The Nanchang Uprising failed to shangjinggangshan for more than half a year, during which the story of what happened

Jude

From August 1927 to January 1928, in just five months, our Party successively led and launched the Nanchang Uprising, the Autumn Harvest Uprising, the Guangzhou Uprising, and the Shonan Uprising. During this period, Zhu De's military strategic thinking gradually matured. He conscientiously drew on the experiences and lessons of the three major uprisings in Nanchang, The Autumn Harvest, and Guangzhou, and actively readjusted and transformed his strategic thinking in light of changes in subjective and objective conditions.

First, the direction of the armed struggle has shifted from the cities to the countryside

The Nanchang uprising fired the first shot of armed resistance at the Kuomintang reactionaries and set a precedent for the armed struggle of the Communist Party of China, which is of great historical significance. When the broad masses had no way out, a new revolutionary banner was set up for the whole country. However, this uprising also had a profound lesson: instead of going directly to the local countryside to mobilize and arm the peasants, carry out the agrarian revolution, and establish rural base areas, they went south to Guangdong according to the original plan of the CPC Central Committee, seized Haikou, and prepared to attack the big cities after obtaining foreign aid.

In early September 1927, after the Nanchang Uprising troops were divided into troops at Sanheba in Tai Po, Guangdong Province, they were besieged by more than 40,000 people from 5 divisions of the Kuomintang reactionary army, and the troops were seriously reduced, from 24,000 to more than 2,500 when they went south. On the way to lead the troops to march from western Guangdong to southern Gannan, Zhu De realized that under the circumstance that the enemy is strong and we are weak, there is no way out for the rebel troops to attack the big cities and carry out large-scale regular wars, and our army "should go to the countryside, not to fight the big cities."

At that time, most of the troops below were not Zhu De's old troops, and it was difficult to lead. At this moment, Zhu De made a correct decision after analyzing the current situation between the enemy and ourselves, and decided to lead his troops to leave Sanheba as soon as possible, shake off the enemy's heavy troops, get rid of the dangerous environment, and avoid the total annihilation of the army. At this time, some of the less determined people left the team, and about 300 soldiers and officers were gone. But what remains is the essence of the revolution, and the revolutionary will has become firmer. On October 7, the rebel army held an emergency military conference at the Guangdong Maozhi Quande School, which was attended by more than 20 people, including Zhu De, Zhou Shidi, and Chen Yi. At the meeting, Zhu De summed up everyone's opinions into four points, the second of which was: If we want to preserve this army as a seed of revolution, we must find a foothold that is both hidden and has a mass base. The border areas of Hunan, Guangdong, and Gansu are places where the enemy's forces are weak, and they are a three-way zone, and the peasant movement in this area has been carried out early, and the support for the Northern Expedition is the most powerful, and we should take this as a foothold. The meeting made a resolution to "conceal the north, go through the west, and go straight to shonan." In order to implement the resolution of the Maozhi conference, from late October to early November, the troops carried out the rectification of Tianxinwei, the reorganization of Dayu, and the rectification of Shangbao, which was called "Gannan Three Rectifications" in history. Although the "three rectifications in Gannan Province" lasted only about 20 days, the troops were put on a break and the direction was clear.

