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Chiang Kai-shek in his later years regretted it and sighed: The biggest mistake was not to withdraw the elite troops from the northeast

author:Jess talks about history

In 1949, a tide that decided the fate of China was officially set off. That year, the People's Liberation Army crossed the Yangtze River with overwhelming force, marking the complete collapse of the Nationalist government in Nanjing. Chiang Kai-shek, the once powerful leader, moved to Taiwan after losing the mainland, and began a long period of reflection and summary. Among them, what is the one thing he regrets the most? It turned out to be the elite troops that did not withdraw from the Northeast in time in 1948!

Chiang Kai-shek in his later years regretted it and sighed: The biggest mistake was not to withdraw the elite troops from the northeast

The year 1949 was undoubtedly a turning point for China. That year, with the People's Liberation Army crossing the river, the Nationalist government in Nanjing came to an end, and Chiang Kai-shek had to flee to Taiwan with the remaining troops to begin his later life. During his years in Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek had more time to look back on the past and more time to reflect on his decisions and mistakes. Among them, he regretted the most that he did not withdraw the elite troops from the northeast in time in 1948.

Chiang Kai-shek in his later years regretted it and sighed: The biggest mistake was not to withdraw the elite troops from the northeast

Why was the Northeast so important that Chiang Kai-shek would be obsessed with it? The Northeast is not only the breadbasket of China, with vast black soils, but also rich in natural resources, such as forests, coal mines, and iron ore. Due to the historical struggle between Russia and Japan for hegemony, Northeast China has established a complete industrial system and railway network, which has made Northeast China an important industrial base for the whole of China.

However, after the end of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party knew that controlling the northeast was equivalent to controlling important strategic resources. Mao Zedong and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China had already aimed at the northeast long before the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, believing that this was an excellent opportunity to develop our army and consolidate its strength. Chiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, was aware of the importance of the Northeast, but his actions were slow and hesitant.

Chiang Kai-shek in his later years regretted it and sighed: The biggest mistake was not to withdraw the elite troops from the northeast

Chiang Kai-shek's hesitation stemmed in part from his consideration of the historical baggage of the Northeast. The Northeast had long been the sphere of influence of Zhang Zuolin and his son Zhang Xueliang, and the Nationalist government never had real control over it. In addition, after the "918" incident, Northeast China became a Japanese colony until the intervention of the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. Chiang Kai-shek's attitude toward the Northeast after the war was mixed, and he feared that excessive military involvement would provoke discontent from the Soviet Union and thus bring greater international pressure.

Driven by the United States, Chiang Kai-shek finally decided to take a more aggressive approach to the Northeast. The implementation of this decision is fraught with problems. Chiang Kai-shek's selection of candidates mainly took into account his own cronies and geographical relations, especially the preference for generals and officials from Zhejiang, and this strategy of employing people seemed out of place in the diverse land of China. As a result, the military deployment and political strategy in the northeast have been greatly constrained, and it has not been able to form effective local alliances and popular support. This internal rift laid the groundwork for the later decisive battle between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

Chiang Kai-shek in his later years regretted it and sighed: The biggest mistake was not to withdraw the elite troops from the northeast

In 1948, as the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party intensified, Chiang Kai-shek began to realize the importance of the Northeast Theater, but this time the time was fleeting. The start of the Liaoshen Campaign marked the full-scale outbreak of the Northeast Battlefield, where Chiang Kai-shek's elite troops encountered unprecedented challenges. Although the Kuomintang army was well-equipped, there was a clear gap between it and the People's Liberation Army in terms of strategic command and morale, and in addition the long supply lines and logistical support difficulties, the performance on the battlefield was far from satisfactory.

In his post-war reflections, Chiang Kai-shek believed that if he could retreat decisively in early 1948 and preserve his strength, he might be able to play better on other fronts. History has no ifs, and the defeat in the Northeast Battlefield directly led to a large consumption of the military strength of the Nationalist Government, and also laid the foundation for a series of defeats and retreats that followed. Chiang Kai-shek's mistake in decision-making was not only a simple military mistake, but also a major misreading of the political situation.

Chiang Kai-shek in his later years regretted it and sighed: The biggest mistake was not to withdraw the elite troops from the northeast

Political corruption and economic collapse were the more fundamental causes of the Nationalist Government's loss of popular support. Chiang Kai-shek's government had long relied on foreign aid, had serious internal corruption, and over-relied on foreign capital in economic policy to the neglect of domestic economic construction. This policy mistake made the Nationalist government's domestic support base weaker and weaker, and it eventually lost the upper hand in the struggle against the Communist Party.

Chiang Kai-shek in his later years regretted it and sighed: The biggest mistake was not to withdraw the elite troops from the northeast

On the other hand, popular dissatisfaction with Chiang Kai-shek's government was also related to its methods of governance. Severe repression and the lack of effective measures to improve people's livelihood have led to a steady decline in popular support for the Nationalist Government. The Communist Party, on the other hand, succeeded in winning the support of a large number of peasants through measures such as land reform, which largely accelerated the collapse of the Nationalist government.

Chiang Kai-shek in his later years regretted it and sighed: The biggest mistake was not to withdraw the elite troops from the northeast

This series of internal and external factors intertwined to form the complex background to the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek and his regime. The missteps in the Northeast Battlefield have undoubtedly exacerbated this process. Chiang Kai-shek's reflections and remorse in his later years, although they left a profound lesson for history, also reflected his helplessness and confusion about his political career.