First, the strategic situation on the Chinese battlefield after the fall of Wuhan
From the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression to the fall of Guangzhou and Wuhan in October 1938, it was a strategic defensive stage of the Chinese War of Resistance. The Japanese army seized its weapon of war and won the success of every Sino-Japanese army battle and occupied the cities it tried to occupy. However, to the panic of the Japanese base camp, although the Japanese army was victorious in the war, it could not achieve its war purpose, that is, to decisively destroy the resistance of the Chinese army and force the Chinese government to collapse or submit. After the Japanese occupation of Guangzhou and Wuhan, Japan became more and more aware that the possibility of ending the war was becoming increasingly unlikely. Due to the lack of troops, the Japanese army could only control the dotted line even in the occupied areas. The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army had grown up during the battles of Xuzhou and Wuhan, forcing the Japanese army to shift its main energies to the occupied areas and forcing them to stop a comprehensive and large-scale strategic offensive on the frontal front. War has inevitably tended to protract, a situation that China has been looking forward to.
As early as May 1938, Mao Zedong foresaw in "On Protracted War" that the fall of Wuhan would usher in a long phase of strategic stalemate in the War of Resistance Against Japan. In November 1938, Chiang Kai-shek confirmed at the First Nanyue Military Conference that China's defensive period had come to an end and had entered the stage of accumulating strength and preparing for a counteroffensive.
The inability of the Japanese to make a quick decision meant that the Nationalist Military Commission's strategy of protracted attrition had some effect. However, the Chinese side has paid a heavy price for this. By the time Guangzhou and Wuhan were lost, China's industrial and commercial centers along the river and along the coast were all occupied by the Japanese army. By the beginning of 1939, the occupied areas accounted for 23% of the country's territory, and these areas were all politically, economically and culturally developed areas of China. The National Government has retreated to the inland provinces of the southwest and northwest, far from the coastline. Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Sichuan, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Xinjiang and other border and inland provinces became the rear bases to support China's War of Resistance. Although these provinces have a vast territory, except for the more developed agriculture and handicraft industries in the Sichuan Basin, the rest of the provinces and regions are poor areas with backward Chinese economies. China has also lost 91 percent of tariffs, 97 percent of its machine-making industry, 75 percent of its flour industry, and 75 percent of its textile industry. The Nationalist government lost a large amount of land and population, its fiscal revenue plummeted, and the modern industry along China's coastal and riverine areas was also destroyed by the Japanese army, and the War of Resistance China almost completely regressed to the agricultural era. This was not a fatal obstacle to a protracted war, but it was extremely difficult to accumulate the strength that could be used for a counter-offensive. In terms of transportation, the Japanese controlled the railway trunk lines of Jinpu, Zhengtai, Tongpu, Beijing-Shanghai, Shanghai-Hangzhou, Jiangnan (Nanjing to Wuhu) and the northern section of Pinghan Road (north of Xinxiang), accounting for about 84% of the length of China's railways. As the lifeblood of transportation was controlled by the Japanese army, the occupied areas were divided into strips. The Japanese were undermanned, but this deficiency was compensated for by the ease and speed with which troops could be transferred. Although the lofty mountains and mountains constitute a natural barrier for the rear area, it also makes it quite difficult for the various battle zones to transfer troops and coordinate operations, and logistical supply is extremely difficult, and it is almost in a situation of fighting for each other. The Chinese army on the frontal battlefield was still brave in strategic defense, but the strategic counter-offensive was unable to do so, thus forming a strategic confrontation between the enemy and ourselves in northern China with the lines of Baotou, Datong, Yuncheng, Bo'ai, Kaifeng, Huaiyang, and Boxian as the combat line, and in central and eastern China with the lines of Hefei, Huangmei, Xinyang, Yueyang, Ningwu, Wuhu, and Hangzhou as the combat lines. This pattern of confrontation, which emerged at the end of 1938, lasted for a long time. Although there were constant local changes since then, it was not until 1944 when the Japanese army launched the Yuxianggui Operation to open up the mainland communication line, and major changes occurred.
