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Europe without the United States
作者：Benjamin Rhode
Translator: Zhou Xintong
Introduction to France and Italy
Survival is a bimonthly journal published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, one of the world's leading journals for the analysis and discussion of international and strategic affairs. Although IISS claims to be an independent think tank, its position can be seen in its open acceptance of funding from NATO members such as the United States and the United Kingdom. This paper argues that as a "non-regional hegemonic power", the U.S. involvement in Europe after the outbreak of the Cold War enabled Europe to achieve the so-called "impossible triangle" of unity, security, and freedom for a long time. Prior to this, although Europe had established a world hegemony, it had never achieved lasting internal harmony on its own. The author notes with concern that this "happy period" may soon come to an end if the United States ceases to function as a provider of European security due to internal political dynamics or strategic priorities for the needs of East Asia. It is a common practice in academic circles to regard the United States as a major factor in maintaining internal harmony in post-war Europe, and this paper inherits the tradition of British historians and international relations scholars, and organically fits them to the current international situation.
However, the author's extensive comparison of Western Europe-North America relations with Eastern Europe-Russia (Soviet Union) relations in the article seems to highlight that the United States is more protective and respectful of its "allies" in its sphere of influence, but the author ignores an important fact that the "Eastern Europe" of the United States is not in Europe but elsewhere, as evidenced by the century-old "Monroe Doctrine". For Europe, even if we look at international relations from the realist perspective of this article, whether Europe can win the continued favor of the United States depends on the geopolitical orientation of the United States on the one hand, and the extent to which Europe can play in the liberal international order led by the United States, despite many challenges. That said, in the U.S.-Europe relationship, the reader needs to see many other factors that are not addressed in this article.
Much of Europe's history has been marked by war, and it's no different from other regions. However, Europe differs from other strategically important continents in several important ways, such as the nature of the security order established in Europe after World War II and expanded after the Cold War. This order is built on the power and participation of the United States, which now faces a potentially deadly challenge. However, in order to fully understand the significance of this order, we should consider it in conjunction with other special aspects of European history.
Perhaps the most notable of these is that since the fall of the Western Roman Empire in 476 BC, no overwhelming overlord has been able to rule Western and Central Europe for long, and certainly no overlord has been able to control most of its territory. In 1453, nearly 1000 years after the fall of Rome, the Ottomans captured Constantinople and the last remnants of the Eastern Roman Empire. During this millennium, while there have been impostors of imperial legacies in Western and Central Europe, such as those erroneously called the Holy Roman Empire, none of them have truly established themselves as heirs to the Roman crown. Europe is largely backward economically, technologically, and strategically, and its internal relations are often in conflict compared to the great empires of East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East.
It has been argued that the lack of imperial leadership and political unity after Rome's decline in itself stimulated internal rivalry and dynamism, which was crucial to Europe's eventual rise and global domination. In the five centuries following the Ottoman capture of Constantinople, European nations succeeded in enslaving, colonizing, or otherwise controlling much of the rest of the world, or giving birth to powerful new regimes that made themselves world powers, such as the United States of America. At the same time, war was almost always present in Europe itself.
Europe has made some important diplomatic efforts to maintain peace. In 1815, after the end of the 25-year-long revolution and the bloody killings of Napoleon, Europe was relatively calm for decades under the leadership of the Concert of Europe. But by the middle of the 19th century, the system had collapsed, and a series of major wars broke out between the European powers. The so-called "balance of power" that followed was based on the possibility of a catastrophic European war, which the leaders of Europe knew could break out at almost any moment – and they were right in 1914.
The Vienna Conference that established the balance of power in Europe
Image source: Google Images
Europe is also unique in that in the twentieth century, Europe's internal struggles triggered two world wars with devastating, global and irreparable consequences for all of humanity. It can be said that the First World War represented the ambition of a relatively powerful European state to rival the international imperialist expansion of its rivals by colonizing and dominating its own continent. World War II went even further, not only exacerbating the suffering of World War I, which ended with much of Europe in ruins, millions killed or maimed, and treasury bankrupt, but also allowing the continent to be effectively divided between two largely non-European powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.