At the Tianxinwei Military Conference, Zhu German said to the soldiers with a heavy heart: Some comrades asked me, what should I do in the future? My answer is to fight guerrillas. Comrades should understand the present situation, the enemy is strong and we are weak, and the enemy is big and we are small. The Kuomintang could only control the central cities and major transportation routes, and for the remote countryside, the enemy was beyond the reach of the whip and could not rule. We want to go to the countryside and unite with our peasant brothers to accumulate and develop revolutionary forces. Some comrades also asked whether the Kuomintang reactionaries were chasing after us every day, but they were afraid that they would not be able to stand up. Please don't worry about this. China is a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country, and imperialism has raised many lackeys in China, and these warlords have always been in a bitter corner and cannot be coordinated. For the benefit of their respective masters, there will also be dog-eat-dog warlord wars. As soon as war breaks out, the enemy has no time to take care of us and enable our strength to develop. Zhu De's words, the clouds and the sun, made the warriors suddenly enlightened. The Shangbao rectification training focused on rectifying discipline. Prior to this, Zhu De and Chen Yi had always attached great importance to the discipline of the troops. On the way to the war, there were a few undesirable elements in Xinfeng who instigated soldiers to rob pawnshops. This is very unfavorable for the rebel army to take root in the countryside. Zhu De and Chen Yi seized on this incident to conduct discipline education for the troops and earnestly warned everyone: "We are the ranks of the Communist Party, and we cannot survive without discipline." "After the rebel army arrives at Shangbao, in addition to marching and fighting, it is also necessary to go deep into the countryside to mobilize the masses and beat up local tycoons to divide their belongings. It is stipulated that all funds collected and captured materials shall be returned to the public, and only the confiscation committee shall have the power to confiscate property. After the reorganization, the vast number of officers and men gradually consciously abided by the discipline of the troops and mingled with the peasant masses.

From November 26 to 28, 1927, Zhu De presided over a joint meeting of the responsible persons of the party organizations in northern and northern Xiangnan and Northern Guangdong in Rucheng, Hunan Province, which is known in history as the Rucheng Conference, which further elaborated: To persist in establishing revolutionary base areas in the rural areas of Shonan Province, the Communist Party should take the countryside as a position, organize the broad masses of peasants, carry out armed insurrection, shift from the countryside to attack the cities, and finally isolate and eliminate the reactionaries. At the meeting, Zhu De learned from the briefing of He Risheng, secretary of the Rucheng County CPC Committee, that in August of the same year, after the Second Division of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army suffered the "8.15" defeat in Rucheng, the remnants were immediately transferred to the rear battalion of Haotou Kuzhu pass in the county, and successively reorganized into the Supplementary Regiment of the Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army and the First Regiment of the Second Division of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army. The Rucheng County Soviet Government was also established. Zhu De believes that this is a successful example of persisting in rural struggle.

Armed struggle consists of units fighting alone to being combined with the workers' and peasants' movement

A revolutionary war is a war of the people, and the source of strength of war is the masses of the people. Zhu De believes that another bitter lesson of the failure of the Nanchang uprising is that the rebel army did not unite with the peasant movement in Jiangxi and went to Guangdong to fight alone. After the focus of the armed struggle shifted to the countryside, the number of regular troops alone was small, the supply was insufficient, the terrain was unfamiliar, and the battle alone was bound to fail. How to make the troops stand firm and stand in an invincible position? At the beginning of November 1927, when the Nanchang uprising troops were training at Chongyi Shangbao, Zhu De asked everyone to do mass work in the countryside and launch a peasant revolution. In late November, the Rucheng Conference proposed a plan for a peasant uprising in which the revolutionary army would strike at the vanguard. Zhu De once again stressed: The rebel army should take the countryside as its position, organize the broad masses of peasants, take up arms, and carry out armed insurrection. When reactionaries engage in white terror, we will engage in red terror, set up black killing squads, disperse production during the day, and act in secret at night to gather and kill reactionaries; we must immediately restore and establish Party organizations, as well as mass organizations such as peasant associations, trade unions, chambers of commerce, women' associations, the Communist Youth League, and students. In Rucheng and other places, Zhu De frequently attended joint meetings of party organization leaders held at local levels, dredged up the contacts between the regular troops and the local party organizations and the peasant self-defense army, and issued a notice in the name of the 14th Regiment of the Sixteenth Army of the National Revolutionary Army, calling on the poor people to unite and overthrow the old and new warlords and the landlords and gentry. At the end of the Rucheng meeting, Zhu De also gave He Risheng, secretary of the Rucheng County CPC Committee, a war horse and a pair of binoculars, and Xia Mingzhen, secretary of the Chenxian County CPC Committee, who attended the Rucheng meeting on behalf of Chen Youkui, secretary of the Shonan Special Committee, two shell guns, encouraging them to mobilize the masses more extensively and carry out armed struggle among workers and peasants.

