Trust Fireworks Show.
Two weeks ago, Ping An Trust officially announced that its trust product named "Funing No. 615" could not be redeemed.
Well, thunder.
The reason for the thunderstorm of this product is that
Invested in the "Zhenhua Mansion" project developed by Zhenro Real Estate in Xiamen, and Zhenro was unable to redeem the thunderstorm, so this product was naturally thunderous.
In fact, this is the fourth time this month that there has been a trust negative/thunderstorm message.
On April 1, Sichuan Trust officially went bankrupt.
Since June 2020, the redemption of Sichuan Trust's products with a scale of more than 25 billion yuan has been overdue. In the past four years, after several times of more than 1,000 investors went to Chengdu to "have a party", Sichuan Trust finally entered bankruptcy proceedings.
On April 11, Minmetals Trust's products expired.
The three Kunming political credit products entrusted to it were overdue, and the financing and guarantee parties were all various urban investment companies in Kunming.
Besides
A number of products under Minmetals Trust have also successively stepped on many thunderstorm real estate companies such as Evergrande, Tahoe, Blu-ray, China Fortune, and Aoyuan.
On April 11, Minsheng Trust was entrusted.
CITIC Trust and Huarong Trust officially intervened in the daily operation of Minsheng Trust. The reason why Minsheng Trust was "taken over" was that its products were thundered in a large area. The reason for the large-scale thunderstorm of its products is that it has invested funds in a number of thunderstorm real estate projects.
On April 11, Cedar Trust was exposed to self-financing.
Cedar Trust, which prides itself on being a "supply chain finance", was found by the regulator to be secretly engaged in "self-financing". The so-called "self-financing" refers to self-financing of products, which is a serious illegal and criminal act in the financial industry.
Where did the money from Cedar's self-financing go?
Do your own real estate!
In less than 20 days, 4 batches of trusts were negatively thundered, and they survived a fireworks show.
In this fireworks show, criticism can't avoid a fuse:
Real estate!
Alas......
We also deserve to be scolded,
What a bullshit rotten industry.
Seeing this, you think I'm about to talk about -
After the real estate thunderstorm, the trust was also pulled into the water, and there were no eggs under the nest, so we had to hurry up to save the property market?
Trust must not be bought, greed is the original sin, thunderstorm is you deserve it?
No, no, no!
Today's focus is not here.
Next
I would like to say a very, very, very serious topic: finance without regulation is a naked robbery.
I hope that every friend who reads this article can ask the following three questions when encountering a thunderstorm of financial products in the future:
What kind of financial product is it, and what is the underlying asset of this financial product?
How was this product sold, and was the sales process compliant?
Who is the product sold to, and is the investor compliant?
Only by figuring out these three questions,
Only then can we truly understand the full picture of the thunderstorm and truly avoid similar tragedies from happening again.
Question 1: What kind of financial product is a trust?
To be honest, I can't tell.
Not only can't I say clearly, but maybe even the people who sold the trust can't say clearly.
In March 2023, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) issued the Notice on Standardizing the Classification of Trust Business of Trust Companies.
In the Circular, the trust business is divided into three categories:
These three types of business correspond to different trust products.
These trust products will be complicated to explain one by one. However, it doesn't matter.
Importantly,
As a company engaged in trust business, your financial statements must clearly show the various businesses.
——How many trust products have you issued, and which category these products belong to due to the different underlying assets.
But!
If you look at the financial statements of trust companies, you will find an incredible fact: there is hardly a trust company that has a clear classification of how to do business.
- You can't clearly see the flow of funds in trust products through financial statements.
Some trust plans may actually be channel business;
A large number of accounts receivable liquidity model transfused to financing platforms can be packaged as property rights trusts even though they are loans;
Real estate projects can be financed through the channels of industrial and commercial enterprises, and the most typical Evergrande automobile is the channel of Evergrande real estate financing.
You don't understand?
It's okay, I'll tell you one thing:
A large number of trust products are not in the right place.
After they are loaded into various junk assets, they are packaged as fixed income products and then sold to investors.
Let's take an example that is inaccurate but straightforward enough.
A trust company issued a trust plan and told you that the underlying asset of this product is the equity of Evergrande Automobile.
You happily rushed in, thinking that you had finally entered the new energy industry, and you were particularly confident in scolding the property market:
Real estate is a low-cost goods, and Mo comes to Lao Tzu's side.
Unexpectedly, the money you invested in Evergrande Auto went around in a big circle, but it eventually flowed to Evergrande Real Estate.
When I was dying, I sat up in shock, and the clown was myself.
It is said that the first step in risk avoidance is to identify risks.
If a trust company's financial statements are completely decoupled from its actual business, and the trust products it issues have nothing to do with the underlying assets, investors will not be able to understand the products they have invested in, and what the hell the underlying assets are......
Let's talk about a fart risk aversion!
Question 2: How was the trust sold?
The sales process of a product like a trust should be-
Professionals with relevant qualifications will first clearly identify whether the customer meets the requirements of qualified investors, and clearly inform the customer of the risk level and capital flow of the product on the premise of resolutely not promising capital preservation and minimum returns, and make audio and video recordings of the whole process.
however
This is not the case!
Let's take the "Funing 615" product of Ping An Trust as an example, although it cannot represent the whole picture of all trusts, it exposes a series of unbelievable sales of trust products.
For example, a life insurance salesman sells trusts.
In the rights protection video on April 11, Ping An's life insurance salesman made it clear that I sold trust products to customers through life insurance channels.
