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From the night of October 28 to 30, 1950, the battle to annihilate the enemy in front of him began one after another. Among them, the first was the battle of Longgudong of the 118th Division, and the second was the battle of Gutoudong of the 120th Division.
1. Battle in Longgu Cave and Turtle Cave
Longgu Cave is a small village with only a few dozen families in the south of Guchang.
The headquarters of the 7th Regiment of the ROK Army, which retreated from Chushan, was once located here.
On the evening of the 29th, the 118th Division found that the enemy troops trapped near Longgu Cave showed signs of breaking through, and in order not to lose the opportunity, Deng Yue decided to launch an attack without waiting for the 148th Division to arrive. Seeing the critical situation in front of him, the commander of the 7th Regiment of the ROK Army, who was in the dead ground, immediately ordered "all units to do their best to break through separately and assemble at the stadium hole."
This order for everyone to disperse and flee had the effect of saving the regiment from total annihilation. In accordance with this order, the officers and men of the regiment scattered and fled in all directions, and plunged into the ravines and jungles one after another, turning this planned encirclement and annihilation battle into a time-consuming and laborious search and suppression operation.
Almost at the same time as the battle of Ryugok-dong, the battle of Gutou Cave was also underway.
Gutou Cave is located between Heecheon and Onjeong, and it is the only way for the 6th Division of the ROK Army to reoccupy Onjeong and receive the 7th Regiment that has advanced alone.
At that time, the 120th Division of the 40th Army was facing off with 2 battalions of the 6th Division of the ROK Army in order to attract reinforcements from the rest of the 6th Division and the 8th Division, but until the evening of the 28th, the ROK Army only dispatched 2 battalions from Heecheon to reinforce in the direction of Gutoudong, and the main force remained in the stadium area.
According to Shiji's order to quickly annihilate two battalions of the 6th and 8th divisions of the ROK Army in the Gutoudong area, the 40th Army made a combat deployment at 14 o'clock on the 28th.
The attack was launched at midnight on the 28th, and the fierce battle lasted until the morning of the 29th, inflicting heavy blows on the 19th Regiment of the 6th Division and the 10th Regiment of the 8th Division of the ROK Army.
The "History of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea" said that the battle "annihilated most of the four battalions of the South Korean Army", and the 40th Army's post-war summary said that "one battalion was annihilated, and all the rest were defeated".
The 40th Army concluded after the battle that although the battle of Gutoudong was won, there were still regrets, mainly because "it failed to form an encirclement in terms of deployment, so that most of the enemy fled" and "turned into a rout".
Despite this, Mao Zedong still attached great importance to the results of this battle, and immediately called Peng and Deng to congratulate him on the victory.
The two battles of Gutou Cave and Yonggu Cave were fought by troops of the 40th Army. From October 25 in Liangshui-ri and Fengxia-ri, to the victory in the battles of Longgu-dong and Gutou-dong on the 30th, the army won all battles, destroying more than 1,400 enemies, and was awarded the "special telegram commendation" by the Volunteer Army Headquarters.
2. The reason why the 38th Army let go of the enemy
While the 40th Army attacked and annihilated the enemy in front of it, the troops of the 38th and 39th armies on its left and right flanks also took action.
On 29 October, the 39th Army advanced to the mountainous area near Unsan and surrounded the ROK 1st Division in the Unsan area from the northeast, northwest, and southwest, creating the conditions for the largest offensive and annihilation battle of the campaign.
However, in the Heecheon direction, there was an accident with the 38th Army.
On the way to Heecheon, the 38th Army issued a "deployment for the task of annihilating the enemy in Heecheon" at 19 o'clock on the 26th, and decided to use the 113th Division as the main attack, the 112th Division detoured back to the northeast of Heecheon to cut off the enemy's retreat, and the 114th Division as a reserve to catch up later; it was scheduled to "capture Heecheon and annihilate the enemy before advancing to Guanshangdong and Tianshuidong" at dusk on the 28th.
On the same day, Shiji sent a telegram to the 38th Army: "At present, the enemy in Xichuan has one or two regiments of the Sixth Division, and the Eighth Division may also have two regiments, a total of four regiments. You must be well prepared and not careless. ”
At 20:30 on the same day, Shiji called again to confirm that the four battalions of the 8th Division of the ROK Army had assembled to the north of the stadium, and ordered the 38th Army (attached to the 125th Division) to "immediately and resolutely attack and destroy the enemy at Heecheon" and immediately move south after succeeding.
