In April 221 AD, Liu Bei proclaimed himself emperor in Chengdu and established the Shu Han regime. Only three months later, he personally led an army east against Sun Wu to avenge Guan Yu. This decision has been controversial in history, with many believing that Liu Bei should have made a northern expedition to Cao Wei first, or to recuperate, rather than venturing his crusade to the east. However, history is often more complex than we can imagine. If we turn our attention to Luoyang, a key figure that has been overlooked by people has surfaced - Liu Xie, the Duke of Shanyang. The former Emperor Xian of the Han Dynasty, after the Zen throne was given to Cao Pi, was named the Duke of Shanyang, and continued to enjoy special treatment in Shanyang-eup, Hanoi County. What impact did the existence of Liu Xie have on Liu Bei's decision-making? Why did the factor of the Duke of Shanyang make Liu Bei's Eastern Crusade logical? Let's uncover this history and discover the truth hidden beneath the surface.
1. Liu Bei's political dilemma as emperor
In November 220 AD, Emperor Liu Xie of the Han Dynasty was forced to settle in Cao Pi, and the Eastern Han Dynasty was officially declared extinct. Cao Pi established the Wei State, changed the Yuan to the early Huang Dynasty, and named Liu Xie as the Duke of Shanyang. When this news reached Chengdu, it became a rumor that Liu Xie had been killed. After Liu Bei heard the news, he immediately put on filial piety clothes, mourned for Liu Xie, and called him the emperor of filial piety.
However, Liu Bei faced a serious political dilemma at this time. On the one hand, he needs to establish his dominance as soon as possible in order to unite the hearts and minds of the people and defend against foreign enemies. On the other hand, he had to take into account his status as a clan member of the Han family and his loyalty to Emperor Xian of the Han Dynasty. This contradictory situation makes Liu Bei's every move must be cautious.
In this case, Liu Bei became emperor in April 221 A.D. at Wudan Mountain in Chengdu, and the country name was still called Han, and the name was changed to Yuan Zhangwu. Although this move met the expectations of the ministers of Shudi, it also brought huge political pressure to Liu Bei. Because Cao Pi treated Liu Xie well, he not only gained legitimacy in legal theory, but also occupied the high ground morally.
Cao Pi named Liu Xie as the Duke of Shanyang, not only gave him ten thousand households, but also allowed him to continue to use the Han Dynasty era name in his fiefdom, worship the heavens with the rites of the Son of Heaven, and even share the sacrifices of the Taimiao Temple. This method of disposition not only showed the benevolence of the Cao Wei regime, but also skillfully prevented Liu Bei from posing to the possibility of Han orthodoxy.
Faced with this situation, Liu Bei's act of claiming the emperor can be regarded as arrogance to some extent. Because de jure, as long as Liu Xie is alive, he is still the titular Emperor of Han. Liu Bei's proclamation as emperor is actually challenging the political order in the entire pattern of the Three Kingdoms of Wei, Shu and Wu.
What's even more tricky is that Liu Bei also faces challenges from within. Not all Shuzhong officials agreed with Liu Bei's decision to claim the title of emperor. For example, Sima Feishi in the front part once wrote to dissuade him, thinking that rashly becoming emperor without defeating Cao Wei might cause confusion. Although this dissent was suppressed by Liu Bei, it also reflected the existence of different voices within the Shu Han regime.
In addition, Liu Bei also needs to deal with external pressure. The Cao Wei regime had a vast territory and a strong military force, while Sun Wu controlled the rich lands of the Yangtze River valley. In contrast, although the Shu Han regime occupied a geographical advantage, it was still at a disadvantage in terms of overall strength. How to survive in the cracks and how to break the current political deadlock has become a difficult problem that Liu Bei must face.
In this complex political environment, Liu Bei had to resort to some unconventional means to consolidate his rule. On the one hand, he is eager to show his strength and determination, and on the other hand, he needs to carefully maintain his image as a loyal servant of the Han family. This contradictory situation eventually led him to make the decision to go east to conquer Sun Wu.
2. The influence of Shanyang Gong factors on Liu Bei's decision-making
The existence of Liu Xie, the Duke of Shanyang, had a profound impact on Liu Bei's decision-making. Although the former Emperor Xian of Han has abdicated, his political status is still a factor that cannot be ignored. Cao Pi's disposition of Liu Xie not only skillfully solved the problem of the transfer of power, but also won the legitimacy of the Wei state.
The legitimacy of the Cao Wei regime is mainly reflected in two aspects. First of all, Cao Pi obtained the imperial throne through the method of "Chan concession", which formally maintained the legitimacy of regime change. Although this "chan concession" was actually accomplished under the threat of force, Cao Pi still followed a complete set of rituals, including the procedure of three resignations and three concessions. This approach not only won the support of the ministers of the imperial court, but also won the approval of the people to a certain extent.
