Zhuge Liang (181-234 AD) in the Three Kingdoms era at the end of the Han Dynasty was indeed a prominent figure among the ancient statesmen of the mainland. His political and military talents, his spirit of fighting with all his dedication to the great cause of the reunification of the world, and his noble moral character and personality are indeed admirable. But he is not perfect, and he also has his shortcomings. Historians and politicians have made a lot of comments on Zhuge Liang and his person, but unfortunately due to the limitations of history, or because of the idea of "being a sage" and the like, or because of admiration, there are many people who are unwilling to say that he is flawed, especially on the issue of his treatment and use of Wei Yan, the general of the Shu State. In "Romance of the Three Kingdoms", the saying that "Wei Yan has a backbone in the back of his head" is familiar and accepted by many people. This requires us to distinguish the truth from the truth of history as it is. Here I will only talk about the gains and losses of Zhuge Liang's employment and the tragedy of Wei Yan.
Liu Bei, who sought survival and development in the gap between the warlords and the hegemony in the late Han Dynasty, was very ambitious and courageous, he knew that talents were rare, and with the mood of seeking talents, he was eager to recruit Corporal Lixian, and did not hesitate to ask Zhuge Liang to come out as his right-hand man. At that time, Liu Bei was a 47-year-old royal general, and Zhuge Liang was a 27-year-old scholar, and it was this "rural educated youth" who put forward the famous strategic decision of "Longzhong Pair" when they met. In the short 300-word "Longzhong Pair", the historical trend of Wei, Shu, and Wu was analyzed and predicted, and an incisive analysis was made from the political, military, internal and diplomatic aspects. The implementation of this strategic decision created a new situation in Liu Bei's career, but the problem was that Zhuge Liang failed to revise some of the outdated plans and assumptions in time according to the changing development of the situation later.
"Longzhong Pair" proposed: after possessing Jing and Yi, and then chasing the Central Plains, "if there is a change in the world, then a general will be ordered to take the army of Jingzhou to Xiang Wan and Luo, and the general (referring to Liu Bei Yong to lead the people of Yizhou out of Qinchuan", that is to say, after occupying Jingzhou, he should go all the way to Wan and Luo, all the way out of Qinchuan, and attack Cao Cao's military group with a pincer momentum. It seems that this plan was put forward before Kong Ming went out of the mountain, but the problem is that Qinchuan, Wan and Luo have undergone major changes in their political and economic status, and Jingzhou's strategic position has become more and more important. If you only rely on Yizhou soldiers and horses to attack Cao Wei from Qinchuan and follow the old road of Liu Bang's "secret crossing of Chen Cang" back then, it will be difficult to win. In addition, 12 years after the "Battle of Red Cliffs," the Wu-Shu alliance had been seriously broken, and Guan Yu, who was guarding Jingzhou, was stubborn and self-serving, violating the diplomatic policy of uniting Wu to resist Cao; Sun Wu, who was extremely sensitive to and attached great importance to Jingzhou, joined Cao Cao to "curry favor with Guan Yu for his own effect" and sent Lü Meng and Lu Xun to copy Guan Yu's back road and "cross the river in white clothes" to attack Jiangling and Gong'an; Cao Cao stationed in Wancheng from Luoyang, and ordered Xu Huang to lead a large army to reinforce Cao Ren, who was trapped in Xiangyang, and echoed with Sun Quan to attack Guan Yu in the north and south, causing Guan Yu's troops to be defeated and depressed, and he was killed in the wheat city. In order to avenge Guan Yu, Liu Bei was emotional, and his military command was improper, and as a result, the Shu army was defeated by "burning the company camp", losing one-third of the troops, and his vitality was greatly damaged, and the ambition of chasing the Central Plains was difficult to realize.