The units of the 38th Army organized the advance with Heecheon as the target. On the 28th, the 338th Regiment of the 113th Division advanced to the vicinity of Heecheon and prepared to launch an attack on the defending enemy, but at this time, news came from the 112th Division that the defending enemy in Heecheon was a "black regiment" of the American army.
Later, it was proved that this so-called "black group" was completely false and false. At that time, the U.S. military was still practicing a policy of racial segregation, and the army units were all black, and on the Korean battlefield, the 24th Division had a black regiment (the 24th Regiment), and the 2nd and 7th Divisions also had black battalions (the 3rd Battalion of the 9th Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 15th Regiment), but these black units were not in the Heecheon area at this time.
At 8 o'clock on the 28th, Peng Dehuai called the 38th Army and pointed out:
"There may be a regiment or no enemy in the existing Heecheon. According to the two black companies of the U.S. Army, there was no such news at all." The 38th Army was ordered to "quickly and resolutely carry out the order at 22 o'clock on the 27th of the 27th, quickly occupy Heecheon, and boldly and quickly attack the stadium, Cheonshui-dong, and Seokang-dong, and the fighters are good and cannot be missed."
However, the false rumors about the "black regiment" (judging from Peng Dehuai's telegram, the army reported to the Zhisi that there were "two black companies of the U.S. army" in Xichuan) seriously interfered with the planned attack and annihilation of Xichuan. Because the leaders of the corps and divisions were too concerned about the enemy's situation and were too cautious, the troops could not move quickly. Until the afternoon of the 27th, only the 113th Advance Guard Regiment of the 1st Division approached Heecheon, and the rest lagged behind.
Liang Xingchu had no choice but to call Shiji, suggesting that the attack on Heecheon be postponed in order to wait for the 112th and 113th divisions to advance to the designated position.
At 13:20 on the 28th, the 38th Army finally decided to "attack and destroy the enemy in Heecheon", and when this belated attack was finally launched, the South Korean troops stationed in Heecheon had already withdrawn under the cover of American aircraft, leaving only an empty city. Only the 335th Regiment of the 38th Army, the vanguard, caught one of the tails of the fleeing enemy in the peripheral battle, captured more than 100 people, and all the others were lost, and the biggest gain was only the interception of 5 trucks full of food.
By October 31, the main force of the Volunteer Army on the Western Front finally completed the battle on the front line of Taecheon, Unsan, Onjeong, and Heecheon, and in the process of unfolding, it severely damaged most of the 6th Division and 1st Division of the ROK Army, forming a three-sided encirclement of the 1st Division of the ROK Army in the Unsan area. The main force of the 66th Army also crossed the Yalu River and advanced towards Guicheng, preparing to block the 24th Division of the US Army and the 27th Brigade of the British Army advancing westward.
The main forces of the 50th Army are crossing the river and assembling towards the Tieshan Peninsula as a reserve of the Volunteer Army.
Since then, the first campaign has entered the stage of expansion and results.
3. Chairman Mao's idea of annihilating the enemy again
Judging from the entire front, the "United Nations Army" north of the Sichuan River is scattered on the front line of Guicheng, Dingzhou, Yunshan, Stadium, and Bochuan in divisions or regiments. A large gap appeared between the American and British forces on the left and the South Korean troops on the right flank. The five regiments of the ROK Army spread out in one line, with a frontal width of 40 kilometers, during which the mountains overlapped and there were many passages, especially the Cheongcheon River valley in the center of the battle line, which opened a large opening to the Volunteer Army and became a detour route that could be carried out to the flank and rear of the American and British troops.
At this time, the Volunteer Army had gathered 10~12 divisions and at least 120,000~150,000 people in the battlefield north of the Qingchuan River, forming a 2~3 times superiority over the enemy. What is even more advantageous is that the main force of the Volunteer Army has been fully deployed, and all units have entered positions where they can launch a coordinated attack.
On October 29, Peng Dehuai and Deng Hua respectively ordered the 40th, 39th, and 66th armies to seize the enemy in front of them, and the 38th Army and the 42nd Army to carry out a flank and rear detour.
The key to this deployment lies in the use of the 38th Army.
It can be said that it was a very lethal move to move quickly south along the Cheongchon River valley with the 38th Army, to occupy the stadium and the courtyard and Junyuli to the south of it, and to cut off the enemy's retreat route at Unsan and Taecheon. If this move can be effective, it will inevitably endanger the foundation of the South Korean army in North America south of the Qingchuan River, and create conditions for the great victory of the volunteer army.