Second, the Cao Wei regime controlled most of the Central Plains, including nine prefectures of Sizhou, Yuzhou, Qingzhou, Yanzhou, Jizhou, Youzhou, Bingzhou, Xuzhou, and Liangzhou, as well as parts of Jingzhou and Yangzhou. This vast geographical advantage made Cao Wei the de facto most powerful regime. In contrast, Sun Wu only controlled Jiaozhou and parts of Jingzhou and Yangzhou, while Liu Bei's sphere of influence was limited to Yizhou.
In this case, Liu Bei faced huge time pressure. With each additional day, Cao Wei's rule will be more stable, and the people's will will be more turned back. Liu Bei must act as soon as possible, otherwise he may lose the opportunity to fight for the world forever.
However, a direct northern expedition to Cao Wei was not a wise choice. On the one hand, Cao Wei was strong, and it was difficult for Liu Bei's army to achieve a decisive victory in a short period of time. On the other hand, even if Liu Bei was able to defeat Cao Wei, the presence of Liu Xie, the Duke of Shanyang, would raise questions about the legitimacy of his rule. After all, nominally, Liu Xie was still the last emperor of the Han Dynasty.
In this case, the Eastern Crusade became a seemingly viable option. By attacking Sun Wu, Liu Bei could achieve several goals: first, to avenge Guan Yu and establish his image of loyalty; secondly, to strike at Sun Wu's strength and weaken Cao Wei's potential allies; Finally, demonstrate their strength through military operations and enhance the influence of the Shu Han regime.
More importantly, the Eastern Expedition to Sun Wu could buy Liu Bei more time and space. If he could successfully occupy Jingzhou and Yangzhou, Liu Bei would be able to gain more resources and strategic depth to prepare for a decisive battle with Cao Wei in the future. At the same time, this can also attract more Han relict ministers and Jiangnan scholars to join the Shu Han camp and enhance Liu Bei's political influence.
However, there are also huge risks associated with Liu Bei's decision. First of all, Sun Wu is not easy to match, and his naval army is particularly powerful. Second, the long-distance conquest may consume the already abundant resources of Shu Han. Finally, if the war is unfavorable, it may deal a fatal blow to the newly established Shu Han regime.
Despite this, under the influence of the factor of Shanyang Gong Liu Xie, Liu Bei still chose to take a risk. He may have believed that only through large-scale military operations could the current political impasse be broken and more room for the Shu Han regime to develop.
In this decision-making process, we can see Liu Bei's foresight as a politician. He not only took into account the current military situation, but also weighed various political factors, including legitimacy, popular support, geographical advantages, and other aspects. Although the final result was not satisfactory, the decision itself reflected Liu Bei's political wisdom in a complex situation.
3. Strategic considerations for Sun Wu's Eastern Expedition
Liu Bei's decision to go east to conquer Sun Wu was not only out of the emotional factor of avenging Guan Yu, but also out of his deep strategic considerations. This decision, which involved many aspects such as geographical advantages, economic foundation, political support, and military strategy, reflected Liu Bei's comprehensive analysis of the situation at that time.
First of all, from a geographical point of view, taking Jiangnan first has obvious strategic advantages. Jingzhou and Yangzhou are located in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River and control the main water and land transportation routes in southern China. If he could successfully occupy these two regions, Liu Bei would be able to obtain a strategic corridor connecting Bashu and the Central Plains. This can not only provide more strategic depth for Shu Han, but also create favorable conditions for the future Northern Expedition to Cao Wei.
Taking the Battle of Yiling as an example, Liu Bei's choice of offensive line fully embodied this strategic thinking. He led his army eastward along the Yangtze River, first occupying Wuling, Changsha and other places, and then continuing eastward, pointing directly at Yiling. This route can not only make full use of the advantages of water transportation, but also gradually encroach on Sun Wu's territory and accumulate strength for the final decisive battle.
Secondly, striking at the economic base of the state of Wu was another important goal of Liu Bei's eastern expedition. At that time, the state of Wu controlled the lower reaches of the Yangtze River and the southeastern coastal areas, which were not only rich in products, but also an important center of foreign trade. By occupying these regions, Liu Bei could cut off Sun Wu's economic lifeline while securing much-needed supplies and wealth for Shu Han.
For example, during the march, Liu Bei paid special attention to controlling important waters such as Dongting Lake and Poyang Lake. These areas are not only important fishing and agricultural centers, but also transportation hubs connecting the tributaries of the Yangtze River. By controlling these areas, Liu Bei could effectively block Sun-Wu's north-south traffic and obtain large quantities of grain and other strategic materials.
