With regard to the Warsaw Uprising, I think many people think too little of Stalin's pattern, whether or not he instructed the Red Army to stand idly by and watch the uprising, and its aim would never be to destroy a small Poland, or the government-in-exile hiding in London. To make this clear, we probably have to start with the Tehran Conference in 1943.
Roosevelt hesitated
The position of the Tehran Conference in the history of World War II is self-evident, it was the first real gathering of the Allied Triumvirate, and naturally formed a series of decisions that affected the trend of the war. At that time, the Soviet Union had survived the hellish Battle of Stalingrad, and the Western Front was sharpening its knives after taking over Italy, ready for a new attack.
The main decisions of the meeting also focused on military aspects, such as the coordination of Operation Overlord and Operation Bagration, or the discussion of how Turkey would respond to the war. In contrast, the political consultations of the conference were insufficient, and Stalin and Churchill had some brief discussions on the Polish question.
But Roosevelt, who had little stake, suggested that all discussions on Poland should be suspended, let alone that any resolutions be formed publicly. The reason is not complicated, in 1944, the United States wanted to elect a general election, he had to be concerned about the attitude of The Polish voters, in case he was elected to play big, then he really had to sing "Cool" and cry in the toilet.
Rough Storm Action Plan
Precisely because there was no final decision on the political issues in Poland, the Upper Echelons of the Allied forces were a little hesitant and hesitant there, and the British side could not support the government-in-exile in London, but it was also clear that Poland would most likely be liberated by the Soviet Red Army, and that excessive investment was likely to break the old capital, so it adopted a laissez-faire attitude. It's up to you what you can toss, I don't help much, but I don't stand in the way, see how the Soviet Union takes over.
The Soviet side also muttered that the Polish People's Army they organized already had 100,000 people, not without the strength of the First World War, but to liberate Poland in the case of undetermined status, will they get an ally or an ally? They were equally undecided, so in the High Command order of 27 July 1944 they only called for the capture of Prague by 8 August, with no specific instructions for warsaw, waiting for movement there.
Almost at the same time as the Tehran Conference, the Polish government-in-exile in London also developed a battle plan called Operation Storm, in which once the Soviets invaded Poland, the local resistance forces began to harass the Wehrmacht and try to cooperate with the Soviet movements. Although they all had internal doubts as to whether such an uprising was necessary, the government-in-exile, which felt too good about itself, further authorized it to decide on a full-scale uprising.
It was actually the United States that mistook the explosives
In a state of fear of wolves and tigers in all three directions, fast forward to July 1944, the timeline and record of behavior that I cite below are from historian Norman Davis's The Battle of Warsaw, which was highly praised in terms of accuracy and trade-offs.
July 13: The Red Army crosses Poland's old borders and the situation is brought to its peak, and the Poles must decide whether to launch an uprising under dangerous circumstances or to face diplomatic accusations from the Soviet Union in the future, such as not helping the situation at all, or even being simply Nazi accomplices.
July 21: The U.S. Army feels it's time for Operation Storm, note that they believe operation Storm is imminent and don't necessarily support a full-scale uprising. The reasons for the US military seem to be very simple, the action helped to swear the sovereignty of Poland (afraid that the Soviet Union would directly swallow it), and could directly attack the German army, but this action caused a series of chain reactions later, and I personally think it also allowed Stalin to find the chess hole of the fall.
25 July: The Polish government-in-exile in London approves a plan for a full-scale uprising against the explicit objection of the commander-in-chief of the army, but without a specific time, they do not even inform the poor commander-in-chief.
31 July: The leaders of the resistance in Warsaw had no plans to launch an offensive the following day, but Prime Minister-in-Exile Pol Komorowski misjudged the soviet tanks in the Plaga district of Warsaw, believing that the Battle of Warsaw between the Soviet Union and Germany had reached its climax, and ordered a full-scale attack the next day.
Stalin's idea speculates
Frankly speaking, many of the questions about the Warsaw Uprising do not have accurate answers, because of the lack of sufficient data support, the Russian archives that store Soviet materials are basically not open to the public, and unfortunately, the British archives that keep British materials are also the same. What's worse is that the British also claimed to have accidentally destroyed the archives of the Polish government-in-exile, complicating matters.
Therefore, Stalin's real thoughts in the Warsaw Uprising can only be guessed, and it is better to say that the Red Army has been exhausted from long-term combat, and has reached the limit of supply, and can only give priority to self-supply, and has provided limited help within the scope of its capabilities. To put it more sinisterly, it is natural that the steel father deliberately watched from the sidelines and watched the destruction of the Warsaw Resistance Organization, which was not in his own interests.
My personal guess is more moderate, I think from the beginning Stalin did not think that the Warsaw Uprising could succeed, so there was no need to fight when the status of Poland was not determined among allies, and he told Churchill on August 5 that he did not think that the members of the resistance who lacked heavy weapons could take down the four German armored divisions. Later, the stalemate of the Warsaw Uprising allowed him to find some breakthroughs, and he could leave some things in his pocket.
In fact, even the Poles themselves may not have understood that it did not depend on how they acted to get the Soviet Union to cooperate with the uprising, and whether they seized Warsaw or waited for liberation, it did not make much difference to Stalin. What people care about is whether the other two giants agree to distribute Poland according to his ideas, and why should the rabbits throw eagles? Do you really have the so-called right to speak in front of those international players?
Therefore, I conclude that Stalin did not use the German army to attack Poland in the Warsaw Uprising, but used this to force the other two old slippers to make concessions, and they did not want to make the move, and the chess piece that was laid out had to go according to my arrangement after the abolition, you see the Yalta Conference behind, the east of the Curzon Line is not soviet?
Finally, let's go a little further, those international political operations in history do not have absolute good and evil, and they are all fighting for the greatest interests of their own countries. It is not impossible for you to look at it in black and white, but the conclusions that may be drawn may not be convincing. Taking Stalin as an example, after a long period of blackening, it seems that many people think that he is simply a tyrant, but they do not notice that he is a super-first-class strategist, so strong that even Rungong only thinks that he has fought a draw with him. The is over.