The normalization of relations between China and the United States is a key
This problem is solved
The rest of the problems are solved
On February 21, 1972, Mao Zedong met with U.S. President Richard Nixon in Zhongnanhai. Photo/Xinhua
The Great Change: China 1972
Reporter of China News Weekly/Kui Yanzhang
Published in the 905th issue of China News Weekly on July 1, 2019
In the east hall of the Great Hall of the People, the beautiful melody of "Beautiful America" wafts. In anticipation of Nixon's visit to China, the orchestra is rehearsing. In those years, foreign songs all but disappeared from the country. As the staff of the General Assembly Hall passed by, they could not help but stop and listen.
Zhou Enlai came to the rehearsal hall and greeted the orchestra, and the orchestra leader told him: "The chief (referring to Jiang Qing) has an opinion on playing this song, thinking that it is a hymn to US imperialism." ”
"I remember it was a song that celebrated the American landscape, not too left. Zhou En said.
This scene on February 20, 1972, is a microcosm of the changes in China in 1972.
"Why be so stiff?"
Zhang Baijia is 71 years old this year, and before his retirement, he was the former deputy director of the Party History Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. In the years when Sino-US relations were détente, he was in his early 20s and a soldier in the army's art troupe.
He first became aware of possible changes in Sino-US relations in early 1971. His unit sent out a transcript of the conversation between Mao Zedong and Snow, and before that, everyone was worried about the outbreak of a Sino-Soviet war. The signs of easing relations between China and the United States made him feel that the possibility of war was reduced, which was a good thing. A few months later, he read the news of Kissinger's visit to China from a newspaper distributed by the army.
Zhang Baijia's parents are both direct participants in breaking the ice between China and the United States. At the beginning of 1971, Kissinger decided to visit China secretly, and under the direct leadership of Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up a special preparatory group. Zhang Baijia's father, Zhang Wenjin, was the director of the North American and Oceanic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time, and was a key member of the preparatory group, and his mother Zhang Ying was also a member of this group. The group is absolutely confidential to the outside world, and neither husband nor wife can say anything about it, and of course Zhang Baijia has nothing to hear.
It wasn't until later that he heard his mother talk about a trivial matter. After the start of the "Cultural Revolution", the flowers and trees in the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse were eradicated as "bourgeois sentiment", and vegetables were planted in the flower beds. Before Kissinger's visit, Zhang Ying and others went to Beijing's major parks to look for potted flowers, and after several twists and turns, they found a master florist surnamed Zhao near the Temple of Heaven Park, and "borrowed" all the seven or eight potted flowers secretly planted at home to Diaoyutai.
Now, Zhang Baijia looks back at the process of the approach between China and the United States, and the overall feeling is that Zhou Enlai played an extremely key role. As the operator of Sino-US diplomacy, he carefully and cautiously finds a balance.
At noon on February 21, 1972, with a loud roar, President Nixon's "Spirit of '76" landed on the tarmac of Beijing Airport. On the huge airport, the flags of China and the United States fluttered in the cold wind.
More than two hours after Nixon stepped off the plane, he received a notice from Mao Zedong that he wanted to meet with him. Accompanied by Zhou Enlai, he came to Mao Zedong's study in Zhongnanhai. The 15-minute meeting was scheduled for 65 minutes.
Regarding the Taiwan issue and the situation in Asia and other parts of the world, Mao Zedong said: "I am not interested in these issues, and that is what he (referring to Zhou Enlai) talked to you about. The two were talking more about "philosophical issues".
Mao Zedong said: "We also have bureaucracy in doing things. If you want to engage in personnel exchanges and engage in some small business, we will not die. For more than ten years, it is said that it is not to solve big problems, and small problems are not done, including me. Later, I found out that you were right, so I played table tennis. Finally, Mao Zedong told Nixon: "I told the journalist Snow, who died a few days earlier, that we can talk about it if we can do it, or if we can't talk about it, why should we be so stiff?"