Explored, although there are many reasons, the main reason is that the political, military, and economic center of gravity was no longer in Guanzhong at that time, but in the Wan, Luo, and Xuchang areas. It is important to occupy Qinchuan Guanzhong, but Jingzhou's strategic position is much more important than that of Hanzhong and Qinchuan. If Jingzhou is lost, the Shu army will inevitably be enclosed in the lofty mountains and mountains within the line of Qinling, Daba Mountain and Wushan, and will be in a very disadvantageous position strategically. However, Guan Yu, the general of Shu Han who guarded Jingzhou, was proud of his achievements and insulted the envoys of Eastern Wu who "married" in order to strengthen the Wu-Shu alliance. Wang Fuzhi, a thinker in the late Ming and early Qing dynasties, criticized Guan Yu as the initiator of the destruction of the Wu-Shu alliance and the decline of Shu in the "Reading through the Commentary", which may be too heavy, but Guan Yu should bear great responsibility for damaging the Wu-Shu alliance. However, with Liu Bei's Xiongxiong and Zhuge Zhizhi's lack of understanding of the importance of Jingzhou's strategic position to Shu, Guan Yu's army was far away, and he did not add a single soldier, nor did he make the troops of Liu Feng and Meng Da, who were close to Shangyong, move closer to Guan Yu, let alone let Zhang Fei in Langzhong (the middle reaches of the Jialing River) and Zhao Yun in Jiangzhou (Chongqing, Fuling) two elite troops with strong combat effectiveness to reinforce Guan Yu, which should be said to be the most important mistake. No wonder Chen Shou said when commenting on Zhuge Liang: "The strain will be slight, not his strength!"
In 223 AD, Liu Bei was critically ill, the White Emperor entrusted Gu, and Zhuge Liang was ordered to stabilize the situation with his outstanding talents, and gradually recovered his vitality under the correct policies such as "strict science and education, rewards and punishments", "rewarding agriculture and mulberry, and living with the people". In the following two years, "crossing Lu in June" and "capturing Meng Shu seven times" stabilized the rear; gradually created a situation in which "the fields are cleared, the warehouses are solid, the equipment is profitable, and the savings are spared," and "the officials do not tolerate adultery, and the people are self-motivated."
In the spring of 227 AD, Zhuge Liang led an army of 100,000 to kick off the prelude to the Northern Expedition of "Six Out of Qishan". The war lasted six or seven years and ended in defeat. Zhuge Liang made a mistake at the beginning. At that time, although the Shu army was sharp, it was at a disadvantage in terms of the number of troops, and it was blocked by the steep Qinling Mountains in terms of strategic position, which was easy to defend but not conducive to attacking. In this case, it is necessary to surprise the army and win the battle quickly. At this point, Zhuge Liang, who seemed to be like a god, was cautious to the point of almost pedantic. So, was there no one who came up with a brilliant and feasible strategic plan at that time? No. Before leaving Qishan, Wei Yan, a famous general who "started from the army", had raised objections to the route of the Northern Expedition. He put forward based on factors such as the terrain and tactical principles of the enemy and the enemy: "Wen Xiahou is young, and the master and son-in-law are also cowardly and unplanned. This holiday, 5,000 elite soldiers, 5,000 grains, straight out of the praise, follow the Qinling Mountains to the east, when the meridian to the north, but ten days to Chang'an. When he hears that he is dying, he will flee by boat. In Chang'an, there are only the imperial officials, Jing Zhao is too guarded by the ears, the Hengmen Mansion and the valley of the scattered people are enough to eat around, and they gather together in the east than the east, and they are still twenty days, and the public comes from the valley, it will be enough to reach. In this way, it can be determined in one fell swoop to the west of Xianyang. "This should be said to be a relatively comprehensive strategic plan. If this plan is adopted, the elite troops will attack with lightning speed, and go straight to Chang'an, and then with the cooperation of the army in the valley, victory is very promising. Even Zhuge Liang's main opponent Sima Yi also said afterwards: "Zhuge Liang was cautious and careful in his life, and he refused to make mistakes. But he doesn't know the geography of our territory, and if I use troops, I will first take Chang'an by the Meridian Valley Trail, much earlier!" It can be seen that Wei Yan's proposition is desirable. It's a pity that Kong Ming reprimanded this as "rash and rash", and did not use Wei Yanqi or his strategy, and as a result, the good opportunity was lost.
