The chain relationship between the three major military political groups in the late Qing Dynasty The three major military political groups in the late Qing Dynasty

The so-called "three major military political groups of the late Qing Dynasty" refer to the Xiang clique founded by Zeng Guofan, the Huai clique headed by Li Hongzhang, and the later Yuan Shikai Beiyang clique (hereinafter referred to as "Xiang", "Huai" and "Yuan"). The three are group forces that have a major impact on the political, social and even historical processes of the dynasty at that time, and they are intertwined, developed and transmuted, and continued to change, which can be referred to as the "three-ring chain". This article gives a brief view of its "chain relationship".

As far as the formation of the three is concerned, "Xiang" and "Huai" are relatively close in time, and the relationship between the source and flow is direct and close. Xu Zongliang, a person from Tongcheng in Anhui Province who had served as an aide to "Xiang" and "Huai" officials (such as Hu Linyi and Li Hongzhang), said in his "Guilu Tan Past Record": "Xiang and Huai are a family, huai is from Xiang, and there is a friendship between the water source and wood" (Later, in the "Brahma Lu Series" of the Cixi clan of Zhejiang, the notes with this sentence were also transcribed). This statement aims to reveal the relationship between them, and undoubtedly to indicate the sequence of their formation. Specifically, Zeng Guofan began to borrow regiments to train troops at the end of the second year of Xianfeng, and the Spring Xiang Army in the fourth year of Xianfeng (1854) was officially trained to go out on the expedition, so it can be said that the rudiments of the Xiang group were initially prepared (of course, it is not said to have a "complete" form). The Huai clique, headed by Li Hongzhang, formed relatively quickly under certain circumstances. Due to the need for "eastern aid", Li Hongzhang, who was originally an aide to Zeng Guofan, was ordered by the master of the curtain to form the Huai Army, and in the first year of Tongzhi (1862), he went to Shanghai, and he soon had the authority of a Xinjiang official (serving as the governor of Jiangsu), so that the "combination of military and government" and the Huai clique had a relatively complete form and completed the derivative differentiation of "Huai from Xiang". Judging from the time when the Xiang and Huai groups were formed, there was a time difference of about seven years before and after, while the time for the two to coexist and "cross" after the formation was even longer.

The incubation and emergence of Yuan Shikai's Beiyang Clique is relatively backward, since the "small station training" after the Sino-Japanese War, it has gradually taken shape since then, and in terms of time, it is better to say that chenghuai derivation is more direct than after Chengxiang and Huai in general. Yuan Shikai's uncles and ancestors had many connections with Li Hongzhang, and Yuan himself's initial rank as an official could be said to have stepped out from under the door of Wu Changqing, an important member of the Huai clan, and then helped to support and recommend Li Hongzhang. The foundation of its group power is also inseparable from the direct extension and use of Huai personnel. By the time of the initial formation of its clique's power, the Xiang clique had already lost its shape, and the Huai clique was still physically alive due to the lifetime of Its "Kaiyuan" leader Li Hongzhang, and had a period of cross-coexistence with the Yuan clique. By the time Li Hongzhang died in the 27th year of Guangxu (1901), yuan shikai succeeded Yuan Shikai (first acting and then granting) the important post of viceroy and minister of Beiyang, which can be regarded as a sign of the completion of his collective direct substitution. It can be seen that the Yuan Group and "Xiang" and "Huai" have relative distance and estrangement.

In this way, the three major military groups are generated in succession, staggered and connected, and continued to continue each other, which is an aspect of their "ring chain relationship". On the other hand, it is more intrinsically reflected in its correlation between similarities and differences, morphological transmutation and evolution.

They share a common foundation. As far as the most basic points are concerned, first, in the background opportunities of formation, they are based on the military needs of the Qing Dynasty under specific conditions and come into being, taking advantage of the opportunity to develop. Although there is a certain time difference between the formation of "Xiang" and "Huai", it is obvious that they all took advantage of the Qing court's need to suppress the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Yuan Shikai's "small station training" was obtained in the context of the Sino-Japanese War and adapted to the needs of the Qing Dynasty by "adapting the military system" and "stressing self-improvement". Without the specific background conditions of each at that time, there would be no objective opportunity for the formation of its military and political groups. Another more important reason is that they all take the army with a strong "private attribute" as the pillar, and then realize a close "military-government combination" (the army with the "private attribute" has the authority to supervise, and the strength of such figures is no longer comparable to that of ordinary overseers), and finally they must form a group force with a complete form. The so-called "private nature" of its army, of course, in a specific sense, mainly refers to a considerable degree of personal subordination within its army, and does not mean that it is completely disobedient and unrestrained to the imperial court. The "Yongying Camp" of Xiang and Huai did not belong to the state's "economic army," and Yuan Shikai's Beiyang New Army seemed to be quite "state norms" in form, but in fact its private control was becoming more and more intense, which was enough to prove the fact that Yuan Shi was able to secretly control his army even during the period when he was deposed from the township during the so-called "raising his troubles." The elements of the "private attributes" of the army can be described as a common basis for the three major groups of "Xiang", "Huai", and "Yuan", and are also an important guarantee for expanding and maintaining their group power.

