog taxi, and the truck driver thought that the word "fast dog" was insulting, causing some drivers to jump to the lala camp.
It is difficult to imagine that a name change has led to a change in the pattern of the two, a name that is insignificant for outsiders, but it is a special concern for fast dog drivers.
A fast dog taxi driver in Beijing recalled that the drivers were very concerned about the new name of fast dog, and it was a hard money to take orders on the platform itself, and it was treated like this by fast dogs.
The key point of this incident is also that Lala was working in the northern market at the time, and there was not much difference between the two for the drivers themselves, and the fast dog caused many drivers to "turn back".
But Chen Xiaohua, the founder of Fast Dog Taxi, does not think so, in his view, the role of the brand is exposure, and user reach is the purpose. Chen Xiaohua believes that "this is related to the company's strategic adjustment, the company to expand from the small B end to the C end, will inevitably need brand effect, and how to let users remember, and the fast dog App and other logistics companies are particularly important."
Sometimes the competition between two companies is so lost.
Just like Baidu takeaway once had a strong momentum, but in the Spring Festival of 2016, Baidu takeaway actually launched a campaign to buy tickets for riders and send riders home for the New Year. On the contrary, Meituan Takeaway retains some riders to maintain capacity during the Spring Festival, and vigorously recruits after the Spring Festival to restore capacity before the fifteenth day of the first month.
It is such a dramatic event, but in a short period of time, the competitiveness of the two companies has been pulled out of the gap. The long-term impact of the name change incident on fast dog taxi has also made it a stroke that cannot be ignored in the history of fast dog taxi.
02 Losses, changes in coaches, continuous turmoil
After 2019, fast dog taxis began to go downhill.
After 58 Express changed its name to Fast Dog Taxi, not only did its market share decline rapidly, but even the enterprise-end freight that originally had the advantage began to decline.
An important manifestation of this market pattern change is that even in the Beijing market, there are more cargo trucks with cargo labels on the road, and there are fewer and fewer fast dog taxi vehicles.
Market-side data can also reflect this change in the competitive landscape.
Fast dog taxi monthly active users are declining. According to the prospectus data, from 2018 to 2020 and the first nine months of 2021, the monthly active users of the Chinese mainland were 690,000, 660,000, 490,000 and 430,000, respectively. Even with the data of overseas markets, the total number of users of Fast Dog Taxi after the month is 870,000, 840,000, 640,000 and 590,000 respectively.
The same trend is also manifested in the number of consignment orders, the total amount of transactions and other data.
The decline in performance is related to the market strategy of fast dog taxi, which mentioned in the prospectus that after 2018, a conservative and prudent market strategy was implemented, one is that the amount of financing is less than that of opponents, one is that the market investment is reduced, and the other is the commission rate is increased.
The market investment in fast dog taxis will decrease significantly in 2019 and 2020. According to the data, from 2018 to the first nine months of 2021, the sales and marketing expenses of Fast Dog Taxi were 520 million yuan, 290 million yuan, 190 million yuan and 230 million yuan, respectively. It can be clearly seen that fast dog taxi has higher marketing expenses in 2018 and the first 9 months of 2021, while the middle two years are in a conservative spending state.
Another strange data is that when the market is still in a period of fierce competition, the commission rate of fast dog taxi has been rising at a high speed. From 2018 to the first nine months of 2021, the average commission rate in the mainland market of Fast Dog Taxi increased from 5.8% to a high of 11.7%, and the net commission rate (the difference between the average commission rate and the net commission rate is the part of the reward and subsidy) increased from 1.9% to a maximum of 8.3%, and in the first nine months of 2021, it was reduced to 2.7% due to the increase in incentives and subsidies.
Reduced marketing and rising commission rates may be related to long-term losses. From 2018 to 2020 and the first nine months of 2021, the revenue of Fast Dog Taxi was 450 million yuan, 550 million yuan, 530 million yuan and 470 million yuan respectively, and the revenue growth was not obvious, and there was a downward trend, with adjusted losses of 780 million yuan, 400 million yuan, 190 million yuan and 210 million yuan.
