First, the seizure of the northeast was a decisive decision made by Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De after Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai went to Chongqing for negotiations after analyzing the specific situation.
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai (hereinafter referred to as "Mao Zhou") went to Chongqing on behalf of the CPC Central Committee and the military and people of the Liberated Areas to negotiate with great sincerity and eagerness, striving to negotiate with the Kuomintang, hoping that the country would enter a new stage of "peaceful democracy" after the War of Resistance. As far as the strength of the Kuomintang and the Communists at that time was concerned, whether it was military strength or economic and other comprehensive strength, there was still a big gap between the people's army led by the CPC and its liberated areas and the national government supported by the United States. The civil war, from the point of view of the time and since then, was imposed on the Communist Party by the Kuomintang, not the active option of the Communist Party and the people's army.
Mao Zhou was busy with negotiations in Chongqing, the Kuomintang negotiators deliberately delayed, and the Kuomintang troops frequently dispatched troops from various places to seize the fruits of the victory of the War of Resistance and pressed hard into the Liberated Areas. Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and Ren Bishi of Yan'an carefully analyzed the situation and must seize the northeast as the base area of the national revolution. Compete with the Kuomintang for the world. With the support of Zhu De and others, Liu Shaoqi, in his capacity as acting chairman of the CPC Central Committee, resolutely made a decision to seize the northeast, "open up the main road and occupy the two compartments," and endured the pain of taking the initiative to abandon several liberated areas in jiangnan, to bring all the people's troops in jiangnan to and from jiangbei, and to implement the strategy of "developing to the north and defending to the south." In this way, on the one hand, open concessions were shown to the Kuomintang, and on the other hand, the positions of the people's army were actually more closed.
Second, the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee was set up to dispatch troops from Yan'an and various liberated areas on a large scale.
At the meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in September 1945, after listening to the relevant report of Zeng Kelin, commander of the Shenyang garrison, Liu Shaoqi said that in order to strive for control of the northeast, the central authorities were ready to send a large number of cadres and main forces to the northeast, but because they did not know the specific situation, they could not make up their minds. It's good now.
Then Liu Shaoqi made a political mobilization and pointed out: The northeast is a strategic place, bordering the Soviet Union in the north, Baoxian in the east, Mongolia in the west, mountainous areas, and a great plain, which can be attacked and defended by attack, and can become an important strategic area of China's revolution. The northeast has convenient transportation, rich products, and developed industry, and the Kuomintang must not be dead hearted and will send a large number of troops to compete for the northeast. We must confront them tit-for-tat and strive for this strategic region.
In response to some people's concerns about the security of Mao Zhou's negotiations in Yan'an, he said: When our troops enter [the northeast] and we have mastered the northeast, we will be able to create a favorable position for Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Zhou's negotiations in Chongqing, and with the northeast we can speed up the process of the Chinese revolution.
In the middle, Commander-in-Chief Zhu De interjected, and before chairman and Enlai went to Chongqing, he shook my hand and said, "If you let go of the fight, the better you fight, the safer and more active we will be in Chongqing." Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De's resolute dark colors and sonorous and powerful words made the senior cadres attending the meeting feel calm and excited.
In this way, the strategic decision to compete for the northeast and "develop to the north and defend to the south" was determined.
On the second day of the meeting, on September 16, 1945, Peng Zhen, Chen Yun, Wu Xiuquan and others flew to the northeast with Zeng Kelin. Soon, a large number of cadres rushed to the northeast again, and we looked at this lineup:
Zhang Wentian, Li Fuchun, Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, Xiao Jinguang, Cheng Zihua, Tan Zheng, Li Lisan, Lin Feng, Tao Zhu, Liu Yalou.
There are also generals who lead troops from various liberated areas:
Huang Kecheng, Lv Zhengcao, Xiao Hua, Deng Hua, Wan Yi...
-- In this way, under the leadership of the Party Central Committee and the Northeast Bureau headed by Peng Zhen, the northeast has comprehensively carried out the takeover work. At this time, qiqihar, Jiamusi, Harbin, Andong, Yingkou, Luda, Fushun, Jilin, Chengde, Chifeng, Jinzhou, Shanhaiguan, there were people's troops everywhere. By the end of 1945, the number of troops leaving customs in the Liberated Areas (including the Anti-Coalition Forces) had grown from the initial 100,000 to more than 400,000
person.
Third, instruct the Northeast Bureau and the Northeast People's Army to "establish base areas." In the early days of entering the northeast, Liu Shaoqi called the Northeast Bureau and Lin Biao and pointed out: If your troops cannot carry out victorious battles, they should avoid fighting. Don't be broken by enemies. A part of the main force should be allocated to control small and medium-sized cities, secondary railways, and the vast countryside, and to establish base areas with a heavy heart and make long-term plans. Later war practice fully proved the wisdom of this strategy.
4. Summary. From the above, it can be seen that Liu Shaoqi, as the acting chairman of the CPC Central Committee, played a decisive role in the grand strategy of contending with the Kuomintang for the northeast and in the initial mobilization of troops and generals. Among the four leaders of the CPC, "Mao Liu Zhouzhu", Liu Shaoqi is not good at "horizontal knife and horseback" in military terms, but his strong strategic layout and organizational ability are his characteristics. The strategy of scrambling for the northeast highlights this.
After Mao Zhou's return to Yan'an during the Chongqing negotiations, the Northeast Strategy formulated under the auspices of Liu Shaoqi was further affirmed and further improved in light of the new situation of struggle. For example, in order to improve the efficiency of decision-making, the northeast implements the unified leadership of the party, government and army, and Lin Biao serves as the commander-in-chief of the northeast people's army, the political commissar, the secretary of the northeast bureau, and Peng Zhen as the deputy secretary. On the basis of Chen Yun's report from the front, Liu Shaoqi put forward a proposal to the central authorities to "establish a consolidated revolutionary base area in northeast China, and the people's army went deep into the countryside, backed up to the countryside, relied on the people, and established grass-roots political power. -- This measure really hurt the weakness of the Kuomintang, which always floated at the top, and at most set up "county party departments" in counties, and at the grassroots level, the "squires," that is, the powerful rule of landlords. The Northeast Bureau relied on the people's army at the grass-roots level to establish grass-roots political power, and later carried out land reform in the liberated areas, thus truly winning the support of the broad masses of the people in the northeast and laying a profound foundation for the gradual development and growth of the people's army and the decisive victory in the northeast.
(Book house owner, research history, original article, reprinted note)