This year, the "ancestor of the devious way" who changed the shape of China's war took the initiative to die of random arrows...

Source: Lookout Think Tank (zhczyj)

Author: Jiang Yamin

In peacetime, the lessons of war are collectively forgotten again and again, until another war suddenly arrives, and only after paying a bloody price will it be suddenly awakened. The Bing family has flourished again and again in Chinese history, and then, again and again, it has been suppressed and forgotten.

A mature country and a mature nation must not forget the disasters and lessons of war; even when the country is at peace and prosperity for a long time, it is still necessary to carry forward the tradition of attaching importance to national defense and the military, so that the alarm bells will always sound and the armament will always be renewed.

The worldwide research boom of Chinese bingjia theory has been enduring, and it is of great significance to re-excavate and discover the value of ancient Chinese bingjia at the key historical node of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Therefore, Uncle Ku invited Jiang Yamin, a researcher at the Former Department of Combat Theory and Doctrine Research of the Academy of Military Sciences, to launch a series of articles on "Ancient Chinese Soldiers", one per week, for the benefit of readers.

Spanning 4600 years, this series tells the stories of 38 representative figures of soldiers who exerted a major influence on China's military and even historical progress from the beginning of Chinese civilization to the end of the Qing Dynasty, and interprets the legendary military books and ancient formations that have been enshrined or even deified by posterity.

Note: In order, Xuannu, Yi Yin, Wu Ding, Jiang Ziya, Xianxun, Ghost Guzi, Tian Hoang Tho, Sun Wu, Sun Zhen, Mo Zhai, Le Yi, Li Mu, Bai Qi, Wu Qi, Wei Ji, Wang Qi, Zhang Liang, Han Xin, Wei Qing, Ban Chao, Zhuge Liang, Yang Su, Li Jing, Xue Rengui, Guo Ziyi, Wei Rui, Yue Fei, Yelü Hugo, Genghis Khan, Badu, Zhu Yuanzhang, Xu Da, Qi Jiguang, Xing Jie, Zheng Chenggong, Shi Lang, Fu Kang'an, Zuo Zongtang.

Under the rule of Zhou Tianzi, for a long time, the princely states disdained the use of tricks in the war, and pursued the banner of the grand and righteous.

However, this is not in line with the laws of war.

The first person to practice the "trick of the soldier" in the Chinese soldiers' homes is the first to be the first. He transformed ancient warfare from a mutually agreed and arrayed war between the princes under Zhou Tianzi into a real life-and-death duel between the state and the army.

As a result, the form of war entered a period of more unpredictable development, and the Chinese way of soldierhood developed to a level that could be regarded as a world military classic theory.

Today's story begins with a palace fight and ends with a random arrow.

1 Appearance: A famous court battle

Let's take a look at Xianxun's resume first:

[Note: Caiyi, the ancient monarch gave Qing Dafu as the Tian Yi of Shilu, also known as "Caidi", "Fengyi", and "Food Yi", which flourished in the Zhou Dynasty. 】

There is no doubt that this is a fierce man.

To tell his story, we must begin with the court struggle set off by a stolen beauty.

During the Spring and Autumn Period, the Jin State was in a place where soldiers in the western part of the Central Plains had to fight:

To the southwest is Qiangqin;

To the south is Fuchu;

To the east, it borders the princely states of Northern Yan, Qi, Wei, and Zheng;

To the west and north are the grasslands of Donghu and Xirong.

In 672 BC, Duke Xian of Jin defeated Li Rong (楊戎, in present-day Lintong District, Xi'an, Shaanxi Province) and obtained Li Ji .com. This is a woman with a beautiful appearance and a deep city government, who has gained a foothold in a foreign country by virtue of her husband's favor, the establishment of a lady, and the birth of a son Xi Qi.

This was not enough, in order to gain greater authority, she relied on her husband's trust to meddle in the government and provoke the relationship between Jin Xiangong and other sons.

In 656 BC, Crown Prince Shensheng was forced to commit suicide, and Chong'er and Yiwu fled to a foreign country.

The 5 henchmen he befriended when Zhong'er was 17 years old, Zhao Wan, Hu Yan, Jia Tuo, Xianxun, and Wei Yi, followed him and fled to the Kingdom of Di, forming a deep sense of suffering.

19 years later, with the help of external forces such as the Song Dynasty, the State of Chu, and the State of Qin, Zhong'er returned to the throne as the Duke of Jin.