It can be seen that reducing market input and increasing commission rates have indeed narrowed the losses of Fast Dog Taxi in 2019 and 2020.
But at the same time, we can also see how unsatisfactory the performance of fast dog taxi, after adjusting the loss and revenue comparison can be found, compared with other new economy companies revenue loss of more than ten billion yuan, fast dog taxi loss is high, and the revenue is too low.
The loss in 2018 is close to 2 times the revenue, and the loss in 2019 is almost equivalent to the revenue, and this rhythm of burning money is extremely stressful for the financial pressure of fast dogs. From 2018 to the first nine months of 2021, the cash of Fast Dog Taxi has been maintained at 200-300 million, compared with the operating expenditure of this capital reserve is stretched.
In the face of unfavorable operating conditions, Fast Dog Taxi has also undergone management changes in the past. Previously, the CEO of Fast Dog Taxi was quietly served as the CFO of The Home Group, and after 2020, the CEO of Fast Dog Taxi was replaced by He Song. Fast dog taxi itself has 58 internal incubation origins, so He Song is no exception. He Song worked in 58.com from 2011 to 2015, and in 2016, He Song served as the vice president of 58 Home, responsible for the freight business of 58 Express.
03 The third pressure of the industry, will the fast dog "disappear"?
The track of intra-city freight is becoming more and more crowded, and the logic behind it is that the commercial competition is beginning to tilt more towards the city limits. Previously, e-commerce as the biggest cake, logistics infrastructure was developed around trunk transportation.
However, as community group buying, fresh food, and instant delivery are closer to consumers, and the infrastructure is more around the city-wide new consumption scenarios, the demand for same-city freight has been greatly stimulated.
The addition of Didi Freight has accelerated the change of the pattern of same-city freight.
A law of the Chinese Internet is that the industry boss and the second boss fight counterfeiting, and finally the third in the industry is "disappeared". Fast dog taxis are also facing such a crisis.
Since Didi Freight was launched, it has had a direct impact on the market of fast dog taxis.
From Frost & Sullivan's report, it can be seen that Didi Freight, relying on the traffic and capital advantages of Didi Taxi, quickly surpassed Fast Dog Taxi and became the second largest in the same city freight market.
Of course, the result of such competition is still achieved after the fast dog taxi began to increase subsidies in 2021, which means that after the disadvantages of the later traffic coverage of the city and other aspects gradually appeared, the competitive pressure of the fast dog taxi will become more and more large.
In fact, the new players in the same city freight market are not only Didi Freight, but also more cruel is that the players will only increase.
At the end of 2021, it was reported that Meituan began to test the freight logistics business "Zhuolu", which will be another extremely aggressive giant player after Didi to enter the same city supply field. In addition, the trunk logistics platform Manbang Group also joined the same city freight in 2020, and logistics companies such as SF also made efforts to distribute in the same city.
As can be seen from these new players, there are three main types of characters.
First, like Didi, there is traffic and there are drivers. Didi's drainage through the passenger transport business and consumers' perception of the brand have surpassed the fast dog taxi in a short period of time.
The second is that there are business scenarios like Meituan. Whether it is the group purchase in the key business community of the Meituan in the past two years, or the fast donkey of B2B or the Meituan purchase of vegetables at the C end, it needs to be supported by the same city freight.
At the same time, Meituan is born with a large number of merchants, which is itself an important source of customers in the field of same-city freight transport.
The third is the business expansion of logistics companies such as SF and Manbang. Such enterprises can accelerate the launch of their own business in the same city through business convergence. For example, among the important customers of Fast Dog Taxi in recent years, postal and logistics service companies include.
In fact, the current express logistics companies have changed the original urban outlets + distribution model, there have long been express delivery companies through the goods to pull the latter fast dog taxi, the parcel from the city distribution center to the end of the courier nearby, direct delivery.
Whether it is traffic or business, or logistics industry, these strong competitors have entered the game, which undoubtedly makes the fast dog taxi that is not ideal in its own business situation even worse.