During their stay in Rucheng, Zhu De and Chen Yi led their troops to go deep into the countryside to carry out the campaign to crack down on local tycoons and train troops to expand the army, and taught the masses to learn and sing songs such as "Down with the Great Powers" and "The Proletariat Is Liberated." Judd said: There is a Marx in Germany who knows that unity is strength; the great alliance of workers and peasants in the whole country, the liberation of the proletariat. After propaganda and mobilization, hundreds of young people signed up to join the army, replenishing fresh blood and strengthening the revolutionary contingent.

On December 10, when the rebel army arrived in Dongtang, Renhua, Guangdong from Rucheng, a mass meeting of thousands of people was held, and Zhu De delivered a speech encouraging the masses to rise up and revolutionize. That night, Zhu De successively and secretly held a meeting of the backbone of the Fifth District Peasants' Association and the Peasants' Self-Defense Army, and decided to launch the Dongtang Rebellion and severely punish the landlords and bullies and local tycoons and inferior gentry. With the cooperation of the peasant army, the rebel army attacked overnight and arrested 33 local tycoons and inferior gentry in one fell swoop. The next day, a public trial and judgment conference of thousands of people was held, and Tan Xueyun and 24 other people who committed the most heinous crimes were executed. This uprising ignited the raging fire of armed struggle in northern Guangdong. On January 4, 1928, Zhu De and Chen Yi led their troops from Shaoguan back to Dongtang, mobilized peasant armed forces to capture Renhua County in one fell swoop, helped raise more than 2,000 yuan and a batch of guns and ammunition, and reorganized the Renhua Peasant Army. In this way, "Renhua became the center of the Beijiang Rebellion, and formed a situation of separation from the parts of Nanxiong, Sixing, Qujiang, and Lechang, and was called the second Hailufeng."

On January 12, 1928, as soon as the Shonan Uprising began in Yizhang, more than a dozen counties responded to the uprising in less than a month, and more than 1 million rural people took action. On January 31, in Pingshi, Lechang, Guangdong, the rebel army and the Yizhang Peasant Army jointly faced the Kuomintang Xu Kexiang's troops and won a great victory in Pingshi.

All these are the brilliant achievements of Zhu De's efforts to draw the bitter lessons of the defeat in the Nanchang uprising and to realize the integration of the army with the workers' and peasants' movement.

During the Shonan Uprising, Zhu De attached great importance to organizing and arming workers and peasants. He helped Yizhang, Chenxian, and Leiyang to set up the Independent Third Division, the Seventh Division, and the Fourth Division of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army, and established the Yongxing Red Guard Regiment, the Rugui Border Region Guerrilla Brigade, and the Tongzishan Workers' and Peasants' Guerrilla Brigade, with more than 34,000 workers and peasants armed. In this way, a people's armed system of the regular army, the local army, and the guerrilla army was formed. At the same time, it will solve the problem of weapons and equipment, strengthen leadership and training, so that it can play a huge role in cooperating with the army in combat, carrying out the agrarian revolution, and defending the fruits of victory.

The Nanchang Uprising clearly pointed out the political direction of the Chinese revolution and began a new period in which the Communist Party independently led the revolution and the army, and since then the banner of the democratic revolution has been shouldered independently by the Communist Party. However, during the Nanchang Uprising, the party's work in the troops failed to penetrate deeply into the grassroots and among the soldiers. The party's organization is not perfect, and only party representatives are set up at and above the division level, such as Li Shuoxun as the party representative of the Twenty-fifth Division of the Eleventh Army and Xu Teli as the party representative of the Third Division of the Twentieth Army. There are a small number of Party members in the upper leading organs and officers, and there are generally no Party or Regiment members among the soldiers.