Zhuge Liang seemed to be a little prejudiced against Wei Yan, and went the other way, wanting to use his "perfect plan" to appoint Ma Yan, who was "exaggerated and not of great use", as the vanguard commander, and insisted on emphasizing what "An is from the open road, you can take Longyou, and you will be safe from everything", and went around in a large circle from Hanzhong to the west to Yangping Pass, and then Wudu, Tianshui, and Qishan, so that the 100,000 troops advanced slowly and clumsily in the lofty mountains and mountains, so that the physical strength and food of the vast number of soldiers were uselessly consumed in the long journey. Such an advance allowed the Wei side to breathe, calmly prepare for battle, deep ditches and high fortifications, and wait for work, causing the Shu army to lose its opportunity. Ma Tan was finally defeated by Zhang Yi, the street pavilion was lost, and Kong Ming had to return south after singing the "empty city plan". In fact, the loss of the street pavilion cannot be entirely blamed on Ma Yan, Zhuge Liang is mainly responsible. From the geographical point of view, the street pavilion was not only a strategic place at that time, but also a key battle. Jieting was lost, "there was no basis for entering", and there was nothing to defend, so he had to be forced to give up the three counties of Longxi that had been obtained and retreat to Hanzhong, which led to the failure of the entire Northern Expedition. It stands to reason that Zhuge Liang should have personally gone to the front line to supervise the battle, but he did not "personally serve the Jieting"; his headquarters should be set up near the Jieting, but it was located in Qishan, which was far away, and under the condition of backward communications at that time, it was inevitable that the command would not be effective. "The Captain" says: "The formation of standing and sitting will be in the midst of each other"; "The Art of War" says: "Therefore, if you know the place of war, you can fight for thousands of miles when you know the day of war." If you don't know the battlefield or the day of the war, then the left can't save the right, the right can't save the left, the front can't save the back, and the back can't save the front." This shows that the generals must share weal and woe with the soldiers in order to boost morale. Mao Zedong criticized when reading the "Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms": "Watching people and viewing the big festival, slightly small, slightly small, the first battle of the pavilion, the first battle of the pavilion, the first battle of the pavilion, the defeat of the post-war Liang will be in the army." This view is fair and profound. Although Zhuge Liang made "self-criticism" in hindsight, demoted himself to the right general and acted as prime minister, and severely punished Ma Yan, he only admitted that he "used people improperly and had the wisdom of being a good emperor" and failed to sum up his strategic and tactical mistakes. Even if he doesn't seem to have a deep understanding of "improper employment", he doesn't seem to think of Wei Yan and Wei Yan's suggestions. In the Northern Expedition that followed, he still followed the old march route, and did not dare to adopt the strategy of "following the Qinling Mountains to the east" and boldly penetrating deep behind enemy lines. The result could only be that under Sima Yi's insistence on not fighting, the Shu army was stunned under the fortified city.
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It seems that Zhuge Liang has indeed been cautious to the point of being cautious in his life. Prudence in strategy and tactics will inevitably lead to "biased knowledge" and "seeking perfection and blame" in the criteria for employing people. Although he is more eclectic in employing people, such as pulling Pang Tong and Jiang Wan in small counties, starting with Yang Hong and He Yi in county officials, his style of "being cautious all his life" seems to like those who are cautious and good at superficial work, while those who have a little personality and eloquence are often lost because they are small. Wei Yan has the shortcomings of "unwilling to be subordinate" and "high-minded", he is a talent rather than a slave, he always only uses his people and does not believe in them, only as a borrowed force. This kind of vigilant attitude of employing people will inevitably make oneself lose the help of "humerus". Not only for Wei Yan, but also for other capable people who do have strengths and some shortcomings, they often use illegal methods, and deal with extreme and biased treatments. For example, when dealing with Liu Feng's "fierce and difficult to control", Zhuge Liang persuaded Liu Bei to take the opportunity to cut off because of his mediocre defeat. In fact, Liu Feng was a credible general, and Liu Bei later regretted it. For Liao Li, who is a little arrogant and arrogant, and claims to be "the second of Zhuge Liang", although he has also praised him as a good talent that can be compared with Pang Tong, but after Changsha was lost, he was no longer used. Later, because he complained a little, such as saying that Kong Ming "did not let the virtuous and became a vulgar official", he was exiled to Wenshan and died of old age. Ma Tan first admired his strategy of "attacking the heart first" put forward in the "Southern War", thinking that he was a promising talent, but he did not seem to seriously consider Liu Bei's opinion that this person was "exaggerated and cannot be used", and he also dealt with his loss of the street pavilion too strictly.
