Continue with the previous issue:
World War II Fun Facts (4) Operation Lizard 1943~~(1)
World War II Fun Facts (4) Operation Lizard 1943~(2)
directory:
(Zero) Telegrams from secret radio stations
(i) Timor Island
(ii) The situation from 1942 to the beginning of 1943
(3) Mis-selection of horses
(iv) Operation Lizard begins
(5) Failure of action
(6) Interrogation of the Japanese
(VII) Fraud Game - START!
(viii) Operation Cobra failed
(9) Afterword
(10) Reflection and summary of the lizard action - flying flying pig
East Timor is a coffee table, and the table is full of cups from Australian agents. Operation Cobra agents landed in areas recommended by Japanese intelligence and were all captured within an hour.
On 29 January 1944, the Australian SRD sent a Special Z Force code-named "Cobar" – Operation Cobra to infiltrate Timor, while the Japanese sent regular troops to set up an ambush and wait at a preset landing site to welcome the Australian agents.
Lieutenant Elwood was taken to the scene by the Japanese, who broke free of the Japanese and tried to loudly warn the Cobra Operators that they were entering the trap, but he was too weak to be captured again by the Japanese, who was subsequently locked up by the Japanese, starved for 48 hours, and then suffered from malaria and dysentery.
Under the deployment of the Japanese army, the agents of Operation Cobra were captured by the Japanese within 1 hour, and 6 Z Special Forces agents, including the commander Lieutenant Jr Cashman, were captured.
The Japanese then used the radio station carried by agents in Operation Cobra to re-establish a communications link with the Australian intelligence service, the SRD.
In March 1944, Australian intelligence officers suspected that Operation Cobra had been cracked by the Japanese, but unfortunately, they did not send their own agents to confirm this, but instead sought information on Operation Lizard's personnel, and the Japanese intelligence officers cheerfully replied that they would send personnel to take this responsibility.
Apparently, a later response from Japanese intelligence confirmed that Operation Cobra Radio was "clean", and Australian intelligence reassured.
Japanese intelligence continued to use these two radio stations to provide false intelligence to trick Australian intelligence into the traps set by the Japanese.
List of losses from the Timorese covert operation:
On 21 August 1944, Operation ADDER failed, killing 1 of the 5 agents and 4 captured.
On May 17, 1945, Operation Sunbaker failed and the plane carrying the agents crashed near Dili, killing all four agents and crew members.
On July 5, 1945, Operation Sunable failed, killing 1 agent and the rest captured within 1 week.
On July 17, 1945, Operation Suncob failed and 2 agents were captured.
< h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" > (IX) afterword</h1>
On 13 August 1945, the Australian intelligence service, SRD, replied to the Japanese radio station with the following message:
Your call has been received, thank you for your good wishes, please continue to take good care of our fighters and inform us of their treatment.
On August 21, Lieutenant Elwood was removed from solitary confinement by the Japanese and held with Operation Cobra Commander Lieutenant Cashman. By this time the Empire of Japan had surrendered, and on September 1, captured Allied agents were transported to Flores, Java, and Bali.
On 2 October, they were released by the Japanese and boarded allied planes for transport to Singapore.
< h1 class= "pgc-h-arrow-right" > the fate of Luz, who fled, and why he failed to get the news of Operation Lizard's failure</h1>
On 29 September 1943, on the same day Patricio Luz fled with 4 native Timorese natives, Japanese fire killed Jaoa Rebelo and Ruy Fernandes.
Domingos Amaral and Domingos Dilor escape with Luz and come to the old camp where they had stayed before.
They learned from local natives that the Japanese were killing Cairui to help the locals.
They found some supplies hidden by Domingos Dilor, including Lieutenant Elwood's radio backup battery, but due to dampness, the battery ran out, and they tried to steal the battery from the Japanese, but without success.
Luz then lost contact with the Australian SRD headquarters and had to move and hide under the cover of locals. The Japanese repeatedly attempted to hunt down Luz, but with the help of four indigenous chiefs—Domingos Dilor, Domingos Amaral (the two natives who escaped with him), Antonio Jesus, and Jose Maria—Luz was not captured.
On October 4, 1945, Luz received news of the surrender of the Japanese Empire, and on January 30, 1946, Luz wrote a letter to the Australian Consulate in Dili describing his experiences after fleeing.