In the video, there is another original sentence:
If the life insurance does not give this right, how can I have so much ability to sell this product directly to the customer?
Including according to a survey by Sanlian Life Weekly,
Most of the investors in "Funing 615" bought this trust through their own insurance salesmen.
As early as October 2015, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission issued the "Notice on Strictly Regulating the Sales of Non-insurance Financial Products", which is very clear: insurance companies, insurance intermediaries and their practitioners are not allowed to sell non-insurance financial products.
Ten years have passed,
Why is there still such a serious non-compliance in a super-large enterprise like Ping An?
What is regulation doing?
For example, full of rhetoric about sidekicks.
The investors of "Funing 615" are all products purchased through the "Bao Zun Bao" platform jointly created by Ping An Lufax and Ping An Life.
The following picture is the description of Bao Zun Bao in the training materials of Ping An Insurance salesman:
The PPT in the style of the last century is full of sensitive words.
High security, rock-solid, investors get 100% of the expected returns, there is no risk of loss of interests, and the returns are 15%-30% higher than those of peers.
These swords may not be able to be broadcast in the video, so they are written in the propaganda materials nakedly.
According to the new regulations on asset management in 2018 and the new regulations on trust business in 2023,
It is not allowed to guarantee the principal and income in any form, let alone make promises to investors in any form.
Ten years have passed,
Why is there still such a hint that it appears in a super-large enterprise like Ping An?
What is regulation doing?
In addition, there are many non-compliance scenarios like this in the sales process of this trust product.
For example, some investors and even salesmen were not clearly informed that the risk level of this trust product was R4 (medium and high risk) when they received training, but were repeatedly hinted that our big brand of Ping An has never had an accident in the past, and it is safe without risk.
At this point, you will find:
The whole thing is off the charts.
A group of unqualified insurance salesmen, receiving zero-risk, high-yield suggestive edge training, selling R4 (medium and high-risk) investment products.
In the whole sales process, except for the trust license, which is compliant, the rest is all rubbing.
Question 3: To whom was the trust product sold?
As a medium and high-risk product, trusts have extremely high threshold requirements for investors.
Take a look at the picture below: This is a screenshot of the chat of an unfortunate investor during the snowball financial thunderstorm.
Because of leverage, the investor's 2 million funds have no principal and interest.
The word "um" is light and light, indicating that I already know and accept it.
That's what makes a qualified investor!
It is a high return, bearing high risks, and having the ability to accept the consequences of losing principal and interest.
That's not clear enough, you say?
Ok, it's clear!
According to the new regulations on asset management in 2018 and the Interim Measures for the Management of Trust Companies in 2020——
Investors in trust products should meet the following conditions: have more than two years of investment experience, have a net family financial asset of not less than 3 million yuan, or family financial assets of not less than 5 million yuan, or have an average annual income of not less than 400,000 yuan in the past three years, and can provide proof of income.
Clear enough!
So, do investors in trust products really meet the above conditions?
According to a survey by Sanlian Life Weekly,
When the income certificate was not approved, the commissioner of Ping An Lufax said:
You can make a certificate yourself, it's very simple, stamping a way, and the small company seal can be used.
even
When some investors don't even have enough investment funds, there are insurance salesmen who guide them on how to use the insurance policy to apply for Ping An's "policy loan", and the loan enters the game.
The salesman said,
The interest rate of the loan is low, the interest rate of the trust is high, and the interest rate difference can be eaten by buying a trust with a loan.
Well, it's silky.
Finally, let's go back and watch the trust thunderstorm fireworks show this time.
We can directly spray real estate,
This calf with a thousand knives is the fuse, and it is it that drags down the trust.
We can also stand on the moral high ground and criticize investors.
It's just that you are too greedy, and you always want to do a big ticket, this thunderstorm, you want other people's high interest rates, and people value your principal.
But
We need to look more clearly at the problem of trust: it is crooked at the root!
When there is a mismatch between your trust product and the underlying assets, you think you are buying the equity of new energy, but the money actually flows into the real estate, and in the end you get back a thunderstorm sorry notice, how can we judge its risk?
When your trust products are sold to non-qualified investors who do not have the ability to discern and invest, and the sales process is full of non-compliant hints of capital preservation and high returns, how can they resist such temptation?
To be honest, I'm not a professional financial practitioner.
Even if I am not professional, if I look at these thunderous trust products, I can find a series of non-compliance: the loopholes are broken like the crotch of an old lady's cotton pants.
More professional regulators,
What are you doing?
Remember what I mentioned at the beginning?
Finance without regulation is a naked robbery.
After every thunderstorm, we carry out a series of risk education that is almost hindsight: you must resist the temptation of high interest rates, and reject all promises of high interest rate capital preservation. If the yield exceeds 6%, it will be a question mark, if it exceeds 8%, it will be dangerous, and if it is more than 10%, it will be prepared to lose all the principal.
But, what I'm trying to say is -
Ordinary people, most of whom are greedy and ignorant.
setting of regulatory rules,
It must be based on "ordinary people are greedy and ignorant", not on "rational and professional".
Like those thunderstorm trusts, there is no mandatory and clear supervision of the underlying assets and capital flow when the product is designed, there is no mandatory requirement for the relevant qualifications of practitioners at the time of sales, there is no penalty for the commitment to rub the edge in the sales process, and the qualification review of investors is full of loopholes and fraud......
When waiting for the thunderstorm, I said lightly:
It's you who are too greedy.
What is it called?
Use the greed and ignorance of ordinary people to cover up the lack of supervision!