Winning the support of the Jingzhou scholars was the third strategic consideration of Liu Bei's Eastern Expedition. Jingzhou has been a place of great talent since ancient times, with many influential families. Not only did these nobles hold a great deal of land and wealth, but they also had a wide social influence in the local area. If they can win their support, it will greatly enhance the political and military strength of Shu Han.
In this regard, Liu Bei took a series of measures. For example, during the march, he paid special attention to protecting the interests of the local people and the nobles, and strictly forbade the army to harass the people. At the same time, he also actively recruited local talents, such as appointing Huang Zhong as a former general and entrusting him with important tasks. To a certain extent, these measures have won the goodwill of the local scholars.
Finally, taking advantage of the internal contradictions of Wu was also an important strategy for Liu Bei. At that time, Wu was not monolithic, and there were various political factions and interest groups. Liu Bei hoped to exacerbate these internal contradictions through military pressure, thereby breaking Wu's resistance.
For example, before the Battle of Yiling, Liu Bei had sent people to secretly contact some of Wu's generals in an attempt to rebel against them. Although these attempts were ultimately unsuccessful, they also reflected Liu Bei's strategic intention to exploit the internal contradictions of the Wu state.
However, these strategic considerations are not without risk. First of all, the long-distance expedition would put great pressure on Shu Han's logistical supply. Second, if the war is unfavorable, it may cause Shu Han to lose its last stronghold in Jingzhou. Moreover, even if Jiangnan is successfully occupied, it will be a huge challenge to effectively manage these newly conquered areas.
Still, under the circumstances, the Eastern Expedition to Sun Wu was still seen by Liu Bei as a strategic choice worth taking a risk. Through this action, he hoped to change the strategic pattern of the Three Kingdoms and win more space for the development of Shu Han. Although the final result was not satisfactory, the decision itself reflected Liu Bei's overall vision as a politician and military strategist.
Fourth, the analysis of the key battles of the Battle of Yiling
The Battle of Yiling was an important battle during the Three Kingdoms period in the late Eastern Han Dynasty, and it was also a key battle for Liu Bei's eastern expedition against Sun Wu. This battle not only determined the balance of power between Shu Han and Eastern Wu, but also had a profound impact on the entire Three Kingdoms pattern. By analyzing several key battles of the Battle of Yiling, we can gain a deeper understanding of the direction and outcome of this war.
The first key point of the campaign was the offensive route chosen by Liu Bei. He led his army eastward along the Yangtze River, occupied Wuling, Changsha and other places, and then continued eastward, pointing directly at Yiling. The choice of this route fully reflects Liu Bei's strategic intentions. First of all, going down the river can make full use of the advantages of water transportation to ensure the logistical supply of the army. Secondly, the gradual occupation of cities along the route can accumulate strength for the final decisive battle. However, this method of attacking also had its weaknesses, namely the slower pace of the march, which gave Sun Quan enough time to react.
The second key point is the tactics adopted by Liu Bei near Yiling. Liu Bei chose to set up a camp in the mountainous area near Yiling, which had both advantages and disadvantages. The advantage is that you can use the terrain to defend and at the same time control the main road to Gangneung. However, the disadvantage lies in the dispersion of troops, which makes it more difficult to communicate with each other. For example, Liu Bei set up camps in Dingling, Wushan and other places west of Yiling, which were far apart from each other, and it was difficult to quickly support them in the event of a surprise attack by the enemy.
The third key point is the fire attack tactics of Lu Xun, the general of the Wu army. Lu Xun observed that most of the Shu military camps were built in the mountains and forests, and the weather was hot, which was very suitable for fire attacks. He ordered his subordinates to raid the Shu military camp at night, while setting fire to it on all sides. This tactic was a great success, not only destroying a large number of Shu army camps, but also causing a large-scale rout of the Shu army. The success of this fire attack not only reflected Lu Xun's military talent, but also exposed Liu Bei's negligence in defensive deployment.
The fourth key point is Liu Bei's retreat. After encountering a fire attack, Liu Bei led the remnants of his army to retreat westward. However, this retreat did not go well. On the one hand, the Wu army followed closely behind, constantly harassing and volleying. On the other hand, the morale of the Shu army was low, and the supply lines had been cut off, making it difficult to maintain an orderly retreat. Under these circumstances, Liu Bei had to give up a large amount of baggage and ordnance, and even personally cut off the rear to cover the retreat of the troops. This retreat not only led to heavy losses for the Shu army, but also greatly undermined Liu Bei's prestige.
The fifth key point is the defensive battle of the White Emperor City. During the retreat, Liu Bei led the remnants to retreat to the White Emperor City. This city located in the Three Gorges area of the Yangtze River has a dangerous terrain and is easy to defend and difficult to attack. Liu Bei took advantage of this geographical advantage to successfully block the attack of the Wu army and secure the last foothold for Shu Han. Although the defensive battle of the White Emperor City was not large-scale, it played a key role in stabilizing the situation and saving the Shu Han regime.