Second, the first Nanyue Military Conference and changes in China's strategic guidance
After the fall of Wuhan, in order to cope with the new war situation, the Military Commission of the National Government held military conferences in Nanyue, Xi'an, Wugong, and other places, with the purpose of summing up the lessons learned from the full outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression to the period when Wuhan and Yueyang were lost, and to determine future strategic principles and military arrangements, of which the first Nanyue Military Conference was the most important.
From November 25 to 28, 1938, the Military Commission held a military conference at Hengshan Mountain in Nanyue, Hunan, which was attended by Chiang Kai-shek and more than 200 generals of the 3rd and 9th Theaters.
At the opening of the meeting, Chiang Kai-shek first explained the division of the period of resistance. Prior to this, according to the official account of the Nationalist government, "the beginning of the war until the fall of Nanjing was the first period, the retreat from the Battle of Lunan to Xuzhou was the second period, and the defense of Wuhan was the third period" Note 1, Chiang Kai-shek believed that this division was no longer appropriate, pointing out that the first period of the War of Resistance should be from the Lugou Bridge Incident to the fall of Wuhan and Yueyang, followed by the second period of the War of Resistance. In the first period, China was on the defensive; after entering the second period, the strength of the Japanese army had reached its limit, so China began to enter the stage of turning defense into attack, and turning defeat into victory.
Chiang Kai-shek judged the superiority or inferiority of the Chinese and Japanese armies in the war. He believes that the Japanese army has the following characteristics, that is, bravely moving forward and swearing to die to achieve the task; enduring hardships and stand hard work is similar to that of the Chinese army; the spirit and habit of implementing orders; the sense of identity formed by loyalty to the masses and patriotism; being good at searching for intelligence; and extremely strict combat discipline. He also pointed out that the Kuomintang army had 12 major humiliations, mainly the battlefield where the dead officers and soldiers died; the wounded and sick had nowhere to shelter; the soldiers could not be prevented from fleeing; the people in the military march fled; they lied about military information; they evaded responsibility; they could not carry out orders; and so on.
Chiang Kai-shek also defended the correctness of the strategic guidance of the Supreme High Command before the fall of Wuhan, saying that the strategy of the High Command was to avoid a decisive battle with the Japanese army in North China, but to lure the Japanese army to the Yangtze River Valley, thus exchanging space for time and completing all preparations for protracted operations. However, with regard to the setbacks of the Japanese army landing from Jinshanwei in Hangzhou Bay, the failure to hold Nanjing, the loss of Madang Fortress, and the landing of the Japanese army from Dapeng Bay, Chiang Kai-shek claimed that "the duty of the commander-in-chief lies, and he really cannot resign his responsibility." Note 2
The greatest purpose of the Nanyue Military Conference was to organize and reorganize the army, and there were many military reforms, and it also had a major impact on the strategic guidance of the Military Commission after the fall of Wuhan, and the main contents were as follows:
1. Rezone the war zone. After the Nanyue Conference, the Military Commission adjusted its front line and divided it into 10 theaters, including the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, and 10th theaters, as well as the Rusu and Jicha theaters. 1st Theater of Operations: Commander Wei Lihuang, with jurisdiction over Henan and Anhui, has a total of 12 infantry divisions, 1 infantry brigade, 1 cavalry division, and 1 cavalry brigade. 2nd Theater of Operations: Commander Yan Xishan, with jurisdiction over Shanxi and Shaanxi, has a total of 32 infantry divisions, 14 infantry brigades, 5 cavalry divisions and 3 cavalry brigades. 3rd Theater of Operations: Commander Gu Zhutong, with jurisdiction over southern Jiangsu, southern Anhui and Zhejiang and Fujian provinces, with a total of 22 infantry divisions and 2 cavalry brigades. 