At that time, I only knew how to fight the world with only a few people, and I didn't know how to transform the army. For example, Cai Tingkai's Tenth Division was pulled under the influence of revolutionary forces, because it was not reformed, and as a result, the whole division turned against the water at a critical moment. When Zhu De led his troops to retreat from Sanheba, one company of troops did not quit and did not know where to go; some spread the feeling of defeat and demanded that the troops be disbanded. The troops are in danger of disintegrating in an instant, and the revolutionary flame left behind by the Nanchang uprising is in danger of being extinguished immediately. Zhu De seriously reflected on the reasons for this, holding that although this unit was tempered by the Northern Expedition and was organizationally controlled by our party after participating in the Nanchang uprising, its ideological and political work was still very weak, and it still retained the bad habits of the old army, especially after the setbacks in the southward movement, and its pessimism was serious. For this 2,500-strong contingent, its fate and future, as the commander of the New Ninth Army, Zhu De, is worried and responsible. At this critical juncture, with great heroism, he stepped forward and took on the heavy responsibility of leading this team.

Zhu De calmly carried out the tianxin wei rectification, convened a military congress, explained the situation and tasks of the revolution, and pointed out that the final victory must be ours, so as to boost morale and strengthen confidence. At the meeting, Zhu De said affectionately: As everyone knows, "The Great Revolution has failed, and our rebel army has also failed, but we still want revolution." Those who want the revolution to follow me; those who do not want to continue to struggle can go home! Not reluctantly! "But everyone must see clearly the future of the revolution. The Chinese Revolution of 1927 is like the Russian Revolution of 1905. Russia, after the defeat of the 1905 Revolution, was dark, but the darkness was temporary. By 1917, the revolution had finally succeeded. The Chinese revolution is now defeated and is dark, but darkness is also temporary. China will also have '1917'. As long as the strength is preserved, the revolution has a way. You should believe that. Zhu De's speech spoke of two political programs, namely, the conviction that communism must inevitably triumph and that the revolution must be voluntary. Zhu De's speech produced a powerful appeal, enabling the vast number of officers and men to see the light in the darkness, clearly understand the direction, and enhance their confidence in victory.

In fact, the rectification of Tianxinwei is the beginning of the party's leadership going deep into the grassroots and the soldiers. Under the circumstances at that time, it was urgent to analyze the revolutionary situation from a Marxist point of view and to point out that the revolution had a future and a way out. Only in this way can we strengthen everyone's revolutionary will. If the troops want to consolidate, they must constantly carry out Marxist political and ideological work, and the most basic thing is to rely on the party organization. After rectifying the Party's organization, at the same time, new Party members are constantly developing, in order to consolidate and stabilize the ranks. At the end of October 1927, the troops were reorganized in Dayu, focusing on strengthening the party's leadership over the army, reorganizing the party organization, and establishing party branches. There are fifty or sixty Communists, and the number of Party members is close to one-tenth of the number of the masses. At that time, although we did not know how to build branches on companies, we implemented the practice of assigning some party and regiment members to various companies and sending some outstanding party members to serve as instructors at the grass-roots level, thus strengthening the party's work at the grass-roots level, which was of extremely great significance to army building.

During the period when Zhu De led his troops to cooperate with the Fan Shisheng department of the Kuomintang army, he still adhered well to the party's absolute leadership over the army. In order to unify the leadership of the 140 regiment of the 47th Division of the 16th Army in Fan Shisheng's department, the 141st regiment (Zhang Ziqing as the regimental commander), and the special service battalion (He Jucheng as the battalion commander), Zhu De and others secretly established the Military Commission of the 16th Army of the CPC, with Chen Yi as secretary, also established the Political Department and the Party Branch, set up political instructors in the company, and arranged communist party members as liaison officers in other organs of the 16th Army. At the same time, in his relations with Fan Shisheng's department, Zhu De adhered to the three principles of organizational independence, political autonomy, and military freedom, and insisted that "we are the ranks of the Communist Party, and whenever the party transfers us, we will leave whenever we want." It can be seen from this that Zhu De has strengthened the building of party organizations and the ideological and political education of soldiers at the grass-roots level of the army by extending the party's leadership over the army from the top to the grass-roots level and soldiers; he has always adhered to the party's absolute leadership over the army and maintained the true color and purpose of the people's army.