A communiqué that breaks with international conventions
On the fourth day of Nixon's visit, the two sides remained deadlocked on one issue: the wording of the Sino-US "Joint Communique" on the Taiwan issue.
An important task of Kissinger's second visit to China in October 1971 was to reach a "joint communique" that was mutually recognized. Traditionally, the joint communiqué was to express the success of the visit and the agreement reached by the two sides, but the situation in the U.S.-China relationship was special: Nixon came before the two countries did not have diplomatic relations, and after more than 20 years of hostility between the two sides. Therefore, China had no intention of issuing such a communiqué.
Zhou Enlai immediately expressed his dissatisfaction with the US draft. Referring to the method used by the KMT and the CPC in the past to clearly state their differences in the "Double Tenth Agreement," he proposed a way of writing that breaks with international conventions: It not only clearly states the differences between the two sides, but also absorbs certain desirable points in the US draft to reflect the common points between the two sides.
In accordance with Zhou Enlai's instructions, Zhang Wenjin and several members of the "political group" (a group retained by Kissinger after his secret visit to China) started a new work overnight and came up with the Chinese draft.
However, Mao Zedong was not satisfied with the plan, he felt that he did not have much right to speak, and he did not have any "spirit" at all, and even said that there was no need to make any more communiqués.
As a result, Zhou Enlai added a large number of Mao Zedong's views on the international situation to the draft, opening with a clear statement: "The Chinese side declares: Where there is oppression, there is resistance. The country's desire for independence, the nation's desire for liberation, and the people's desire for revolution have become an irresistible historical trend. Mao Zedong expressed satisfaction after reading it and said, "I am a little angry."
Zhang Ying recalled that Kissinger was shocked when he first saw the draft proposed by the Chinese side. This presented him with a difficult question: could he accept a communiqué that began with a revolutionary discourse? Zhou Enlai patiently and meticulously explained and analyzed this to him.
Tang Wensheng, the interpreter at the scene, recalled that the talks were suspended for a time, and Kissinger and his aides walked for a while in the garden of the Diaoyutai Hotel and came back to express their agreement with the plan.
Fan Chao, associate professor of the Department of Diplomacy at the China Foreign Affairs University, believes that Kissinger's acceptance of the communiqué has something to do with his diplomatic style.
"Kissinger's diplomatic style is not a hard-line American style, but a European court-style diplomatic style that is good at compromise. Fan Chao told China News Weekly. He had read the records of the talks between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai, and when Zhou Enlai spoke revolutionary words, Kissinger would not refute them, but took a listening attitude.
However, the most important issue of Taiwan has not been resolved by the two sides after many talks.
During Nixon's visit to China, the two sides continued to negotiate the details of the communiqué, with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua negotiating directly with Kissinger. Qiao Guanhua's statement is: "The United States hopes to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully, and will gradually reduce and eventually withdraw all US armed forces and military facilities from Taiwan." Kissinger felt that the language was too strong and wanted to frame the withdrawal of American troops as a goal.
During this period, Nixon told Zhou En: "If the communiqué is too tough on the Taiwan issue, it will inevitably cause difficulties in the United States." Zhou Enlai said that the revised arguments of the US side could be considered.
During the talks, Zhou Enlai had to go to Mao Zedong late every night to report. Mao Zedong's soil protector Wu Xujun said: I often see the prime minister striding in front of him, Wang (Hairong) and Tang (Wensheng) trotting all the way behind him.
With Mao Zedong's consent, the final wording read: "It (the United States) reiterates its interest in the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese themselves." With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate goal of withdrawing all U.S. armed forces and military installations from Taiwan. During this period, it will gradually reduce its armed forces or military installations in Taiwan as tensions in the region ease. ”
On February 21, 1972, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Zhou Enlai clinked glasses with US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger at a banquet. Photo/Ic
A great year for diplomacy
As Mao Zedong said, "The normalization of Sino-US relations is a key." This problem is solved, and the other problems are solved. ”
Two weeks after the U.S.-China joint communiqué was issued, China and the UK signed a joint communiqué on the exchange of ambassadors, elevating the diplomatic relations between the two countries, which had been established since 1954, to the level of ambassadors.