While the salvation of Western Europe owes Britain, at least in part, to Britain's perseverance, Britain's own survival and future role as a springboard for European liberation, in turn, owes it to the great industrial power of the United States. Isolationist politics in the United States made it impossible to intervene at the outset of this new European war, but the American president assured Churchill that the fighting would continue even if Britain itself fell into the hands of the Nazis, and assured Washington that it would assist in the ongoing resistance. Thus, in June 1940, Churchill pledged that even if Britain itself fell, the British Empire would hold on "until the new world, in such time as God thinks fit, with all its might, to save and liberate the old world." While Britain remained free, the New World did liberate its European ancestors, although the United States itself had been attacked in the Pacific before that. Intervening earlier, while politically unlikely, could protect much property and avoid more bloodshed and suffering.
Fortunately, for the next 45 years, Europe maintained internal peace, but from a strategic point of view, the continent's new role was to serve as a chessboard for superpowers outside of Europe, and if the Cold War turned into World War III, it would become the main battlefield for these superpowers. If the conflict between the superpowers turns into a thermonuclear war, Europe may well be completely destroyed.
On a more positive note, a security order also emerged in post-war Western Europe, based on Washington's superiority in military and economic power and the concept of collective security in the North Atlantic. NATO was naturally dominated by the United States, but soon there were emerging European economic and political communities, which overlapped with NATO as both complementary and conflictual.
While there were many within the countries of Western Europe, especially those on the left, who were dissatisfied with the long post-1945 American presence in their countries, this dissatisfaction never reached the level of hatred of the Soviet Union by the majority of the inhabitants of the Warsaw Pact "satellite" countries. While the United States drastically reduced its military presence in Western Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, this was more due to Washington's desire to enjoy the "peace dividend" than to the opposition of European citizens or leaders. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era, the US-led European security order has continued and even expanded eastward, even though the Soviet Union, a unified common adversary, has disappeared.
Europe's trilemma
U.S. President George W. H· In 1989, George W. Bush proclaimed "Make Europe Whole and Free." With the end of the Cold War, Washington described the "grand vision" of a "free and peaceful Europe." In an article published in late 2023, historian Timothy Garton Ash assessed Europe's progress toward the "trinity" of "integrity, freedom, and peace" over the decades. If you look closely, on a longer time frame, it can be more appropriately understood as what economists call the "impossible triangle" or "trilemma": in this triangle, the three goals are in tension to some extent, and it is often impossible to achieve all three goals at the same time.
For example, the unity and security brought about by Roman hegemony was accompanied by the absence of freedom or the right to self-determination. Later generations of European nations may enjoy more freedom, but they are also more politically fragmented and less secure. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, European countries tried to establish a local security order of equal and sovereign states, strengthen cooperation, and even take the form of collective security, but these efforts ultimately failed.
It was not until the return of the prodigal son of the United States that Europe was able to achieve all of these goals at the same time. In fact, both during and after the Cold War, the United States exhibited a historically abnormal form of non-territorial hegemony in Europe. This is a far cry from the "offshore balance" espoused by some contemporary "realists": Washington has deployed hundreds of thousands of troops and nuclear weapons on the continent and maintains close ties with Europe through NATO's collective security treaty. However, the United States did not occupy or annex European territories, nor did it depose governments within the alliance that went against its interests. For example, in 1966 de Gaulle withdrew France, one of the Western powers, from the NATO Integrated Military Command and expelled the NATO military headquarters, but American tanks did not enter Paris. However, the European security order is indisputably dependent on the military power of the United States (and to some extent on the economic power of the United States).
Washington plays this role not out of self-sacrificing altruism, but out of enlightened self-interest. Washington believes that preserving the position of Western Europe in the free world is an important national interest. The same is true of European wars that prevent further infighting and destabilization. The United States was not only a protector against external threats from the Soviet Union, but also a guarantor of internal peace in Europe. U.S. involvement in Europe provided important assurances to its wartime allies that West Germany was safe to rebuild and become a bulwark against communism. The enduring U.S. presence after 1989 provided additional comfort to Britain and France, whose leaders shared serious misgivings about the unification of Germany. As a result, Europe enjoys many of the security advantages that come with the presence of a hegemon, but it has not suffered from the tyranny or territorial plundering of traditional hegemons.