<h1 class = "pgc-h-arrow-right" > (10) Reflections and summaries of lizard actions - flying weed pig</h1>
The following content contains a lot of my own bootlegs, please read carefully, so as not to be taken to the ditch by me.
1.1 Mismanned by Lieutenant de Pierre
The Australian intelligence service selected Lieutenant de Pierre to carry out the task of establishing the Timorese spy network based on his irreplaceable contacts in the local area, but he did not have any experience in intelligence behind enemy lines.
However, judging by his words and deeds, the person's purpose may simply be to expand his influence on the ground with the help of free foreign resources.
In the month before his capture, the lizard operation was organized bloated, with the mistresses of the two main leaders, with the chiefs and servants of the local tribe, and I think that this person, if the wind goes well, may gain great influence in the local area. On the other hand, if the situation is unfavorable, it is possible to abandon the team and flee to Australia with a mistress at any time. For him, Australia is to pull the tiger skin to make a big banner and leave a way out for himself.
To carry out such deadly lurking missions, it is necessary to send a competent and loyal commander, and then let the local liaison person act as a responsibility for assistance, and the local contact person can be established to lurk in disguise.
1.2 Misused Sergeant Elwood
The Australian liaison, Elwood, was only a sergeant, who had no real power in Lieutenant de Pierre's ranks, was despised, and failed to play a liaison role under the suspicion of Lieutenant de Pierre.
Sgt. Elwood, attended the Z Special Forces Veterans Party in 2016
Most of the current recollection material about the failure of the operation comes from the unilateral testimony of Sergeant Elwood, and I think first of all that this man is also problematic.
First, he did not establish a good relationship of mutual trust with Lieutenant de Pierre, which should have been his main duty.
Secondly, I believe that he has committed a dereliction of duty in destroying radio codebooks.
Third, during the interrogation of the Japanese, did he voluntarily reveal the location where the codebook and communication plan were buried, and I drew a question mark here? He himself was the most immediate beneficiary of the capture of the apostasy.
Fourthly, I think that some of his testimony may be suspicious of smearing Lieutenant de Pierre, after all, Lieutenant De Pierre died while in Japanese custody, and many things cannot prove his innocence.
1.3 Mistakes by the Australian intelligence community SRD
first
Each expatriate radio operator of the prior intelligence service shall agree with Headquarters on a "death" code in order to warn Headquarters in the event of adverse circumstances. If the headquarters can find the "death" code in time, then the calculation can be turned from passive to active.
second
The time and location of the follow-up intelligence operation were revealed too much, and the Japanese knew it all. The various action groups should operate independently so as not to involve the whole body.
third
How can it be possible to check the whereabouts of Operation Cobra intelligence personnel in detail when there are doubts? It was indeed convenient to use the previous lurking group to investigate, but it caused the consequences of a series of failed operations in Timor.
fourth
The level of counterintelligence operations of the Japanese army has always been underestimated.
1.4 The ultimate reason, liu Adou who can't be supported - colonial war
The ultimate reason for its failure, I think, is that in the colonial war, the colonists on the side of the colonists could not support Liu Adou, and the Australian intelligence agencies have always believed that with the contact of the old colonial government officials, an underground intelligence network can be established and served.
Prior to 1942, Australian intelligence agents had been self-evident in their contacts and contacts with locals. As everyone knows, the national form of the colony must be that the colonist rule suppresses most of the locals by co-opting a small number of locals.
The indigenous people of Timor have long suffered from Portugal, and the local chieftain who followed the actions of Lieutenant de Pierre must have been a small number of local indigenous chiefs who were co-opted by the Portuguese colonial rulers at that time, and they were also vested interests, and the Australian military intelligence personnel negotiated with them, of course, constantly obtaining positive information from them.
But in fact, after the Japanese army entered Timor, most of the local excluded Native Timorese took the initiative to support the Japanese army, and the oppressed people of that year stood up, and their private armed forces prevented Lieutenant de Pierre from digging for supplies for the first time. The second time completely surrounded Lieutenant de Pierre and his party, and let the japanese garrison that followed completely wiped out the Lizard Operations.
It turns out that the risks of fighting behind enemy lines without a mass base are high.
~(End)~
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