Sino-Japanese relations also ushered in a turning point this year.
In July of that year, Kakuei Tanaka, who was friendly to China, became Japan's new prime minister. Mao Zedong proposed that a positive attitude should be adopted toward the issue of resuming diplomatic relations between China and Japan. Whether the negotiation can be successful or not, in short, now that the time comes, we must step up. Zhou Enlai personally deployed and directly commanded this major diplomatic operation.
On September 25, Kakuei Tanaka was invited to visit China. The focus of the dispute between the two sides is how the history of Japan's aggression against China is expressed in the preamble to the Joint Statement.
At 10 p.m. on September 28, Chinese Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei and Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira held their last meeting before the signing of the Joint Statement in the conference room on the ground floor of Building 18 of the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse. Zhou Bin, who served as an interpreter for the talks, recalled to China News Weekly that as time passed, the two foreign ministers still looked at me and I looked at you, waiting for the other side to express their position first, and the time was already past 1 o'clock in the morning.
Finally, Foreign Minister Daping took out a note from his jacket pocket and said, "Minister Ji, this is the maximum concession my side can make. He read: "The Japanese side feels deeply remorse for the responsibility of Japan for the great damage caused to the Chinese people by the war in the past. ”
After thinking about it, Ji Pengfei suggested that both parties rest for 10 minutes. Later, Zhou Bin learned that he had asked Zhou Enlai for instructions. That night, Zhou Enlai sat in Diaoyutai.
After the resumption of the meeting, Ji Pengfei said that he would accept the Japanese side's proposal. The problem is finally solved.
According to Zhou Bin, some people in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are not quite satisfied with this, and believe that the word "aggression" should be added before "war." After learning about it, Zhou Enlai said that as far as the idea of written expression is concerned, anyone can think that the "war" in the "Joint Declaration" is a "war of aggression." This is because, if it were not a war of aggression, how could it have caused great damage to the Chinese people; if it were not a war of aggression, how could the Japanese Government today feel its responsibility and deeply reflect on it?
In the same year, China also formally established diplomatic relations with the Netherlands, Greece, the Federal Republic of Germany, and other countries, and established diplomatic relations with a total of 18 countries or upgraded their diplomatic institutions.
"Four-three" plan
The key to Sino-US relations has also opened the door to economic and trade relations between China and the West.
Around the time of Nixon's visit to China, two Chinese expedition groups set off one after another, one to Western Europe and the other to Japan. Their trip is to introduce Western chemical fiber equipment.
At that time, domestic cotton production was in short supply and oil production was excessive. Qian Zhiguang, the new minister of light industry, proposed that China's own oil and gas resources should be used to build several chemical fiber bases, and the technical equipment needed could be imported from abroad. The State Development Planning Commission supported this plan and drafted a "Report on the Import of Complete Sets of Chemical Fiber and Chemical Fertilizer Technology and Equipment" and submitted it to the State Council. At the beginning of February 1972, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong successively gave instructions.
Among them, in terms of chemical fiber, four major chemical fiber projects have been preliminarily determined, which are located in Shanghai, Liaoning, Sichuan and Tianjin. It is planned to import four sets of equipment from France and Japan, which will cost about 270 million US dollars.
Gu Xiulian, who was a member of the leading body of the State Development Planning Commission at the time, took part in the inspection group to Western Europe as a special adviser, which lasted more than a month and inspected Britain, France, Germany, and many other Western European countries. She once said in an interview with China News Weekly that the inspection opened her eyes and touched her a lot. "After reading it, I feel that the foreign economy is so developed and so advanced, and we must catch up in a hurry. ”
In May, the inspection team returned to China one after another. The four major chemical fiber projects have entered the negotiation stage. Negotiations began first on the Shanghai project, followed by the Sichuan, Liaoning and Tianjin projects, which began in June and ended in September of the following year, lasting more than a year.