In the process of exile, the kind-hearted Song Xianggong once took in this fallen prince and gave him a generous gift of 80 horses.

This Song Xianggong is not a man without a story.

2 The Battle of the Bulge, Courtesy or Stupidity?

During the Spring and Autumn Period, the masses rose up, and with the weakening of the authority of zhou tianzi, the ideal hierarchy established by the Zhou Dynasty marked by liturgy was constantly broken.

However, in the era of the ancestors, the monarchs and courtiers of various countries still placed the Zhou Li in a very high position (at least verbally). The reason is simple: if the law of etiquette is violated openly, its country will be accused of being a country of tigers and wolves, and its people will be accused of being shameless villains or rogue courtiers.

Even in war, we must pay attention to etiquette and abide by the rules.

In the early winter of 638 BC, Song Xianggong led an army to attack the State of Zheng, and the State of Zheng asked the State of Chu to send troops to the rescue. Therefore, the Chu general Cheng Dechen led an army to attack the capital of the Song state and save Zheng. Song Xianggong was worried about domestic losses, so he had to withdraw his troops from Zheng Guo and return to the capital.

The two armies of the Song and Chu dynasties met at Hongshui (the name of the ancient river, so the road was about northwest of present-day Zhecheng County, Henan Province). The Chu army began to cross the river and approached in the direction of the Song army. Gongzi Muyi thought that this was a good opportunity to defeat the Chu army, so he suggested to Song Xianggong:

"There are many Chu soldiers and our army is small, and the battle is unfavorable to our army, and now we are taking advantage of the opportunity of them crossing the river to launch an attack, and the odds of victory are very good."

Song Xianggong objected:

"We are known as the master of benevolence and righteousness, how can we take advantage of the fact that others cross the river to attack?"

Soon, the Chu army crossed the river and began to deploy on the shore.

MuYi asked the leader:

"Now you can attack, right?"

Song Xianggong continued to object:

"It's very immoral for people to fight before they're ready, so we'll wait until they're lined up."

In this way, under the leadership of the supreme commander, a group of Song generals quietly looked at the opposite side, waiting for the enemy who was more powerful than themselves to cross the flood water and set up a formation.

However, the enemy's values seemed to be a little different from those of the Song army. The Chu army was very realistic, and after setting up the army position, it did not verbally thank the enemy for waiting for kindness, but directly gave Song Xianggong an arrow as a "return gift" - shot in the leg.

The Chu army rushed forward and defeated the Song army.

A battle that originally had a great chance of winning was beaten to the ground, and the generals could not help but complain that Song Xianggong did not listen to advice. However (you read that right, still), the dude made a serious criticism of these subordinates:

"A gentleman with a benevolent heart will not attack the enemy who has been injured and the elderly whose hair is gray when fighting; the ancients did not rely on the obstacles to win when fighting. Although the widowed Song Kingdom was in danger of destroying the country, the widow still could not bear to attack the enemy who did not have a good position. ”

In the eyes of our contemporaries, the Battle of Hongshui is a bit strange: Song Xianggong would rather be defeated, and the country should also die of benevolence and etiquette, and finally defeated, putting the country in danger, as the king of a country, such a move is really stupid.

In fact, Song Xianggong's behavior was understandable in the early Spring and Autumn Period.

At that time, the ritual system as a symbol of zhou tianzi's authority was still healthy, on the one hand, the "just war" as an ideology had been deeply rooted in the hearts of the people; on the other hand, from a more realistic point of view, most of the wars occurred between the princely states, because there was a common superior Zhou Tianzi on the head, and there were many princes watching the war around. In such a context, if you want to start a war, you must have a famous division and occupy a moral high ground in order not to be regarded as an unjust division by your superiors and colleagues, and avoid giving people a handle and ending up being attacked by a group.

Therefore, slogans such as "The Teacher of Xingren Righteousness", "Hanging the People for Crimes", and "Punishing Injustice" are very popular, and the frequency of appearance is no less than that of the current Internet hot words.

In such an environment, making the "sinister move" a little dangerous, the consequences of being caught in a small braid are a bit serious, and it is impossible to do without strong psychological endurance and superb military wisdom.

3 If the benefactor asks for help, will he send troops?

In 633 BC, the State of Chu organized a coalition of princes to attack the State of Song, and the State of Song appealed to the State of Jin for help.

The State of Song had kindness to itself first, and Duke Wen of Jin had the heart to rescue him, but it was far away from him, and he had to pass through the State of Cao and the State of Wei in the middle. You know, these two countries are allies of the enemy Chu state.

