Recently, the Taiwan independence authorities said that they would extend this year's Han Kuang 3405 exercise from five to eight days, and that they would conduct actual combat exercises in July. The focus of the exercise was to prevent the PLA from taking advantage of military exercises to suddenly launch an actual battle to reunify Taiwan. Judging from the actual situation, after so many years of preparation, the PLA does have the conditions to turn the exercise into actual combat at any time. The gap in military strength between the two sides of the strait is getting wider and wider, there is a generation gap in weapons and equipment between the army, navy, and air force, and the Taiwan military has no long-range strike force and no space-based information support force. As for the differences in morale, courage, and military skills between the PLA and the Taiwan military, it is also obvious. If the data comparison of weapons and equipment is simply used, the PLA can even use small units to make the Taiwan military incapacitated and ineffective. For example, in a naval operation, the PLA cannot withstand the missiles that can be launched by a 055 destroyer. A J-20 flying squadron can make it impossible for the Taiwan Air Force to fly. As for the rocket troops, the Taiwan troops can only hide underground and not show their faces.
Judging from the history of warfare, it is all too common for exercises to turn into actual combat. This is also a exercise in which all countries in the world are very vigilant against their opponents, especially comprehensive and large-scale military exercises. Recently, the PLA's naval and air forces have often operated in an area 24 nautical miles away from the coastline of Taiwan's main island, which has made the Taiwan side very nervous. Such a range of activities and a distance of engagement are completely aimed at pressing the Taiwan military into the rhythm of fighting in military ports and bases. Therefore, it is not unreasonable for the Taiwan military to worry that the PLA exercises will turn into actual combat. However, the worries of the Taiwan authorities are meaningless. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been preparing for reunification by force for more than a day or two, and it has no intention of concealing itself. The Taiwan Strait is the area with the most dense coverage of air-to-sea radars today, and the United States is still using a large number of military reconnaissance satellites and commercial remote sensing satellites to keep a close eye on the relevant areas of the mainland.
Moreover, the PLA's military exercises and training in the Taiwan Strait have never stopped. These exercises are not for showmanship, but for the purpose of beating and beating the troops. Especially after the new equipment enters the troops, in order to form combat effectiveness as soon as possible, it is necessary to carry out corresponding exercise activities. Over the past 10 years or so, the pace of equipment upgrading of the PLA has been relatively fast, especially the replacement of the main battle equipment of the navy and air force, and the corresponding exercises and training have been particularly frequent. In addition, it is also necessary to use military exercises to deter the separatist activities of Taiwan independence forces. Since Lee Teng-hui was in power, the PLA has carried out many military exercises against Taiwan. During Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in 2022, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) carried out a joint exercise of the navy, air force, and rocket force, which was unprecedented in intensity and effect, effectively deterring Taiwan independence forces and foreign anti-China forces. The purpose of such exercises is to avoid the occurrence of subversive incidents and force the two sides of the strait to move toward reunification by force ahead of schedule.
If the situation comes to a point where the use of force is necessary, will the mainland use an exercise as a cover to achieve the suddenness of launching an actual battle? Although Taiwan is small in size and has limited military strength, reunification by force should not only consider the elimination of Taiwan's armed forces, but also consider preparing for a large-scale conflict with the United States and Japan. The mainland will need to mobilize a large-scale military force, and it will have to requisition a considerable number of civilian ships, aircraft, airports, ports, and so on, and the scale will be extremely large and spectacular. It is impossible for any country to fully simulate such an operation in a single exercise. Therefore, when the mainland is forced to unify by force, it will use a dignified way to gather troops and weapons. Neither the United States nor the Taiwan authorities can stop them even if they can see it, let alone dare to strike first. As for the tactical suddenness of the campaign, that is, when the first shot was fired, that is a matter of another category, and that suddenness must be there. When the mainland has assembled sufficient troops and has the conditions for launching military reunification, the Taiwan authorities will be forced to enter long-term and high-intensity combat readiness, and the personnel will not be able to hold out for a long time in a state of despair and fatigue, and their combat capability and reaction speed will seriously decline. At that time, will suddenness still be needed?