After the news of the introduction of chemical fiber and chemical fertilizer projects spread, various ministries and commissions came to the Planning Commission and proposed one after another to send delegations abroad to inspect and carry out the introduction work. Gu Xiulian recalled that in 1972, the State Planning Commission building at No. 38 Yuetan South Street in Beijing was bustling with people. Especially on the second floor of the director's office, all the ministers were wandering around, each holding a black leather bag in his hand.
Li Xiannian, vice premier in charge, actively supported and approved dozens of delegations to go abroad. After the delegations returned, they successively proposed a number of technical equipment introduction projects. Zhou Enlai felt very fragmented, and at the same time thought that since there was such a good opportunity, things should be bigger. He instructed the State Council's business group and the State Development Planning Commission to merge these projects and adopt a larger-scale introduction plan.
The overall plan put forward by the Planning Commission in early 1973 planned to introduce 26 technology projects with a total capital of $4.3 billion, which was called the "43 Plan" (this plan was later added with a total investment of $5.18 billion).
Chen Donglin, a member of the academic committee of the Institute of Contemporary China Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said in an article that the "43 Plan" introduced a large scale and a high level of equipment and technology, which gave birth to the second upsurge of the introduction of technology and equipment and economic exchanges since the founding of New China (the first upsurge was the 156 projects built with the aid of the Soviet Union in the 50s), and also provided the material basis for the subsequent reform and opening up to the outside world to introduce experience and improve the people's livelihood, which can be called the prelude to opening up to the outside world.
On September 27, 1972, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai met with Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and his entourage in Zhongnanhai, Beijing, opening a new page in the history of Sino-Japanese relations. Photo/Xinhua
"Liberate" old cadres
After the "913 Incident" in 1971, with the support of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai seized the opportunity and made careful arrangements to speed up the process of implementing the cadre policy.
On January 10, 1972, Mao Zedong suddenly decided to attend Chen Yi's memorial service. He said to Chen Yi's relatives: "Comrade Chen Yi is a good person and a good comrade. He pointed to Zhou Enlai, Ye Jianying and others and said: "If Lin Biao's conspiracy is completed, we old people will be killed." He also referred to Deng Xiaoping, saying that Deng was a "contradiction among the people." Zhou Enlai immediately instructed Chen Yi's family to spread these words.
Encouraged veteran cadres wrote letters to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, asking to come out to work, or to end the censorship and reunite with their families. Mao Zedong replied to some of the letters and gave them support.
On April 24, the People's Daily published an editorial revised by Zhou Enlai himself, "Punish the former and the latter, cure the sick and save the people". The editorial pointed out that "veteran cadres who have gone through a long period of revolutionary struggle are the precious wealth of the party" and demanded that interference be eliminated and the instructions of the Central Committee on cadre work should be actively implemented.
The central authorities have clearly defined the four principles for the liberation of veteran cadres: the end of examination, the resumption of organizational life, the payment of original salaries, and the distribution of work. Among them, the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee is responsible for cadres under the CPC Central Committee and local governments, the State Council Business Group is responsible for cadres of state organs, and the General Political Department is responsible for military cadres.
Accordingly, the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee has set up a "Group for Implementing the Cadre Policy." Gao Qi, the leader of this group, recalled that because of the heavy task of liberating the veteran cadres, the heavy workload, and the tight time requirements (before the 10th Party Congress), the group members often worked late into the night or even all night.
In the process of handling, Zhou Enlai instructed: from top to bottom, first easy and then difficult. He also said: "Some people don't stop because I approved it, it depends on what the situation is." ”
At the beginning of l973, Zhou Enlai presided over three consecutive meetings of the Politburo, listened to the reports of the three systems including the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, and discussed them one by one.
Tian Weixin, then deputy director of the General Political Department, was responsible for leading the implementation of policies for military cadres. In his memory, Zhou Enlai presided over such a Politburo meeting, and he didn't talk much, only one or two sentences at the key points. He knows everyone's attitude inside out. When he felt that he needed someone to support him, he would point out in time: "Jianying, what do you say?" He never argued openly with Jiang Qing at the meeting, but often used concise language to explain the ins and outs of the matter, and then asked a rhetorical question, Jiang Qing was often speechless.