By strengthening the European political and economic union, national sovereignty was centralized, which to a certain extent contributed to unity, while maintaining national freedoms to a large extent. But this has not led to much meaningful growth in homeland security: Europe's security remains ultimately dependent on the United States. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the United States hoped to ease budgetary pressures by intensifying conventional disarmament, and perhaps by drawing too much on the destructive and self-destructive lessons of earlier centuries, there has been a succession of shameful military hesitation or incompetence in Europe itself and its environs, from Bosnia to Kosovo to Libya, when the need arises from the need for American power. Despite these humiliations, and despite numerous reasonable demands from successive US administrations for a more equitable "sharing of responsibility," most Europeans still believe that they will be able to enjoy the protections and benefits of the relatively benign and free Leviathan indefinitely.
What will happen when Leviathan leaves? If the United States is unable or unwilling to continue to be the guarantor of Europe's security, will Europe continue to enjoy unity, freedom, and security?
Abraham Bosse as Hobbes
The cover designed by Leviathan
Image source: Google Images
Ukrainian melting pot
The Biden administration has often reaffirmed Washington's commitment to providing military support to Ukraine and protecting Europe through NATO's Article 5. But both commitments depend on the direction of U.S. politics and broader structural adjustments to U.S. security priorities in East Asia. Europe's declining global importance – in 1990 European countries accounted for 28.6% of global GDP compared to 17.9% in 2019 – we cannot ignore this cold reality. The United States has largely abandoned its earlier idea of fighting two wars at the same time in different regions. If the United States wants to win the war in East Asia, then it can reasonably supply military supplies to allies in other regions that are in conflict at the same time, but it cannot fight on two fronts itself.
Biden with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
Image source: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-66977467
In January and February 2024, while a majority of U.S. voters and members of Congress were in favor of continuing military support for Ukraine, the powerful minority of the Republican Party, under the influence of Trump, blocked the passage of a bill to provide $60 billion in military aid to Ukraine, while the Ukrainian army was rationed with ammunition (a sordid surprise may have been resolved at the time of writing). But it shows that the United States and the world face the real prospect of Trump becoming president again in 2025, which would have a catastrophic impact on the defense of Ukraine and Europe as a whole.
Trump has repeatedly made it clear that he does not share the idea of collective security. He believes that NATO is, at best, an American landlord deceived by European "tenants" who are "in arrears of rent", and even acts as an "umbrella for the mafia", and he also boasts that it will "encourage" Russia to attack any European who does not pay its dues. Given that Trump had advised his advisers during his first term that Washington should withdraw from NATO, and that one of his former national security advisers, John Bolton, had declared that Trump would certainly deliver on that threat in his second term, any assumption in Europe that the United States would support NATO indefinitely could prove to be a strategic disaster. As Bolton put it, Trump's "goals...... not to strengthen NATO, but to lay the groundwork for its exit from NATO".
Trump at a meeting of NATO leaders
Image source: https://thehill.com/policy/international/4459201-nato-allies-fear-repercussions-trump-reelection/
Biden could still be re-elected, especially if Trump is convicted in one or more criminal trials later this year. But the fundamental volatility of U.S. politics is likely to persist regardless of which president is in power, as are the structural pressures that force the U.S. to shift its strategic focus to Asia.
As a result, an old security threat is re-emerging on Europe's borders, while its guarantors of the past 80 years risk disappearing from Europe or at least weakening their protection. However, the idea that some have only recently begun to see Russia as a future partner in the European security order seems unthinkable for at least a generation. For the foreseeable future, any European security order can only be sustained if it repels and fends itself against Russia. The speech of French President Emmanuel Macron epitomizes this realization, having previously been bent on avoiding insulting Russia and reserving its place in the European security architecture, but in February 2024 he declared that European security actually depends on Russia's defeat in Ukraine. Macron and other European leaders recently stressed that Russia has the potential to expand its attacks on Europe for years, not just Ukraine.