The expedition of the labor division, the entanglement of enemies and friends, there are many difficulties.

Jin Wengong was a little hesitant.

At this time, Xianxun made a statement to Jin Wengong:

"We must send troops to rescue the Song Kingdom!"

It was necessary to fight this battle well---the Song kingdom was destroyed from the Chu state because of its closeness to the Jin state, and the rescue of the Song state could not only repay the favor, but also greatly help establish the prestige of the Jin state among the princes and lay the foundation of its own hegemony in the Central Plains.

Hu Yan expressed his approval and further proposed to attack the State of Cao and wei in order to relieve the danger of the State of Song.

In this way, Jin Wengong made up his mind and sent troops to aid the Song.

The prelude to the Battle of Chengpu has been played.

Here I would like to mention that in the process of following the exile of heavy ears, Xianxun probably had several contacts with Song Xianggong, and it is likely that he also honored him as The Duke of En. However, the ancestors who had endured the hardships and experiences of the world were different from the princes and doctors who had lived a superior life in the court for a long time.

On the basis of this benevolent father's war practice, he drew lessons and summed up experience, swept away the whitewash and directly exposed the essence of war -- to fight for interests: the interests of the state, the interests of the army, and the personal interests of the monarchs.

Therefore, in the future military practice, Xianxun broke the so-called etiquette of teaching benevolence and righteousness to the enemy, and put forward and practiced the military ideology of "the trick of the soldiers."

As a result, many factors that were not originally taken into account in the war have become the exploitable factors for the soldiers to exert their tricks, the world of the longitudinal and transverse is much wider, and the plot of the war story is much more exciting.

Next, the Jin state divided the army into three armies: upper, middle, and lower, with the first being the lower army and assisting the subordinate general Luan Zhi. During the battle, the main general of the Chinese army, Hao Yi, was killed in battle, and Xianxun was ordered to succeed him.

Soon, he sacrificed a serial meter.

[Note: There is a claim on the Internet that Xianxun was the first marshal in ancient China, which is not accurate.] Because when Xianxun served as a subordinate military commander in the army, the main general of the Jin Dynasty was the marshal. Later, Xianxun took over Hao's class. However, Xianxun was indeed an early marshal and a representative of the warrior family with distinctive characteristics. 】

4 The enemy is by no means monolithic

Xianxun did not believe that the enemy's camp was monolithic, and as long as the main target of battle was determined, the enemy's allies were almost all objects that could be separated.

Eliminate the double weakness and unite the two strong

In 632 BC, according to Xianxun's plan, the Jin army adopted the strategy of "invading Cao Wei", capturing Wulu (五鹿, in modern Puyang County, Henan) within a few days, and then attacking the capital of Cao Guo.

At this time, the Song state, whose capital was still surrounded by Chu troops, once again complained to the Jin state. Due to the unclear attitude of the State of Qi and the State of Qin behind him, Duke Wen of Jin wanted to send troops but could not act rashly. First of all, the serial meter is offered:

* Let the Song State bribe the State of Qi and the State of Qin, so that the two powers will intercede and persuade the State of Chu to withdraw its troops;

* After that, he detained the king of the state of Cao and divided part of the land of Cao and Wei to the state of Song, so as to anger the state of Chu, and be humiliated by this, he would refuse the mediation of Qi and Qin;

* In this way, the Qi and Qin countries, who accepted bribes from the Song State, were refuted by the Chu State, and they would definitely be angry with the Chu State and turn their heads to cooperate with the Jin State.

Jin Wengong immediately adopted, and the subsequent plot development was exactly the same as xianxun predicted--the two powers leaned towards the Jin state, and the worries were relieved.

Separate Cao Wei and isolate Qiang Chu

The Jin army was approaching, and King Cheng of Chu, who was besieging the Song state, retreated in frustration, withdrew most of the army besieging the Song state, and left The commander Of Yin Ziyu in the Song state, telling him not to engage the Jin army. However, Ziyu, who is known for his good fighting, insisted on asking for war. King Cheng of Chu did not agree in his heart, and there was nothing he could do about it, so he sent him part of the troops.

Ziyu, who is eager to win, has a plan. He sent emissaries to the State of Jin and proposed that as long as the State of Cao and wei were spared and their lands returned, the Chu army would lift the siege of the State of Song.

The fox was furious when he heard this:

"Zi Yu is just a Chu courtier, but he came to bargain with the monarch of the Jin Dynasty, which is very rude and very underwhelming!" We should attack the Chu army immediately. ”

The sober pioneer saw through the conspiracy behind this remark.