Fourth, the method of warfare ranges from regular warfare to guerrilla warfare

After the Nanchang Uprising, Zhu De led his troops to retreat from Fujian to Jiangxi, and began to be forced to go up the mountain, forced to carry out guerrilla warfare, and fought battles that were certain, and battles that were not certain were not fought, and "traveled" without fighting. Thus the revolutionary forces were preserved and developed. Zhu De soberly saw that the Dongjiang Red Army after the Guangzhou Uprising, precisely because it did not have the correct direction of "swimming," did not know "swimming," and only knew "striking," as a result, fought a hard battle, fought a clean battle, and suffered a complete defeat.

This change in strategic thinking of the Nanchang rebel army was forced to go up the mountain and be forced to carry out guerrilla warfare because of the grim situation at that time when the enemy was strong and we were weak on the whole.

First of all, through daily ideological work, the officers and men were gradually instilled in the idea of guerrilla warfare. At every foothold, Zhu De had to talk to the officers and men about the inevitability and feasibility of fighting guerrilla warfare, so that most commanders and fighters could ideologically understand that only by going up the mountain could they have a way out, and only by fighting guerrilla warfare could they save themselves. On the way to the southern part of Guangdong, especially in the regular training of Shangbao and the regular training of ploughing heads, the rebel army further clarified the military strategy of changing regular warfare into guerrilla warfare.

Second, emphasis should be placed on strengthening the training of guerrilla tactics. When the rebel army was training in Shangbao, Jiangxi, it took one or two days to train the troops, and the small classes were maintained every day; when the Guangdong Plough Shoptou carried out a long-term regularized large-scale military training, Zhu De told Li Qizhong, the leader of the teaching brigade, that it is necessary to seize every opportunity to train the troops so that everyone can often learn new operational knowledge. During the training, Zhu De gave lectures on his own, combined the military theories he had learned in Yunnan Wutang and Germany and Russia, and combined his many years of actual combat experience, he demanded that the troops abandon the old formation and change it to a loose formation equipped in echelons to reduce the killing and injury of the enemy's firepower; he asked the commanders to attach importance to the search and reconnaissance of the enemy's situation and not to touch the enemy's situation and not to move their hands; and to require the soldiers, in addition to being familiar with the weapons in their hands, to ensure that they did not go near the enemy and did not shoot. He repeatedly stressed that we must let every comrade firmly remember that we have fewer guns and fewer guns and cannot fight hard with the enemy; we must keep an eye on the enemy's weaknesses and pay attention to guerrilla tactics of avoiding the real and making virtual mistakes. Because the explanation was vivid and in-depth, the commanders and fighters quickly accepted it and understood it thoroughly.

Third, through actual combat exercises, Zhu De's unique theory of guerrilla warfare was formed. In the plough-laying training, Zhu De personally compiled two types of teaching materials based on his own experience and understanding of guerrilla warfare: infantry training with guerrilla warfare as the core and service supply in the formation. He also put forward the principles of guerrilla warfare, such as "a strong enemy should not strike hard when attacking, we should attack if we grasp the enemy's weaknesses, we should encircle and annihilate the enemy when the enemy is alone, and we should always send elite troops to harass the enemy." These operational principles gradually developed into the "sixteen-character recipe" of the Red Army: "The enemy advances and retreats, the enemy garrisons us to disturb, the enemy tires and fights, and the enemy retreats and pursues us." "It not only made military and tactical preparations for the Shonan Uprising, but also laid a good foundation for the formation of the Red Army's strategy and tactics during the Jinggangshan period."