Two days ago, when the 38th Army was still hovering outside Xichuan, Peng Dehuai urgently ordered the army to quickly occupy Xichuan, and then boldly attacked and advanced to the area around the stadium, stressing that "the fighters are good and cannot be missed."
Mao Zedong greatly appreciated Peng Dehuai's killing move.
At 9 o'clock on November 1, Peng Dehuai, Deng Hua and others sent a telegram to all the armies and reported to the Central Military Commission, pointing out:
The enemy's flank leaned on the Qingchuan River and was scattered on the line from Guicheng and Dingzhou to the stadium and Bochuan with divisions (or regiments) as units, which has created a favorable situation in which we have divided and encircled and annihilated the enemy.
It is worth noting that when Peng Dehuai issued the operational arrangements, he particularly put forward the requirements of carrying forward the fighting spirit and strictly observing combat discipline.
4. The history of the battle of Yunshan
On the evening of November 1, the various units of the Volunteer Army launched a fierce attack on the "United Nations Army" north of the Qingchuan River.
The focus of the operation was in the Yunshan area.
At this time, in the face of the fact that the 6th and 8th divisions of the ROK army had been dealt a heavy blow, the intelligence department of the US 8th Army was slow to admit that the Chinese army had entered the war.
However, they estimated that China's participation in the war was very limited, probably only two regiments.
Based on this judgment, MacArthur insisted that the plan to occupy all of Korea remain unchanged and still forced the 8th Army to continue to advance along the Yalu River.
It was under these circumstances that the 1st Cavalry Division, which was the reserve of the group army, was ordered to move forward from the vicinity of Pyongyang to the north to the Unsan and Yongsandong areas to take over the defense of the ROK 1st Division. On October 31, the headquarters of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 5th Regiment arrived at Yongsandong, south of Unsan, and the 8th Regiment of the division left for Unsan, preparing to exchange guards with the 12th and 15th Regiments of the 1st Division of the ROK Army defending Unsan.
It was the 39th Army that was tasked with attacking and destroying the enemy at Yunshan.
Soon after the start of the first campaign, Mao Zedong listed the 1st Division of the ROK Army near Unsan as the target of the search for destruction.
On October 26, he sent several telegrams in succession to personally direct the operations of the 39th Army in the direction of Yunshan.
At 0:05 on the 30th, Wu Xinquan and others called Zhiji to report the deployment of the attack on Yunshan:
The 116th Division was the main attacker and carried out the main attack along the road on both sides of Yingfeng in the northwest of Yunshan; two regiments of the 117th Division were to go around to the east of Yunshan and fight from southeast to northwest, and the other regiment was to fight from north to south to sweep away the enemy at Machangdong and Sanjuli on the periphery of Yunshan; the main force of the 115th Division advanced to the south side of the road south of Yunshan and attacked from west to east, and one battalion was inserted to the bend of the southeast road of Zhurenxiadong to cut off the enemy's escape route.
Due to road restrictions, all artillery units were placed north of Yunshan and the 29th Artillery Regiment was assigned to the 117th Division, the 26th Artillery Regiment was used to fight with one battalion of the 25th Artillery Regiment and the 116th Army Rocket Artillery Battalion, and the 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment was assigned to the 116th and 117th Divisions respectively.
Wu Xinquan decided:
The artillery bombardment began at 19:30 on the 31st, and a general offensive was launched, and the battle was expected to be resolved in one day and night.
At this time, the 39th Army did not know that the 1st Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division of the US Army had advanced to Unsan and was changing guards with the ROK Army. Wu Xinquan estimated that the battle would be resolved in a day and night, and he calculated that the ROK army would be the target of the battle, not the US army.
On the afternoon of November 1, the 8th Cavalry Regiment of the US Army occupied positions in the north, west, and south directions outside Unsan City, and the 12th Regiment of the 1st Division of the ROK Army began to withdraw from Unsan, leaving only the 15th Regiment to continue to be stationed on the high ground east of Unsan City.
At around 15:30, Wang Yang, commander of the 116th Division, observed from the front line that cars were coming and going in Yunshan City, and the defenders of the high ground outside the city began to retreat under the cover of artillery fire. He didn't know that this was the beginning of the U.S. military to change guards with the South Korean army, and thought that the enemy of Unsan was going to flee. In order to catch the enemy and prevent him from escaping, Wang Yang immediately called to report Wu Xinquan and suggested that he launch an attack in advance.