If it is handled according to Ziyu's move, it can make the three kingdoms get what they want - the Song kingdom will be lifted, and the Cao and Wei will be restored. On the surface, the dispute is resolved, and everyone is not happy to go home and live a peaceful life?

However, Ziyu's real intention in this move was to roast Jin Guo on the fire:

If the Suggestion of the State of Chu was accepted, the Battle of the Jin Army to destroy Cao and Wei would be fought in vain, and the xingshi mobilized the masses and worked hard and desperately, and the land occupied would still be returned to the original owner, which was really a nest;

If they refused, the Jin state would offend Cao and Wei at the same time, abandoning the Song state that was supposed to be rescued, and the three countries would only thank the chu state, but the Jin state would get three enemies because of this, so that the enemy accumulated resentment, how to achieve hegemony?

Neither acceptance nor rejection was appropriate, and Xianxun decided to make a plan: imprison the emissaries of the Chu state and provoke the Chu state; take advantage of Cao and Wei's eagerness to restore the country, allow them to secretly restore the country, cut off their dependence on the Chu state, and use the divisive plan.

Sure enough, the two countries sent emissaries to sever ties with the Chu state.

5 Anger the enemy commander + tiger advance + pretend retreat = ?

Zi Yu was so irritated that he withdrew from the Song dynasty and marched north to attack the Jin army. Duke Wen of Jin followed Hu Yan's advice and kept his promise to the King of Chu that year, causing the army to retreat ninety miles (this is the source of the idiom "retreat to the three houses"), temporarily avoiding its sharp edge, and occupying a more favorable geographical position.

[Note: Zhong'er was met by King Chu Cheng on his way to escape, and promised that if he encountered it in the future when fighting in the Central Plains, he would give in three retreats to repay king Chu Cheng's favor.] In ancient times, the marching schedule was thirty miles as a house, and the three houses were ninety miles. Later, Zhong'er became the Duke of Jin, and during the Battle of Chengpu in Jinchu, he fulfilled the previous covenant and ordered the Jin army to "retreat to the three retreats to break it". ——From "Zuo Chuan , Duke Gong". 】

Overwhelmed by anger, Ziyu ignored the advice of everyone and insisted on pursuing the Jin army, and the Battle of Chengpu began.

In early April, the armies of the Jin, Qi, Qin, and Song dynasties reached the Weiguo city of Pu (present-day southwest of Juancheng, Shandong), forming a coalition posture. A few days later, the Jin army faced off against the Chu army at Youxin, south of Chengpu.

The Jin army zuo xuchen ordered the sergeant to cover the tiger skin on the horse and take the lead in attacking the weak right army of the Chu army. When the Tiger Army attacked, the Chu Right Army was terrified and quickly collapsed and retreated.

The Jin army used fox fur to erect two large banners and retreat backwards; the military chariot dragged the branches, raised dust, and forged the illusion of retreat. The Chu left army was deceived, attacked alone, and soon ventured into the prominence, exposing the flanks. Xianxun led the Chinese army to intercept the left army of the Chu state, and the Jin shang army, which pretended to be retreating, quickly turned back and launched a counterattack against the left army of Chu. One after another, the Chu left army was also defeated.

Ziyu had no choice but to gather the defeated army, withdraw from the battlefield, and commit suicide on the way back to Chu.

After the war, Duke Wen of Jin made a pilgrimage to Zhou Tianzi and made allies to the princes. Zhou Tianzi officially appointed Duke Wen of Jin as Hou Bo, and the Jin state achieved its political goal of "taking power and hegemony".

Some scholars have raised objections to this battle: The so-called Jin army's so-called tactic of "using one army to advance into one army and one army to pretend to retreat and lead to the isolation of the enemy's main force" may only be the result of a crooked fight because of getting lost.

It is mentioned in the Zuo Biography that the Jin army was lost by strong winds; in the Chinese, it is mentioned that before (or during) the Battle of Chengpu, Xianxun had planned to withdraw for some reason.

On careful analysis, these controversies are nothing more than grasping some minor issues, and getting lost and winning is also a manifestation of the well-run and well-trained military in peacetime, and having doubts about the enemy's situation is a common thing in war.

In the above process, Xianxun made full use of the complex fang-state relations in the Spring and Autumn Period, and carried out a series of military diplomatic operations with interests as the inducement, and confronted the military diplomacy of the Chu state, dismantling it one by one.

