During the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, Deng Hua and Mao Zedong jointly analyzed the drastic and overlapping war situation, especially paying attention to the amphibious assault that the US military might launch behind enemy lines. Since the entry of the Volunteers into Korea, they have always been vigilant in case the Incheon-style landing incident happens again. This article will provide an in-depth analysis of Deng Hua's outstanding leadership skills in preventing the U.S. landing, as well as his foresight and determination throughout the campaign.
Historical Background and MiscalculationSince the outbreak of the Korean War in the early 50s of the 20th century, resourceful and flexible intelligence gathering and in-depth and meticulous analysis and research have played a crucial role in military strategic decision-making. For example, Peng Dehuai, a former general of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, deduced that about 50,000 U.S. troops were likely to carry out a landing operation in Wonsan by deciphering the information broadcast from the United States. However, this prediction has not been verified. Towards the end of the Fifth Campaign, the forward troops observed the movement of American troops in the waters near Wonsan, and although General Nie Rongzhen denied speculation that American troops were about to launch a landing operation, the Military Commission decided to take the necessary defensive measures. The miscalculation set off a cascade of fallouts.
The threat of an amphibious landing by the US military
In September 1951, Russia spied on the United States' plan to launch an amphibious assault in response to the fierce offensive launched by our volunteers in the fifth campaign. This tactic poses a serious threat to our army, both in terms of material supply and military security. Although the United States did not implement the program in the end, the volunteers remained vigilant.
Deng Hua's Disappearance and Analysis of Anti-Landing OperationsIn the cold winter of 1952, the U.S. intelligence community noticed that Deng Hua, the deputy commander of the Volunteer Army, had not appeared for a long time, and his performance in many important battles attracted widespread attention. Earlier, in his research on defensive warfare, Deng Hua proposed countermeasures for two possibilities, especially emphasizing the in-depth analysis of the selection and importance of defensive positions.
At the defensive level, the Volunteer Army took a series of measures to strengthen the southern defense line and focus on the Qingchuan River and Hanchuan areas. Some people misunderstand that this move of the Volunteer Army is a passive move, but in fact it is a strategic decision after careful consideration. This strategic withdrawal and defensive line adjustment had a profound impact on the entire campaign.
Deng Hua took away the troops and influenceGeneral Deng Hua's strategy in military mobilization has aroused heated discussions and great concern from all walks of life. It is understood that he had secretly deployed part of the troops of the 16th Army and the 54th Army, and privately brought some Moutai wine. However, the other 120,000 officers and men of the 38th, 39th, 40th and 50th armies did not receive the same attention during the same period.
Through an in-depth interpretation of the important role played by Deng Hua and other key figures in the process of blocking the amphibious invasion of the US military and their strategic decision-making, it shows the unique challenges brought about by the flexible and rapid change of information in the war environment. In the future, in order to maintain national security and stability, it is necessary to strengthen countermeasure research and improve contingency plans.