At the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty, Zhuge Liang was a clever man among ancient politicians in the selection and use of talents, but compared with Cao Cao, Sun Quan, and Liu Bei of the same era. Zhuge Liang failed to select and cultivate brilliant civil and military talents to assist and inherit his career in his lifetime, although there are many reasons here, but his perfection in the selection of talents, bias and bias is an important reason, and as a result, the majority of the officials in Xishu are cautious and cautious, even Jiang Wan, Fei and others are more than compliant with the rules but lack talent and lack enterprising spirit. What is particularly intriguing is that Liu Bei selected two people most prominently in his life, one is Zhuge Liang and the other is Wei Yan, and Zhuge Liang does not trust Wei Yan very much, and seems to suppress him a little. But even in this case, Wei Yan still endured humiliation and was born and died in the decades of southern expeditions and northern wars, defeated Guo Huai in Qiang, entered Sichuan to capture Xishu, captured Meng Shu seven times in the Southern War, served as the vanguard in the Northern Expedition, Tianshui collected Jiang Wei, shot Cao Cao, beheaded Wang Shuang, killed Zhang Yi, fought Sima Yi, frightened Xiahou Ba, turned the tide after the loss of Jieting, and so on. The army is strictly governed, "both good at raising soldiers and brave people", almost no evil battles are not fought with, and every battle must be defeated. In particular, his strategic proposal for a surprise attack on Chang'an was a far-sighted strategy, but unfortunately it was not adopted by Zhuge Liang. If Wei Yan's strategy of "following the Qinling Mountains to the east" is to be let go, its prospects are incalculable. No wonder Wei Yan often sighed: "Brightness is cowardice, and sighing is inexhaustible." ”
Cao Cao's employment is higher than Zhuge Liang's because he advocates "letting the world's intelligence and striving for the world's heart," "the great users do not do their work," and "I let the world's intelligence be controlled by the Tao, and everything is impossible"; he knows very well that "the chicken that loses the morning will think about it and make up for it again"; "knowing people and being good at observing, it is difficult to dazzle and be false, pulling out the forbidden and being happy to advance between the line and Chen, and taking Zhang Liao and Xu Huang among the deceased, all of whom have made meritorious contributions and are listed as famous generals"; he attaches importance to the overall situation and can do "each according to its own instrument, hypocrisy, and not remembering the old evil" , Zhang Xiu mutinied after surrendering, and then surrendered again, Cao Cao treated him favorably and made him a liege, Bi Chen, Wei Chong and others had deceived Cao Cao, and he was still reused after being captured. Therefore, the Cao Wei camp produced Chinese ministers and military generals, thus creating a relatively large situation. Sun Quan knew that people were good at their duties, and knew very well that "Zhou Gong did not seek to be prepared by one person", and he could not only observe his shortcomings, but also use his strengths, boldly use young generals, and entrust Zhou Yu, Lu Meng, and Lu Xun with heavy tasks; he said that Lu Su had two strengths (it was recommended to establish the emperor's business and join Liu Kangcao) and one short (to lend Jingzhou to Liu Bei), and he could not compromise his two strengths because of his shortcomings. Liu Bei's knowledge of people is also higher than Zhuge Liang's, he promoted Wei Yan to boldly trust and use him, although there are many good generals under his command, but he always regards Wei Yan as a unique general. In 219 A.D. (24 years of Jian'an), Liu Bei captured Hanzhong and was called the king of Hanzhong. At that time, he planned to move to Chengdu, when he wanted to pull out a general to guard Hanzhong, he knew that Hanzhong is the barrier of Yizhou, and it is the base of the Central Plains in the future, and the status is very important, at that time, the first general Guan Yu has stayed in Jingzhou, "the public thought that it must be in Zhang Fei, and Fei also promised himself with his heart", but the discerning eye, "is to pull Wei Yan as the general of Hanzhong Zhenyuan, leading