4th Theater of Operations: Commander Zhang Fakui, with jurisdiction over Guangdong and Guangxi, with 18 infantry divisions and 2 infantry brigades. 5th Theater of Operations: Commander Li Zongren, with jurisdiction over western Anhui, northern Hubei, and southern Henan, with 26 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry unit, and 1 cavalry brigade. 8th Theater of Operations: Commander Zhu Shaoliang, with jurisdiction over Gan, Ning, Qing and Suiyuan, including 6 infantry divisions, 9 infantry brigades, 4 cavalry divisions and 4 cavalry brigades. 9th Theater: Commander Chen Cheng (Xue Yuedai), with 52 infantry divisions in southern Hunan and Hunan Provinces. 10th Theater of Operations: Commander Jiang Dingwen, with jurisdiction over the Shaanxi side, has 9 infantry divisions, 1 infantry brigade, 1 cavalry division and 1 cavalry brigade. Lusu Theater: Commander-in-chief Yu Xuezhong, with jurisdiction over northern Jiangsu and Shandong, with 7 infantry divisions. Jicha Theater of Operations: Commander-in-Chief Lu Zhonglin has jurisdiction over The Jicha side, Ð has a total of 5 divisions and 1 cavalry division.
2. Reduce the level of command. Since the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Military Commission has "deeply felt that there are too many levels of command in our army, and since the Central Military Commission of the Supreme Command, through the theater, corps, group, and army in the middle, it has been able to reach the division of strategic units, with a total of seven levels." Note 3 Due to the vastness of China's region, backward transportation and communications, and excessive command levels, which makes it easy to delay in issuing orders, which affects the command and the use of troops, it is decided to abolish the corps and corps levels, change the army to a strategic unit, and abolish the brigades below the division level, so that the command structure above the strategic unit army is only the three levels of the military committee, the theater, and the group army, which is conducive to strategic and tactical command.
3. Set up Guilin and Tianshui camps. In order to effectively and uniformly command the operations in the southern and northern theaters, the Military Commission has set up additional battalions in Guilin and Tianshui. Bai Chongxi served as the director of the Guilin camp, responsible for coordinating and directing the operations in various theaters of the southern battlefield. Cheng Qian was the director of the Tianshui Xingxing Battalion, responsible for coordinating and commanding the various theaters of operations in the northern battlefield. At the same time, the camps in Guangzhou, Xi'an and Chongqing were abolished.
4. Establish a party and government committee on the ground. The party and government committees in the field are the special organs in charge of the occupied areas, and their task is to mobilize the people in the occupied areas to resist the enemy and eliminate the puppet organizations, and at the very least, to ensure that the people in the occupied areas do not cooperate with the enemy and the puppets, so that the Japanese army will not leave the city gates by order, and its power will reach the cities and lines of communication, but will not be able to spread throughout the vast rural areas. The party and government committees in the field were headed by Chiang Kai-shek and Li Jishen as deputy directors, and branches were set up in the occupied areas.
5. Reorganize and train the army. At the Nanyue Conference, Chiang Kai-shek announced: "One-third of the existing troops in the whole country will be allocated to the guerrilla areas——— the rear of the enemy army to serve as guerrillas, and one-third will be placed in the front to resist the enemy, and one-third will be transferred to the rear for rectification." Note 4 The meaning of the rectification training is to improve the establishment, enrich the equipment, unify personnel management, and carry out military training in order to strengthen the combat effectiveness of the troops. From the end of 1938 to April 1939, the training unit consisted of 26 corps and 27 divisions, which was completed as late as the end of July. The second phase of the army reorganization training lasted from August 1, 1939 to the end of November, and the number of troops participating in the reorganization was 40 corps. This rectification and training measure has played a certain role in restoring and strengthening the combat effectiveness of the Chinese army.