Fourth, when commanding operations, adopt flexible and diverse guerrilla tactics. In the Battle of Pingshi, Xu Kexiang led 6 regiments to deal with the strength of 1 regiment of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army and the Yizhang Peasant Army. Zhu De adopted the flexible tactics of "playing hide-and-seek with the enemy, avoiding his sharpness, enticing the enemy to go deeper, causing the enemy to be tired, taking the initiative to attack, and hitting hard and pursuing the enemy", so that the enemy had no chance to breathe and annihilated him in one fell swoop. Attacking The city of Qiyang, Zhu De took advantage of the contradiction between Tang Shengzhi and Bai Chongxi, and used the strategy of the golden cicada to break away from the shell and quietly withdrew from the garrison, so that the two warlords of Tang Shengzhi and Bai Chongxi mistakenly believed that the other side was Zhu De's troops, and as a result, they mistakenly fought each other. The battle of the Luoshan Temple allowed the enemy to obediently drill into his pocket, and the three breads were copied to annihilate the enemy in one fell swoop. In the Battle of sangongmiao in Leiyang, Zhu De asked a company of the rebel army to disguise itself as a white army, and under the banner of the "Nineteenth Army of the National Revolutionary Army" and in the name of "celebrating merit," a mass meeting was held at the Sangongmiao Temple. The rebel army attacked the city of Leiyang for the second time, and Zhu De adopted the method of fighting with grass and trees, collecting straw and dry firewood, soaring into the sky, setting off firecrackers in oil barrels, and the guns outside the city were urgent, the masses inside the city were in an uproar, the wind was loud, and the rebel army quickly occupied the county town. Under the leadership and command of Zhu De, two dozen Xinshi Street, an ambush at Ao Shan Temple, two keyang city, a bloody battle of Chunjiangpu, a three-gong temple to annihilate the enemy, a surprise attack on Xiaojiangkou, three dozen Anren, and so on were successively achieved. Zhu De began to command the entire Shonan Uprising in Leiyang.

Among them, Xinshi Street and Ao Shan Temple won two major victories, and because of Lin Biao's outstanding performance, Zhu De discovered Lin Biao, a military talent. Fifth, the selection of base areas should be made correctly according to the locality and the time

After Zhu De led his troops to retreat from Sanheba, in the three months from October 1927 to January 1928, from Raoping →, Guangdong, Dapu → Jiaoling → Wuping → Jiangxi Anyuan → Tianxinwei → Dayu → Chongyi Shangbao → Hunan Rucheng → Zixing → Rucheng → Guangdong Renhua → Shaoguan → Lechang → Milk source → Hunan Yizhang, thousands of miles away, traveling thousands of miles, traveling through more than ten counties in Xiangdong, Guangdong, and Ganbian, all the time looking for a foothold and establishing a base area.

When choosing the foothold of the troops, Zhu De focused on considering favorable conditions such as geographical location, topography and landform, mass base, supply of goods, and current situation and war. See whether the troops can be concealed, survive, and developed, and whether the masses can be fully mobilized to carry out revolutionary struggles.

In early October 1927, at the Raoping Military Conference, Zhu De proposed that he should take as a foothold in the border areas of Hunan, Guangdong, and Gansu, where the enemy's troops were weak. In early November, he was selected to be in Chongyi Shangbao to carry out discipline rectification and military training for the troops. At that time, the area around Chongyi and Shangyou was the defensive area of Yang Ruxuan, commander of the 27th Division of the Kuomintang Army. Zhu De wrote to Yang twice, hoping that Yang would "raise his eyelids and lend Him shangyu to train his troops for three months, and he would guarantee that by training a group of people, he would be able to defeat Chiang Kai-shek." Although Yang Ruxuan did not give a positive answer, he did not harass the rebel army. During the rectification of Shangbao, Zhu De accidentally found fan Shisheng's department in the area of Rucheng, Hunan, which was adjacent to Chongyi, and decided to cooperate with Fan Shisheng and abandon the foothold of Shangbao.