Hanzhong to guard, and the army is shocked." It seems that Liu Bei not only knows Wei Yan, but also trusts and boldly uses Wei Yan. Wei Yan also did not live up to Liu Bei's expectations, sat in Hanzhong, took charge alone, and even strengthened Wei, the enemy did not dare to commit it, and went to Liu Bei's worries in the north. However, Zhuge Liang is not only "biased", but also too meticulous and too deadly, "everything must be bowed to himself", and "the punishment of more than 20 people will be seen in person", which makes talents rare and is not conducive to the growth of talents. When commenting on Zhuge Liang, Wang Fuzhi said: "Everyone is in the way of following the rules", "Although there are talented people, they are so angry that they will be destroyed, and they will be able to be trusted!" In the later period of Western Shu, "there was no general in Shu, and Liao turned into a pioneer", which may have a lot to do with Zhuge Liang's defects in employing people. Moreover, Zhuge Liang did not understand the importance of cultivating local talents. Throughout the important ministers in the later period of Western Shu, there were not many locals, and the successors Jiang Wan, Fei and Jiang Wei did not do much, but were restrained by Huang Hao, Qian Zhou and others. It seems that the cultivation and use of local talents cannot but be another defect of Zhuge Liang.
Although Wei Yan had the shortcoming of "refusing to be subordinate", he still obeyed Zhuge Liang wholeheartedly. In the case of major strategic differences between him and Zhuge Liang's Northern Expedition, he was still able to take into account the overall situation and did not do anything to damage the Shu State, and even when Kong Ming died in the army and the situation was very urgent and complicated, there was no evidence to prove that Wei Yan rebelled against Shu and returned to Cao Wei. The feud between Yang Yi and Wei Yan was already very deep, and as soon as Zhuge Liang died, their conflict became more superficial. "Zhuge Liang's illness is said to be delayed: 'After my death, but be cautious and don't come back. 'Command to prolong your own business, and hold on to mourning. If you delay it, you will go to the mouth of praise, and it will be mourning. Liang Changshi Yang Yisu and Wei Yan were at odds, and when they saw that Yan was carrying out military affairs, he was afraid of being harmed, so Zhang Yanyan wanted to raise the people to the north, so he led his people to attack Yan. Yanben has no such intentions, and he will not go to the army. Chase and kill. Pei Songzhi believes: "This is a rumor that covers the enemy country, and it must not be contested with this biography", but even if it is a one-sided statement, we can see Yang Yi's bad behavior of spreading rumors and framing to eliminate his political enemies. Even according to the records of this biography, it cannot be explained that Wei Yan rebelled and surrendered to the north, but only when Yun Zhuge Liang was ill, "he secretly retired from the army after the death of Yang Yi, Sima Fei, and Jiang Wei, etc., who were killed, and after the order was delayed, Jiang Wei was second, and if the delay or disobedience to the order, the army would spontaneously", Kong Ming only estimated that Wei Yan might not obey Yang Yi's order and made a little arrangement to distrust Wei Yan, of course, it could also be Yang Yi's fake "Prime Minister's Order". Sure enough, Wei Yan was unwilling to be controlled by Yang Yi, but instead rushed to destroy the plank road before retreating to prevent Yang Yi from returning. The battle after the break was commanded by Jiang Wei, and it cannot be said that Wei Yan surrendered to the north and rebelled against Shu. It seems that Zhuge Liang is also very inconsiderate in dealing with the serious discord between Yang Yi and Wei Yan. Although he subjectively "can't bear to be biased", Wei Yan fought on the front line to meet the enemy, while Yang Yi has always been by Zhuge Liang's side, and his reliance and feelings for the two are really different. If Zhuge Liang summoned the two of them to the bed before his death, knowing the righteousness and entrusting him with the important responsibility, at least the contradiction between Wei and Yang could be temporarily alleviated, but he excluded Wei Yan and only left him a broken order, which was completely a distrustful act.