6. Major changes in strategic and tactical guidance. In accordance with the spirit of the Nanyue Military Conference, on January 7, 1939, the Military Commission formulated the "Second Phase of the Operational Guidance Plan of the Nationalist Army", the main content of which was: "The Nationalist Army should strengthen the strength in the areas occupied by the enemy and actively carry out extensive guerrilla warfare in order to contain and consume the enemy." The main forces should be deployed on the key lines of Zhejiang, Xianggan, Xiangxi, Guangdong and Han, Pinghan, Longhai, Western Henan, and Western Hubei, and strive to maintain the current situation. When we have no choice, we should also try our best to contain the enemy near the current ground line, gain time and spare time, and then instigate a large-scale offensive after the cultivation of new combat strength is completed. Note 5 The Military Commission also put forward a series of propositions, such as politics over the military, the people over soldiers, spirit over material, training over combat, movement over positional warfare, and guerrilla warfare over regular warfare. Generally speaking, the strategy of the Military Commission has changed considerably compared with before the fall of Wuhan, which is mainly manifested in two aspects: First, it attaches importance to the occupied areas, strives to strengthen the control and harassment of the rear of the Japanese army, turns the enemy's rear into the front, pushes the Japanese army to the dotted line, and prevents the Japanese army from implementing the attempt to control China with China and feed the war with war. To this end, the Military Commission has set up a field party and government committee and has paid more and more attention to guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines, thus setting up the Jicha and Sulu theaters behind enemy lines and sending a part of the regular army behind enemy lines to engage in guerrilla warfare. The second is to prepare for a limited offensive and counterattack on the frontal battlefield. In response to guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines and to change the unfavorable situation, there were two large-scale counter-offensives on the frontal battlefield in 1939, namely the spring offensive and the winter offensive.
Third, the Japanese army was forced to turn into a protracted situation
After the Japanese army occupied Guangzhou and Wuhan, the Base Camp of the Japanese Army regarded the Nationalist Government as a local political power, and in November 1938 made the following judgment of the situation, that is, the Nationalist Government "has lost the Central Plains, fled to the interior, lost most of the main water and land lines of communication, and the abundant resources and residents, if we take timely measures to accelerate the process of its internal collapse, at least make it a local political power." Therefore, from a strategic point of view, it can be said that the empire has destroyed the anti-Japanese Chinese regime. The next stage is to actually attack the administrative slightly, in order to resist the success." Note 6 The so-called political offensive is to use strategy to disintegrate the Chinese anti-Japanese camp from within and to support the puppet regime under the wing of the Japanese army.
On November 3, 1938, the Japanese Government issued the "Statement on Building a New Order in East Asia", which stated: "If the National Government abandons its previous consistent policy, changes the personnel organization, achieves new results, and participates in the construction of the new order, we will not refuse." Note 7 This statement changed the arrogant hard-line policy of the Konoe Cabinet on January 16 of the same year of "not taking the Nationalist government as an opponent", and openly tempted the pro-Japanese faction in the Nationalist government and the wavering elements who had lost confidence in the war. On December 22, the Japanese government issued its third Konoe Statement, declaring that "the three countries of Japan, Manchuria and China should unite with the common goal of building a new order in East Asia, and jointly seek to achieve mutual good-neighborliness, friendship, common defense and economic cooperation." Note 8 It demanded that the Chinese Government abandon its anti-Japanese campaign, recognize the puppet state of Manchukuo, agree to Japan's stationing of troops in specific areas of China, and provide convenience to Japan in the development and utilization of resources in North China and Inner Mongolia. In its statement, the Japanese Government also hypocritically declared that if the Chinese Government acceded to the conditions proposed by Japan, Japan would not only respect China's sovereignty, but would also be willing to consider the return of the concession and the revocation of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Japan's political strategy and policy of abduction did not shake the will of the Chinese Government and people to resist Japan, and only Wang Jingwei, vice president of the Kuomintang, and others were willing to act as traitors and broke away from the camp of the War of Resistance.