After the successful cooperation between Zhu Fan and Fan, Zhu De seized this rare opportunity and convened the Rucheng Conference to plan the Shonan Rebellion, planning to launch the Shonan Nianguan Rebellion in mid-December 1927. Zhu De believed that the rucheng peasant movement was doing well, and fan Shisheng's department was hiding, and decided to take Rucheng as a foothold. Later, due to receiving instructions from the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, Zhu De led his troops south to support the Guangzhou uprising, and the plan to launch the Shonan Uprising with Rucheng as the center was temporarily shelved. After the failure of the Guangzhou uprising, Zhu De took a break from shaoguan ploughing head in northern Guangdong province, conducted long-term and large-scale military training for the troops, and launched a campaign to fight local tycoons. In early 1928, Chiang Kai-shek discovered that the remnants of the Nanchang rebel army were hidden in Fan Shisheng's department, and immediately ordered Fan to disarm the rebel army and arrest Zhu De. After Zhu De received Fan Shisheng's secret message, he immediately led his troops out of danger. He initially planned to go to the East River to join the remnants of the Guangzhou uprising, in accordance with the opinion of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee. However, when the troops arrived in Renhua, they suddenly found that the troops of the Kuomintang 13th Army had cut off the rebel army's way to the East River. In this extremely urgent situation, Zhu De immediately decided to turn to Shonan to realize the Shonan Uprising that he had been brewing for a long time.

Zhu De chose to carry out revolutionary activities in Shonan with two important favorable conditions: First, at this time, the war between the Nanjing government and Tang Shengzhi, who had originally occupied the two lakes, was underway, and for a while he was unable to take care of other aspects, and Shonan was empty. Second, the peasant movement in shonan had a good foundation during the period of the Great Revolution, and the Northern Expeditionary Army passed through here first, and had a good mass base.

In January 1928, with the cooperation of the Xiangnan Special Committee of the COMMUNIST Party of China and the peasants, Zhu De and Chen Yi led the remnants of the Nanchang Uprising to launch the Shonan Uprising, capturing Yizhang, Chenzhou, Leiyang, Zixing, Yongxing and other counties, and extensively mobilizing the masses of workers and peasants, establishing a revolutionary regime, and launching a vigorous campaign to insert standards and divide the fields. In March and April of the same year, under the circumstance that the Shonan Special Committee's "Left" blind line was wrong, seriously alienated from the masses, and isolated itself, due to the end of the Ninghan War, the Xiangyue warlords gathered the regular troops of 7 divisions and the armed forces of the Shonan landlords, attacked from the south and north of Hengyang in Hunan and Lechang, Guangdong, and advanced into Shonan. The disparity in strength between the enemy and us was enormous, and the rebel army suffered from the enemy on its backs. In order to preserve the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army and avoid a decisive battle with the enemy under unfavorable conditions, Zhu De made an important decision to withdraw from Shonan and go to Jinggangshan. Previously, Zhu Mao's two rebel units had a connection, and Zhu De was very satisfied after a detailed understanding of the terrain, property, and masses of Jinggangshan, especially Mao Zedong led the autumn harvest uprising troops to create a base area in Jinggangshan, laying a good foundation, and being a good place for tun troops to fight. However, the Shonan Special Committee stressed that the Shonan rebel army "has the responsibility to defend the territory" and "Communists should not avoid hardships and dangers," negated Zhu De's proposal to transfer to Jinggangshan, and forcibly demanded that all the armed forces of Shonan be thrown into battle and fight the enemy to the end. Zhu De believes that the purpose of the great enemy at present should be to preserve the revolutionary forces. He resolutely decided to move the Shonan rebel army to Jinggangshan and build a revolutionary base area with Mao Zedong. In late April 1928, zhu de and Mao Zedong's two revolutionary armed forces met in victory at Jinggangshan to jointly create a new situation in the Jinggangshan revolutionary base area.