The last key point is the post-war peace talks. After a terrible battle, both sides realized that the cost of continuing the war was too high. Liu Bei sent Zhuge Liang to negotiate with Lu Xun, and a peace agreement was finally reached. This negotiation not only ended the Battle of Yiling, but also won a respite for Shu Han.
By analyzing these key battles, we can see the complexity and drama of the Battle of Yiling. This war is not only a contest of military strength, but also a contest of strategy, tactics, and diplomatic wisdom. Although it ended in Liu Bei's defeat, the military talent and political wisdom displayed by both sides throughout the war are worthy of in-depth study by future generations.
5. The impact of the Battle of Yiling on the pattern of the Three Kingdoms
As an important battle in the Three Kingdoms period, the Battle of Yiling had an impact far beyond the military level and had a profound impact on the entire pattern of the Three Kingdoms. This battle not only changed the balance of power between Shu Han and Eastern Wu, but also indirectly affected the strategic deployment of Wei, which eventually led to a subtle change in the balance between the three kingdoms.
First of all, the Battle of Yiling greatly weakened the military strength of Shu Han. In this battle, Shu Han not only lost a large number of elite troops, but also lost a number of important generals. For example, Huang Zhong was killed in battle, and Zhang Fei was killed by his subordinates during his retreat. These losses dealt a heavy blow to Shu Han's military strength, making it difficult for Shu Han to launch large-scale military operations for a long time to come.
Specifically, Shu Han had to adopt a more conservative military strategy after the Battle of Yiling. For example, during Zhuge Liang's reign, although there were many northern expeditions to the Wei state, the scale and duration were far inferior to the Battle of Yiling. This weakening of military power directly affected Shu Han's position in the Three Kingdoms pattern, causing it to gradually transform from an attacker to a defender.
Second, the Battle of Yiling consolidated the rule of Eastern Wu in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River. Through this campaign, Eastern Wu not only succeeded in repelling the Shu Han attack, but also consolidated its own control in Jingzhou and the Jiangnan region. This allowed Soochow to concentrate more resources on economic development and increase national strength. For example, after the Battle of Yiling, Sun Quan vigorously developed water transportation and maritime trade, which significantly increased the economic power of Eastern Wu.
In addition, the victory in the Battle of Yiling also boosted the morale and combat effectiveness of the Eastern Wu army. Lu Xun's outstanding military talent in this battle made him a central figure in the Eastern Wu army. In the years that followed, Lu Xun led his army to repel the attacks of Wei many times, and made important contributions to the survival and development of Eastern Wu.
For Wei, although not directly involved in the Battle of Yiling, the outcome of this battle had an important impact on its strategic deployment. The defeat and weakening of Shu Han greatly reduced the pressure on Wei on the Western Front. This allowed Wei to devote more of its military resources to the war against Eastern Wu.
For example, shortly after the Battle of Yiling, the Wei state launched a large-scale attack on Eastern Wu. In 222 AD, Cao Xiu, a general of Wei, led his army south in an attempt to capture Xiangyang, an important town in Eastern Wu. Although this attack was eventually repelled by Lu Xun, it also showed that Wei had already pointed the main spearhead at Eastern Wu.
However, the new pattern that formed after the Battle of Yiling was not entirely favorable to the Wei state. Although Shu Han and Eastern Wu suffered heavy losses, they did not completely lose their ability to resist. On the contrary, both regimes, after a bitter war, realized the importance of supporting each other. Therefore, in the years that followed, Shu Han and Eastern Wu repeatedly took joint action to jointly resist the Wei attack.
This new alliance played an important role in the later period of the Three Kingdoms. For example, in the famous battle of "Seven Captures of Meng" in Wei, Shu Han and Eastern Wu successfully contained Wei's forces through coordinated operations, and bought time for Shu Han to quell the Nanzhong rebellion.
Another notable effect is that after the Battle of Yiling, the pattern of warfare between the three kingdoms changed. Large-scale decisive battles gradually dwindled, replaced by small-scale border clashes and battles for strategic points. This change reflects the relative balance of power among the three countries, as well as the desire for peace after a large-scale war.
For example, in the decade after the Battle of Yiling, although the wars between the three kingdoms did not stop, they were all relatively small. The Wei State attacked Hanzhong several times, and the Shu Han also made several northern expeditions, but the scale and duration of these battles were far inferior to the previous wars.
Overall, the Battle of Yiling was an important turning point in the Three Kingdoms period. It not only changed the balance of power between Shu Han and Eastern Wu, but also affected the strategic deployment of Wei, which eventually led to the formation of a new pattern of relative balance between the three kingdoms. Although this new pattern has not completely changed the situation of the three countries, it has profoundly affected the way in which the three countries interact and their respective development strategies.