Before the official visit to China, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a new appointment order, determined the leadership of the presidential office, and basically completed the high-level change of the Russian central government. In the process, Putin's confidant, Alexei Dyumin, the former governor of the Tula region, was also able to return to Moscow and officially enter the core of power.
[Putin's confidant, Alexei Dyumin, former governor of the Tula region, has returned to Moscow]
According to the list released by the Kremlin, Putin's personnel adjustment in the presidential office this time is not large, most of the people, including the presidential chief of staff Vaino, deputy director and press secretary Peskov, have been retained, and there are only two high-level assistants who have really been transferred from other departments to the presidential office, the former governor of the Tula region, Changming, and the former secretary of the Federal Security Council Patrushev.
Although both serve as assistants, Putin is now transferring the two men to the Kremlin with different intentions.
Patrushev, who is 73 years old, has really entered the central power since 2008, when he became secretary of the Security Council, but after serving as assistant to the president, he was only responsible for shipbuilding. Instead, it was his son Dmitry, who was promoted by Putin from Minister of Agriculture to Deputy Prime Minister in charge of agriculture. It can be seen that Patrushev's assistant position is in fact an idle position before retirement.
[Patrushev's assistant position is more like an idle job for the elderly before retirement]
For Jiuming, being able to enter the palace now can be regarded as a key step in his political career.
The 51-year-old Jiuming was born in the counterintelligence department of the Russian army, and later entered the security system, and was once Putin's personal adjutant, and is an important figure in the younger generation of the "Sirovik" group.
In 2016, Putin delegated Jiu Ming, who had just served as deputy defense minister for less than half a year, to Tula Oblast as governor. At that time, there was speculation that Putin intended to cultivate Jiuming so that he could go further in the future and take up more important positions, and there were even rumors that Jiuming might be Putin's internal "successor". The purpose of making him governor is to enrich his resume and develop his ability to govern.
Before the change of the Russian government, Putin held a working meeting with Jiuming, and the outside world basically determined that Jiuming would be transferred back to Moscow. It's just that at that time, there was widespread speculation that Jiuming would succeed Shoigu as Minister of Defense, but he didn't expect Putin to transfer him directly to the Kremlin.
[The outside world originally thought that Jiuming would succeed Shoigu and become the Russian Defense Minister]
However, if we carefully analyze the current situation in Russia, this job arrangement is actually more conducive to the future development of Jiuming.
First of all, in the context of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the post of Russian defense minister, which seems to be more powerful, is actually a hot potato. Although the Russian army currently has an advantage on the front line, the situation on the battlefield is ever-changing, and a new batch of assistance from NATO to Ukraine is about to arrive, no one dares to say that in this summer's offensive campaign, the Russian army will inevitably be able to achieve a big victory. If the Russian army fails to attack on the battlefield, it is natural to "take the blame" for the defense minister.
At the same time, in Putin's plan, the civilian officials of the Russian Ministry of Defense now have a top priority in cooperating with the government to promote the development of the "wartime economy." And to accomplish this task, you need to have work experience in the economic field and be able to really spend your money where it should be. Belousov, who served as first deputy prime minister, is undoubtedly better suited to this task than Jiuming.
Second, the position of assistant to the president is actually closer to the core of power than the secretary of defense. The suggestions made by the assistants can often affect Putin's decision-making more directly, and according to the division of labor, the assistants can also participate in specific matters.
[After serving as an assistant, Hisaki's opinions can have a direct impact on Putin]
Hisaki was responsible for overseeing the Russian military-industrial complex, sports affairs, and the Council of State. Among the more important are the supervision of the military-industrial complex and the work of the Council of State.
Let's start with the matter of supervising the military-industrial complex. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine will continue for a certain period of time, and whether Russia can achieve victory in the end depends to a large extent on whether the rear can provide a stable supply of weapons and ammunition. However, as president, Putin cannot always personally supervise military production, but needs to find a confidant to coordinate various departments to ensure the progress of military production.
In this case, Jiuming, who has served in the military and has been polished in the civilian system for many years, has become a suitable choice.
In addition, the State Affairs Council of the Russian Federation, which is a special organ within the Russian government, although it does not have legislative power, can participate in formulating domestic and foreign policies, deciding on personnel policies, and demanding changes to laws.
But Putin also does not have time, and has been personally involved in the daily work of the committee, and Jiuming will now cooperate with the secretary general of the committee to ensure the operation of the committee.
[There are too many things that Putin himself needs to deal with, and it is impossible to do everything himself]
It can be seen from this that Jiu Ming is now holding a special position with a certain amount of real power, can participate in national decision-making, and is convenient for himself to be familiar with the power operation mode of the central government, but there is no risk of "taking the blame" and is not easy to be criticized by the outside world.
As long as Jiu Ming can safely complete all the tasks assigned by Putin during his time as an assistant, he is expected to take up some more critical positions in a few years.
It should be added that in the current internal personnel adjustment, Jiuming is not the only local senior member who has been transferred to the central government, and many of them are also outstanding members of the younger generation in the Russian political arena. The most obvious example is the former governor of the Kaliningrad region and the new minister of industry and trade, Anton Alikhanov, who is only 38 years old this year, and was the youngest governor of Russia.
[Former Kaliningrad Governor Alikhanov and other local officials were also transferred to the Central Committee this time]
This also shows from the side that the Russian political arena has entered a critical period of replacement between the old and the new, and Putin needs to rely on experienced "veterans" such as Shoigu and Lavrov to get through the current difficult period, but he must also make arrangements in advance to cultivate talents for Russia's future.
After the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Jiuming and other post-70s and 80s officials who are optimistic about Putin will gradually take over the burden of Shoigu and others and truly decide the future of Russia. As for who among these people will eventually inherit Putin's political legacy and become the new generation of Russian leaders, it will depend on their performance in the coming years, as well as Putin's final choice.