Wu Xinquan immediately made a decision, decided to advance the time of the general attack to 17 o'clock, and telegraphed to the Zhi Division:
"The enemy in Yunshan began to retreat at 15:30 on the same day, and I have given the order to attack. ”
At 16:40, Wu Xinquan gave the order to start the general attack. The artillery unit carried out a rapid artillery attack, and the domestically produced six-barrel rocket launcher was put into actual combat for the first time. After 10 minutes of fire preparation, the main forces of the 116th and 117th Divisions divided into three routes and launched a full-scale attack on Yunshan City.
At first, neither side of the battle in the inner city of Unsan City knew the identity of the other: the attackers thought that the defenders were the South Korean army, and the defenders thought that the attackers were the North Korean People's Army. When the volunteers attacked the enemy line and captured the first prisoners with Western faces, they realized that they were fighting Americans.
The 1st Cavalry Division is a veteran force of the U.S. Army, founded during the Revolutionary War, and is known as the "Founding Fathers' Division". The division participated in two world wars and fought a lot of tough battles. Although the whole division has long been replaced with mechanized equipment, in order to maintain its historical honor, it still uses the name "cavalry division", and the officers and men wear the symbol painted with the horse's head. When they first met the US army, the volunteer soldiers wondered: Why can't they see horses in this "cavalry division"?
However, the officers and men of the volunteers did not be timid because of the sudden encounter with the US troops, but became more and more courageous and soon took control of the situation. For the 8th Cavalry Regiment of the U.S. Army, this meant disaster.
After the battle of Unsan began, the main force of the 1st Cavalry Division of the US Army in Yongsandong went all out to reinforce the north and met the rest of the 8th Regiment to break through.
The 115th Division served as a blocker.
The 343rd Regiment of the division was determined to defend to the death and engaged in fierce battles with reinforcements of American troops. On November 2, Milburn, commander of the 1st U.S. Army, and Guy of the 1st Cavalry Division went to the front line to supervise the battle, and commanded the U.S. Army to continuously attack the 343rd Regiment that held the Longtoudong position.
Blazing artillery fire and napalm dropped by aircraft burned the regiment's position and destroyed most of the fortifications, but the troops holding their positions remained immovable and repelled enemy onslaught after attack. In the fierce battle, the American army suffered more than 400 casualties, and the commander of the 5th Cavalry Regiment was also seriously wounded.
That night, in order to avoid further losses, Milburn decided to abandon the northern aid attempt.
For the U.S. military, the Battle of Yunshan ended in this "most heartbreaking" way, and for the volunteers, this first encounter with the U.S. military, which was both expected and unplanned, was not only highly symbolic, but also far more than the actual results.
In the Battle of Yunshan, the 39th Army killed, wounded and captured more than 2,000 enemies, including more than 1,800 American troops, accounting for more than half of the US troops annihilated in the first battle, destroyed and captured 28 tanks, more than 170 automobiles, and 119 artillery pieces of various kinds, and also accidentally captured 4 light planes parked at the temporary airfield, creating a combat example of "rifle captured aircraft".
The 8th Cavalry Regiment of the U.S. Army suffered heavy losses, and the 3rd Battalion of the regiment was completely annihilated. For the first time, the Chinese Volunteers gained valuable experience in fighting against the US troops, which greatly enhanced their confidence in defeating a strong enemy.
In the Battle of Yunshan, the 115th Company of the 343rd Regiment of the 115th Division annihilated more than 100 people from one company of the US Army in a counterattack battle, captured 3 mortars, and was rewarded by the general order of the Zhiji.
This undoubtedly serves as an example for the volunteers who fought against the US army for the first time.
The 5th and 38th armies again "let go" the enemy troops
After the Battle of Unshan, the entire battlefield situation became even more unfavorable for the "United Nations Army".
On the right flank of the 8th Army, the ROK 2nd Army Corps had collapsed on all fronts, and on its left flank, the US 24th Division and the British 27th Brigade had penetrated alone along the West Coast Highway and rushed all the way to Namse-dong, which was only a few dozen kilometers away from the Yalu River. In the Battle of Unsan, the US 1st Cavalry Division and the ROK 1st Division, which were located in the center of the battle line, suffered heavy losses, and the 8th Army was punched a big hole here.
Faced with this situation, the commander of the 8th Army, Walker, knew that at this time, the greatest threat to the integrity of the 8th Army's front was the Cheongchon River Valley, which was open to the opposing attack force after the Battle of Unsan.
