After king Zhou Ping moved east to Luoyi, the history of the Spring and Autumn Warring States officially began. During the Spring and Autumn Period, the wars of the princes for hegemony formed the Spring and Autumn Five Hegemonies. However, there are still many theories about which five princely states the Spring and Autumn Five Hegemons are monarchs. Among them, Sima Qian gave the views in the "Records of History": Duke Huan of Qi, Duke Xiang of Song, Duke Wen of Jin, Duke Mu of Qin, and King Zhuang of Chu. As far as Qin Mugong is concerned, the year of birth and death (?) –621 BC), courtesy name Renhao. He was also the Duke of Qin Miao. The younger son of Duke De of Qin, the younger brother of Duke Xuan of Qin and Duke Cheng of Qin, was the monarch of the State of Qin during the Spring and Autumn Period (reigned 659 BC – 621 BC), and the courtesy name Mu.
For Qin Mugong, the reason why he was able to become one of the five hegemons of the Spring and Autumn Period, compared with the Duke of Qi Huan and the Duke of Jin Wen, was mainly because he dominated Xi Rong. Further, the reason why Qin Mugong was able to dominate Xi Rong was inseparable from a general who was often defeated. This warrior only fought once in his life, but he laid the foundation for the hegemony of the Qin state, making Qin Mugong one of the five hegemons of the Spring and Autumn Period.
One
First of all, this person is Meng Mingshi, also known as Bailishi. Meng Mingshi (born and died unknown), surnamed Jiang, Baili clan, mingshi, character Meng Mingshi, historically known as Meng Mingshi, a native of the State of Yu (present-day Pinglu County, Shanxi) during the Spring and Autumn Period, the son of Qin Xiang Baili Xi, and the main general of Qin Mugong. Bai LiShi, also known as Meng Mingshi, his father was Bai Li xi and a minister of the Qin state. Under the governance of BaiLi Xi and others, the national strength of the Qin state increased, which gave Qin Mugong the confidence to compete with the Jin state for hegemony. In particular, after the death of Duke Wen of Jin, In 628 BC, Duke Mu of Qin was regarded as a general by Baili, and Xi Qishu and Bai Yibing were made deputy generals, thus attacking the Jin ally Zheng Guo.
In this battle, because Baili mistakenly thought that Zheng Guo was already prepared, he did not dare to attack Zheng Guo again, but he was afraid that he would not be able to send a bus to Qin Mu when he went back, so he conveniently destroyed the slippery country and robbed a lot of jade and grain. However, in the process of returning to the Dynasty under the leadership of Bai Lishi, he was ambushed by the Jin army in the Kunshan area (present-day eastern Shaanxi County, Henan). In the Battle of Kun, not only did the Qin army suffer heavy losses, but also the two deputy generals of Bai Lishi and Xi Qishu and Bai Yibing were also taken prisoner.
Two
As a result, for Bai Lishi, a military general of the Qin state, he suffered defeat in the first expedition, and also led to becoming a prisoner of the Jin state. Of course, because the Jin State was temporarily unwilling to be complete with the Qin State, it released BaiLishi and others. After Bai Lishi and the others returned to the Qin State, Qin Mugong not only did not punish them, but instead took responsibility himself. In this regard, in the author's opinion, the reason why Bai Lishi was able to shame before the last snow was obviously directly related to the fact that he encountered a magnanimous Qin Mugong.
If he were to be replaced by other monarchs of the Qin State, Bai Lishi would probably not have the opportunity to continue to lead the army after the Battle of Kun. In 625 BC, Bai Lishi asked Qin Mugong to send troops to avenge the battle of Kunshan. Qin Mugong agreed, and handed over the Qin army to Bailishi. However, because of the power gap between the Qin and Jin states, Bailishi was once again defeated by the Jin state in 625 BC. In the face of the second defeat of Bai Lishi, Qin Mugong continued to encourage him, and also let him serve as the commander of the Qin army, which can be described as the use of people without doubt, and suspicious people are not needed.
Three
After two defeats, Bailishi was no longer proud of the enemy, but calm and composed. On the one hand, Bailishi paid attention to the training of soldiers, and even achieved the same happiness and hardship with the soldiers, which made Bailishi gain the sincere support of the qin generals. On the other hand, Bailishi paid more attention to the pattern of the nations in the Spring and Autumn Period, that is, to make its vision and pattern more long-term. Soon after, the Jin state united the three kingdoms of Song, Chen, and Zheng to reach the border of the Qin state.
In this battle, Bailishi could not hold out, prompting the Jin state to capture only two cities, and failed to further expand the results. Further, because the Jin State was mobilizing its troops this time and its troops were flourishing, what Baili Could do was to reduce the losses of the Qin State. Of course, judging from the results, in the third confrontation with the Jin State, Bai LiShi still suffered a defeat, which also allowed Bai Li Shi to gain criticism in the Qin court. Thus, in the summer of 624 BC, Bai Lishi once again requested to attack the Jin state, thus launching the Battle of wangguan.
Four
Finally, after the Qin army crossed the Yellow River in the east, Meng Ming, seeing that it was to stimulate the morale of the generals, ordered the ship to be burned to show that it was a decisive battle with the Jin army. On this basis, the scrappy Qin army captured the Jin state's chengchi wangguan, and then marched north to attack the suburbs (WenXixi). In view of the fierceness of the Qin army, the Jin army held the city and refused to fight. In the view of many historians, Meng Ming regarded the tactical method of "burning boats on the Jihe River" adopted in this battle as providing a practical basis for the tactical theory of "throwing oneself into the land of death and then surviving, falling into the land of death and then living again" in the later "Art of War of Sun Tzu". The victory in the Battle of Wang Guan was the first time that the State of Qin defeated the State of Jin on a frontal battlefield, which meant that the hegemonic position of the State of Jin was loosened, and it was also an important battle in which Qin Mugong was able to rank among the five hegemons of the Spring and Autumn Period.
What is more crucial is that after the Battle of Wang Guan, the Qin state was mighty and shook Xi rong, and more than twenty small countries and tribes rushed to annex the qin state, so that the qin state expanded thousands of miles and became the overlord of xi rong, which all had a certain relationship with Meng Mingshi. That is to say, if there was no battle of wang officials led by Meng Mingshi, it would be difficult for the Qin state to dominate Xirong so smoothly, and without hegemony over Xirong, it would be difficult for the Qin state to compete with the six kingdoms of Shandong during the Warring States period, that is, the territory where Xirong was located, which was the backyard of the Qin state. In general, although Meng Ming regarded this Qin general as a victorious warrior who had only fought once in his life, he was a figure that had to be mentioned in the history of the Qin state.