With the advancement of the implementation of the cadre policy, a large number of overthrown party, government, and military leading cadres have returned to important leadership posts, strengthened the party's strength to resist and correct the mistakes of the "Cultural Revolution," and prepared the conditions for the eventual end of the "Cultural Revolution" in an important aspect.
The struggle against the extreme "left".
While stepping up efforts to liberate the old cadres, Zhou Enlai was also making efforts to rectify the "left."
On August 1 and 2, 1972, Zhou Enlai delivered a long speech at the Great Hall of the People for two consecutive days to the ambassadors who returned to China to report on their work and the heads of foreign affairs units. He said: "The ultra-left trend of thought has a worldwide character. There are also ultra-leftist ideologies in China, under our noses, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in embassies and consulates abroad. He said that this trend of thought is empty, extreme, formalistic, and abstract in calling the proletarian politics in command, which is contrary to Mao Zedong Thought.
In October, in accordance with the spirit of Zhou Enlai's speech on the need to thoroughly criticize ultra-leftist ideology, the People's Daily organized a page criticizing anarchism. For example, the article signed "Long Yan" criticized the views of "bringing down everything", "smashing everything", and "the mass movement is natural and reasonable" in sharp language, which can be said to be a disguised negation of the theory and practice of the "Cultural Revolution".
In November, Wen Wei Po's internal publication, Wen Hui Situation, published two consecutive issues refuting articles refuting Long Yan and others, vigorously engaging in an "anti-rightist resurgence."
An Jianjian, a former researcher at the Central Literature Research Office, told China News Weekly that the opposition between the two forces has become clear and open.
On December 5, a person in charge of the People's Daily wrote to Mao Zedong: "Now the newspaper propaganda is facing a perplexing question, that is, whether it is anti-'left' or anti-right, and I would like to report to you and ask for instructions. He said that he did not believe that the formulation of Wen Wei Po was the spirit of the central government, because the central document had just said that in the process of criticizing the rectification of forests, we should pay attention to opposing anarchism, which is extremely "leftist" and that "the spirit of the central government cannot change so quickly."
On December 17, Mao Zedong said to Zhou Enlai and others: I can't read that letter correctly, let's criticize the ultra-left ideology a little.
Since then, the term of criticism of ultra-left ideology has disappeared from all kinds of propaganda.
In the early morning of January 13, 1973, after reviewing documents all night, Zhou Enlai had blood in the urine.
In May 1972, Zhou Enlai detected 4 red blood cells for the first time in the urine routine, and after expert consultation, he was diagnosed with "transitional epithelial cell carcinoma of the bladder". Following the instructions, the medical team did not inform Zhou Enlai of the confirmed results.
"The Prime Minister knows his illness well, and so do we. The Prime Minister knows that we are well aware, and we know that the Prime Minister is well aware. But no one pierced. Zhou Enlai's guard Gao Zhenpu once said in an interview with China News Weekly.
On March 10, 1973, with the approval of the central government, Zhou Enlai finally underwent the first cystoscopy and electrocautery treatment after being diagnosed. The treatment effect is not satisfactory, and the follow-up treatment is intermittent due to the heavy workload. Zhou Enlai's health continued to deteriorate.
What is gratifying is that on 10 March, the CPC Central Committee issued the "Decision on Restoring Comrade Deng Xiaoping's Party Organization Life and the Posts of Vice Premier of the State Council," and the overall situation of Deng Xiaoping's comeback was decided.
"If the comprehensive rectification of 1975 led by Deng Xiaoping and others was an upsurge of the struggle between the party and the people during the 10-year 'Cultural Revolution', then the struggle to criticize ultra-leftist ideologies around 1972 led by Zhou Enlai and others was the precursor of this upsurge. An Jianshe told China News Weekly.
And the impact of this wave after wave of tide will eventually lead to the end of the "Cultural Revolution" and the arrival of reform and opening up.