Judging from historical facts, the military diplomacy of the First Emperor is indeed superior to that of the Chu State and other Fang States, providing a typical example for military diplomacy in later generations to emulate.

6 The first ambush was immediately decided

In the winter of 628 BC, Duke Wen of Jin died and was succeeded by Duke Xiang of Jin, respecting the meritorious servant of his uncle Xianxun.

Taking advantage of the mourning of the Jin state and the replacement of the monarch, the State of Qin sent troops across the borders of the State of Jin and made a long-distance attack on the State of Zheng. Zheng Guo detected the Qin army's intentions early and strengthened his defenses.

The surprise attack failed, and the Qin army temporarily changed its combat objectives, and after destroying the slippery state of the neighboring Jin state, the return troops withdrew in the direction of their own borders.

In the face of the Qin army's cross-border provocation and the move to destroy the slippery country, it has become the forerunner of the commanders of the three armies to make a decision and advocate blocking the Qin army. However, the Duke of Xiang of Jin and many ministers believed that they had not repaid the favor of the State of Qin in sending troops to quell the rebellion and support the Duke wen of Jin, but instead attacked the State of Qin, which was not only incompatible with etiquette, but also ashamed of the ancestors.

The first sharp objection was raised:

"The fact that the State of Qin did not come to mourn for the Duke wen of Jin was already disrespectful, and it was even more rude to cross the border without authorization, and it was even more rude to attack the state of Jin as a feudal state of the Yin clan and attack the state of Jin. Am I not going to fight back when I am bullied into my own head? ”

[Note: The kings of the Jin state, the Zheng state, and the hua state are all surnamed Ji, which is the orthodox Zhou feudal state, while the Qin state monarch surnamed Yin is a meritorious feudal state of the Zhou Dynasty, or a foreign surname feudal state of the Zhou Dynasty, and the Ji surname fengguo believes that the monarch of the Qin state is an inferior monarch. 】

Jin Xianggong thought about it again and again, thinking that this was very reasonable. Therefore, the Jin State urgently mobilized the army, dyed the mourning clothes into black uniforms, and gathered troops to prepare for battle.

As the Qin army passed through the narrow road of Kun (崤, southeast of present-day Shaanxi County, Henan), the Jin ambush troops who had been waiting for a long time suddenly launched an attack, destroying the enemy's entire army. Against the enemy's command center, he adopted the means of elite surprise attack, quickly broke into the enemy camp with the strongest combat strength, and captured 3 main generals in one fell swoop, namely Meng Mingshi, Xi Qishu and Bai Yibing.

The "Battle of Kun" was the first campaign-scale ambush battle recorded in history, after which the form and method of warfare changed greatly, and the form of the approximate array of battles was no longer the only way to march. From then on, once the army encountered the pass, the officers and men would be terrified and afraid of being ambushed.

There is also controversy about the exploits of the Ancestors in the Battle of Kun. Some people have proposed that Xianxun thwarted its strategic attempt to advance into the Central Plains before the Qin state became strong, so that it had to develop westward, intensifying the contradictions between Qin and Jin in advance. Later, the alliance between Qin and Chu, coupled with the invasion of Northern Rong and Di, eventually caused the Jin state to be attacked on three sides of the strategic situation.

The author believes that this is an "hindsight" argument. If there is no victory in the "Battle of Kun", allowing the Qin state to step over the territory of the Jin state, destroy the state of Shui, and destroy the state of Zheng, the result is likely to make it grow at a higher rate. Later, the Jin state was attacked on three sides and even destroyed the country, mainly because of the lack of internal affairs and the lack of generals in later generations, and the conclusion that "the war should not be fought" could not be concluded.

Taking 10,000 steps back, even if the "Battle of Chengpu" and the "Battle of Kun" had some problems in strategy and tactics, it would be difficult to erase the major contributions made by the pioneers in the practice and theory of the soldiers, that is, to break the line of the halls, to alienate the enemy with the "tricky way of the soldiers", to set up ambushes and raids with the "tricks of the soldiers", to change the pedantic military way of stressing honesty and benevolence to the enemy, so that the Chinese soldiers embarked on the advanced development path of flexible use of the art of war and combat strategy in the 7th century BC.

In some countries in the West, by the 19th century, when hot weapons had developed considerably (after having rear-loading guns), they were still using the tactics of attacking in square arrays, and after the soldiers in the team were knocked down by the cold arrows of the enemy's cold guns, the officers leading the team were still shouting "Keep the formation!" ”。 From this point of view, the development speed of China's art of war has been at the leading level in the world for a long time.

