Battle of Liaoshen
Author Lantai
The "sea of people tactic" was often used by people with ulterior motives to attack the People's Liberation Army and the Volunteer Army.
As a result, a mindset has long been formed, as if the "sea of people tactic" is a particularly inferior tactic that ignores the lives of soldiers.
But in fact, "man-sea tactics" has a proper noun in military science, "dense formation".
"Dense formation" can be divided into two situations, one is because of the officer's tactical arrangement and command mistakes, resulting in "dense formation", which increases the casualties of soldiers in the course of combat; the other is that in view of the weak firepower point of the enemy, the tactic of "dense formation" is deliberately adopted to open the breakthrough, although this intentional tactical choice may cause an increase in local casualties, but because of the rapid opening of the breakthrough, in the whole battle, it reduces the total casualties of its own soldiers.
In fact, the four generals who claim to have the highest tactical attainment in the Platon Army also think that the tactic of "dense formation" is a scientific tactic that can quickly open gaps and reduce the total casualties of their own soldiers.
For example, General Wang Yang, the youngest division commander in Siye at that time, in his memoir "Ten Assaults", specifically mentioned that during the Liberation War, he repeatedly took the initiative to adopt the "intensive charge" tactic to quickly open a breakthrough, which reduced the total casualties of the troops.
second world war
Of course, "dense formation" or "dense charge" is ultimately a kind of effective tactic in the "low intensity war environment", because the enemy's firepower is not strong, in modern warfare, with the enemy's firepower increased, it is also a backward tactic.
However, this backwardness is "time-sensitive", for example, during the First World War, the British and French armies proved that the "dense charge" was not applicable in the "high intensity" European battlefield; but at the same time, under the conditions of the "low intensity" battlefield in the East, the "dense charge" was still an effective tactic that could reduce the overall casualties, as General Wang said.
At the same time, the senior generals of the Volunteer Army, headed by Marshal Peng Dehuai on the Korean battlefield, found very early on that the "intensive charge" tactics that had been effective in the civil war were not applicable in the "high intensity" Korean battlefield, and it was easy to increase the casualties of soldiers.
In other words, even if there had been a "dense charge" in the Korean War, it would have been in the eyes of the Volunteers that the front-line commander had adopted the wrong tactics based on the wrong experience in the domestic battlefield, and it was not an act encouraged by Shiji.
And, then again, don't look at the "dense charge" tactics that only apply to "low intensity" wars, but from the late Qing Dynasty to the Korean War, not any army in The whole of East Asia could use the "dense charge" tactics.
Battle of the Somme
Because if we want "intensive charge" to become an effective tactic, the premise is that there must be a well-trained squad, platoon, and company of grass-roots officers and non-commissioned officers, otherwise the "dense charge" will become a random charge and a rush by virtue of the courage of the flesh.
Taking the Tashan Blockade Battle, the most tragic of the Liaoshen Campaign, as an example, when the Kuomintang army adopted a "dense charge," it was also the grass-roots officers who took the lead, rather than rushing indiscriminately and hushed.
In the Beiyang period, the troops that could really master the "intensive charge" tactics were all well-known troops at that time, such as the Beiyang Third Division at the peak of Wu Peifu, in fact, the British and American military observers did not have a high evaluation of the Beiyang Third Division, believing that the Beiyang Third Division could only guarantee normal training and have relatively qualified grass-roots officers, but even so it was enough for Wu Peifu to be proud of Beiyang.
Bai Chongxi, Li Zongren
Taking Zhang Zuolin's Fengjun as an example, during the Second Zhifeng War, the only one who was really qualified to skillfully use the "dense charge" tactic was the "Third And Eighth Brigade" trained by Guo Songling.
In the south, only Bai Chongxi's Gui army could skillfully use the "dense charge" tactic, and more than half of Bai Chongxi's so-called title of Little Zhuge was won back by relying on the "dense charge" tactic. By the way, during the Songhu War, Bai Chongxi originally wanted to reproduce this tactic, but as a result, the six brigades of the Gui clan were completely incapacitated by the Japanese army within one day, which once again proved that under the conditions of "high intensity" war, the "intensive charge" tactic had great limitations. (The Japanese knew in advance that Bai Chongxi would counterattack, and not only concentrated their artillery, but also used naval guns.) ）
And on the Korean battlefield, what did the South Korean army master the "dense charge" tactics?
It was not until the South Korean army was completely reorganized by the US army that the South Korean army took the initiative to adopt the "dense charge" tactic against the 38th Army in the Battle of White Horse Mountain, because the firepower of the volunteer army could not be compared with the United Nations Army, that is, it was still relatively weak compared with the Japanese First Class Division during the War of Resistance, so the South Korean army was assured to use the "dense charge" tactic in the Battle of White Horse Mountain.
The "dense charge" tactics of the Rok army left a deep impact on the volunteer army, saying that the Rokk army was about to collapse at a touch, but this time it was different, and the officers actually took the lead in the charge, and the ROK army should be paid attention to in the future.
Therefore, South Korean television stations often "black" volunteers use "dense charge tactics", as everyone knows, the volunteer army up and down is taking the "dense charge tactics" as a mistake to reflect, and the real initiative to use "dense charge tactics" is the South Korean army, and even the South Korean military even takes the initiative to take the initiative to use "dense charge tactics" as the pride of the South Korean Army.
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