According to information from overseas open-source platforms, a large number of Chinese ships departing from Hainan and other places are gathering on Scarborough Shoal in multiple routes, and at the same time, the Chinese Coast Guard has also carried out maritime exercises in the area, and for the first time released high-definition aerial images of Scarborough Shoal.
This series of developments is a clear indication that China is strengthening its strategic deployment in the Scarborough Shoal region in response to a series of recent provocative actions by the United States and the Philippines.
According to data provided by the AIS system, some Westerners concerned about the situation in the South China Sea have observed that in the near future, the waters around Scarborough Shoal will gather a large fleet of at least four Chinese coast guard patrol vessels and 26 civilian vessels.
China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant authorities have confirmed that the China Coast Guard is conducting regular maritime training in the waters off Scarborough Shoal, with a focus on improving maritime rescue skills.
At the same time, there are also Chinese fishing boats in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal carrying out normal fishing operations.
Western observers and domestic media generally believe that the CCG's training and vessel build-up in the Scarborough Shoal area is a precautionary plan to quickly block the waters around Scarborough Shoal if necessary in response to an upcoming "civilian operation" by the Philippines.
The "civil action" they refer to is actually a maritime protest called "This is our South China Sea" planned by certain non-governmental organizations in the Philippines.
In the campaign, the Philippines plans to use several large maritime vessels to carry activists and a large fleet of about 100 Filipino fishing boats to the waters near Scarborough Shoal, with the intention of asserting its so-called "sovereignty in the South China Sea" by placing buoys.
The original plan was to start this civil action around May 14.
Objectively speaking, the China Coast Guard's training activities at Scarborough Shoal do have the ability to deploy in advance and respond to relevant Philippine operations.
But given the realities of the South China Sea, this civilian action is just one of the many factors that have triggered the regular training of the Chinese coast guard and the release of high-definition aerial footage of Scarborough Shoal by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
China is now taking the initiative to step up its actions in the direction of Scarborough Shoal, asserting its sovereignty through various channels, and more importantly, in response to the increasing tension in the South China Sea following a series of incidents such as the deployment of the Philippines by the US intermediate-range missile system.
In October this year, the United States took the opportunity of the "Shield-24" military exercise jointly held with the Philippines to deploy the US Army's First Multi-Domain Task Force to the northern part of the Philippine island of Luzon for the first time.
The task force is equipped with the Typhon system, capable of launching a variety of missiles, including Tomahawk and Standard-6, giving it long-range strike capabilities, a key weapon system that the U.S. Army has equipped to rebuild its INF capability after the INF Treaty expires.
After being deployed in northern Luzon, the task force theoretically has the potential to pose a potential threat to the central and northern parts of the South China Sea, ##岛等目标进行打击的能力, and even to Hainan, Guangdong, and other places.
After the end of the "Shield-24" exercise, the US military did not withdraw this unit in time, apparently intending to make the intermediate-range missile system permanent in the Philippines.
In addition, in early May, U.S. and Philippine forces sank a targeted Chinese-made oil tanker in waters northwest of Luzon in an apparent attempt to demonstrate to China the two countries' maritime strike capabilities in preparation for more future operations in the South China Sea.
China is well aware of the intentions of the United States and the Philippines.
At the 30th ASEAN-China Senior Officials' Consultation held recently, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong held face-to-face talks with Philippine diplomats and clearly expressed his concern over the deployment of the US intermediate-range missile system to the Philippines and other events.
Against this overall backdrop, the strategic importance of Scarborough Shoal – just over 200 kilometers from the coastline of Luzon and about 350 kilometers from Manila, the capital of the Philippines, is becoming increasingly important.
If only to deal with the United States and the Philippines, China is well positioned to resume land reclamation at Scarborough Shoal and transform the reef into a key strategic point similar to Mischief Reef and elsewhere.
By deploying early warning radars and anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems here, China can expand the range of its own anti-missile early warning.
If the United States and the Philippines take a risky action, China will be able to intercept the missiles flying towards China at the first opportunity.
In practice, land reclamation at Scarborough Shoal is the most politically and militarily significant of all China's current options, and the most deterrent to the United States and the Philippines.
In other words, given the current situation in the South China Sea, Scarborough Shoal will undoubtedly be the place of choice if China decides to restart its reclamation program.
However, given that the South China Sea issue is not only about China and the Philippines, China would be able to restart its land reclamation project at Scarborough Shoal.
It will inevitably cause panic among Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and other relevant countries in the South China Sea, which in turn will affect the negotiations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea that China and ASEAN are jointly promoting.
As a result, China has not immediately dispatched professional dredgers to Scarborough Shoal for land reclamation.
Nonetheless, this does not prevent China from using other means to enhance the strategic position of Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea response system, and to strengthen its deployment in this direction to ensure that it can act quickly if land reclamation is needed in the future.
Judging from the sequence of actions in which the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs first communicated with the Philippines, ASEAN and other parties, and then carried out regular coast guard training at Scarborough Shoal, it can be seen that China is still adopting a strategy of "salute before soldiers" to respond to changes in the situation in the South China Sea.
This is both a demonstration of China's strength and a chance for Manila to ease relations.
If the Philippines fails to seize this opportunity and continues to act as a proxy for the United States to maintain its hegemonic system and promote bloc confrontation, then land reclamation plans for Scarborough Shoal and Xianbin Jiao will naturally be put on the agenda.