< h1 toutiao-origin="h2" > this exercise, why not wear combat equipment</h1>
■ Cheng Xiaodong, a reporter for the People's Liberation Army Daily, Zhou Yuan
△ During the exercise, heavy tanks are passing through the pontoon bridge that has just been erected.
"They didn't even wear helmets or combat boots when they went to the exercise?!" To this day, Corporal Zhou Cai of the Twelfth Company of a Certain Zhouqiao Brigade of the Central Theater Army still remembers the surprised glances thrown at them by comrades-in-arms of brother units during that live-fire exercise .-
It was an inspection exercise across the Yangtze River, and they were all dressed up in full gear according to the requirements of their superiors to organize combat training in unfamiliar areas.
During the training, as the operator of the tail boat, Zhou Cai stared at the flag signal of Chen Shengtao, the head of the gate bridge, while accurately controlling the throttle and gear of the tail boat. Suddenly, Sergeant Liu Fangxiao, who was inspecting on the gate bridge, slipped and fell to his feet, almost sliding into the river, but fortunately was caught by his comrades next to him...
"When the door bridge is decomposed and combined on the river, it is inevitable that there will be water and hydraulic oil on the steel plate of the bridge deck, and it is easy to slip and fall when wearing combat boots." At the company's training analysis meeting, Zhou Cai expressed his worries.
Zhou Cai's speech aroused the resonance of everyone: Some officers and men reported that helmets would obscure the line of sight and reduce operational efficiency; some officers and men talked about the narrow space on the gate bridge and the inability to operate normally with guns on their backs; some officers and men complained that once the combat equipment was put on, it was difficult to put on the life jacket, and even if it was put on, the buoyancy of the heavily armed personnel after falling into the water was not enough...
Coincidentally, these problems also occurred from time to time in the brotherly companies, and they were gathered together on the desk of the brigade party committee's training committee.
The brigade leader's investigation found that although the existing combat equipment is more convenient in infantry tactical operations, it is not very practical in the special environment of boat and bridge operation, and even affects the speed and safety of bridge construction to some extent.
However, can you take off your combat equipment? This issue has aroused considerable controversy among officers and soldiers:
Some people frankly say that all units now wear combat equipment when training, and it will look "irregular" if we do not wear combat equipment; some people believe that in fighting a war, we must seek truth from facts, and whether or not to closely follow actual combat lies not in dressing neatly, but in completing the effect of actual combat tasks.
What is right and wrong? After repeated study, the brigade party committee pointed out: Combined with the background of actual combat, when building bridges, the superiors will be equipped with professional defense forces such as air defense and reconnaissance to coordinate operations. It is recommended that the officers and men of Zhouqiao not wear combat equipment when working on the river.
Their opinions were approved after consulting the Director's Department and higher authorities. As a result, such a scene appeared during the exercise: the officers and men who built the bridge "went into battle lightly, and the vigilant personnel were fully armed.
A bridge flys north and south, and the graben changes its path. This battle, which brought zhou Cai and his comrades-in-arms to reflect, is still continuing...
<h1 toutiao-origin="h2" > the actual combat standard must not be set on the "rules"</h1>
△ Correction axis
"What other practices do we have that seem to be close to actual combat, but in fact they tie their hands and feet and weaken their combat effectiveness?" The exercise is over, and the reflection on how to really implement the actual combat training continues.
After making a successful attempt at the exercise, a certain Zhouqiao brigade of the Central Theater Army did not stop, but specially organized officers and men to sort out a series of thinking concepts and behaviors that were inconsistent with actual combat.
After some in-depth discussions, officers and men generally held that the standards for actual combat are not set in stone, and that only in the course of changes in time and place can we get close to actual combat.
△ Driving door bridge
Different units have different characteristics and carry out different combat tasks, so how can the actual combat standards be rigidly set?
Before the long-distance maneuver, holding the material loading table, Liu Jie, commander of the first battalion and a company of the brigade, was worried: "Shovels, pickaxes and other civil tools are often used to build docks and level the site, and when loading, they are placed on the inside of the carriage, which is inconvenient to use!" ”
It turned out that a certain brother unit had a set of mature material loading experience results, which had been promoted by the superiors. Liu Lianchang had a hard time finding a reference to learn from, who knew that it was not appropriate to take it for a while.
Through this incident, Liu Jie realized: Different units have different characteristics and carry out different combat tasks, so how can the standards of actual combat be rigid? Only by studying and planning battles around the characteristics of the unit can we truly meet the standards of actual combat.
Even the driver of a camp of boats and cars, Zhao Xiuwu, also deeply understood this. Not long ago, he returned from studying at a driver training institution, who knew that once he got on the car, he could not understand the "temper" of the boat car. Because this newly issued boat car is a special vehicle, ultra-long, ultra-wide, and overweight, the general vehicle driving skills cultivated by the driver training institution cannot meet the requirements of use.