Militarily, the Japanese army began to have to turn into a strategic and protracted posture to adapt to the state of long-term war. In November 1938, the War Department of the Japanese Army's headquarters formulated the "Guidelines for Army Operations", which determined that the basic policy of operations was to "ensure the occupation of the area, promote its stability, and use a strong long-term siege posture to extinguish the remaining anti-Japanese forces." Note 9 The specific guidance is as follows: (1) On the north China side, it is necessary to concentrate on ensuring and stabilizing the occupied areas, especially first restoring public order in important areas such as northern Hebei Province, Shandong Province, northern Shanxi Province, and Mongolia, and ensuring that the main lines of communication can be carried out on a large scale in the occupied areas as necessary. (2) In central China, on the one hand, it is necessary to ensure the stability of the areas occupied east of the first line of Luzhou, Wuhu and Hangzhou, and in particular, it is necessary to first quickly restore public order in the area between Shanghai, Nanjing and Hangzhou, and ensure the main lines of communication. On the other hand, the combat troops deployed in the Wuhan area should use the three towns of Wuhan and Jiujiang as their bases and coordinate with the navy to ensure transportation from the Yangtze River downstream of Yuezhou. Probably taking Anqing, Xinyang, Yuezhou, Nanchang and other areas as combat areas, the Chinese army's attempts to resist the war were crushed. (3) South China, with the aim of cutting off China's supplies, allocate a minimum number of troops, with Guangzhou and Humen as bases. Probably between Huizhou, Conghua, Qingyuan, Beijiang, and Xijiang as combat areas, the Chinese army's intention to resist the war was crushed. On December 6, 1938, the Base Camp of the Japanese Army stipulated in detail in the "Measures for Handling China after the Autumn of Showa 13": (1) If there is no particularly significant need, it will not attempt to expand the occupied area. The occupied areas, on the other hand, were divided into areas of public order, which were mainly to ensure public order, and areas of operations that were mainly aimed at eliminating anti-Japanese forces. (2) The public security area generally includes the area east of the first line connecting the lower reaches of the Yellow River, the New Yellow River, Luzhou, Wuhu and Hangzhou from Baotou, especially the Taiyuan Plain, the areas along the Jiaoji line in Shandong, and the Beijing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Triangle. (3) The occupied areas other than those mentioned above are combat areas, with a new force in Wuhan and Guangzhou, thus becoming a base for political and strategic suppression of the anti-Japanese forces, and the Chinese army concentrates its forces to attack and counterattack in a timely manner, depleting its combat effectiveness, but vigorously guarding against expanding the unprepared front and making small contacts. To this end, the number of troops allocated according to the situation between the enemy and ourselves should be controlled to a minimum. Note 10
According to the above-mentioned strategic guidance of the Japanese army base camp, it can be found that after the Japanese army occupied Guangzhou and Wuhan, due to the excessive length of the front line, resulting in a lack of mobile troops, it has automatically stopped further large-scale strategic offensives, and has used its main forces to sweep away the guerrillas in the occupied areas and consolidate the occupied areas, especially in north China, attracting nearly half of the total number of Japanese troops invading China to deal with the Eighth Route Army and other guerrillas behind enemy lines. In the Wuhan area, only the 1st Army remained, as the only field mobile corps, to deal with China's 5th and 9th theater troops, with a partial tactical offensive, to achieve a strategic defensive position, and to carry out a war of attrition against the main force of the Chinese field army. In order to bring China to its knees as soon as possible, Japan began to use various indirect means to undermine the Chinese Government's confidence and strength in the War of Resistance, politically supporting the puppet government and constantly inducing the Nationalist Government; economically plundering China's resources and using war to feed the war; diplomatically, exerting pressure on Britain, France, and other countries to prevent them from supporting China materially, and at the same time strengthening the total blockade of China's coastline in order to suffocate China and drag China down in a protracted war 。