It is important not to underestimate what European countries have achieved so far. Europe's desire to avoid a resurgence of war means that Europe's unity and determination to resist Russia is far stronger and more enduring than many feared two years ago. Germany was initially criticized (and understandably forgiven) for its timid and perfunctory level of military assistance to Ukraine, but later it significantly increased its military aid and announced a permanent military presence in the Baltic region. Russia's actions in Ukraine in 2014 gave Europe an initial shock, and since then, defense spending in Europe has increased further due to Trump's threats and the 2022 conflict. Kyiv signed bilateral security agreements with Berlin, London and Paris. In early 2024, the EU overcame Hungary's veto to provide a similar amount of aid, but this is the financial aid allocated over the next three years, as MAGA's Republicans blocked the much-needed $60 billion in aid to Ukraine. Recently, Macron raised the possibility of direct defense of Ukraine by NATO ground forces, although his European counterparts were quick to declare that they would never do so, which undoubtedly weakened the deterrent power of his proposal.
An isolated Europe?
Europe is made up of about 30 sovereign states that vary widely in size, economic and military capabilities, and strategic perspectives, and it is foreseeable that it will be difficult for them to agree or even agree on security priorities. With the support of the American Leviathan, this disunity is somewhat sustainable, especially since a European federation is by no means a viable prospect for the foreseeable future. But with Leviathan likely to be withdrawn in months rather than years or decades, it's unclear to what extent Europe's recent encouraging rhetoric will be matched by meaningful action. Decades of underinvestment in defense have required significant and sustained spending to compensate, while weak economic growth, costly social models, and an aging population have put enormous pressure on these budgets.
As NATO's 75th anniversary approaches, NATO's status as the most powerful alliance in history will be widely known. Publicly, at least, there is probably little talk of the reality that NATO members are still largely dependent on a single ally militarily, and even less is known about how Europe will be able to ensure its own security viably and sustainably during Trump's second presidency. Prior to the U.S. presence on the continent, Europe had never developed a sustainable homegrown security order that would allow it to balance the trinity of freedom, unity, and security. Now, if Europe finds itself again without the United States, it is unlikely to do so. It is unlikely that we will see the emergence of a new, homegrown hegemon that will not be strongly resisted. We are likely to see a fragmentation of the vision of a united Europe and an increasing regionalization of security cooperation based on geographical and security concepts. If the United States shrinks sharply from Europe on all fronts, it is conceivable that some European countries (especially those closest to Russia) may begin the process of acquiring nuclear weapons. In the short term, we may see efforts to develop a European nuclear sharing arrangement, although it is unclear whether Eastern European countries will be more confident in the extended deterrence provided by France or the United Kingdom than the deterrence provided by Trump's United States. Federalism is also unlikely, although European countries will eventually need to find a way to secure themselves from threats from larger, more cohesive entities while maintaining their freedoms. But necessity is not always the mother of invention.
In the first volume of his monumental History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Edward Gibbon states that "if one were to identify the happiest and most prosperous period in the history of the world in the human condition, he would not hesitate to name the period between the death of Domitian and the accession of Commodus (96-180 BC)". It is striking that these more than eighty years of the second century AD, the heyday of the Datong world, in 1776, when the first volume of Yoshimoto was published, seem to have been not only a golden age, but also the happiest period in Europe up to that time. However, Gibbon could not have fully foreseen the long-term effects of the major developments that took place on the other side of the Atlantic in the same year on his own continent. The birth of the United States of America and its eventual role as a provider of security brought Europe into a period of relative unity, security and freedom, with happiness and prosperity far beyond the second century. Perhaps, long after, our descendants will be like Gibbon and think that the post-war – especially post-Cold War – 80-plus years of "peace in the United States" was only a brief aberration in Europe's long bloody history, itself a golden age long gone.
Domitian sculpture
Image source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domitian
Article Source:
Benjamin Rhode, Europe Without America, Survival, 28 Mar 2024
Web Links:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ful/10.1080/00396338.2024.2332054
·Translator Introduction ·
Zhou Xintong, a master's student in the Department of History of Peking University, is currently a member of the compilation team of the Franco-Italian view of the world.
END
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