The brigade leaders also recognized that different units had different needs for the driver's driving skills. There are many special vehicles distributed in the brigade, but the new drivers who have returned from training cannot be used immediately, which has become a "bottleneck" restricting the construction of the brigade's combat strength.
To this end, this brigade has taken time and energy to arrange for drivers to carry out re-training, and adopted the training mode of "key explanation, long-distance training, and pairing assistance" to rapidly improve the special driving skills of new drivers.
During the interview, Huang Lei, commander of the fourth battalion of the heavy Zhouqiao Battalion, expressed his confusion to reporters: As a battalion commander of the Zhouqiao unit, his core combat ability should be the command of the operation of the Gate Bridge and the mastery of the water situation. This is very different from the ability requirements of a synthetic battalion commander, and whenever there is a major examination, Huang Camp Commander is almost faced with the same content as the synthetic battalion commander: drawing, calculation, running, shooting targets...
Taking the map as an example, the most marked in the training and examination of Commander Huang in peacetime is the determination map of the composite unit, and in the actual battle position, he has hardly used these maps. Staff Officer Kepeng of the Brigade Training was also very helpless about this: he knew that these examination subjects could not reflect the true face of combat effectiveness, but he still had to organize such a training. I want to change but can't do anything, because my superiors will take the test in this way.
Hearing the confusion of Commander Huang and Staff Officer Peng, the reporter could not help but sigh: "If we want different units to establish different standards of actual combat according to the actual conditions of their own units, we must work together from top to bottom. ”
△ Synergy combination
Combat skills should be distinguished from posts, and the combat materials carried should also vary from post to post
Speaking of appraisals, Officer Peng of the Brigade's Political Work Department was somewhat aggrieved -- some time ago, officer Peng was not prepared for the examination of the chief organs, and because he was busy preparing lessons, he finally scored more than 70 points, ranking last in the transcript published on the list, which made him feel very unhappy.
"When fighting a war, the skills used in each position are different, so I and the training staff officers 'measure the length' in the same ability framework, but I can't test them, I am not convinced." As soon as Officer Peng saw the reporter, he opened the conversation box, saying that the art industry has a specialty, each position requires different abilities, the profession is different, and the assessment is not appropriate for "one size fits all".
The brigade leaders also have their own views on the "one-size-fits-all" approach to assessment: People in different posts have different specialties, and under the premise that the common courses of military personnel reach qualified, they should pay more attention to the professions engaged in by each post, and only by allowing professional people to concentrate on doing a good job in their own professions can they find the optimal solution for the generation of combat effectiveness.
"Combat skills should be differentiated from post to post, and the combat materials carried should also vary from post to post." Platoon leader Miao Yunlong patted the bulging bag on his body and told reporters that no matter what kind of battle was fought and where he went to fight, he had to bring all the things on the "watch" with him, and some items were not used at all for the platoon leader of the Zhouqiao troops.
Take the telescope, for example, which he carried for more than ten days during the exercise and never used it.
Brigade commanders and staff officers need telescopes, and Miao Yunlong, as the platoon commander of the Zhouqiao unit, when performing the bridge-building task, a gate bridge is only tens of meters in circumference, and it can be seen at a glance.
It is not okay to bring less combat materials, and it is also a burden to bring more. Miao Yunlong sincerely hoped that if he could carry equipment according to different positions, everyone could only have more combat effectiveness if they held the combat readiness materials they needed.
The leader of the brigade frankly said that the problem was accurate, but it was not easy to solve. A brigade has hundreds of posts, and if each post is distinguished to organize training and assessment, it is very difficult to coordinate as a whole, and it is not convenient to evaluate each other horizontally. This is a huge and complicated systematic project, which requires the painstaking efforts and meticulous study of the chief organs.
△ Unified modulation
If we set the standard of actual combat to death, the happiest is the combat opponent
"Fighting south across the river but carrying cold medicine?" During the exercise, a briefing from the terminal guide caused an uproar in everyone's minds, watching the medicine box bulge, but most of the medicines in it were not useful in the expected battle.
The medicine box is still that medicine box, but when you fight in different places, the variety of medicines in it will change accordingly.
Lu Shuai, the guide and dispatcher, told reporters that during the inspection, they also found that individual units in the exercise only mechanically formulated material carrying standards in accordance with the usual practice, without analyzing the impact of unfamiliar areas, and the result was often that the things needed were not brought, and the unwanted ones were brought instead.
"When to bring something, what to wear for what task, what tactics to use in a war with what opponent, the commander should know as well as Spiegel in his mind." When commenting, a leader of the directing department said that being rigid and rigid is not a real combat, and the standard of actual combat is not a fixed standard, and it is the most important thing to be able to accomplish the combat task well because of "war."
Chen Yin, instructor of the Sixth Battalion, introduced that as a Zhouqiao soldier, although the possibility of the southern conquest and the northern war is very small, it is also necessary to "sing what song to what mountain." Also in the Yangtze River Basin, the situation is very different in different sections of the river. That year, the first time they built a bridge in a certain section of the river, they found that the water flow speed was faster, and the mud at the bottom of the river was different, and the direction of the simple dock by the river was also different, which had an impact on the bridge operation.