Here, in the center of the battlefield, directly connected to the rear supply line of the 8th Army, is the center of gravity of all the deployment of the "United Nations Army" on the Western Front. If the other side follows the trend along the river valley and takes the points of Bocheon, Yuanchuan, Gunyu-ri, Anju, and Sinanju in one fell swoop, the entire front of the 8th Army will be divided and dismembered, and the rear roads of the 24th Division of the US Army and the 27th Brigade of the British Army, which have crossed the Cheongchon River and advanced northward, will be cut off, and the consequences will be unimaginable.
In order to prevent the troops from falling into the encirclement of the other side, Walker decided to temporarily abandon the plan to advance to the Yalu River and withdraw all the American, British, and South Korean troops north of the Cheongchon River to the south of the Cheongchon River.
On the evening of 1 November, Walker gave the order to retreat south of the Cheongchon River in its entirety.
In view of the fact that the ROK army and the Chinese army often collapse at the touch of a button, resulting in the complete exposure of the US flank, Walker instructed the 24th Division and the 2nd Division to build two blockade lines behind the ROK army with one regiment each, to monitor the ROK army, and to stop it by coercive means if it broke and fled, so as to ensure the safe retreat of the main force of the US army, and to launch a new offensive after the entire line was shrunk and organized.
All units of the Volunteer Army continued to attack the enemy in front of them as planned, and a new situation emerged on the entire battlefield on the Western Front in which the enemy retreated and we advanced.
At 7 p.m. on November 2, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Peng Dehuai, Deng Hua and others, putting forward requirements for advancing the development of the campaign, and their focus was on the use of the 38th Army.
The telegram stated:
The key to the overall situation lies in the fact that the whole army of our 38th Army has taken a swift action to capture the areas of Gunyu-ri, Yuanchuan, Anju, and Sin'anju, cut off the connection between the enemy in the north and the south, and resolutely annihilate the second division of the US army advancing north.
Here, Mao Zedong had high hopes for the 38th Army. In particular, he pointed out the significance of using the army to control Anju, Sinanju, Junyu-ri, and the stadium for the overall situation, saying that "this success is a strategic victory" and that "this is the first urgent matter, and the rest are second." The words are to the point and carry a lot of weight.
Anju, Xinanju, Junyu-ri, and Stadium are all located on the banks of the Qingchuan River, and they are the must-haves, contentions, and must-control places for the volunteers to develop and attack along the Qingchuan River valley to the south and west. Anju and Sinanju, 6 kilometers west of it, are the two most important ferry ports in the lower reaches of the Cheongcheon River, with road and railway bridges connecting the south and north of the Yangtze River.
Before Mao Zedong sent the above telegram, Peng Dehuai and Deng Hua also saw the general direction of the development of the campaign and the important role that the 38th Army's actions would play, and on October 30, they ordered the 38th Army to "quickly and resolutely attack the stadium with its vanguard division" after occupying Xichuan, and after the attack on the stadium was successful, "continue to advance to the courtyard and the military corner to threaten Anzhou".
At 9 o'clock on November 1, Zhiji issued a new deployment order for destroying the enemy, which pointed out: "The more fierce and faster the Eighth Army moves, the greater the effect on the overall situation. ”
In the early morning of the 3rd, Peng Dehuai and Deng Hua found that the enemy in front of them began to retreat on all fronts. In order to seize the enemy, Peng, Deng and Du Ping jointly issued a mobilization order.
Unfortunately, the enemy was allowed to escape.
On the one hand, the "United Nations Army", with modern means of transport, under the cover of the air, contracted back extremely quickly. The two legs of the volunteers raced against the wheels of the car, and they simply could not catch up.
On the other hand, the movements of the 38th Army, which was tasked with flanking and detouring, did not meet the standards of "fierceness" and "speed" required by Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai.
After the battle, Peng Dehuai harshly criticized the 38th Army. His critique is divided into two paragraphs, one at the tactical level and the other at the campaign level.
Regarding tactical mistakes, Peng Dehuai specifically pointed out the battle of the 113th Division on the pitch, pointing out:
"Especially in the battle on the field, the two regiments of the puppet army had already been cut off by me, but the 113th Division only went to one regiment, and the main force of the division rested in an area twenty or thirty miles away, causing the enemy to flee. ”
In the first battle of Xichuan, the 38th Army encountered the embarrassment of being able to only face an empty city due to its slow movements, and after that, it responded to the old saying that "one step can't catch up, one step can't catch up", its actions are always half a beat slower, and it can't catch up with the pace of the development of the campaign.