Judging from the key texts of many historical books, there is no mention of Wei Yan's rebellion and surrender to the enemy. The most evidenced thing is that he did not take the opportunity to go north, but he still returned to the south first, even after being defeated by He Ping (He Ping is Wang Ping) without intentionally killing his own people, he did not attach to the north, but instead made a few people mourn and return to Shu, and wanted to jointly announce the deployment of the Northern Expedition with Fei Liu, but unfortunately Fei was betrayed and died of defeat. Judging from many historical materials, Wei Yan's intention is very clear, Wei Yan believes that although the prime minister is dead, the great cause of the Northern Expedition cannot be interrupted, and it should be up to me Wei Yan to continue to "lead the army to fight the thieves, why should one person die and abolish the evil of the world?" If Wei Yan really wanted to rebel against Han and join Cao, he might have three choices: one was to lead the army to defect on the front line, which was as easy as a snap; the second was to stand still, wait for Yang Yi to lead the army to retreat, and then pull out the army to garrison Hanzhong, wait and see the situation, follow the example of Zhang Lu back then, and stand out by virtue of his prestige in guarding Hanzhong, which is not difficult to do; the third is to learn from Liu Bei's move to seize Liu Zhang's territory in those years, and return to Chengdu with lightning speed to seize the Shu Han regime, and then cut off Yang Yi's army, which is not an extremely difficult thing. However, Wei Yan did not choose any of them, on the contrary, he clearly stated that he would not "abolish the world with the death of one person", and should lead the army to inherit the will of the prime minister and continue the Northern Expedition, which is not related to betraying Shu and surrendering to Cao in any way.
Where there is a tragedy in history, there will be tragic characters. When Ma Dai carried Wei Yan's head to report his merits, the "narrow-minded" and ruthless Yang Yi actually "stepped on it and said, 'Yongnu! Can you do evil again?' Wei Yan sacrificed his life and forgot to die for the existence and development of Shu, and the iron horse Jinge did not die on the battlefield against the enemy, but died in the dark arrow of his own camp. In fact, Yang Yi, who spread rumors and framed Wei Yan, wanted to betray Shu and surrender to the north. Yang Yi is "narrow-minded" and capricious by nature, and is a profit-hungry traitor; he is narrow-minded and has always been at odds with civil ministers and military generals. But it was such a minister who was valued by Zhuge Liangsu and was given the military power of the governor when he was dying. After Yang Yi got rid of Wei Yan and returned to Chengdu with "victory," he boasted that he had made great achievements and could not be honored; after failing to obtain the high position of "Shangshu Ling," he was resentful and said to Fei Yi: "When the former prime minister died, if I raised an army to serve the Wei clan, I would rather be so evil! This confession was secretly reported to the imperial court for Fei Yi, so "abolishing Yi for the people and migrating to Hanjia County", but Yang Yi was vicious and difficult to change, and he was slandered by the court later, and the court later wanted to investigate him, so he committed suicide. Jiang Wan and Fei first connived at Yang Yi to get rid of Wei Yan, and then got rid of Yang Yi. Zhuge Liang's death, and Wei Yan's death, followed by Yang Yi's death. After this toss, the vitality of Shu Han was greatly damaged, causing a downward trend in Shu, and Zhuge Liang was also responsible for this.
Later generations have commented that the rights and wrongs of those involved more than 1,000 years ago should be clearly judged, and research and recollection can provide us with valuable references.
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