7 Fierce man, voluntarily killed by a random arrow

Generals who are good at leading troops to win battles are usually fierce people, and fierce people are usually bad tempered and irritable. Xianxun is such a person, so temperamental that sometimes he can't control his emotions.

After the "Battle of Kun", Xianxun went to see the Duke of Jin xiang and asked about the disposition of the three captured Qin generals. Jin Xianggong replied: It has been released.

Duke Xiang of Jin's concubine, Huai Wei, was the daughter of Duke Mu of Qin, and she asked the monarch to release the three Qin generals and let the Qin state punish them, so as not to make the two countries of Jin and Qin too deeply resentful. Jin Xianggong actually agreed.

Xianxun was furious and shouted:

"The soldiers did not know how much effort and life it took to capture the enemy general, but because of the woman's clever words, they were easily pardoned! Destroying the achievements of the battle and growing the ambition of the enemy like this, the Jin kingdom will not be long before it will be destroyed! ”

Speaking of anger, he also smacked the leader fiercely.

Jin Xianggong seemed to have been awakened by the scolding and hurriedly sent people to chase after him, but it was too late, and the 3 Qin generals had already crossed the river to escape. Afterwards, Jin Xianggong sincerely apologized to this hero.

The relieved prophet realized that he had made a big mistake: he ignored the courtesy of the monarch and did not choose his words, and even spat at the monarch. Jin Xianggong's tolerance made him feel deeply remorseful, landless, and burdened with a heavy psychological burden.

Soon, Zhai Guo, who had been benevolent to Duke Wen of Jin, attacked the State of Jin. The State of Jin sent troops to resist, defeating Zhai's army at Ji (箕, northeast of present-day Pu County, Shanxi) and shooting his lord Baibu Hu ( 胡 ) , known in history as the "Battle of Ji".

[Note: The State of Zhai was founded by the descendants of the Yellow Emperor of Xuanyuan and later became a princely state of the Zhou Dynasty. Zhai was originally the surname of the Nomadic Chidi people in the northern part of the Central Plains, hence the name Di. 】

At this time, Xianxun fell into a dilemma: in the 19 years that he had followed gongzi to take refuge in Zhong'er, he had been favored by the Di people, and fighting with all his strength was tantamount to being ungrateful; if he indulged the enemy's attack and caused damage to the interests of the country, he would not only bear the heavy trust of the father and son of The Duke of Jinwen, but also violate the principle of being a subject.

Guilt over Jin Xianggong seemed to have become the last straw that overwhelmed the camel.

In the end, Xianxun embarked on the third path.

He took off his helmet and armor, drove his chariot into the Zhai army alone, and was killed by random arrows.

The history books record that the Di people looked at his face, his eyes were round and the corners of his eyes were cracked, like a living person, he was shocked by the gods, and immediately returned the first rank to the Jin Kingdom.

Apologizing for Jun's death and repaying Di's kindness with death was an ancient style of being praised at that time. At this point, the reader may wonder: How could the military experts, politicians, and pioneer comrades who dared to challenge the etiquette and the grand front, end their precious lives because of their "grace and righteousness"?

The reasons are not complicated:

On the one hand, he lives in an era of the transition of old and new, the consciousness of liturgical music is deeply rooted in the hearts of the people but has collapsed in real operation, he dares to challenge tradition but cannot completely get rid of it (which shows how difficult it is to break the old ideas);

On the other hand, it was his duty to be loyal to the king and patriotic as a minister and general to win the war, and the death of "grace" reflected his moral pursuit as a person, and the conflict of the dual evaluation system made him miserable and finally broke his last psychological defense.

This year is 627 BC, a generation of fierce people disappeared, leaving the book of soldiers immortal.

More than 200 years after the death of Xianxun, Sun Wu (c. 545 BC - c. 470 BC) stood on the shoulders of giants and wrote the "Art of War of Sun Tzu", which is famous today.

Resources:

1. (Spring and Autumn) Zuo QiuMing's "Zuo Chuan , Gong Gong of Zuo Chuan"

2. Jiang Fan, "Zuo Chuan, Spring and Autumn Five Masters Biography", Cultural Relics Publishing House, September 2018 edition

Column Editor-in-Chief: Gu Wanquan Text Editor: Cheng Pei Title Image Source: Dongfang IC Image Editor: Yong Kai

Source: Author: Lookout Think Tank