The relative specificity of the three major military groups, here are the main three ends:

One is the contrast between the old and the new in the army. In contrast, the Xiang Army is the most traditional and old-fashioned, while the Huai Army has made great progress, mainly due to the increasing "westernization" of weapons and equipment. As far as Yuan Shikai's Beiyang New Army, and then from the overall level of the "military system" to pursue the imitation of the "Western style" (this can be seen in the relevant content of Yuan's compilation of the "New Army Strategy"), the "modernization" color at the technical level has been more distinct, the Huai Army is inferior to it, and the contrast between the Xiang Army is even greater.

The second is in the state of the group structure. The Xiang Army took "selecting soldiers to lead the mountain farmers" (Wang Ding'an's "XiangJun Chronicle" Chinese language) as its organizational rule, while the Huai Army generals were born from "soldiers" were much less, and the composition of soldiers was obviously complex, but "war" was taken from practical utilitarianism. In Yuan Shikai's Beiyang New Army, the selection of personnel obviously drew on the "Western law," and the quality and conditions of officers and men became more and more "new." Another example is the relationship between key personnel, on the whole, the Xiang clan is "multi-headed and co-established", not only has many branches of the army, but also a large number of key members who can serve as supervisors and monopolize one side, and there is an "eruption" stage. The Huai clan, on the other hand, not only is the situation that the army is under the command of Li Hongzhang relatively obvious, but also its key personnel serve as supervisors much less (this one is because it does not take the lead, and then it is also limited by the conditions of birth), there are few people in terms of strength that can compete with Li Hongzhang, and its group relationship pattern can be said to be "the stars arch the moon". As for Yuan Shikai, the control within his clique became more and more tight, and he "practiced 'soldiers as generals' and made himself the 'king of his own army'" (Li Xinyu, a scholar of the previous generation), and the "oligarch" color became more and more intense.

Three in the chief style characteristics. Let's take the most representative figures of the three groups, Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and Yuan Shikai, as examples. Zeng Guofan is the most traditional, immersed in Confucianism, pursuing the sacred way, and commanding the army and governing the government without abandoning learning. Although Li Hongzhang was also a jinshi and a Hanlin, he devoted himself to leading soldiers and managing the government, was less bound by Taoism, and was not even afraid of "leprosy", such as "beating up the leper cavity" and "participating in the use of leprosy means" to deal with the language of foreigners (while Zeng Guofan advocated that he should also be "honest and honest, push sincerity to meet each other", "be faithful in words", and "act with respect"). Even in the daily gaseous state and pie, Zeng and Li are very different. To Yuan Shikai, it is even more different here. Compared with Zeng and Li, he is simply a "big old man", and such a person can make his debut in the military and political circles and reach out, which is naturally inseparable from his very scheming, power and means.

The above similarities and differences are based on objective conditions of the times and depend on subjective human factors. And the end of the similarity is not absolutely and categorically separated, but the same is different, and there is similarity. The perception of this complex situation helps to perceive its historical effects in an integrated manner.

Let's first talk about the node and trajectory of the military system reform in the late Qing Dynasty. The rise of the Xiang and Huai armies (the so-called "Yongying") was inseparable from the corruption and incompetence of the Eight Banners and The Green Camp as the "economic army" of the Qing Dynasty, and the emergence and promotion of the "training army" (founded by Liu Changyou, a major member of the Xiang clan, directly under the direct subordination) and the transformation of the green camp with the "Yongying" and the survival of the "Yongying" of the Xiang and Huai as a "defense army" can be said to be a manifestation of the liberalization of the "economic system" for its actual progress. If this has not yet completely broken through the barriers of the "old system," then the formation and training of Yuan Shikai's "new army" is undoubtedly the beginning of a kind of "transformation." And this nature is not completely "red land new", it is inseparable from the use of the tangible and intangible resources accumulated by the new development of the Xiang and Huai armies (especially the Huai army), in this sense, it also has its own lineage.

Looking at the process of breeding warlords in modern times. Regarding the definition of the modern warlord and the view of when and how it was formed, the academic circles do not agree with each other, and it is believed that it was not formally formed until the Yuan Shikai clique after the Qing Dynasty of the Republic of China, while the formation and development of the new army at the end of the Yuan Dynasty was "the incubation stage of the Beiyang warlord", which should be said to be more reasonable. From the perspective of the before and after connection, in the "duan position" of the entire "gestation" process, "Xiang" is in the initial base, "Huai" is close to a journey, and "Yuan" is finally completed. And this, instead of "Westernization", tends to twist and twist