On the second day of the Battle of Yunshan, the 38th Army entered the stadium and failed to achieve its goal of destroying the enemy. When he was inserting into Junyuli and Yuanchuan again, Peng Dehuai forwarded a telegram from Mao Zedong instructing the 38th Army to cut off the enemy's rear route on November 2, and strictly ordered the leaders of the Liangxing Primary Army:
"You lead the army and say that you must quickly enter the courtyard tonight, and lead the main force to quickly attack the price, the second division of the United States may arrive later, and the entire battle will be affected. If you delay any longer, you will be disciplined. ”
Directly warning commanders at the military level with "disciplinary sanctions" is tantamount to giving a death order.
On the evening of the 3rd, the main force of the 38th Army began to move, but due to the dense artillery blockade of the enemy, coupled with the darkness, heavy rain, and slippery roads, the advance of the troops was still relatively slow. It was not until dawn on the 4th that they launched an attack on Junyu-ri by different routes. At 15 o'clock in the afternoon, the battle captured key points such as Feihu Mountain in the northeast of Junyu-ri, but failed to take Junyu-ri. After that, the U.S. and South Korean forces, with the support of aircraft and tanks, launched counterattacks at Feihu Mountain and other places, and even confronted the 38th Army.
In this way, the task of the 38th Army to detour behind the enemy's flank and cut off the enemy's contact was not completed.
7. Another critic - the 66th Army
Another unit criticized by Peng Dehuai was the 66th Army, which was located on the right flank of the front.
The 66th Army was urgently dispatched from Tianjin, Langfang, and Cangxian to Andong on the day of the first campaign (October 25). At that time, the task assigned to the army was to enter the territory of Korea with one division, to be responsible for protecting the communication between Sinuiju and Jeongju, and to replace the troops of the 39th Army, which had been garrisoned there, and the main force of the army was to serve as the reserve of the Volunteer Army.
After the battle began, the 66th Army advanced to the Cheronkan and Hyeon areas, preparing to block the 24th Division of the US Army and the 27th Brigade of the British Army attacking Sinuiju. At that time, the two American and British forces were advancing, one to the southeast of Taichuan and the other to the north of Dingzhou. On the one hand, Shiji ordered the 39th Army to get out of the way of the road from Taecheon to Guicheng to lure the enemy north, causing the enemy's forces to disperse, and on the other hand, he ordered the 66th Army to advance rapidly towards Guicheng to block the westward advance of the American and British forces.
On October 29, the main force of the 66th Army advanced to the area of Tadong and Sinse-dong west of Guseong.
On the 30th, Mao Zedong reminded Peng and Deng when approving the next operational deployment of the Volunteer Army:
"Please pay attention to the use of the 66th Army in a major battle to increase the strength of the army. ”
On 1 November, Peng Dehuai ordered the first part of the 66th Army to pin down the US 24th Division west of Guicheng, and insert the other part into the Guicheng-Taichuan Highway and the Guicheng-Dingzhou Highway to break roads and blow up bridges to block enemy transportation; the main force of the Army controlled the appropriate area and prepared to attack from the flank and rear to encircle and annihilate the US 24th Division.
But at this time, the 66th Army went wrong.
Originally, the 66th Army had already made arrangements in accordance with Peng Dehuai's telegram order to attack and annihilate the 24th Division of the US Army in Guicheng with the 198th Division, but due to poor communications, when the division received the order to enter Guicheng after several twists and turns, the enemy had already withdrawn south. Prior to this, the 1st Battalion of the 66th Army, which was ordered to break the road and blow up the bridge south of Guicheng, and the reconnaissance team discovered the enemy's southward retreat, but they did not have communication tools at hand, so they could not report the situation in time, resulting in the 198th Division being empty.
The first four armies of the Chinese People's Volunteers to enter Korea generally had a low level of communications equipment, and the largest number of radio communication equipment owned by one army was only 68, and the 66th Army, which left the country in a hurry, was even worse; when the whole army entered Korea, it only brought five radio stations with it -- one for each of the military headquarters and two divisions, and two for the other division; only 12 telephone operators and five crutches were double-wired in the military headquarters, and the other communications detachments were all left behind in the country and did not keep up.
This time, the 66th Army failed to seize the 24th Division of the US Army as ordered by Peng Dehuai, and to a considerable extent suffered the loss of backward communications.
(End of text)
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