Taking the dock orientation as an example, the wharf access road of the troops needs to be perpendicular to the river section, and due to the fast flow speed, the local docks built are parallel to the river, so before erecting the pontoon bridge, the local wharf must be transformed first.
The reporter's field investigation of many battalions and companies in this brigade found that the enthusiasm of officers and men in studying corresponding tactics in light of the characteristics of the tasks and regions is very high, and many good tactics have emerged.
During one exercise, the six battalions combined with the characteristics of the mission waters and ports, adopted the method of local convenience, used large-scale hoisting equipment at local ports, directly "grasped" the parts of the bridge, and steadily unfolded on the river surface, which greatly improved the efficiency of the equipment flooding. After seeing this, the brigade leaders praised one after another: "Although the way the equipment of the sixth battalion is flooded is not the standard practice in the teaching materials, this method is adapted to local conditions and is worth advocating." ”
Ma Jun, the former commander of the health company, a 30-year-old military doctor, found that there were many poisonous snakes in the exercise area, and the health and epidemic prevention work was under great pressure. After the troops were in place, he immediately contacted a number of hospitals with snake venom, conducted field investigations, and selected an emergency route to ensure that the hygienists of each company could rescue the wounded as soon as they found an accident.
At the end of the interview, the reporter could not help but sigh: I once thought that the actual combat standard should be as unquestionable as steel, but here it is changing everywhere.
Will the change of change make the actual combat standards chaotic and lost? In this regard, a leader of the Central Theater Army said: "If we set the standard of actual combat to death, the happiest person is the combat opponent..."
The battlefield calls for "adaptive" capabilities
■ Luo Cifeng
If we follow the habitual thinking, if we are fully armed during the exercise and "lightly armed" during the exercise, the former seems to be close to the actual battle, and it seems that "the implementation of the actual combat standard is not discounted." However, combined with reality to understand and think, sometimes the second approach is the real actual combat.
Problems are easy to find, the key is whether you have the courage to break the rules.
There is an animal in nature called chameleon, which can change the color of the body at any time with the change of the environment, which is conducive to hiding itself and catching prey, which is the ability to "adapt".
The battlefield calls for this "adaptive" ability. It is not a mechanical copy based on dogma and experience, but an analysis and judgment of the current situation, seeking truth from facts, keeping abreast of the reality of the task, and making changes that are beneficial to itself.
At present, some units have organized actual combat training, which has exposed some problems: Some commanders have a very solid basic theory of leading troops to fight a war, but they "panic" as soon as they arrive in unfamiliar areas; some command processes are memorized well, but they are not "spiritual" as soon as they arrive in actual combat; some exercise plans are done in the first place, but they can be "chaotic" as soon as they fight. This phenomenon of two skins of theory and practice is a concrete embodiment of the ability to deviate from actual combat and have poor "adaptive" ability.
During the Liberation War, Liu Deng's army marched thousands of miles into Dabie Mountain, which fully demonstrated its ability to "adapt": Strategically, it completely obeyed the orders of the party Central Committee; although it was a lone army and its future was uncertain, it was still indomitable for the sake of the overall strategic situation; tactically it fully embodied the "adaptive" ability; they closely integrated with the actual conditions of operations, ordered all heavy weapons to be discarded when crossing the Yellow Pan Area, went into battle lightly, and finally successfully arrived at Dabie Mountain, realizing the strategic turning point of the liberation war.
Our army has grown and grown stronger in battle, and mobile and flexible strategy and tactics have always been the magic weapon for our army to defeat the enemy and win victory. The variability and complexity of war are far beyond the imagination of many officers and men, and when training troops in peacetime, we must also be mobile and flexible, and we must not train our troops stupidly or mechanically.
The battlefield is a contest between life and death between the enemy and us, and we must fight in a down-to-earth and hard-hitting manner, and we must not make any false moves or fake moves. Those practices that usually look very close to actual combat and are actually in vain are bound to collapse in one blow on the battlefield.
Today, when the form and mode of war are accelerating, we especially need the "adaptive" ability of "linking with reality, being good at innovation, and daring to take responsibility".
It is hoped that leaders at all levels will attach importance to the ability to "adapt" to the battlefield and create a good atmosphere of strict and down-to-earth training in a difficult and strict manner.
It was published on January 15 in the "Military Camp Observation" section of the People's Liberation Army Daily
Author | Cheng Xiaodong, a reporter for the People's Liberation Army Daily, Zhou Yuan
Photography | Xu Shuitao Zhang Dongqing Fang Yuanchao
Source | Reporter of People's Liberation Army Daily and Military Daily
Producer: Wang Shibin, Zhang Xiaohui
Editor: Ou Can Zou Fei
Editor-in-charge: Du Haifeng Gu Shuai